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THE POLICYAND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING
INTRODUCTION

On November 7, 1989, the voters of the City of New York approved,
by a vote of fifty-five percent to forty-five percent, the broadest and most
radical changes to their Charter since 1901.' These changes abolished the
City's historic Board of Estimate, while preserving a borough voice in
government, expanding and increasing the powers of the City Council,
retooling almost all of the City's significant decision-making processes, and
adding a myriad of other changes. 2 These changes were the product of a
revision process that started in mid-1987 with the first hearings of an initial
Charter revision commission,3 and moved to an intense and dramatic pace
after March 23, 1989, when the Supreme Court declared the voting system
of the Board of Estimate unconstitutional in Board of Estimate v. Morris.4
We were fortunate enough to play central roles in that process of
change. Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., was chairman of the Schwarz
Charter Revision Commission (the "Commission"), which was established
in January 1989, and succeeded an earlier commission that expired in
1. The first Charter for the greater City of New York was adopted by the state
legislature in May 1897 and went into effect in January 1898. This Charter was the first
to govern the consolidated greater City of New York, which included New York City (the
area now known as the Borough of the Bronx was part of New York City), the City of
Brooklyn, and areas that are now known as the Boroughs of Staten Island and Queens. This
original Charter was short lived. In 1901, the state legislature enacted a second Charter
which reduced the mayor's power and increased the power of the borough presidents by,
among other things, placing them on a redesigned Board of Estimate. Thereafter, changes
were less frequent and less significant. The major changes were: 1937, the power of the
mayor was increased, the Department of City Planning was modernized, the City Planning
Commission was created, and proportional representation for the City Council was
established (and lasted until 1947); 1961, the power of the borough presidents was reduced
and that of the mayor and City Council increased; 1975, a system of community governance
was adopted. For a detailed description of the city's governance history, see WALLACE S.
SAYRE &HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS INTHE METROPOLIS
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1960) and Joseph P. Viteritti, The Tradition of Municipal
Reform: Charter Revision in HistoricalContext, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY
GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 16-29 (Frank J. Mauro &
Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989).
2. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER (1989).
3. This first Commission was named the Ravitch Commission and is described infra
notes 35-39 and accompanying text. Between April 22 and May 7, 1987, the Ravitch
Commission held one citywide public hearing, as well as one public hearing in each
borough. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY
CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION 17 (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter JANUARY 1989 COMMISSION
REPORT].
4. 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989).
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November 1988.' Eric Lane served as executive director and counsel to
both commissions. For both of us, the Charter experience was among the
most challenging of our careers.
We both had had substantial
governmental experience-Schwarz as chief counsel to the Church
Committee in the mid-1970s, 6 and as corporation counsel to the City of
New York from 1982 through 1986, and Lane as counsel to the State
Senate Democratic minority from 1981 to 1986. However, none of our
experiences rivaled Charter revision for the combined breadth of our
decision-making responsibilities, the sustained political pressure, and the
opportunity to affect the lives of the people of a city we both were born in
and loved.
Morris was the genesis of the Commission's effort, but the adopted
revisions went far beyond simply curing the Board's legal problem. In our
view, as well as in the views of other Commission members and large
numbers of people with whom we communicated, the then-existing Charter
neither satisfied the aspirations of the City's vastly pluralistic population
nor met the City's governance needs in 1989.
This article is our exposition on how we arrived at these conclusions
and how we tried to shape the Charter to respond to them. It is our story.
While it quotes and describes positions taken in 1989 by other Commission
members, it does not try to depict the unexpressed reasoning of other
participants whose stories, without a doubt, would be different. Nor is our
goal to detail or even explore each of the multitude of decisions that
represent the Commission's work. Our focus is on the most significant and
most controversial issues that confronted the Commission and how they
were resolved through the weighing of legal, policy, and political
considerations. Through this exploration, we hope to provide the
background for what we did and why we did it.
While most significant changes, at least those dealing with the power
of elected officials, were controversial, not every controversial decision
was significant. For example, the maintenance of the city council president
(now public advocate) was extremely controversial, but it was not as
significant in the context of other changes. Similarly, changes to the City's
landmark laws were of little consequence in the context of our overall
mission. However, landmark issues spurred such controversy that we
provided a second ballot question for their public consideration, lest the
intensity of that debate spill over into the central questions of governance.
5.

See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEw

YORK

CITY CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION, JAN. 1989-Nov. 1989, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT].

6. The Church Committee (named for its chairman, Senator Frank Church of Idaho)
was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that investigated and exposed wrongdoing
by the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence agencies.
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Two final introductory notes are in order. First, writing ten years after
the events in which we were such central participants, we may be tempted
to speculate on what might have been the outcome of the process had we
been able to predict the occurrence of certain events. For example, in the
fall of 1989, David Dinkins was elected mayor, the first minority to hold
a citywide elected office. We saw the dearth of elected minority officials
and the sense by minorities of exclusion from the City's political processes
as a problem with the City government structure. This supported several
Commission changes. What would we, or the Commission, have done had
we known that, within several short months, a minority would be elected
mayor? We will not attempt to answer this or any similar speculative
"what if"
questions for two reasons. First, our focus is on what was done
and why. Second, the Charter revision process was too complex and
interrelated to speculate on how a particular change in facts might have
affected its outcome.
Additionally, since the adoption of the 1989 Charter, disputes have
arisen over the meaning of particular Charter provisions in the context of
particular fact patterns. Many of these disputes ended in the courts.
Examples are disputes between the mayor and Council over the process to
modify the budget, 7 over the power to close a public hospital,8 and over the
power to appoint members of a civilian police review commission. 9 Such
disputes are ongoing, the result of competing interpretations of the meaning
of particular provisions or dissatisfaction with some clear lines imposed by
the Charter. In some cases, these conflicts resulted in a call for further
Charter change to enact one view or the other into law. One extreme
example was the proposed creation in early 1998, by the City Council, of
a commission to weaken mayoral powers, including those over the budget,
and a responding proposal by the mayor to create his own Charter revision
commission to ensure that such weakening did not occur and to push in the
opposite direction.'0
7. See Council of New York v. Giuliani, 621 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1994) (allowing the mayor to withdraw a budget modification proposal and thus, in
effect, prohibiting the City Council from initiating budget modifications).
8. See Council of New York v. Giuliani, 664 N.Y.S.2d 197, 203-04 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1997) (holding that the Charter's "savings provision," section 1152(e), requires a
sublease by the Health and Hospital Corporation of Coney Island Hospital to be subject to
the City's Uniform Land Use Review Procedures and to the City Council's review).
9. See Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 651 N.Y.S.2d 531, 531-32
(App. Div. 1997) (holding that the City Council does not have the power to create the
Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board).
10. See Alan Finder, Give City Council IncreasedPower, New York Is Urged, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1989, atBi; Richard Levine, Koch Voices Some Doubts on Charter,N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1989, at BI.
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We will discuss many of the issues raised by these disputes. Our goal
is not to take sides but to describe the reasons for decisions made with
respect to these topics. Hopefully, such reasons will be informative in
these ongoing Charter debates."
Finally, while this tale is ours, the Charter revision effort was,
obviously, not ours alone. There would have been no story without the
extraordinary efforts of the members of the Schwarz and Ravitch
Commissions, who gave of their time and wisdom unstintingly.1 2 Nothing
close to what we did could have been done without the endless, dedicated,
and intelligent efforts of the staff assembled by its leaders Frank Mauro,
director of research, and Gretchen Dykstra, director of communications.
Also, the many advocates who continually commented on our efforts,
offered alternative suggestions, and spent almost as much time as we did
pursuing their goals regardless of whether they were adopted, made the
product better than the Commission could have produced without them.
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

November 1986

U.S. district court declares that the Board of
Estimate violates the "one person-one vote"
principle. '3

December 16, 1986

Mayor Koch establishes the Ravitch
Commission."'

11. While these "dueling Commissions" were mutually withdrawn, in the summer of
1998, Mayor Giuliani formed another Charter Commission for the express purpose of
attempting to preclude a City Council-sponsored referendum seeking the public's view on
whether to move Yankee Stadium to the west side of Manhattan. (Earlier in 1998, Mayor
Giuliani had originally announced that there was no need for any Charter revision, claiming
it was "unnecessary and premature.") See Elizabeth Kolbert, Metro Matters: Charter Battle
Is a Seriously Comic Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998, at BI.
12. The Schwarz commissioners were as follows: Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.,
chairman; Harriet Michel, vice chair; Nathan Leventhal, secretary; Aida Alvarez; Amalia
V. Betanzos; Fred W. Friendly; Simon P. Gourdine; Judah Gribetz; Therese M. Molloy;
Patrick J. Murphy; Archibald R. Murray; Mario J. Parades; W. Bernard Richland; Most
Rev. Joseph M. Sullivan; and David G. Trager. All served on the Ravitch Commission,
except for Schwarz, Gourdine, Parades, and Sullivan. These four replaced Ravitch, Father
Joseph O'Hare, Frank Macchiarola, and former Mayor Robert F. Wagner.
13. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1478-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
14. See OFFICEOFTHEMAYOR, CERTIFICATEOFAPPOINTMENTTOCHARTERREVISION
COMMISSION (Dec. 16, 1986).

1998]

THE POLICYAND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING

May 7, 1987

Ravitch Commission holds six fact-finding
solicit public views on Charter
hearings to
5
revision. 1

October 8, 1987

Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirms
Morris v. Board of Estimate.16

April 4, 1988

Supreme Court notes probable17 jurisdiction in
Board of Estimate v. Morris.

April 14, 1988

Ravitch Commission postpones consideration
of governance issues in response to the
Supreme Court's decision to hear Morris.

November 8, 1988

Public adopts Ravitch Commission revisions
through referendum.' 8

January 19, 1989

Mayor Koch establishes the Schwarz
Commission.' 9

February 28 -

Schwarz Commission holds six legislative
hearings.20

April 22 -

March 15, 1989
March 22, 1989

Supreme2 1Court affirms Board of Estimate v.
Morris.

March 31, 1989

Commission votes to strive to finish its work
in time to submit to the voters at the
November 1989 general election."

April 4 and 16, 1989

Commission holds two public hearings to
elicit views of elected officials.

15. The meetings were held on April 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, and May 7, 1987.
16. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 831 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 485
U.S. 986 (1988).
17. 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
18. See Clara Hemphill, Election '88 Voters Approve Ethics Reform Proposals,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 9, 1988, at 38; see also JANUARY 1989 COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 11.
19. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
20. These hearings were held on February 28, March 1, 2, 9, 14, and 15, 1989.
21. See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 703 (1989).
22. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, RECORD OF MOTIONS, VOTES AND
CONSENSUS 1 (Mar. 31, 1989).
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April 24, 1989

Chairman issues initial ideas for Charter
changes.2'

April 24 May 15, 1989

At seven public meetings, Commission
discusses Chairman's initial ideas and votes
on its preliminary proposals.24

May 1989

Schwarz Commission issues its preliminary
proposals.

May 31 June 13, 1989

Commission holds seven public hearings on
its preliminary proposals.'-

June 15, 1989

Chairman releases and discusses revised
proposals reflecting many ideas and reactions
received from the public, as well as thoughts
that came from individual discussions we had
with Commission members.2 6

June 15 June 27, 1989

Commission discusses and votes on revisions
at six public meetings.27

Late June 1989

Commission releases Summary of Revised
Proposals.28

July 13, 1989

Commission holds meeting on various open
issues.

July 17 July 21, 1989

Commission holds five public hearings, one
in each borough, to get the public's reaction
to the Summary of Revised Proposals.2 9

23.

See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, THE CHAIR'S RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR CHARTER REVISION 1-48 (Apr. 24, 1989).

24. The meetings were held on April 24, 25, and May 2, 6, 10, 13, 15, 1989.
25. These hearings were held on May 31, and June 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, and 13, 1989.
26.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, SUMMARY OF REVISED PROPOSALS

3 (June 1989) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF REVISED PROPOSALS].
27. The meetings were held on June 15, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, and July 13, 1989.
28.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, SUMMARY OF REVISED PROPOSALS,

supra note 26, at 1.
29. The hearings were held on July 17, 18, 19, 21, 1989.
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July 31 August 2, 1989

Commission holds three final meetings and
makes final changes. On August 2, 1989,
Commission approves final proposals by a
vote of 11-4. The Commission also resolves,
without dissent, to present the new Charter to
the voters in November 1989.30

August 11, 1989

Commission submits revised Charter to the
U.S. Justice Department for review under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
as amended. 3 '

November 7, 1989

Public approves revised Charter at
referendum.32

December 13, 1989

The Justice Department approves revised
Charter.33

This was an incredibly compressed schedule. As one indication of the
work done by the Schwarz Commission as a whole, the transcripts of the
Commission's public meetings, legislative hearings, and public hearings,
comprise 13,060 pages. We also had scores of meetings with advocates,
experts, opponents, and supporters. We felt that all this work, in this
compressed period of time, was necessary and appropriate because,
substantively, the City had an unconstitutional government that had to be
promptly fixed. Politically, a referendum at the regular City election to be
held in November would mean that special interests would have less
influence and would give us a better chance to win approval than in a later
referendum.

30. The meetings were held on July 31, and August 1 and 2, 1989. See N.Y. CITY
CHARTERREVISION COMM'N, RECORD OFMOTIONS, VOTES AND CONSENSUS 4,7 (Mar. 31,
1989).
31. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, SUBMISSION UNDER SECTION 5 OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT FOR PRECLEARANCE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To THE NEW
YORK CITY CHARTER 1 (Aug. 11, 1989); see alsoTodd S. Purdum, CharterPaperson the
Way to Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1989, at B1.
32. See Alan Finder, Overhaul of New York City CharterIs Approved, Polls Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1989, at B1.
33. See Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department Of Justice, Civil Rights Division, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman,
1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (Dec. 13, 1989) (on file with the New
York Law School Law Review); Alan Finder, New York City CharterRevision Approved by
Justice Department,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1989, at Al.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
PART

[Vol. 42

I. THE ORGANIZATION, PROCESSES, AND THRESHOLD QUESTIONS
OF THE SCHWARZ COMMISSION
CHAPTER I. THE SCHWARZ COMMISSION

On January 18, 1989, Mayor Edward Koch, pursuant to his powers
under section 36 of the Municipal Home Rule Law, appointed Schwarz and
34
fourteen other New Yorkers to serve on a charter revision commission.
The Schwarz Commission was the second of two appointed by Mayor Koch
to respond to Morris.
The first commission, chaired by Richard Ravitch, was appointed in
December 1986, in response to the district court decision holding the Board
of Estimate's voting scheme unconstitutional.3 5 The creation of the Ravitch
Commission had been recommended to the mayor by Schwarz, then
serving as corporation counsel. While the Board of Estimate was entitled
to appeal the Morris decision and to obtain a vigorous constitutional
defense, there was a substantial chance the defense would fail. If it failed,
the City would have had to started thinking about appropriate changes. The
substantial work done by the Ravitch Commission and staff was one factor
enabling us to responsibly present recommended Charter changes as early
as November 1989.
Some Board of Estimate members (anxious that nothing be done to
weaken the Board's appeal) resented, or worried about, the creation of the
Ravitch Commission. Partly in response to this concern, and partly to
ensure that the Commission's proposals would be regarded as the product
of an informed debate, the mayor nominated a majority of the Commission
members from lists of names given to him by each of the other Board
members and by the City Council. Nearly all of these choices, however,
were people the mayor knew-and would, on his own, have found
satisfactory.
The Ravitch Commission's efforts to grapple with the question of
reconstituting or replacing the Board of Estimate were interrupted in April
1988 by the unexpected decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to review the
Second Circuit's affirmance of Morris.36 As a result, the Ravitch
Commission voted "to postpone any further consideration of. . . [any]
34. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36(4) (McKinney 1994); Richard Levine,
Koch Picks Schwarz to Head CharterCommission, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1988, at B3.
35. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1478 (E.D.N.Y. 1986);
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CERTIFICATE OF APPOINTMENT TO CHARTER REVISION
COMMISSION, supra note 14.

36. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 831 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'd, 485
U.S. 986 (1988).
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proposals concerning the structure and functions of the city's elective
37
institutions pending the Supreme Court's decision in the Morris case."
Pursuant to state law, the Ravitch Commission had to complete its
work by the second general election after its formation (by November 8,
1988).38 Although the mayor offered to reappoint the entire Commission
for a second two-year term, Ravitch resigned to run for mayor, and three
other members of the Commission decided not to continue.3 9
The Schwarz Commission therefore consisted of the eleven members
of the Ravitch Commission who continued and four new members,
including Schwarz. 40 Lane had been serving as executive director and
counsel. Schwarz-in an easy but very important decision-kept Lane and
the rest of the staff in place with only a few changes that Lane
recommended. The combination of holdover commissioners and holdover
staff allowed the new Commission to take advantage of staff work on a
number of issues that the prior Commission never reached because the
Supreme Court had decided to review Morris.4
37. JANUARY 1989 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. This decision did not
end the Ravitch Commission's work. Aside from a body of material and analysis prepared
on questions concerning the legality of the Board of Estimate and the commencement of
deliberations on its functions, the Ravitch Commission successfully proposed a series of
non-Board-of-Estimate-related provisions for the Charter. These Charter revisions all
passed in the 1988 referendum. A description of the work of the Ravitch Commission is
contained in its final report, N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION, DEC. 1986-Nov. 1988 (Jan. 1989).
38. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36(5)(b) (McKinney 1994).
39. In addition to Ravitch, former Mayor Robert Wagner, Fordham President Father
Joseph O'Hare, and former Schools Chancellor Frank Macchiarola resigned. Mayor
Wagner resigned because he felt his health would not allow him to do the work; Father
O'Hare resigned because he was also working extensively for the city on the new Campaign
Finance Board, which he chaired; and Macchiarola resigned to run for city comptroller.
40. Biographical information about the 15 commissioners is set forth in the Appendix.
Of the 15 commissioners, as noted in the text, six were minority (three African-American
and three Hispanic). Four were women. Geographically, four came from Brooklyn, two
from the Bronx, five from Manhattan (four below 96th Street), two from Queens, and two
from Staten Island. Although during the Commission's work, all members had significant
private sector jobs (five in the not-for-profit area), nine had previously worked in city
government (Schwarz, Vice Chair Harriet Michel, Secretary Nathan Leventhal, Aida
Alvarez, Amalia V. Betanzos, Simon P. Gourdine, Patrick J. Murphy, Bernard Richland
and David G. Trager). Five of these, plus Archibald Murray, had also worked in federal
or state government. Fred Friendly's public affairs career had included in-depth analyses
of constitutional issues. Bishop Joseph Sullivan and Mario Paredes were deeply involved
in the concerns of the City through their work on church issues. Therese Molloy was going
to law school after having been a bank vice president and chair of a local economic
development corporation.
41. See Morris, 831 F.2d at 384.
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The mayor had approached Schwarz in the fall of 1988 about his
willingness to serve as chairman. Schwarz had greatly enjoyed service as
Mayor Koch's second corporation counsel from 1982 through 1986. Koch
was-to the surprise of many-a very good client. The private person,
dealing with governmental business, was different from the public man.
He listened well-even to junior staff people whom Schwarz brought to
meetings. Koch would change his mind based on legal as well as non-legal
advice. Surprisingly to those who knew only the public man, he accepted
criticism, sometimes sharp criticism. For example, the last substantive
communication between the mayor and Schwarz before the mayor's offer
was a letter from Schwarz criticizing the mayor for his comments about
Jesse Jackson in the 1988 presidential primary.42
Schwarz's knowledge of the mayor's willingness to accept criticism
helped Schwarz realize that the mayor would not prevent him from acting
independently as chairman. While the mayor and Schwarz never explicitly
discussed this, they both implicitly understood it. The mayor also did not
attempt to control matters with the Ravitch Commission.
Schwarz agreed to serve as chairman, but first discussed with the
mayor the other vacancies on the Commission. While all of the holdover
members of the Commission were experienced in and knowledgeable about
City government, in Schwarz's view, a fifteen-member Commission with
only four minority members could not function effectively, or appropriately
explore City governance problems, or give sufficient legitimacy to the
Commission's work. This reasoning (which Lane shared) was based on the
City's pluralistic population, the different life experiences reflected in the
pluralism, the City's historical discrimination in voting matters, 43 the
imperatives of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 44 the fundamental nature of
the questions of allocation of government power likely to arise, and the
need to foster trust and acceptance among all groups in the City for moral,
policy, and political reasons.
The mayor (who might have already been thinking in the same
direction) agreed to name two additional minority members: Simon
Gourdine and Mario Paredes. The addition of Gourdine and Parades
increased the Commission's minority membership from four (Vice Chair
Michel, Alvarez, Betanzos, and Murray) to six, or forty percent.
Subsequent events made it clear that the additional diversity on the
Commission helped in many ways.
42. Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, to Edward Koch, Mayor, City of New York (Apr. 25, 1988)
(on file with Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., and with the Schwarz Records on file with the
Columbia Oral History Project on the Koch Administration).
43. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).
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By January 1989, we had a new Commission, we had a staff, and we
understood the breadth of our legal mandate.45 However, the Supreme
Court had not yet decided Board of Estimate v. Morris, which had been
argued on December 7, 1988. While the Justices, in their questions and
comments, seemed skeptical of the City's arguments,46 and while we were
unhesitatingly predicting that the City would lose, it would have been
politically unacceptable, if not impossible, to proceed with concrete
proposals before the Supreme Court ruled. The timing of the Supreme
Court decision would also greatly affect whether we could finish our work
in time for a referendum in November 1989.
It was generally predicted
47
that we would be "hard pressed" to do so.
The Commission's first task was then simply to wait for the decision
of the Supreme Court. But this delay also allowed the staff to brief the
Commission's new members, including Schwarz, on the work they had
done for the Ravitch Commission, and for the Commission to hold a series
of legislative hearings. Finally, during this time, we began to formulate
what would become the chairman's initial proposals.
CHAPTER II. BOARD OF ESTIMATE V. MORRIS
On March 23, 1989, in a short opinion by Justice Byron White, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that "[b]ecause the boroughs have widely
disparate populations-yet each has equal representation on the board," the
Board's "structure" violated the "one person-one vote" requirement
previously found to be implicit in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.4 8 Quoting from its earlier
45. A mayoral commission is obligated to "review the entire charter... [and] prepare
a draft of a proposed new or revised charter. . . ." N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW §
36(5)(a) (McKinney 1994). But see Cruz v. Deierlein, 644 N.E.2d 1347, 1347 (N.Y.

1994).
46. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme CourtHearsArgumentsfor andAgainstEstimate
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1988, at Bl.
47. See id.

48. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 691 (1989). The Supreme Court's
decision affirmed the unanimous decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, which, in turn, affirmed the decision of the district court. See Morris v.
Board of Estimate, 831 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'g 647 F. Supp. 1463 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
In an earlier round of litigation, District Court Judge Neaher stated that the "one
person-one vote" doctrine did not apply to the Board of Estimate because, unlike Avery V.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), and Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971), the
Board was not an electedgoverning body but rather was comprised of select elected officials
appointed by virtue of their positions to the Board. This view was supported by an earlier
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cases, the Supreme Court said that "fair and effective representation" is the
"basic aim of legislative apportionment" and that "full and effective
participation requires 'that each citizen have an equally effective voice in
the election[s] ...."49 In describing the Board's powers, the Court found
it "of major significance" that the Board shared "legislative functions" with
the City Council with respect to modifying and approving the City's
budget.50
The challenge to the Board was simple. The Board consisted of the
City's three citywide officials-the mayor, comptroller, and city council
president-each with two votes-and the borough president of each
borough-each with a single vote. The legal difficulty with the Board's
voting system was that every borough had vastly different populations. At
the extremes were Brooklyn with 2.2 million people and Staten Island with
a population then of about 350,000. In between were Queens with 1.9
million, Manhattan with 1.4 million, and the Bronx with 1.1 million.
From a representational perspective, each Staten Island resident had six
times more representative power than a Brooklyn resident. Similarly,
Staten Islanders had six times the access to their borough president. In real
terms, this meant that geography could outweigh people as a basis for the
Board's decisions, similar to the manner by which small states are
protected in the United States Senate. But the Supreme Court had long
before held that the Senate analogy did not help states or municipalities.
The Senate was specifically protected by the U.S. Constitution, 5 whereas
analogous state and local systems were not.
Before Morris, the Supreme Court already determined that the "one
person-one vote" requirement applied to municipalities through the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although some small
deviations from exact equality in districts would be tolerated for good
reasons.5 3 Grabbing onto this exception, the City argued that the unique
New York Court of Appeals decision. See Bergerman v. Lindsay, 25 N.Y.2d 405, 409-10
(1969). Moreover, the district court concluded that the Board did not have a legislative
character. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652, 656-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
(The day this decision came down, Judge Neaher amazed Schwarz by telephoning him to
suggest that he had saved the City.) The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's
decision, holding that the "one person-one vote" rule did apply to the Board and remanding
for a decision on whether the rule was violated. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d
686, 690-91 (2d Cir. 1983).
49. Morris, 489 U.S. at 693-94.
50. Id. at 696.
51. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 573 (1964) ("We ... find the federal

analogy inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes.").
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
1.
53. See, e.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
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role that boroughs historically played in New York City government
justified the large deviation. Referring to the "structure and function of the
Board and of its role in the development of New York City," the City
characterized the Board as "a unique response to the history, geography,
culture and demographics of the city. 54 The Supreme Court gave this
argument short shrift. 5
It is important to note what the Supreme Court did not decide. First,
the Court did not hold that the Board as an institution was unconstitutional,
but rather that its voting structure was unconstitutional. This led to one of
the central early debates of the Charter revision process: Could the Board
legally-and should it substantively-be "saved" by a scheme of "weighted
voting" that would, for example, give six votes to Brooklyn's borough
president as opposed to one vote to Staten Island's? Second, the Court's
decision was based only on the "one person-one vote" principle. The
parties did not argue, and the Court did not touch upon, whether an at-large
(boroughwide and citywide) system to elect the members of the City's most
important "legislative" body created voting rights issues by suppressing the
weight of minority votes. Finally, the Supreme Court did not determine
when a new Charter should be in place (although the Second Circuit had
called for change within a year). All of these vital and difficult matters
were left for the Commission to decide.
Banner headlines greeted the Court's decision. The New York Times,
in a front page banner headline, read, Justices Void New York City's
Government; Demand an End to 5 Boroughs' Inequality.56 The lead story
in the Times (one of six, plus an editorial) said the decision's "immediate
impact was to sow considerable
confusion in a city that is entering an
57
intense political season."
The decision to delay consideration of fundamental restructuring until
the Supreme Court's Morris decision, and the enormous attention that
54. Brief for Municipal Appellants and Appellant Straniere at 4-5, Morris v. Board
of Estimate, 831 F.2d 384 (2d. Cir. 1987) (Nos. 87-1022 to 87-1112); see also Board of
Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
55. See Morris, 489 U.S. at 702 (rejecting City's claim that the Board should not be
disturbed because it allegedly "accommodates natural and political boundaries as well as
local interests," "has been effective," and "is supported by the city's history").
56. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Void New York City's Government; Demand an End
to 5 Boroughs' Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989, at Al.
57. Linda Greenhouse, High Court Says Board ViolatesRule of One Person One Vote,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989, at Al. All of the city's papers gave extensive coverage to the
Court's decision and to the forthcoming responsibilities of the Commission.
In the months that followed, however, among the City's major media institutions, only
the New York Times-which assigned two reporters full-time (Alan Finder and Todd
Purdum)-and New York Newsday-but only its editorial board-gave substantial attention
to Charter issues until the referendum heated up in the fall.
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accompanied the decision, 8 demonstrate that major Charter change requires
a substantial and politically recognizable reason. Without Morris, there
would have been no Charter revision. Without Morris, attempts to make
major changes in the City's governance would have been thwarted,
regardless of significant objections to the Board's governmental functions
and representational deficiencies. 9 With Morris, broad change became
possible, not only because of what it held but because it galvanized
attention to questions of governance. Three editorials that appeared soon
after the Supreme Court decision evidenced that focus.
A New York Newsday editorial entitled Back to the Drawing Board
noted that "the impending political debate will necessarily be heated at
times, perhaps even a bit frightening. Change is inevitably threatening."
It concluded by saying that after a life span of 91 years the "City [had] to
go back to the drawing board." '
A Times editorial called Electricity
Suddenly Crackles posed two questions for the Commission: "What form
of government does New York [City] now want? Is moving quickly a
virtue, minimizing uncertainty, or a vice, forcing haste in a heated
campaign?" In language more colorful than some of its editorials, the
Times opined that "electricity suddenly crackles because New York must
now search for new ways to govern itself." 6' A Noticias del Mundo
editorial referred to the decision as "[a]n open door for empowerment of
the city's minorities." It called for an alliance with "leaders of other
minority elements," predicted a "wholesale restructuring" of City
government, and said:
[O]ur job ... will be to make certain the restructuring provides
for our future political empowerment because whatever new
system is ultimately approved by the voters W~ill be in place for a
long time to come-well into the next century when Latinos and
other minorities will constitute nearly two-thirds of the city's
population. 62

58. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
59. See discussion infra Chapter V, Part II.
60. Editorial, And the Court Says It All: City Must Jettison Its Board of Estimate;
What's Next?, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 23, 1989, at 80.
61. Editorial, The Right Way to Rule New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989, at A28.
62. Latinos and CharterRevision, NoTICIAS DEL MUNDO, Mar. 1989.
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From the moment of the Court's decision, the Commission was flooded
with advice, threats,63 and entreaties from politicians, public-interest
groups, private-interest groups, and the press. We had much to decide.
Before describing how the Commission reached its decisions about the new
government, it will be useful first to discuss the factors that affect
constitutional writers generally and some that affected us specifically as
well as to describe the early process decisions made by the Commission.
CHAPTER III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Every Charter, like every constitution, is a child of its time and place
and of the views of its own framers. Charters reflect the attitudes and
goals of their framers, strained through whatever enactment processes they
must undergo. They also reflect their era's worries, concerns, and angers,
as well as hopes and aspirations. While influenced by political and
governmental theory, writing a constitutional document is not an exercise
in the application of abstract thinking. The U.S. Constitution, for example,
did not spring full-blown from a philosophical brow. Rather, it reflects a
series of compromises among varying individual philosophies, historical
perspectives, attitudes, experiences, and perceptions of current events and
of political requirements-all within the broad aim of creating a
representative and effective national government, while protecting the
authority of states and individual rights. The 1989 Charter, although not
such a grand undertaking, also reflect the views of its participants in the
context of important current events. The attitudes of the participants are
discussed throughout this article. The most significant of many current and
historic events that shaped the 1989 Charter are discussed below.
I. THE CITY AS WE FOUND IT

New York City in 1989 was not the city of 1901 or of any other year
in which major Charter changes occurred. A variety of centrifugal forces
threatened to unravel the weave of the City's fabric. Race was foremost
among them. The City of 1989 was almost fifty percent minority,
primarily African American and Latino, with a growing Asian population.'

63. The immediate reaction of Staten Island's Borough President Ralph Lamberti and
State Senator John Marchi was to call for Staten Island to secede from the city. Marchi said
he would not wait to see what solutions were proposed but would push his secession bill
because "we would be better off under the rule of George III." Todd S. Purdum,
PoliticiansScrambling to Decide Who Won, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 23, 1989, at B4.
64. See Alan Finder, Minority Groups on Council: Competing Approaches, N.Y.

TIMES, May 30, 1989, at B1.
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This number was increasing. The City had once again become a powerful
immigration magnet. 65 In 1989, the City had troublesome racial issues. 66
Along similar lines, many residents of the "outer boroughs" sensed that
despite their representation on the Board of Estimate, they were being
shortchanged and that Manhattan was too dominant in governmental
decision making.67 Representives of some communities echoed this sense
of disenfranchisement. They felt that their borough presidents did not
speak for them and that more community-controlled decision making was
needed. Another problem was that the Democratic Party had historically
overwhelmingly dominated City government.68
While these issues were not unknown to earlier commissions, a
combination of events-a mayoral election in which race was an issue; the
perceived weakening of borough presidents; increasing NIMBY ("not in
my backyard") protests over the placement of service facilities in various
communities, particularly poor and minority communities;69 and concern
over whether power was overly concentrated, to name a few-made them
particularly important in 1989. Our City was different from the City of the
1901 Charter in one other very important way. The people expected far
more government services.
How these and other similar matters played out through our
deliberations and affected the new Charter is discussed repeatedly in this
article. Race, fear of Manhattan domination, and concerns about a oneparty City, in particular, merit special attention at the outset.
A. Race and Electoral Politics
A dominant theme in the Commission's work was enhancing minority
political opportunities and increasing the likelihood of minority political
participation. Something was seriously wrong with race relations in the
City. A Charter that failed to address race relations-but only to the extent
charters can-would leave behind a ticking time bomb for the City.
65.

See Carol Groneman & David M. Reimers, Immigration, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF NEW YORK CITY 581, 583-586 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
66. See John Mollenkopf, Government and Politics, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW
YORK CITY, supra note 65, at 492.

67. See End of a Power in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1989, at 1.
68. See Evan Comog & Peter Eisenstadt, DemocraticParty, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF NEW YORK CITY, supra note 65, at 325-26.
69. See New York: Building Placement Plan Wins Effectiveness Kudos, PUBLIC
FINANCE/WASHINGTON WATCH, Aug. 31, 1992, at 2.
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New York City's record on race was mixed. The City had been a
pioneer on human rights legislation.7 ° Its opinion leaders were at the
forefront of the civil rights revolution of the 1960s-although the battles
were often fought far away in the South.
On the other hand, like other northern cities, New York also had a
discouraging, and often ugly, history on race. The draft riots in 1863 led
to savage lynchings of blacks.7 ' More recently, the City, like the states of
the former Confederacy, became subject to the pre-clearance requirements
of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because of low minority participation
and the use of a literacy test.72 Under this section, changes affecting
"voting" must pass muster with the Justice Department before they can
become effective. 3 Using this power, in 1981 the Justice Department set
aside the new lines that the City Council drew up to redistrict itself after
the 1980 Census on the grounds that they were intentionally racially
discriminatory.7 4 During the twenty-year history of the ten at-large
borough representatives on the City Council, just one minority was
elected-a Hispanic from Manhattan, for one four-year term (1965-69). 75
From 1977 to 1985, the Board of Estimate had no minority members. The
complexion of the Board was changed somewhat by the election of David
Dinkins as Manhattan borough president in 1985, on his third try, and by
the appointment of Fernando Ferrer as Bronx borough president in 1987,
giving minorities two of eleven votes on the Board.76
Thus, in 1989, the history and the recent record of the City on issues
of race was mixed. Although there were some positives, the negatives were
cancer sores on the body of a City that was often, and certainly saw itself
as, progressive. Racial tensions were high in 1989 and the years leading
up to it. Concerns over police brutality, the Howard Beach killing, the
furor over Jessie Jackson's presidential bid in 1988, and many other
70. See, e.g., George Will, Guffawing Where the CourtMay Not, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
June 24, 1988, at 95 (discussing the enactment of human rights legislation in 1965).
71. See Iver Bernstein, DraftRiots, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY, supra
note 65, at 344.
72. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 148 (1977) (noting that the City
of New York had become subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
73. See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1998). This Act was effective in
1989.
74. See, e.g., Maurice Carroll, U.S. Rejects PlanforRedistrictingNew York Council,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1981, at Al.

75. See Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); see also i;fra
Chapter VII, notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
76.

Herman Badillo had served one term as Bronx Borough President from 1966-1969.

Dinkins had three African-American predecessors as Manhattan Borough President: Hulan
Jack from 1954-1960; Constance Baker Motley from 1965-1966; and Percy Sutton from
1966-1977. Motley and Sutton had initially been appointed rather than elected.
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incidents, fanned the flames. As incisively shown in the report of the
Commission on the Year 2000, chaired by former Mayor Robert F.
Wagner, Jr., the city seemed to be slipping and sliding into two divided
cities.'
This second city, the city of the poor, was predominately
minority. In 1989 there was tension between the incumbent mayor and
many blacks and other minorities.7" Furthermore, 1989 was a mayoral
election year.
Our Commission's task was to restructure the City's governance
scheme for the long term. In doing so, the Commission had to think about
the short term as well and had to act in ways that would help to bring
people together and avoid exacerbating tension.
Many of the commissioners were attuned to this history and the need
for reforms that would provide more opportunities for minority
participation in the City's political processes. The addition of two more
minority members to the Commission added to the confidence that a
sufficient minority voice could ensure such reforms received continual
Commission attention. 9
All of the commissioners heard frustration and discontent from
minority witnesses at public hearings, in memoranda and written proposals
sent to us by civil rights organizations, and in meetings with many
organizations. In 1989, a wide cross-section of minorities had a powerful
sense of past unfairness, of exclusion from full and fair participation in the
electoral process, of discrimination, and of cynicism about reform. No
thoughtful person, concentrating on the needs of New York City in 1989,
could have participated in the Commission's work without a firm
conviction that these were real concerns, real issues, and real problems for
all New Yorkers, whether minorities or not.
Our work had to relate to the structure of government. But the attitude
the Commission expressed, including our language, goals, and openness as
well as the expression of our ideals, aspirations, and desire to listen, had
worth of its own. It helped reduce the likelihood that the Charter debate
itself would be "racially divisive," as Mayor Koch predicted.8" It also
increased the likelihood that we would succeed with the Justice Department
and pull together a winning coalition in the referendum.

77. See N.Y. CITY COMM'N ON THEYEAR2000, NEWYORKASCENDANT:
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE YEAR 2000, at 10-12 (1988).

78.
79.
80.

See Mollenkopf, supra note 66, at 492.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text
See, e.g., infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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B. Borough Voices and the Fearof Manhattan Domination
Just as minorities worried about exclusion and unfairness, so did many
in the so-called "outer boroughs," who expressed a fear of Manhattan
domination." Unlike race-where the very structure of City government
(e.g., the dominance of at-large elections associated with the Board) and
specific actions relating to structure (e.g., the 1981 districting of the City
Council) were problems-this was not a structural or legal issue. Rather,
the outer boroughs sensed that they were eclipsed, dominated, and
overshadowed by Manhattan. In the view of many citizens and elected
officials, the cultural, media, and financial center in Manhattan received
too much of the City's attention and money.
Fear of Manhattan domination was nothing new, of course. The theme
had run through the City's Charter and governmental history since the
consolidation of 1898.82 While many public officials and citizen witnesses
expressed worries about Manhattan domination, we had to wrestle with a
broader issue. It involved not only the balance between Manhattan and the
rest of the City, but also how borough-or, for some advocates, more
local-voices should be preserved and expressed in a world without a
Board of Estimate. Much of the passion underlying this difficult issue,
however, remained the century-old fear that people in, and the interests of,
Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island, would be suppressed by
the central city government.
The central government was
assumed-accurately or not-to be dominated by Manhattan.
C. Concerns About a One-Party City
Another important concern cutting across all of our work and affecting
many Commission decisions was that the City was essentially a one-party
city. Non-Democratic mayors were occasionally elected (e.g., LaGuardia
and Lindsay), but Democrats, from time immemorial, comprised the
overwhelmingly dominant party in the City. Other than Mayors Lindsay,
who won re-election as a Liberal and eventually became a Democrat, and
LaGuardia, who was hardly a typical Republican, and won as a
Republican/City Fusion candidate, only Democrats had been elected to
citywide office since 1902. In 1989, the Republican "Minority Leader" on
the City Council had no fellow Republicans to lead.
While Commission members were not chosen for their party affiliation,
the Commission also was mostly Democratic. Nonetheless, the City's one81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
82. See DAVID C. HAMMACK, POWER AND SOCIETY: GREATER NEW YORK AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY 185-203 (1982); SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 1.
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party phenomenon was troubling.
Real and repeated multi-party
competition can help develop better ideas. Real party competition can also
increase voter interest and voter participation.
We took some actions that increased party competition, but only
slightly. The likely continued absence of significant and sustained party
competition caused us to think hard about other ways to encourage
competitive ideas, particularly by ensuring that other elected officials would
compete with whomever was mayor. Our concern about the lack of strong
and consistent party competition was also one of many factors contributing
to the new Charter provisions relating to open government.
II. POLICY AND POLITICS
Charter framers cannot simply decree what they want. For our
proposals to become law, they had to be supported by at least a majority
of the Commission, by a majority of the voting public, and by the U.S.
Department of Justice. This meant that the proposals needed the support
of groups who influenced these decisions. Our obligation was not only to
create a sensible Charter, but to create one that could pass all of the
political hurdles to making our proposals law. We were, after all, charged
with the responsibility of providing a replacement to a government
decision-making structure that had been declared unconstitutional on the
basis of its representational failures. 3 Moreover, at some point, the courts
would demand an immediate remedy.
Politics, in the sense of devising proposals that would win approval,
affected our work in three interrelated ways. First, we had to develop a
consensus on the Commission; second, we had to identify the elements for
an election victory; and finally, we had to make sure that the Justice
Department would not object to the proposed 8Charter
changes. Our
4
referendum strategy is discussed in Chapter XIII.
The building of consensus on the Commission is discussed in detail in
Chapter 11 85 To build consensus, we knew we needed support from most
of the minority members, and from Nat Leventhal, the most experienced
and best connected member of the Commission. We were also convinced
that without support from David Trager or Judah Gribetz (both articulate
and strong-willed members with substantial government experience), it
would be harder to achieve Commission consensus. Finally, we knew we
had to pay fair attention to all commissioners, and that without a reasonable

83.
84.
85.

See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 703 (1989).
See discussion infra Chapter XIII.
See discussion infra Chapter XI.
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and open process, attentive to the merits of each member's arguments, we
could not achieve consensus.
Elements of this we knew from the start; other elements developed over
time. To achieve an electoral victory, we wanted support from the major
civic and good government advocacy groups, and from the editorial boards
of the City's daily newspapers, particularly the New York Times. We
needed support from the candidates for mayor, and from the leaders of the
City's minority groups and communities. We needed to win at least two
of the three largest boroughs, Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens, and the
City's minority communities. Support from the borough president of
Queens became particularly important at the end of our process.8 6 Support

from minority leaders and communities would also be essential to our
efforts at the Justice Department.
Our political strategies reflected our own policy goals. We believed
that many of the proposals that we thought represented good policy would
be consistent with the policy views of the groups whose support we were
seeking-and that we personally were particularly interested in obtaining.
But we knew that this would not always be the case and that policy
preferences of Commission members and of the various entities we would
be courting, including the editorial boards, would result in a multitude of
compromises. The tale of the compromises is recounted throughout the
article. Most of the changes to our initial proposals were the product of the
wisdom of these suggested changes. Our procedural plan from the outset
was to have the Commission put out preliminary ideas and then to use
public comment to improve the proposals. Simply put, most accepted
changes were better than or as good as the ideas we began with. In some
instances, however, we compromised with people or groups whose support
we needed. Fortunately, in no case did we accept a demand that we
believed deleterious to City governance, although some were offered.
The lesson is that politics matters, and that it should matter. By
politics, in the words of Hanna Pitkin, we do not mean "the making of
arbitrary choices, nor ...

the ...

bargaining between separate, private

wants. [Rather we mean] a combination of bargaining and compromise
where there are irresolute and conflicting commitments, and common
deliberation
about public policy, to which facts and rational arguments are
87
relevant.,

86. See discussion infra Chapter VII.
87. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 212 (1967).
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III. A CHARTER COMMISSION, NOT A LEGISLATURE
A charter commission's task is to provide a structure and a process for
governmental decision making, not to make the governmental decisions
themselves. In our proceedings, this distinction was often blurred by
advocates who requested that we make regulatory or redistributive
decisions to further their policy goals. Schwarz gave an example at the
Commission's June 15 meeting, following several weeks of public
hearings: "As a personal view of what we've-what I feel I've learned,
anyway, in all of this, the first is the incredible yearning of New York
City's citizens and residents for services. We talk a lot about structure, the
yearning is for services." 88
While we could do some things related to the provision of services, and
while the ultimate outcome of a better structure should increase the
likelihood of better services, a charter is not legislation and a charter
commission is not the legislature-the governmental body intended to
determine the nature and level of government services.
The City Charter was already mind-numbingly detailed-consisting of
more than 60 chapters and 200 pages.8 9 But still we could not-and should
not-act as a legislature. "Our job [was] to increase the chance of good
things happening ...not to sit as a legislature deciding, from day-to-day,
what those good things may be. ' 9 We needed ways to express the
distinction, and Schwarz did so by a metaphor:
"

[A] charter is the foundation, it is not the building. The charter
allows for the building to be built, but the building has to be built
by other people in future times.
Whether the building will be one that . . . is beautiful or...
dumpy, depends on. . . whether elected officials are leaders, on

their character, on their intelligence, on their visions[,] on their
compassion. It depends on the people,
on their participation, on
9
their common sense, on their soul.

88. Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 4.
89. As a generality, the more local the government and the later the constitution, the
more detail appears. Ease of amendment is also associated with length.
90. Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 12.
91. Id. at 10.
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CHAPTER IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS

The legitimacy of governmental efforts in democracies is anchored in
their processes. For a charter revision commission, process is particularly
important. Its members are not elected, and once appointed, they cannot
be removed or replaced. 9' Its budget is protected against legislative
interference, and certain types of competing commissions are prohibited.93
While the public's right to reject a commission's proposals at a referendum
means a commission may not simply dictate, that public right is only to say
yes or no. This, together with the great power and responsibilities of a
charter commission, created an obligation to be open and to engage in a
meaningful and extensive dialogue with the public throughout our work.
To accomplish this obligation, we made a number of key decisions at
the outset. Clearly our early process decisions dramatically affected our
end product for the better. In addition, as we had hoped, our procedural
decisions also helped both build allies and temper the opposition of some
critics. The fairness and openness of our processes also helped us win
Justice Department approval.
I. COMMISSION GOALS

The Ravitch Commission had adopted a series of goals to frame its
work. We decided that readoption and elaboration of these goals would
serve an important public and Commission purpose: to provide a
touchstone for the Commission's deliberations; to provide logic, rationale,
and context for various decisions; and to link Commission decisions to
more universal principles, particularly those embedded in the American
constitutional experience. These goals would also create a basis for the
public to measure our proposals. Adopting goals could be seen as a risky
strategy because it gave critics a target with which to judge our work. The
value, however, outweighed the risk.
For these reasons, on the day of the release of "The Chair's Initial
Proposals" at the Commission meeting held on April 24, 1989, Schwarz
restated the Commission's goals as follows:94

92.

See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36(4) (McKinney 1994).

93. See id.
94. See Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 4-7 (providing substantial ensuing

discussion and elaboration and a response by Harriet Michel that expressed happiness that
we had "rais[ed] the stakes of what we are doing to try to get at those kind of philosophical
goals"). Id. at 58.
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1. First and foremost, there is the goal of fair representation. The
one person-one vote idea . . . is not just a formula; it is the heart
of democracy. And fair representation also means the legal, but
more importantly, the moral imperative that underlies the Voting
Rights Act .... 95
2. Balancing power, checking power, is "really in the bones of
Americans. That is part of the genius of our Constitution .... 96
3. Fixing accountability and clarifying responsibility. You do not
want a government in which it is vague who has made a decision,
then everybody can say they are not responsible .... 97
4. [H]ave the government operate efficiently. If it does not ..
then the needs of the public cannot be met because there are too
many roadblocks in getting8 from the policy goal to the
implementation of that goal."g
5. [C]oncentrate on the fundamental problem, . . . and
concentrate, at the outset, on what you can do to alleviate the
problem, instead of focusing on the problem when it has arisen in
crisis and you're trying to address the problem on the margins at
the time of crisis.
6. [I]ncrease the participation of all levels of government and of
the people in the things [that] affect their lives[.] °°
These goals were rooted in America's constitutional history and general
thinking about constitutional government. They were also a product of the
specific environment in which the Commission was born.
Fair
representation (in the "one person-one vote" sense) created the need for the
Commission, and fair opportunity for all races and groups to be represented
was high on the list of the City's current needs. Balancing and checking
power would be particularly important in a world without a Board of
Estimate and in a City without a flourishing two-party system. Weakness
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 6-7.
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in fixing accountability and clarifying responsibility had been a substantive
problem with the Board. The need to enhance efficiency is ever
present-and sometimes conflicts with the other goals.' °1 Finally, a lack
of concentration on the fundamental problems, and instead a focus on
crises, had been a weakness of the Board and the City in general.
II. LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS
Although the new Commission was in place by mid-January 1989, and
the Supreme Court had not yet decided Board of Estimate v. Morris, it
seemed that we could do some useful preparatory work. At the first
Commission meeting, on January 20, 1989, Schwarz said that "to choose
to do nothing would be to make a choice, to tie our hands as far as the
option of taking action this year. ,102 Following Director of Research Frank
Mauro's suggestion, we proposed, as a starting point, that the Commission
hold a series of "legislative" hearings about the workings of City
government, rather than discuss any further what ultimate form a revised
government should take.
We had two reasons for this approach: political and substantive. First,
it would have been impolitic to jump to the topic of structure without
giving the Supreme Court reasonable time to decide Morris. Doing so
would have galvanized opposition and risked the support of people who
might support us if the Supreme Court declared the Board unconstitutional.
Second, as put by Schwarz, rather than starting by "debating the ultimate
questions of how the government should be structured," we would be better
informed and in a stronger position with the "people who must ultimately
judge" if we started at the "bottom instead of from the top." 0 3 For
example, on land use or budgeting, we would do better by "exploring what
actually goes on in government and making sure we really understand."'°4
Of course, many, perhaps most, of the commissioners knew a great deal
about how the system worked, and it is unclear whether we would have
held these legislative hearings if Morris had already been decided.
Nevertheless, it turned out to be time very well spent.
This proposal was not accepted without some debate. At the
Commission's second meeting on February 16, a few of the holdover
commissioners expressed concern that earlier tentative proposals of the
Ravitch Commission and work that supported them not be lost. But work
would not be "lost," and it was difficult to see how learning more could be
101.
102.
103.

See id. at9.
Public Meeting, Jan. 20, 1989, at 3.
Id. at 5.

104. Id.
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harmful. Commissioner Leventhal helpfully cut through the concerns by
pointing out that at the legislative hearings, commissioners would obviously
be free to ask witnesses questions like: "Last year we thought that this
might be a direction to go in, what do you think about it?"" °5
06
Between February 28 and March 15, we held six legislative hearings.'1
The format of the hearings consisted of, in general, opening observations
by Schwarz, presentations by staff, questions of the witnesses, and
discussion among the commissioners. The subjects covered were: (1) local
voice in government, (2) contracting and procurement; (3) land-use
decision making; (4) oversight and representation; (5) franchising; and
(6) budgeting.
There was an important unstated implication of the breadth of these
hearings: Charter revision was likely to be broad. This, in turn, suggested
that we were looking at a government without a Board of Estimate.
In addition to being informative, these hearings were valuable in other
ways. First, they showed the Commission's open and professional
approach to its work. Coming as they did before the Supreme Court's
Morris decision (and the extra spotlight this threw on the Commission's
responsibilities), these hearings affected mostly the more devoted Charter
watchers. Second, the hearings built a record for some of our changes,
such as what ultimately became of the Independent Budget Office, the "fair
share" policy for the distribution of City facilities, the remedies for the
City's "slow pay" practices with contractors, and decisions to rectify
certain weaknesses of the Board of Estimate, exemplified by its emphasis
on last-minute crisis management rather than on earlier planning. 0 7 These
hearings also provided added comfort for significantly increasing the
Council's powers, because the hearings showed that the Council recently
had focused more on citywide needs in the budget than the Board of
Estimate had.

105. Public Meeting, Feb. 16, 1989, at 49.
106. See Legislative Hearings, Feb. 28, 1989, Mar. 1, 1989, Mar. 2, 1989, Mar. 9,
1989, Mar. 14, 1989, Mar. 15, 1989.
107. See, e.g., Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York
City Charter Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York
City Charter Revision Commission, to Barry Weinberg, U.S. Department of Justice 10-12
(Sept. 28, 1989).
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III. OPEN MEETINGS

We decided that every meeting of the Commission would be public and
transcribed.'0 ° The Ravitch Commission had closed some meetings, and
Lane did not believe that openness was required by New York's Open
Meetings Law, 9 a view not fully shared by Schwarz. In any event, we
thought that the Commission would be better served by allowing the public
to see our work. Allowing and encouraging public observation of our
efforts would demystify what we were doing and diminish any sense that
we were "acting upon" rather than "acting for" the public. Also, public
debate makes narrow-minded views more difficult to express.
Initially, the idea of open meetings met some token
resistance-expressed individually in private-among a few members of the
Commission who wondered whether they could speak as fully in public as
they might in private or, alternatively, who questioned whether the
Commission's efforts would benefit from public dispute among
commissioners. In the end, however, all seemed to agree, although the
Commission took no vote on this.
In retrospect, the open meetings did serve the intended purposes. No
one ever criticized us for making secret deals. The open meetings did not
restrain debate; indeed they may have sharpened it (because of the constant
public feedback we received). Nothing that ought to have been said in
private could not have been said in public.
Our openness was also helpful with the Justice Department, because
process was an important consideration for pre-clearance. Among those
who followed the Charter, moreover, it increased understanding of the
issues, of the necessary tradeoffs, and of the enormous complexity of what
we were doing.
This commitment to openness did not mean that private conversations
between the chairman and individual members of the Commission never
occurred. They often did. For example, the chairman telephoned
individual members, met with them before meetings, or spoke with them
in a corridor at a meeting. Examples of reasons for such discussions
included describing upcoming issues and why a particular course seemed
sensible, asking a particular commissioner to take the lead on a particular

108. Transcription was in contrast to the 1975 (and earlier) Charter Commissions (and
to much of the Ravitch Commission), where there is no such record for historians, lawyers,
or others to examine. See Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 91-92 (remarking on the
unfortunate absence of a record of the deliberations of the 1975 Goodman Charter Revision
Commission).
109. See N.Y. OPEN MEETINGS LAW § 103 (McKinney 1994).
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argument, or indicating how a particular Charter provision might be helpful
in attracting support. Openness does not prevent individual persuasion.
IV. PUBLIC HEARINGS-AND AN ITERATIVE PUBLIC PROCESS

In addition to conducting our work in public, we wanted the public to
contribute to our work. We decided to plan on an interchange between the
Commission and the public, to avoid the undemocratic and ill-formed
nature of most referenda." 0
Our plan was for the public to monitor, and occasionally participate in,
public meetings. In addition, after each round of Commission meetings,
which culminated in a preliminary set of proposals, public comment and
public hearings followed. Then a new round of Commission discussion,
revised proposals, and more public hearings ensued. Schwarz captured the
sentiment behind this approach when he presented the chairman's initial
ideas to the Commission:
[P]ublic debate and comment "is going to make what is presented
today different and better at the end of the process [because]...
we all need to learn, we all need to grow, we all need to develop,
we all need to improve in our ideas .... and I know that we will
learn from the wider New York City public." 1
The Commission's rhythm of formulating tentative ideas and hearing
public reaction and criticism, followed by establishing more Commission
meetings and a new set of sharpened ideas, created some element of risk.
Would we be "accused" of changing our minds and, therefore, not
knowing what we were doing? In fact, this open and iterative public
process helped us enormously. It demonstrated that good policy equals
good politics. Considerable political capital and many good ideas were
gained from our openness to public participation.
We held two rounds of Public Hearings to obtain public comment on
different stages of the Commission's work. At these twelve hearings, held
all over the city, 679 witnesses came to press, to pummel, and, in some
cases, to praise us-though usually not to praise, because until the
Commission issued its own final proposals, everybody was an advocate
seeking an edge. Hearings generally started in mid-afternoon. Several
went to midnight or beyond. Indeed the length of the hearings became
110. See Eric Lane, Men Are Not Angels: The Real Politikof Direct Democracy and
What We Can Do About lt, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101 (1999).
111. Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 3-4.
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something of an inside joke on the Commission. In chairing the public
hearings, Schwarz often allowed speakers to talk past their allotted times.
This led to much teasing. For example, when Commissioner Richland, a
dissenter from our ultimate proposals, nonetheless praised Schwarz's
"patience," Fred Friendly jumped in with "[a]nd I'll never forgive him."" 2
One aspect of broadening public participation was to ensure that
hearings (and Commission meetings) occurred throughout the City and that
they not be limited to Manhattan or even to traditional downtown areas in
any borough." 3 The public hearings were held in all five boroughs, often
in poor or minority neighborhoods. Indeed, eighty-seven percent of our
public hearings (other than in Staten Island) were held in community
districts with greater than fifty percent minority populations. 114
One public official, Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden,
criticized this policy, proving perhaps that no good policy goes unassailed.
As part of his lead-off testimony at a hearing in the Brooklyn Masonic
Temple, located in a community district with a sixty-two percent minority
population, the Brooklyn borough president complained that we should
have held this hearing "where we can get a representative group of citizens
who work."" 5 This comment led to an6extremely heated exchange between
Schwarz and the borough president."
Schwarz called Golden arrogant and insensitive because of his insulting
remark, and he attacked Golden for hanging on to the Board of Estimate's
old voting structure even though Golden's own Brooklyn constituents were
enormously underrepresented. The exchange, which the Times described
the next day as "among the most acrimonious moments" in the
Commission's history," 7 was probably the only time during the
Commission's history when Schwarz lost his temper. As the Times put it,
Schwarz, "a seasoned litigator ...cross-examine[d] Mr. Golden in a tense
and withering tone ....,,
112. Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 290.
113. See Public Meeting, Mar. 31, 1989, at 50-52; Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989,
at 109-10.
114. See Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, to Richard Posner, U.S. Justice Department 4-5 (Sept. 26,
1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).

115. Public Hearing, June 1, 1989, at 15.
116. See id. at 16-26, 33, 37.
117. Todd S. Purdum, Angry Skirmish Over CharterBrings Apology, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 2, 1989, at B1.
118. Id. Schwarz went too far when he said: "Golden does not have an open mind,"
prompting Commissioner Leventhal's response: "I don't think it helps us to overstate the
case." Public Hearing, June 1, 1989, at 37-38. Schwarz later withdrew the remark, and

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

While this volatile exchange was a product of anger, it might have
helped us politically. Golden would never support any Charter that
abolished the Board. The very next witness, Reverend Johnnie Ray
Youngblood-an independent minority leader, and co-chair of the East
Brooklyn Congregations, which were responsible for the Nehemiah
Housing-started his testimony by saying: "We want you to know that we
are all from Brooklyn, and we are delighted that you chose this spot...
,,119 Tumultuous applause followed.
Rev. Youngblood also said:
In our experience, the Borough President first represent[s] the
Kings County Democratic machine. Secondly, represents the
campaign contributors, contractors, lawyers, and insiders who
grease that machine. Third, represent[s] the non-minority and
she controls; And four,
minority Council people whom he or 20
when time permits .... the rest of us. 1
Certainly, this incident dramatically demonstrated the Commission's
determination to break with traditional practices of how and where public
business should be conducted.
V. PUBLIC OUTREACH

While the public's involvement in public hearings and in many
meetings with staff and members was extensive, it was insufficient to meet
our substantive, political, and legal needs. Therefore, Gretchen Dykstra,
the Commission's director of communications, developed an extensive
community outreach program to increase awareness of the Charter process
and of the Commission's proposals, as well as to stimulate public
suggestions. Dykstra, a committed believer in public participation, created
an active press office, a speakers' bureau, and a mailing list of 62,000
names-members of the press, public officials, community groups, and as
many political, legal and civic groups as it was possible to discover.
Among the materials sent to the mailing list was the CharterReview,
the Commission's periodic newsletter. 121The Review contained thoughtful
and reader-friendly pieces.
Golden later apologized. See id. at 49-51.

119. Public Hearing, June 1, 1989, at 66.
120. Id. at 69.
121. See, e.g., CHARTERREVIEW (N.Y. City Charter Revision Conm'n, New York,
N.Y.), Fall 1987.
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Dykstra and her staff also organized many meetings with all sorts of
groups, at which Commission members and staff members would speak
with and listen to all sorts of groups. During the early months, the thrust
of the meeting focused primarily on the exploration of ideas. During the
referendum, the thrust focused primarily on explaining why the
Commission had done what it did and, thus, seeking support for the
referendum.
Each member of the communications staff was required to have some
policy expertise. This allowed them to interact substantively with
community groups and with our research staff, thereby enhancing the work
of both groups of staff members.
Dykstra's outreach program included placing posters about the Charter
process in the subway system; putting notices about Charter change in
telephone bills;' 2 distributing a booklet of games and puzzles explaining
the City's governmental system to libraries, unions, literacy programs, and
schools; distributing fliers to every City worker (385,000); offering a wall
poster illustrating the structure of the government; and making public
service announcements.
The gist of all this was to increase awareness of the Charter process,
rather than to seek support for our specific proposals. We believed that:
(1) a good-government aura would help us and (2) the wider the interest in
Charter change, the less special-interest opponents could hurt us. Finally,
as with everything we did, we had an eye on the Justice Department's
ultimate review. (As it turned out, our outreach effort was helpful with the
Justice Department when it considered whether the Charter process had
been fair to minorities.)
Our outreach efforts also improved public feedback and increased
Charter awareness. However, Charter Revision did not readily grab and
sustain burning public attention. This was expressed well in two cartoons
by Dan Shefelman in New York Newsday. One depicted two grave diggers
beside a newly dug grave with a Board of Estimate gravestone. One grave
digger asks, "Who the heck was he anyway?" The other responds, "Beats
me.")23 The other cartoon is headed "Election 1989: Scenes We Probably
Won't See." The picture shows a huge crowd at a rally with placards like
"CHANGE THAT CHARTER"; "DEATH TO THE BOARD OF
ESTIMATE"; "CHARTER REVISION iSI!"; and, "WAY TO GO
FAO. ",124

122.
123.

These notices produced approximately 5,000 requests for information.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION

COMMISSIONSELECTED PAPERS,

School Law Review).
124. Id.

1986-1989 11 (unpaginated) (on file with theNew YorkLaw
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CHAPTER V. TWO CRUCIAL-AND CONTROVERSIAL-THRESHOLD
DECISIONS

In its early days, the Commission made two crucial threshold decisions.
We would strive to finish in time for the ballot in November, and we would
abolish the Board of Estimate. Both decisions were controversial and had
powerful and persistent opponents. Both were grounded in the law,
politics, and policy.
Abolition of the Board vastly increased the
Commission's responsibilities; all of its powers had to be reallocated. This
made achieving our timing aspiration more difficult and more important.
I. THE DECISION TO STRIVE TO FINISH IN TIME FOR A NOVEMBER
REFERENDUM

A. The Commission'sDecision
On March 31, 1989, just eight days after the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Morris, the Commission voted, without dissent, to
strive to place proposed Charter revisions on the ballot in November."2
Schwarz urged this decision on the Commission for three reasons. First,
the system had been held unconstitutional, not for a technical, trivial
reason, but because some four million New Yorkers' right to vote was
being diluted. This unconstitutional wrong was not to be allowed to fester.
Second, even if we wanted to delay, we were not entirely free actors; the
courts could intervene.' 26 Third, if we did not act in November, a full
year's delay until the next general election would never be tolerated by the
courts. A special election in early 1990 would be irresponsible and
undemocratic. Special elections in New York City had a history of
abysmal turnouts. Low turnout tended to favor special interests-which we
believed might tend to oppose a new Charter.127
Other reasons for the decision to strive for November were less
explicit. Eleven members of the Commission had already served for two
years, as had most of the staff. By the beginning of the Schwarz
Commission, many proposals for revamping government processes and
structure had been completed at the staff level and started to bubble up to
125. Public Meeting, Mar. 31, 1989, at 26.
126. Before the Supreme Court accepted the case, the New York Court of Appeals
said the system had to be changed in six months to a year. See Morris v. Board of

Estimate, 831 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1987).
127. See, e.g., Public Meeting, Mar. 31, 1989, at 3-6 (regarding the timing of the
referendum); Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 48-56.
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commissioners. Commission members and staff holdovers were anxious
to finish.
A more political reason was that in 1989, elections for the three
citywide officials, the Council, and the borough presidents were to take
place. Substantively, such elections would afford an opportunity to address
Charter revision in a visible competitive setting, and to increase voter
turnout, which we felt would offset the ability of entrenched opponents to
organize against the revisions. In addition, a number of potential
opponents to abolishing the Board would be tied up in elections, and also
might want to have in the election a "good government" aura of supporting
Charter reform-or not want to be accused of being captives of an old
system.
David Dinkins (the Manhattan borough president) and Jay Goldin (the
comptroller) were both running for mayor. Both were devotees of the
Board of Estimate. Their attention would now be focused on the mayoral
race and not on Charter change. In the end, Dinkins became a cautious
supporter, and Goldin remained silent. Their positions might have been
different had they stayed in their current posts. A related analysis applied
to Ruth Messinger, running for Manhattan borough president, and
Both, particularly
Elizabeth Holtzman, running for comptroller.
Messinger, were heavily involved in the Charter process and were ultimate
supporters. Whether they would have been so if they had been elected and
served on the Board for a year before a referendum was another risk
avoided by pushing for the vote in November 1989.
B. Some Powerful Opponents of Our Decision
Outside the Commission, proceeding toward a November referendum
was not met with universal favor. On March 29, 1989, six days after
Morris, Mayor Koch invited Schwarz and Lane to dinner at Gracie
Mansion, along with First Deputy Mayor Stanley Brezenoff and
Corporation Counsel Peter Zimroth. We enjoyed dinner with the usual
good food and wine, but in the living room after dinner, the guests aired
their view that a referendum in 1989 would be harmful. (Perhaps the
meeting occurred because, after Morris, Schwarz was quoted as saying, "I
think we have to do it in November unless it's impossible. ,"128)
They said in effect, "Well, you know it really would be terrible for the
City if you were to make the Charter decisions in 1989." It was inevitable,
128. Todd S. Purdum, Charter Panel Chairman Sees a LargerRole for Minorities,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1989, at Al.
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they said, that the Charter debate would be racially
divisive. The mayor
29
indicated that he did not want, or need, that. 1
We told the mayor and his colleagues that we disagreed with them for
the reasons given to the Commission two days later. Schwarz also said that
he would not lead a group that would have a racially divisive effect.
A potpourri of other public figures with widely varying positions on the
merits also urged delay upon the Commission. Governor Mario Cuomo did
so in a long telephone call to Schwarz on July 7, 1989. The governor did
not tend to be as direct as the mayor. During this conversation, he never
made clear to Schwarz his reason for seeking delay.
Schwarz responded to the governor with a new argument sharpened
because the race for mayor was clearly becoming competitive. If the Board
of Estimate continued in power, without the Commission having resolved
its fate, a new mayor (if that were to eventuate) would be pressured
unmercifully by his fellow Board of Estimate members saying, in effect:
"If you want our support on such and such a vote on the Board, then you
must support us on continuing the Board, or in enhancing our powers in a
government without a Board." Continued controversy on the shape of the
City's future government would not help a new mayor faced with running
the current government.
Shortly after the conversation, the governor was quoted as saying at a
press conference that he was "not at all sure" the issues could get a fair
hearing if they were on the ballot this year, but adding: "I'm not going to
suggest that they delay it .... That's not my point. It is my point to get
people to think about this."' 3 °
Others seeking delay included a group led by former Mayor Beame and
developer Lewis Rudin;13 ' Assemblyman Albert Vann, leader of the New
129. This was the only time the mayor made private efforts to persuade either of us
on a Charter issue. The mayor did write several letters to the chairman, with copies to all
commissioners, objecting to or querying various provisions. These matters are discussed
below.

At the Commission's last meeting, Commissioner Paredes illustrated the same point by
saying that when he had been appointed, Mayor Koch did not ask him to "accept anything
but the invitation" and "was the only public official that never called me or pressured me
or talked to me about absolutely any issue. . . ." See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 7374.
130. Todd S. Purdum, Queens Citizens Lobby CharterPanel, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,

1989, at B4.
131. See Alan Finder, Charter Panel Facing More Pressure to Delay Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1989, at B1. This group seemed to be substantive opponents of the new
proposals and last ditch defenders of the Board. Just what their strategy was in seeking
delay was never made clear.
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York State Legislature's Black and Hispanic caucus; 132 and Herbert Sturz,
former chairman of the City Planning Commission, former member of the
Times editorial board, and close friend of both Schwarz and Jack
Rosenthal. 3 3 Rosenthal, as the head of the Times' editorial board, would
play an important role in influencing public opinions about our work.
Former Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton promised a lawsuit to
force delay. 134 None came.
The most sustained and public voice in favor of delay was an informal
coalition of minority activist groups-who we referred to as the "Delay
Movement," and who, after our March 31 vote to strive to finish in
November, contended that they would not have enough time to prepare
their own proposals and react to the Commission's proposals. It might well
have surprised these groups to find themselves on the same side of an
important issue as Mayor Koch, of whom they were not fans. But they
would not learn of this alliance, because the mayor had chosen not to go
public with his request for delay.
There was a continuing dialogue between the Commission and the
members of the Delay Movement in person, through the newspapers, and
in one instance by letter. 31 Specifically, Angelo Falcon wrote that "the
reason" for calling for a delay was that in the 1988 vote on Charter
changes, the minority vote had been "extremely disproportionate[ly]" low,
indicating a "serious problem" in the [prior] Commission's ability
to
"effectively reach out to Black, Latino and Asian communities." 36

132. Letter from Albert Vann, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New
York City Charter Revision Commission (June 27, 1989) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review).
133. See Herbert Sturz, Editorial, CharterRevision:Why So Fast?,N.Y. TIMES, Apr.

8, 1989, at 27 (concluding a long list of arguments for delay by urging the Commission to
"make haste slowly").
134. See Sam Roberts, Special Election on the Charter?DangerAhead,N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 1989, at BI; see also Finder, CharterPanel FacingMore Pressureto Delay Vote,

supra note 131, at B1. Another public official, former Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin,
urged the Commission to give the mayor no say in land use and to restrict his role in
shaping the budget. See Todd S. Purdum, Officials Defend Their Posts to Charter Panel,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1989, at B3.
135. Letter from Angelo Falcon, President, Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, to
Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision
Commission (May 16, 1989).
136. Id. Falcon's letter followed a long meeting Schwarz had with a number of the
Delay Movement's leaders. At the meeting, Schwarz said that while disagreeing with
delay, he understood the concerns about whether minority communities would get
sufficiently engaged in the Charter process, and therefore, he would continue to review the
timing issue. When Commission staff members were so told, there was great anguish, and
in one case, tears. See also Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 546-47 (describing
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Schwarz's letter response to Falcon attached tables, prepared by Frank
Mauro, that showed the drop-off in votes from the 1988 state bond question
to the Charter question had actually been lower in predominately minority
districts than in predominately white districts. Statistics aside, however,
Schwarz responded that we agreed "increased minority participation is of
great importance," and that the Commission was "absolutely committed to
maximum outreach." 37 On the issue of timing, Schwarz said:
I told you and others that your concern about minority input and
community education was reasonable. However, as I also said, I
was not convinced that delay-which would continue a form of
government that the Supreme Court has unanimously found
unconstitutional as violating principles of fair representation-was
appropriate . . . . [A] special election has
38 far greater turnout
problems than those you have focused on.
Generating interest in Charter issues at the time of a contested general
election is a "much more achievable goal than getting people to go to the
polls for a special election." 39 The case for a year's delay was not
effectively made.
After this exchange, the Delay Movement developed a parallel strategy
of arguing for delay (for a full year) while engaging the Commission
fruitfully on a number of substantive subjects.
The various proponents of delay never formed an effective coalition
against the Commission's decision to proceed. Their views on the merits
of Charter reform were too disparate. Some were last-ditch defenders of
the Board of Estimate and the status quo. Others (particularly some within
the Delay Movement) wanted radical decentralization of City government.
Some explicitly shifted to supporting delay only when they did not get their
way on a merits issue. None of these widely disparate groups presented a
cogent strategy for delay, nor did they provide any good answer to the
constitutional, legal, and policy arguments against delay.
All of the disparate urgings for delay were rejected. Nonetheless, the
mayor's expressed fear of racial divisiveness, and the Delay Movement's
Schwarz's reporting on meeting with the Delay Movement by saying that although he
continued to believe the delay was not justified, the Commission should nonetheless
continue to "carefully consider" the subject).
137. Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, to Angelo Falcon, President, Institute for Puerto Rican
Policy (May 23, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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concern whether minorities had enough time to participate in and evaluate
the Commission's work, were factors contributing to our tone, to our
process, to the date of our final proposals, 40 and to our substantive
decisions. Our goal was to be open enough and responsive enough to avoid
racial divisiveness and to gain substantial minority support. Both goals
were met.

II. THE DECISION TO ABOLISH THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE
On May 2, 1989, the Commission, in what it characterized as a "sense
of the meeting vote," voted 13 to 1 "that weighted voting is not the way to
go, that we have to proceed with an agenda that figures out what is the way
to go, [and] that while that does not bar people from speech-we're not
gagging anybody-the presumption is, that we are going forward on other
than a weighted voting scheme.'' 4
This vote effectively abolished the Board of Estimate, for without
weighted voting it was impossible to reconstitute the Board. For reasons
that we explain below, 4 2 this vote was rooted in law, although we also
thought there
were a number of other drawbacks to the Board beyond its
13
illegality.
As the Morris decision only addressed the Board's voting scheme,
Board denizens and supporters seized on the limits of the Court's opinion
as an opportunity to reconstruct the Board with a new voting scheme. This
raised the question whether the Board could legally-and whether it should
substantively-be "saved" by use of "weighted voting."
The
140. At the outset, it had been assumed that the Commission had to finish its work at
the end of June to leave enough time for the Justice Department review. But at a short
Commission meeting in the middle of a public hearing on June 6, Schwarz recommended,
and the Commission approved, extending our work until late July or early August. This
was a "reasonable accommodation" to those who had asked for more time to comment both
on the proposals and on the actual proposed Charter language. It also allowed for an entire
other round of useful public hearings after another draft of Commission proposals. See
Public Hearing, June 6, 1989, at 52-56. One of many outsiders who suggested this
extension was Dennis DeLeon, a top aide to David Dinkins, who had worked for Schwarz
as an assistant corporation counsel.
This was simply sensible and helpful to the Commission in getting its work done. It
also was helpful in rebutting the Delay Movement's argument. The expressed reaction of
the Delay Movement was that it was only a "good first step" because we had been moving
at a "frenzied and totally incomprehensible pace." Todd S. Purdum, Charter Panel
Postpones Vote on FinalProposals,N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 1989, at B2.

141. Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 77.
142. See discussion infra Chapter V, Part II.
143. See discussion infra Chapter V, Part IIB.
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Commission's vote ended a bruising and time-consuming legal debate over
the applicability of the "one person-one vote" doctrine and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 to any form of reconstituted Board of Estimate. This
vote also ended a somewhat more hidden debate over the virtues of the
Board as a vehicle of governance. Untied from what to many was the
City's governing keystone, the Commission was free to explore governance
and decision-making options that would affect its publicly stated goals.
A. A Brief History of the Board of Estimate
Since 1901, the Board of Estimate consisted of the mayor, city council
president, comptroller, and, most important in the representative sense,
each of the five borough presidents, voting under various schemes.I 44 The
presence of the borough presidents on the Board was an intended antidote
to the dominance of Manhattan-based Tammany Hall, which had gained
control of the Mayor's Office (and most city jobs) after the creation of the
greater City of New York in 1898.145 At various times after 1901, when
the borough presidents were added, the mix of votes varied little from that
which the Supreme Court held illegal. Prior to 1958, for example, the
borough presidents of Brooklyn and Manhattan each had two votes and the
remaining borough presidents had one apiece. 146 By 1978-and in
1989-all borough presidents
had one vote and each of the three citywide
47
elected officials had two.1
Throughout its history, the Board exercised considerable power,
although these powers waned a bit over the years:
The powers and duties established for the Board of Estimate by
charter, local law and state law have reflected changing
perceptions of the consolidated city and the methods of its
governance. Each of the major Charter changes, 1901, 1936,
1961, and to a lesser extent 1975, have embodied substantial
144. In the 1898 Charter, which provided the framework for the newly consolidated
city, the Board consisted of the mayor, comptroller, city council president, corporation
counsel, and president of the Department of Taxes and Assessments. See N.Y. CITY
CHARTER tit. 5 § 226 (1897).
In the 1901 Charter changes, the borough presidents became members, together with
the three citywide elected officials. See Nora L. Mandel, Borough Presidents, il THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY, supra note 65, at 129.
145. See SAYRE &KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 688-89.
146. See Edward T. O'Donnell, Changes to the City Charter, 1653-1989, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK CITY, supra note 65, at 206.
147. See id. at 207.
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rearrangements of political power among the central city
government, the boroughs and, since 1961, particularly 1975, the
city's communities. While it is always difficult to discern a trend
in historical review, it is reasonably clear the 1936 Charter ended
the growth of the Board of Estimate as the "governing body of the
city" and in fact stripped the board of substantial powers. The
1961 Charter furthered this decline of borough-based decentralized
governments. Three trends have contributed to the overall decline:
first, the political acknowledgment that a greater degree of
centralization was more efficient; second, that a greater degree of
centralization made government more accountable; and, third, the
growth of communities (at the expense of boroughs) as entities for
organizing and expressing the political views and needs of the
city's diverse population.' 48
Despite this incremental loss of power, the Board maintained its
position as the City's best known body and as the main place where a
borough voice could be heard. At the time of the Morris litigation, the
Board exercised a number of legislative and executive functions.
Legislative roles included approval of the City's budget and of changes to
its zoning law. Executive roles included approval of all contracts that were
not competitively bid, and approval of thousands of land-use decisions,
including the location of City-owned facilities such as shelters and prisons.
Because of the significant powers the Board exercised and the presence of
such an array of elected officials, the Board was widely regarded as the
City's most important institution of governance.
This view of the Board was celebrated by two of the most
accomplished City historians, Walter Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, who
declared:
The Board of Estimate occupies the center of gravity in the city's
political process. Almost all other participants ultimately converge
upon the Board of Estimate because of the inclusiveness of its
powers ....
.. . The Board also provides
political contest ....

. . .

the central stage for the city's

. . . The Board of Estimate as an institution is itself also a
contestant, perhaps the most powerful single participant, in the
148. N.Y. CITY CHARTERREVISION COMM'N, BRIEFING BOOK II-E- 18 to II-E-19 (Jan.
12, 1988) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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city's political process. This power is the result of a number of
extraordinary characteristics combining to make the Board a
unique political and governmental institution. It has the most
generous grant of formal powers of all the city's governmental
institutions; its eight members are the most influential elected
officials in the city government; it has developed a mode of
operation which maximizes both its formal and informal powers;
the relationships of its members with the party leaders are close
and usually stable; it has high prestige with other participants,
particularly with those to whom it provides a public forum; and its
institutional life, especially its informal processes, is surrounded
by a helpful amount of mystery. The story of the Board of
Estimate is the history of an institution steadily acquiring more
formal power, regularly enhancing its formal powers, increasingly
fulfilling its own expectations as an institution. This institutional
success has been achieved most clearly at the expense of the Board
of Aldermen and its successor, the Council-but also at the cost of
the Mayor. 4 9
The Board's proponents offered this description to the courts as a
rational basis for deviation from the "one person-one vote" principle and
to the Commission and the public as the argument for preserving the Board
in some form.
B. The Decision Relied on Law
While we did not share this substantive view of the Board, the
Commission's decision not to pursue weighted voting, and thus effectively
to abolish the Board, was based entirely on a debate focused on law, not
governmental merit.
Although Schwarz's proposals in April assumed a government with no
Board of Estimate (the direction in which Ravitch's ideas had also been
heading), 50 some outsiders, and one member of the Commission, Bernard
Richland, continued to propose weighted voting.
Richland was passionate on the issue. On one early occasion after
Schwarz finished outlining the chairman's initial ideas, which simply
assumed no Board, Commissioner Richland said: "I say to you, like John
149. SAYRE &KAUFMAN, supra note 1, at 626-27.
150. During the Ravitch Commission, numerous leading experts had been hired to
write on the voting rights issues underlying weighted voting. These issues occupied a great
deal of time and attention of the Ravitch Commission.
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the Baptist of old, 'Repent ye, repent ye." '15 Schwarz countered, by
saying: "[W]hen you walk into the headquarters of the CIA at Langley,
they, too, have the Bible on the wall, and it52says, from St. John, '[k]now
the truth and the truth shall set you free."1
It soon became clear that the pressure to "save" the Board had to be
explicitly confronted. The nature and scope of our changes would vary
enormously, depending on whether the Board of Estimate's powers had to
be redistributed. Minds had to be concentrated.
Although Schwarz had given his initial legal reasons against weighted
voting, 153Commissioner Friendly-frustrated because Richland and various
outsiders continually raised the issue-called for an extensive discussion
and vote "because if we don't, we are going to be coming back to that all
the time . . . ."' '4 Schwarz agreed, and said we would distribute to the
commissioners: (1) the computer runs that demonstrate "two conclusions,
both adverse to weighted voting"; and (2) "my best judgment as a
lawyer. "155
On May 2, the Commission extensively discussed weighted voting. "
By a vote of 13 to 1, Commissioner Richland dissenting, the Commission
determined that weighted voting was "not the way to go." 51
This meeting was one of the few with acrimony among the Commission
members. Richland's long argument in favor of weighed voting had
included attacks on the fairness of Frank Mauro's staff work and on former
Chairman Richard Ravitch's supposed bias in selecting consultants on the
voting rights issues.' 58 The fireworks came when Judah Gribetz, a close
friend of Ravitch, became red-faced and angrily said to Richland, "[w]e
should be above personalization and vilification," and (after Richland said
"[d]on't rebuke me, Judah"), added "[y]ou're entitled to be heard on the
substance, but you demean yourself
and us by vilifying people in this room
159
and outside of [this] room."
Without referring to the expert reports, Schwarz presented a series of
legal reasons why weighted voting would present "severe problems" under
151. See Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 64.
152. Id. at 68-69.
153. See, e.g., Public Meeting, Mar. 31, 1989, at 14-16; Public Meeting, Apr. 24,
1989, at 89-91.
154. Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 88-89.
155. Id. at 89-91.
156. Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 1-78.
157. Id. at 77. Fred Friendly, who could not be present, sent a letter of support.
158. See id. at 21-44.
159. Id. at 74.
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both the "one person-one vote" principle and the Voting Rights Act. 16
Under the "one person-one vote" rule, weighted voting would not cure the
fact that, at the extreme, Staten Island residents would still have six times
the access to their borough president as compared with Brooklyn residents.
Even if you could "equalize the vote" you could not "equalize the voice."
The New York State Court of Appeals had already rejected simple
proportional weighted voting, and instead required a system called "critical
votes analysis," developed by Professor Banzhaf. 161 The Supreme Court's
Morris decision cast great doubt on the Banzhaf concept. 62 Further,
Schwarz believed that the concept would not solve the problems anyway:
[Y]ou can't equalize the voice even if you could equalize the vote.
In trying to equalize the vote, simple proportional weighted voting
doesn't work, as the New York Court of Appeals has recognized.
The methods that are more complex, these computer driven
Banzhaf type analyses, the Supreme Court doesn't like, and when
you look at them and they play themselves out,
63 they don't work,
either .... there being too great a deviation.
On the Voting Rights Act, Schwarz said weighted voting presented two
great risks: first, "submergence"-meaning that minorities in the larger
boroughs do not have the same opportunity to influence or elect their
borough presidents; and second, "retrogression"-meaning the loss of
voting power for the Bronx (with a minority borough president) under any
weighted voting scheme that "can be put forward with a straight face under
one person-one vote."164
160. See id. at 4-21. It also would either reduce Staten Island to a "nonentity" or
'clearly violate the law." Id. at 5-6.
161. See generally lannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 229 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967);
R. Alta Charo, Designing Mathematical Models to Describe One-Person, One-Vole
Compliance by Unique Governmental Structures:The Case of the New York City Board of
Estimate, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 784 (1985) (explaining that critical votes analysis
calculates votes in proportion to the district's population, rather than the district's size.
Under critical votes analysis, each voter in every district in theory has the opportunity to
have a decisive effect on the outcome of an election.).
162. See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 699 (1989) ("[I]ts challenge is
hardly met by a mathematical calculation that itself stops short of examining the actual day-

to-day operations of the legislative body.").
163. Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 17; see also Memorandum from Frank J.
Mauro to Judah Gribetz (undated) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review)
(regarding weighted voting).
164. Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 20-21.
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Richland and other advocates of weighted voting argued that New York
City should follow Nassau County's lead in using weighted voting.
Schwarz predicted the Nassau County system would be held
unconstitutional. 65 Four years later, it was." 6
Some advocates of weighted voting did not trust our legal analysis,
because they sensed our opposition to the Board as a governing institution.
Edward Costikyan, a partner at the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, a former head of Manhattan's Democratic Party, and
a persistent and effective advocate for the Board who participated in the
Morris defense, remarked that if Lane had favored the Board as an
instrument of government, Lane would have tried weighted voting and let
the courts decide the legal questions. This is hard to respond to
because-quite apart from our concerns about the Board as "an instrument
of government"-we were absolutely certain that weighted voting could not
solve the Board's constitutional and legal deficiencies.
The substantive problems we saw with the Board, discussed below, had
a significant impact on several of the Commission's proposals. During the
May 2 debate, however, these substantive problems were not discussed at
all, for reasons that reveal something of the delicacy and difficulty of
what we were doing. We proposed radical change to a government that
was in place. A number of the commissioners-or the organizations they
worked for-had important matters before the Board. For them, reliance
on the chairman's legal advice was safe; discussion and a vote on substance
or policy would have been less so.
C. Substantive Problems with the Board
The legislative hearings and the intensive thinking about City
government that we did in the early months led us to conclude that despite
all the attention it garnered and despite all the important things it decided
(or appeared to decide), the Board of Estimate had flaws beyond its
representational illegality. The Board simultaneously exercised too little and
too much power. It lacked the broad legislative authority needed to
promote and effectuate policies different from a mayor's. It nevertheless
threw a stunting shadow across the City's legislative branch-the City
Council. It therefore impeded the healthy development of countervailing
165. See id. at 18.
166. See Jackson v. Nassau County Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.N.Y.
1993); see also Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, to Judge Arthur Spatt (undated) (offering ideas about a
Charter revision process) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
167. See generally Public Meeting, May 2, 1989.
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power to the mayoralty. The Daily News editorial board, writing on the
day of the Commission's vote, echoed these views by saying that, apart
from its legal problems ("sure to be axed by the courts"), "the B of E isn't
worth saving. It's an exercise in deal-making, not policy-setting. The
members strike bargains on homeless 68shelters, for example, but never
consider how to solve homelessness.",
The Board concentrated on specific contracts and land-use matters at
the very end of the process. As a result, it contributed to the City's
tendency to move from crisis to crisis without giving sufficient attention to
the fundamental problems underlying or causing the crises.
While the papers and the politicians all thought the Board was
powerful, it exercised little real power; its most significant role in City
governance was as a trading post for Board members, particularly borough
presidents, to gain mayoral favors in return for Board votes.
Despite claims to the contrary, the Board brought little policy
perspective to the decisions it was required to make, because it functioned
only at the end of the decision-making process-too late to make any
substantial contribution to the decisions shaped by the administration over
considerable time. Despite its formal decision-making power, for the most
part the Board rubber-stamped administrative decisions. Mayors controlled
the Board's agenda, and once they placed a matter before the Board, they
did not intend for it to be defeated. 69 From a political perspective, defeat
of a matter before the Board would have constituted a mayoral failure; even
a close vote could have meant political trouble. Negative votes, except in
the rarest of cases, would constitute political warfare with the mayor, a
battle members of the Board usually did not want to enter. For example,
once Comptroller Jay Goldin decided to challenge Mayor Koch, he then
voted against every contract that came before the Board. Previously he had
supported most, if not all, mayoral contract initiatives.
Of course, in behind-the-scene discussions, members of the Board
occasionally convinced a mayor to make a change. Some such changes
were important. However, members of the Board could not affect the
fundamental issues that were really important for the City. Nonetheless,
the media (and no doubt the Board members themselves) thought the
Board's actions must be critical. After all, the Board members were the
City's most important elected officials. The media attention to the Board's
bi-weekly late-night meetings fed the notion that the Board's playing field
must be where the game was played.
168. Editorial, Nix on Weighted Voting, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), May 2, 1989, at 28.
169. Before the Justice Department, we developed the statistics showing how
incredibly few votes defeated or even disagreed with mayors.
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Even though the mayor dominated the Board, the Board's mandate to
make formal decisions shielded mayors from accountability for their
decisions. A mayor would respond to any finger-pointing by saying that
the mayor could not singly make a decision at the Board and that all who
voted "aye" shared responsibility. In fact, one mayoral aide related that
the mayor's office labeled their efforts to maximize votes for contracts as
an "unaccountability policy." The Commission's concern about such
"policy" is reflected in its core goal of enhancing mayoral accountability
for mayoral decisions, and is evident in a number of Charter provisions,
particularly those dealing with contracts.
The board also had an array of procedural problems. First, discussion
among the members usually took place at private Board meetings the day
before the public hearing and meeting. Second, members of the Board
almost never attended public hearings or meetings, leaving this work to
staff members who, after taking public testimony, cast the "mayor's" or
"comptroller's" or "borough president's" vote. People would wait in line
late into the night to testify before staff members, who sat behind placards
that identified their principals, about an issue that the principals had
privately decided the day before.
This gave rise to Fred Friendly's comment that showed the lasting
negative impact of staff assistants sitting and voting at the Board meetings
(behind plaques indicating "The Mayor," "The Comptroller," etc.):
One of the most shocking moments in the history of this
Commission, and every time it comes up it shocks me again, is
when I've heard that members of the Board of Estimate are not
present and the vote is cast for them by their subordinates. I don't
believe it. Each time I hear it, I say, "This can't be true," and yet
it is true, it's history and this [a requirement that Council members
must vote in person] is being written to make sure it never,
ever
1 70
happens again[,] even after our lifetime, Mr. Richland.
The decision to eliminate the Board confirmed that the Commission's
proposed changes would be broad. The powers of the Board over land use
and contracts had to be redistributed, and the elimination of the Board's
shared power over the budget required attention to budgets as well. While
elimination of the Board did not mean the offices of the members of the
Board- particularly the borough presidents and the council president (now
public advocate)-would disappear, it was also necessary to consider the
170. Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 3940. At a recent event honoring Richland,
Friendly told Schwarz that, long ago, he had warned Board members that the Board's
practice looked terrible and was wrong.
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following: (1) should they disappear?; and (2) if not, what should be their
appropriate roles under a new Charter?
Apart from the changes that we had to consider as a matter of logic, we
wanted to consider others as a matter of policy. Schwarz, at the
Commission's first meeting discussing specific changes, said that if we
merely fixed the Board, then: "[I]f we were to grade ourselves, we would
get a passing grade, perhaps a high passing grade, but we won't get high
marks .... 171

171.

Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 7.
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II. THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES
OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

The decision to abolish the Board of Estimate compelled us to examine
the City government's structure and all of its decision-making processes.
In theory, we could have done nothing but distribute the Board's functions
in land-use, procurement, and budget decision making to other
governmental bodies or elected officials. The legal requirement to review
the entire Charter and our interest in doing so, however, consistent with
our concerns and goals, made a broad review imperative. In fact, from the
end of the Ravitch Commission onward, under the leadership of Frank
Mauro, our thoughtful and experienced director of research, we prepared
for such a review through a variety of research efforts involving the staff
and a broad array of experts. The legislative hearings, discussed earlier,
were part of that effort.
The open question was where to begin this exploration with the
Commission. Should we start, for example, with a discussion of
procurement methodologies leading to the roles of various officials in that
process, or should we start with a discussion of the roles of elected officials
in the government and reach the process questions later?
This question was answered by pressure, both internally and externally,
to focus first on the roles of the elected officials and the structure of
government. Internally, the Commission wanted first, as Vice Chair
Michel said, to talk about "what the structure is going to be before reaching
the details of how the Board's functions should be allocated."' As Michel
explained, it was hard to decide, for example, the role of the borough
presidents with respect to contracts without knowing where borough
presidents would fit in the overall scheme of things. The chairman's Initial
Proposals made assumptions about who the players in City government
would be and about their basic roles. Commissioners wanted, however, to
have some initial general discussion about that broad picture: who would
be the players in the future City government, and what would be the broad
outline of their roles?
Externally, the desire to start with structure and the basics of the roles
of elected officials was expressed by the intense lobbying of public
officials, particularly borough presidents. One newspaper report of an
early Commission hearing read: "[A] parade of public officials passed
yesterday before the commission .... [V]irtually all of them presenting

1. Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 130.

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42

plans to preserve, protect or defend the powers of the posts they hold."'
A week later, another paper opined that "office-holders, office-seekers and
special-interest promoters" were making "varied and complicated"
proposals to the Commission. "But most can be summed up in a single
sentence: 'Give me more power." 3 Because the borough presidents felt
they had the most to lose, they were particularly vociferous and persistent
in lobbying Commission members.
All these "office holders" had faces known to us, and we also knew
that our decisions about their offices would be controversial and painful for
some. Some analysis of structure would be necessary before we could
usefully focus on the details of process, which had to assume a structure.
This decision to deal with structure before process reflected only an
approach to our deliberations. The lines between structure and process (or
operational details) is not clear. For example, the related issues of:
(1) how many appointments to the City Planning Commission should be
made by the mayor and (2) which of the Planning Commission's decisions
could or should be "appealed" to the City Council, are questions of both
structure and operational detail.
Moreover, some issues of pure
structure-such as whether there should be a city council
president-continued to be debated from the earliest to the latest meeting.
Despite the fuzziness of these lines, discussion at the Commission
loosely followed the outline of looking first at the elected officials and then
at the decision-making process-an outline we use in this and the next
chapters of this article. The factors underlying our views and the
Commission's decisions on the first question (structure) are divided below
into sections on: (1) the City Council; (2) the borough voice; (3) the
citywide elected officials; and (4) community government.
I. EXPANDING AND EMPOWERING THE CITY COUNCIL

A. The Emphasis on the Council
Besides the decision to eliminate the Board of Estimate, the decision to
empower and expand the Council was the Commission's most important
decision. Although it was not the most difficult decision-that was

2. Todd S. Purdum, Officials Defend Their Posts to CharterPanel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1989, at B3. Todd Purdum was evoking the constitutional oath of office, which requires
the President to swear (or affirm), to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cI. 8.
3. Editorial, Changing the Charter:Not a Day to Waste, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr.
13, 1989, at 46.
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probably the relationship between the central government and a borough
voice-it was the most important for reasons of both principle and politics.
For a legislature to balance and check the executive branch is the
American norm. For all the messiness of legislatures, for all the criticism
of them, the basic concept is readily understood and reasonably accepted.
Much of the focus of a city government is on the delivery of services,
which have proliferated in New York. Underlying these efforts is the
legislative function of establishing what services ought to be delivered and
at what level of expenditure. These decisions are political in the best sense
of the word; that is, they require processes that maximize public input and
deliberation. In New York in 1989, the City's extraordinary array of
groups and interests assured intense competition for governmental
attention. To accommodate this, we needed to focus on the legislative
branch of City government.
How to work out the Council's role in the administrative functions that
the Board of Estimate had once carried out presented us with a number of
difficult questions, which are discussed briefly below, and in detail in
Chapter VII. 4 One reason for our emphasis on the Council, however, was
the belief that a legislature could better concentrate on the City's basic
problems than the Board of Estimate either had or could, given its lack of
power to address fundamental problems. The Board could decide-but
only at the last minute and very seldom actually changing an administration
decision-where, for example, a shelter could be located. It could not,
however, enact legislation dealing with homelessness. This difference
emerged in an exchange that began when Commissioner Richland
contended that the "basic problems of the City" are matters such as where
shelters could be located. Schwarz replied:
The basic problems of the City are what we should be spending
our money on, how we can act by legislation, or otherwise, to
address our underlying social ills and focusing, characterizing, as
the basic problem of the City, where we should put a shelter, while
absolutely a vital question, is not the basic problem of the City.
The basic problem of the City is-[using the subject of
homelessness to make the point]: How do we avoid so many
people having to go into shelters? And what we should be striving
for is what can we do to help the structure be one that causes
people to focus on what [are] really the basic problem[s] of the

4. See discussion infra Chapter VII.
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City and not the manifestation of that at the last minute of the
process.
Another reason for emphasis on the Council reflected the
Commission's first goal of "fair representation." The Council could be the
most representative of the City's elected bodies. Persons elected from
smaller districts are, by definition, closer to and more likely to reflect their
constituents. Apart from this truism, a Council with an increased number
of members would greatly increase the opportunity of minorities to be
elected. This, we believed, was fair, right, and necessary given the climate
in the city in 1989, and important given how the city's complexion would
change over the decades ahead.
The empowerment of an expanded and more representative Council
also was part of our legal and political strategy. Legally, we knew the
issue with the Department of Justice would be: Did the new Charter
diminish minority rights? We wanted to be able to say, on the contrary,
that it enhanced minority opportunities to participate in the political
process. On the political side, we wanted to prevent the Charter debate
from being "racially divisive," as the mayor had predicted in Gracie
Mansion. We wanted support from all elements of the City; the top
priority of most of the minority participants in the Charter debate was for
an expanded, more representative Council. Since the "one person-one
vote" rule required the Council to be apportioned by population, another
political benefit was that the Council members would overwhelmingly come
from outside Manhattan. While this did not stop some Charter opponents
from sloganizing that the new government would be "Manhattan
dominated," this argument was undercut by the fact that on the 1989 Board
of Estimate seven of eleven votes were cast by people from Manhattan.
Finally, on the political side, an expanded Council appealed to
Republicans, and substantively we believed the City needed more two-party
competition.
We believed the Council was important for many reasons. But what
kind of a Council should it be? Should it be bicameral or unicameral?
Should the borough presidents sit as members? What should be the size of
the Council? Who should draw the district lines (as required after each
decennial census) and what criteria should govern their work? What should
be a Council member's term of office and should there be term limits?
Should our Commission address the Council's internal rules, and, if so,
how? Should Council members be "full" or "part" time or, put more

5.
6.

Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 36-37.
See discussion supra Chapter V.
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accurately, should there be limitations on Council members' outside
income? When should the first election for the new Council take place?
Each of these matters presented important, and sometimes difficult,
questions. Before turning to how we resolved these questions (and why we
did what we did), we set out: (1) the state legislation that relates to the
Council; (2) a brief history of the Council, and how its size and structure
changed from 1898 through 1989; and (3) some observations about the
strengths and weaknesses of the Council as we found it in 1989.
B. The Council's Powers and Status as We Found Them
1. Powers, 1989
The City Council is the City's legislative body, vested with the
legislative power of the City, except as otherwise provided by the Charter.
The legislative power of the City, however, is delimited by the state
constitution, which first mandates a local legislature, 7 and then authorizes
local governments through their legislatures to "adopt and amend local laws
not inconsistent with the provision of this constitution or any general law
relating to its property, affairs or government .
8..."'
A general law, in
contrast to a special law, is defined by the Constitution as one "which in
terms and in effect applies alike to all ... cities . . . . "9 A special law is
defined as one "which in terms and in effect applies to one or more, but not
all, . . . cities . . . . "'0 For the state legislature to act by special law on
the property, affairs, or government of a city, the local legislature must
invite it to do so through a home rule message, defined as a "request of
two-thirds of [its] total membership," or a request of a majority of its
membership along with the mayor." Article IX also contains a directive
that the "[r]ights, powers, privileges and immunities granted to local
governments by this article shall be liberally construed," a provision
intended to repudiate "Dillon's Rule, or the traditional, judicial
rule of
2
interpretation that local powers are to be narrowly construed."

7. SeeN.Y.CONST. art. IX, § l(a).
8. Id.§ 2(c)(i) (emphasis added). Article IX also lists a series of specific legislative
powers that can be exercised by local government in the event that they are not considered
related to property, affairs, or government.
9. Id. § 3(d)(1).
10. Id.§ 3(d)(4).

11.

Id.§2(b)(2)(a).

12.

Id.§ 3(c); see also Richard Briffault, Intergovernmental Relations, inINTER-

GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK

119, 129 (G. Benjamin ed., 1994).
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Despite what seems like a broad preference for local action in the state
constitution, state legislation has often been aimed at micro-managing the
affairs of local governments in general and New York City in particular.
The state courts usually had permitted this. One well-known example is
the New York Court of Appeals upholding legislation that provided for
certain benefits for a cultural institution if it "held fee title to contiguous
[tax] exempt real property in excess of fifty thousand square feet in area for
a period of at least five years" and if the institution was located within "a
city having a population of one million or more"-a term frequently used
in state legislation that is facially neutral, but which in fact covers only
New York City-with "average annual admissions of at least five hundred
thousand persons ... for a period of at least five years .... " 3 According
to the New York Court of Appeals, "[a]lthough the statutory specifications
fit the present statistics applicable to the Museum of Modem Art, there is
no showing that other institutions could not, in time, meet them also." 4
The legislative record and history prove the thinness of that claim.
Clearly the bill was solely directed at the Museum of Modem Art. It has
not, and could not, be used again.' 5 This case also illustrates the low
regard in which the City Council had traditionally been held. The bill in
the State Assembly was initially defeated in part because some members
felt that a home rule message was necessary. It was passed only after a
provision was inserted that required approval by the Board of Estimate (and
not the City Council).' 7 About this defeat and insertion, Chief Judge
Breitel, in his dissent, wrote: "The city's elected legislative body is the
City Council, and it should have been for the council to decide how the bill
should be approved. The Legislature's callous substitution of the Board of
Estimate for the City Council violates both the spirit and the letter of the
home rule .... "18
In 1989, the legislative power of the City Council included: the power
to adopt local laws; the power to override the veto of the mayor; the power
to amend the Charter in certain instances; the power to fill vacancies; the
power to advise and consent on certain appointments; and the power to
investigate and to oversee consistent with its legislative powers. 9 Through
the existing Charter, however, the Council shared its power to appropriate

13. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 307(1), 302(15) (McKinney 1986).
14. Hotel Dorset Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (N.Y.

1978).
15.

See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW

§§ 301, 325 (McKinney 1986).

16. See id.
17.

See id.

18. Hotel Dorset Co., 385 N.E.2d at 1296 (Breitel, C. J., dissenting).
19. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 21, 28 (1976, as amended through 1988).
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money with the Board of Estimate-the Council alone had the power to
raise property taxes-and had no power over zoning legislation.20 This was
part of the Board's authority.2'
2. Status, 1989
Historically, the Council's reputation was not particularly good. Sayre
and Kaufman capsulized the Council as follows:
Though the comment of one was that the chief activity of the
Council is naming streets is certainly unnecessarily ungenerous,
there is just enough truth in this hyperbole to give it some sting.
The legislative record of the City Council has certainly not been
distinguished. Nor is its record as a guardian of the public purse.'
Henry Stem, a former Manhattan "at-large" member of the Council,
said of the Council that it "was not even a rubber stamp because 'a rubber
stamp leaves an impression.'"" While Stem was quick with quips, the
Council sometimes did historically seem to see its role as a junior partner
of the mayor.
Among the reasons for the historic weakness of the Council was the
presence and prestige of the Board, with its jurisdiction over items that
normally would be legislative.
The 1989 Council, however, was not nearly as poor and tawdry as
Sayre and Kauffman, or Stem, described it. To the contrary, the Council
was becoming a more able body with a sense of its representative
obligations and policy-making responsibilities.
Peter Vallone was elected as Council leader in early 1986. Vallone
was ambitious for the Council, strengthened its professional staffs, and
from the start-long before the Supreme Court decision-was a persistent
advocate of the abolition of the Board of Estimate.
Vallone involved the Council in the issues of the day. Despite his own
religious tenets, he allowed the Council to debate and pass one of the
nation's first gay rights laws (which his predecessor had bottled up for

20. See id. ch. 10 § 254.
21. See id. ch. 8 § 200, 201.
22. WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY:
POLITICS INTHE METROPOLIS (W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1960).

23.

Editorial, Vallone Class ofDEM Field,DAILY NEws (N.Y.), Sept. 8, 1998, at 28.
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years). 24 Further, testimony at our legislative hearings evidenced a Council
that demonstrated, in its budget actions, concern for citywide issues, rather
than simply district issues. Indeed, under Vallone, the Council's changes
in the annual City budgets were much more focused on basic City needs
than the Board of Estimate's. Similarly, an expert on the environment said
that the Council "has been the city's major environmental catalyst in recent
years. "25
Our view of the Council was captured by Schwarz's response to
Commissioner Richland's criticism of the Council's competence. After
stating that Richland's view was not "fair to the facts" because it was the
Council, in recent budget negotiations, that "paid attention to important
Citywide needs . .
6 Schwarz added that "it's unfair to our trust in
democracy to assume that a popularly elected body, particularly if we can
make it more representative of all the citizens of New York City, cannot
do the job." 27
As a matter of principle, we had to assume that a democratically
elected body would rise up to reflect the voters' expectations. The Council
under Vallone had stirred from slumber, and was moving in the right
direction, which certainly made it easier for us to move as we did. Despite
its progress, however, the Council was not sufficiently representative and
had too much dead wood.
As we thought about expanding the Council, the subject to which we
next turn, our dominant goal was to increase the opportunities for racial
and (to a lesser extent) political diversity. Additionally, we believed that
expansion of the Council by sixteen members (about fifty percent),
accompanied by the consequent redrawing of all lines and the widened
responsibilities of the body, would draw in new blood and help shake up
the Council.
C. Size, Number of Houses, and Terms of Office
The size of a legislative body, the number of houses, and the terms of
office for its members have historically been central points in debates

24. Jennifer Preston, New Yorkers Peter Vallone: The Council'sNew Whip, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), Dec. 15, 1986, at 4.
25. Eric A. Goldstein, Letter to the Editor, Environmentalists Favor Revised City

Charter,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1989, at A26.
26. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 53-54.
27.

Id.
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concerning the reform and legitimacy of legislative bodies. 28 As might be
expected, our deliberations on the City Council focused on these issues.
Framing the debate were concerns about representativeness, particularly
regarding minority opportunities to elect candidates of their own choice,
efficiency, and an attempt to reach a balance between them.
Regarding size, the New York State Commission on the Governmental
Operations of the City of New York, stated (somewhat in the vein of
Polonius):
[A] legislative body should be large enough to be truly
representative, to provide for deliberation and the debate of public
issues, to prevent control by corrupt influences, and to guard
against too easy a combination for improper purposes. [But] small
enough to get capable men and women, to avoid confusion and
expedite action, to avert excessive involvement by its members in
administrative details, and to center responsibility for its action or
inaction. 9
The Council we found was a unicameral body of thirty-five members,
serving four-year terms, elected from single member districts of
approximately 200,000 constituents each. 30 It consisted of thirty-four
Democrats and one Republican.
It had seven African-American
members. 3' But the history of changes in the Council's size (as well as its
structure) reflected a continuing debate over representativeness. Thus the
Commission joined in an effort to relate the Council's size to New York
City's new demographics, and the needs of the city as we saw them.
1. Historical Changes
The 1898 Charter established a bicameral body consisting of a Board

28. As James Madison wrote in Federalist Papers No. 55: "No political problem is
less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient
for a representative legislature." THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 341 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
29. 3 NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, BACKGROUND RESEARCH ON THETOP STRUCTURE OFTHE GOVERNMENT OFTHE

CITY OF NEW YORK 57 (1961).
30. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 50 (1976, as amended through 1988).
31. See Charles V. Hamilton, Needed, More Foxes: The Black Experience, in URBAN
POLITICS NEW YORK STYLE 359, 380 (Jewel Bellush & Dick Netzer eds., 1990).
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of Aldermen of sixty members and a Council of twenty-nine members.3 2
This arrangement was replaced in 1901 by a seventy-three member
unicameral Board of Aldermen after some claimed the bicameral bodies
were "snarling" City government.33 The aldermen were elected for twoyear terms from single-member districts.34 Borough presidents were also
seated on this body, an idea that was to recur for a short time in 1989.
Charter amendments reduced the size of the Board of Aldermen to sixtyseven in 1916 and to sixty-five in 1921. 35 In 1924, the state legislature
provided for the City's second bicameral legislative body, the Municipal
Assembly, consisting of the Board of Aldermen and the Board of
Estimate.3 6
The City's legislature again became a unicameral body through the
1936 Charter, which created a single-house City Council. 37 Because of the
proportional representation system to select its members for two-year terms
from at-large boroughwide districts, this Council varied in size from a high
of twenty-six members to a low of seventeen.38 The proportional
representation system, created to break the massive Democratic majorities
characterizing earlier legislative bodies and to reduce opportunities for
corruption,39 provided a more representative, or at least a more politically
diverse, body. But this also led to its downfall. For, in addition to a few
Republicans, several Communists and representatives of a variety of other
splinter parties were elected.
Proportional representation was repealed in 1947 by referendum. 40 It
was replaced by a twenty-five member Council whose members, each now
serving four years, were elected from districts co-terminus with state senate
districts on a winner-take-all basis. 4' This again strengthened the
Democratic Party's domination of the Council. In 1949, the first election
after abolishing proportional representation, the Democrats controlled over
80% of the seats (although they only received 52.6% of the vote),

32.

See Edward T. O'Donnell, Changes to the City Charter, 1653-1989, in THE
OF NEW YORK CITY 203, 205-06 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
See FREDERICK SHAW, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY LEGISLATURE 12

ENCYCLOPEDIA

33.
(1954).
34.

See id. at 57.

35. See id. at 59.
36. See id. at 43.
37. See O'Donnell, supra note 32, at 206-07.

38.
39.
40.
41.

See id.
See SAYRE &KAUFMAN, supra note 22, at 617-20.
See O'Donnell, supra note 32, at 207.

Id. at 207.
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compared to the 61% they had controlled in 1945, the last election under
proportional representation. 42
As a result of continuing concern over Democratic dominance of the
City Council, in 1961, by Charter revision, the Council was increased to
thirty-five members with the addition of ten at-large members to the
Council, two from each borough.43 As no party was permitted to nominate
more than one at-large candidate in each borough, and no voter was
permitted to vote for more than one candidate, this plan assured
representation for minority parties." Then, in 1967, the Council was
increased to thirty-seven with the addition of two new districts.' This
change also ended the use of state senate lines as a basis for Council
districting.4 6 In 1973, the Council was again expanded by the addition of
six new districts in an attempt to provide opportunities for more minority
Two more members were added through the
representation.4 7
reapportionment of 1981, resulting in thirty-five single-member districts
and ten at-large borough districts.48
In 1981, the at-large districts were declared unconstitutional as a
violation of the "one person-one vote" rule, because, for example, they
gave both Brooklyn and Staten Island two seats. 49 The at-large districts
were eliminated from the Charter in 1983, by a Charter revision

42. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 22, at 619.
43. See O'Donnell, supra note 32, at 207.
44. See id. at 208; see also Charles Brecher, City Council, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
NEW YORK CITY, supra note 32, at 229.
45. See Douglas Muzzio & Tim Tompkins, On the Size of the City Council: Finding
the Mean, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE REEMERGENCE OF
MUNICIPAL REFORM

89 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989).

46. See Brecher, supra note 44, at 229.
47. See id. at 229-30.
48. See Muzzio & Tompkins, supra note 45, at 89.
49. See Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (decided by Judge
Edward Neaher, who was also the district court judge in Morris), aff'd on opinion below,
688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Giacobbe v. Andrews, 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
The reason for the change of name in the Supreme Court was that Mayor Koch accepted
Schwarz's recommendation that the City not seek review by the Supreme Court because
there was no legitimate argument to counter the Second Circuit's "one person-one vote"
ruling. Anthony Giacobbe, who continued to press for review, was the Republican at-large
member from Staten Island.
A second recommendation that the mayor accepted was to use the Municipal Home Rule
Law to appoint a Charter Revision Commission to focus on Charter changes that were
necessary or sensible if and when the Supreme Court held that the at-large seats could not
survive. This was the first use of a mayorally appointed Charter Commission since 1961
and only the second in over half a century. See Muzzio & Tompkins, supra note 45.
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commission chaired by Columbia's5President Michael Sovern. 50 This left
thirty-five single member districts. '
2. A Unicameral Body with 51 Members
Our own choice of a unicameral body consisting of fifty-one single
member districts reflected several goals: (1) to enhance minority
opportunities to elect candidates of their own choice; (2) to increase
minority membership (and minority-party membership); (3) to maintain a
Council of manageable size in which all members could meaningfully
participate; and (4) to increase constituent responsiveness by decreasing the
size of each district.
An example of how the concern over representativeness dictated our
results was the withdrawal from consideration of a trial balloon bicameral
body. One thought in offering this idea reflected Lane's observation that
some unicameral bodies in single-party jurisdictions tended toward
precipitous legislative action. To force a more disciplined and deliberative
regimen on the City's lawmaking process, we suggested a smaller upper
house. For some members of the Commission, particularly David Trager,
the small upper house was initially seen as an opportunity to give a
legislative role to borough presidents. The issue of bicameralism is
discussed more fully in the borough voice section below.52 The key reason
for withdrawal of the idea was that the addition of a smaller upper
house-nineteen members with borough presidents as members-could
have diminished any gains in minority power in the lower house. This
illustrates the value of the Commission's adopted goals. The commitment
to fair representation as the primary goal trumped any argument in favor
of bicameralism, regardless of its other merits.
After Schwarz suggested expansion to fifty members on April 24,53 the
Commission on May 6 extensively discussed the factors supporting an
increase in the City Council's size.54 Frank Mauro presented detailed
charts with data on the correlation between minority population and
minority representation in the districts of the City Council and in the state
assembly and state senate. This data, and general experience, showed that
"for a minority to have a reasonably effective chance of being elected, you
need a quite high percentage" of minorities in a district-70% or above.5 5
50. See O'Donnell, supra note 32, at 208.
51. See Muzzio & Tompkins, supra note 45, at 89.
52.

See discussion infra pp. 36-42.

53. See Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 48.
54. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 127, 141-88.
55.

Id. at 182.
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This reflected "historic prejudice," and issues of citizenship (fewer
minorities were citizens), age (more minorities were too young to vote),
and voting participation (which, in turn, can be correlated with poverty,
education, and a sense of exclusion)., 6 The data also showed that "if you
alter the size of the districts by making the districts smaller, you increase
57
the number of districts where there will be a 'quite high percentage."
The data also showed that with an increase to fifty districts, the percentage
of "high percentage" minority districts could go up to 35 or 40 % from the
current twenty-six. 58
Based on this data, the Commission voted to expand the Council to
fifty-one members.5 9 Only Commissioner Richland dissented. He argued
that the increase would "fool" people because the results would not be
(As things turned out, the minority numbers on the new
achieved.'
Council in fact went from nine to twenty, or almost 40%.)
Outside the Commission, there was a lot of praise and only limited
controversy over expanding the Council. Some Council members,
including some minority members, argued that enlargement would not
produce our predicted results and that it would reduce the importance of
individual Council members. Substantively, we did not agree with this
view. 6 ' Politically, we had little reason to pay it more than casual
attention. The Council was a clear beneficiary of Charter changes
regardless of what we did on its size. We were confident that Peter
Vallone and other Council members in the end would not jeopardize the
Charter's chances in a referendum.
The number fifty-one was chosen as "an attempt to balance two issues
"62 After we tentatively
...minority representation with workability ....
decided on fifty-one members, some representatives of minority
communities urged us to increase the number of districts still further. They

56. See id. at 175-82.
57. Id. at 82.
58. See id. at 154.
59. See id. at 188. There were 51, rather than 50, to assure an odd number, which
reduced the (theoretical) chances of the need for a tie-breaker vote by the city council
president.

60. See id. at 187.
61. See Letter from Congressman Major Owens, Coalition for Community
Empowerment, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission (Apr. 14, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review)
[hereinafter April 14, 1989, Letter from Congressman Owens to Schwarz] (The Council
members' response was designed to "preserve their personal powers .... We regret the
fact that what is good for most minorities and for the long-term happens to be perceived as

an inconvenience for the incumbents.").
62.

Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 178.
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argued that a fifty-nine member Council would produce even more
majority-minority districts. There was enough "serious testimony" that we
asked Frank Mauro to do another study. 63 After the analysis demonstrated
that an increase to fifty-nine districts would not increase the number of
minority-majority districts, the Commission confirmed its decision to adopt
the fifty-one district plan. The motion to remain with fifty-one was made
by one minority member, Arch Murray, and seconded by another, Amy
Betanzos, who said she was "convinced that staying at the fifty-one will
enhance minority participation and still have a workable size for the
Council."'
This fifty-one member lan was ultimately supported by
leading advocates of a larger Council.
A possible fifty-nine member Council was also discussed from a second
perspective-that of coterminality with the City's fifty-nine community
districts. The 1976 Charter revision required New York City to establish
community districts, each with a community board of not more than fifty
persons for, among other stated reasons, "the planning of community life
within the city, the participation of citizens in city government within their
communities." ''
The 1976 Charter also provided that "[tjhe community
districts may serve as the basis for city council districts for the election of
council members .... "6 7 Building on this provision, Commissioner Amy
Betanzos suggested that there be fifty-nine Council districts, each
coterminous with a community district. This was an intriguing idea.
Coterminality could create more legislative accountability and electoral
competition as community board members observed and worked with the
Council members from their district. Unfortunately, we could not do this,
because the community boards were not nearly of equal population, and,
leaving aside the angst of change, their purposes required other criteria to
take precedence. Coterminality thus expired on the alter of the "one
person-one vote" rule.
D. Redistricting
Almost as important as expanding the Council were our decisions
relating to the Council's redistricting. The goal to increase opportunities
for minority representation depended, not just on the size of a district, but

63. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 34-35 (referring to public hearings and
public meetings).
64. Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 46-52.
65. See, e.g., Public Hearing, July 21, 1989, at 255-64 (containing testimony of Dr.
Luther Blake, Coalition of African Americans and Latinos for a Just City Government).
66. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 69 § 2700 (1976).
67. Id. § 2701(d).
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on who drew the lines and what criteria were followed. More generally,
the integrity of district line-drawing lends legitimacy to the legislative
process.
Expanding the Council's size to fifty-one could not, by itself, guarantee
the Commission's goals of providing more minority representational
opportunities and achieving broader representation generally.
Accomplishing these goals also depended upon the districting system
because "how the district lines are drawn is the way in which to deliver on
the expectation and design of enhancing representation for underrepresented
groups in the Council.""8 In attempting to improve districting, there is the
"how" approach and the "who" approach. "How" equals districting
criteria; "who" equals who does the districting. 69
1. Criteria
The insertion of districting criteria into constitutional-type documents
has a long-and often unsuccessful-history, as reformers sought ways to
counter self-protective legislative redistricting. In 1989, the existing
Charter included a number of the traditional criteria-such as protection of
communities and compactness-as well as the "one person-one vote"
doctrine inspired by the Supreme Court cases from the 1960s that imposed
the standard on state and local legislative districting. 70 The Commission's
several additions to the criteria reflected the Commission's goals and the
issues of our day.
The first addition, a provision that districting was to ensure "effective
representation of racial and ethnic minorities,"71 was proposed and passed
at one of our earliest meetings.72 It was placed second in the order of
priority of the districting criteria, following only the obligatory "one
person-one vote" criterion.
This provision not only furthered the paramount goal of a more
representative government, but also served some of our more political
68. Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 2.
69. For a distinction between "who" and "how," see David Wells' testimony at the
Public Hearing, July 19, 1989, at 236-50. Mr. Wells had worked on New York districting
issues for 30 years, and was the plaintiff in Wells v. Rockefeller, 311 F. Supp. 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), the case which held New York's Congressional districting
unconstitutional. Testifying near the end of our process and focusing on the "how," Wells
said the Commission's approach was "praiseworthy" and "commendable" and suggested
a further improvement. See Public Hearing, July 17, 1989, at 236-50; Public Meeting, July
31, 1989, at 64-67.
70. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
71. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 130.
72. See id. at 130-39.
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aims. We wanted to avoid the "racial divisiveness" that had been predicted
at Gracie Mansion.' On the Commission itself, this addition was one of
several early steps that solidified the support of the core of our minority
members-as can be seen by the enthusiastic reactions of Commissioners
Gourdine and Betanzos. 4 In addition, this provision was one more signal
to minority voters and minority groups of the seriousness of our efforts.
Finally, provisions like this certainly could only be helpful in a Justice
Department review.
While we emphasized districting criteria designed to increase political
opportunity for minorities, we-with the knowledge and understanding of
gay leaders-did not emphasize a change designed to increase political
opportunity for gays. The existing Charter included a districting criterion
that, to the maximum extent practical, "district lines shall keep intact
neighborhoods and communities with established ties of common interest
ethnic, or
and association, whether historical, racial, economic,
76
religious." 75 We added the words "or other" to this list.
We intended this addition to increase the opportunity for New York's
gay community to elect a representative of its own. This attempt was
cloaked in more general language because a more specific term might cause
unnecessary controversy.
The gay community in New York, after years of fighting for equal
rights protection 77 and organizing themselves and the resources of the City
the existing
term "common
in
the fight
AIDS, understood
districtCharter's
lines to create
a district
interest
andagainst
association.
They wanted
in Manhattan that increased the likelihood of a gay person being elected to
the Council. After several meetings with leaders of the gay political
community, we agreed on the "or other" language at a meeting in
Schwarz's law office. In response to concern that the term "other" could
be interpreted without reference to the gay community (although all agreed
that it was hard to imagine to what other community reference could be
made, given the Charter's existing list). We agreed to provide a clear

73.
74.
75.

See discussion supra Chapter V.
See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 130-32.
See Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 71; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2A § 52(c)

(1989).
76. See Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 71; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2A § 52(c)
(1989).
77.

See NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No. 2 (1986). The City finally included legislation

in the City Charter that prohibited sexual orientation discrimination in 1986.
78. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2A § 52(c) (1989).
79. That they were willing to accept our solution was substantially helped by the
efforts of Tim Tompkins, Lane's executive assistant, who, among many other duties, was
the Commission's informal liaison with the gay community.
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statement of intent to the new Districting Commission, upon its
establishment. This was done by Lane as a lead-off witness to the
Districting Commission in 1990.
One last criterion was unique for its political value to the Commission.
Section 52(f) provides that district lines may not be drawn "for the purpose
of separating geographic concentrations of voters enrolled in the same
political party into two or more districts in order to diminish the effective
representation of such voters." 0 Staten Island Council Member Susan
Molinari, the only Republican in the Council, suggested this criterion, to
limit political gerrymandering, at a public hearing. 8' The Commission
agreed with this criterion.8 2 It was a good idea for two additional reasons.
First, one of our goals in expanding the Council was to increase political
diversity on the Council. Second, Molinari's support would help with two
groups-Staten Islanders and Republicans. Indeed, the combination of
more districts and this provision were a reason for support from not only
Molinari but also State Senator Roy Goodman, chairman of the 1975
Charter Commission as well as of the New York County Republican Party.
In addition, Susan Molinari's father, Guy, a Congressman running for
Staten Island borough president, supported the Charter.
2. The Districting Commission
In 1989, responsibility for Council district line-drawing rested with a
districting commission of nine politically and geographically diverse
members. The mayor appointed all nine of the members, but the City's
two largest political parties each nominated ten members. The mayor had
to choose two from each party. The mayor also designated the
commission's chairman.
This districting system had been in place only since 1983. Prior to that
the Council performed its own districting. Nonetheless, the 1983 Sovern
Charter Revision Commission decided to grant the appointment power to
the mayor as a response to the debacle over the Justice Department's
rejection of the Council's 1981 districting plan under the Voting Rights
Act.
Even though this system had only been in place for six years, we did
not favor leaving so much power to the executive in a system where the
legislature was meant to be independent of, and a check on, the executive.
Imagine a mayor indicating to Council members that district lines-a
subject in which legislators are intensely interested-might be affected by

80. N.Y.
81.

CITY CHARTER ch. 2A

§ 52(f) (1989).

See Public Hearing, July 17, 1989, at 78-79.

82. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 63.
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how a Council member acted on matters that concerned the mayor. Even
though Commissioners Betanzos and Murray had served on the Sovern
Commission, the Commission agreed that we should change the system
again. The question was, "how?"
a. The Appointors
Our initial focus was on how the Districting Commission members
should be appointed. While Peter Vallone and other members of the
Council lobbied to regain the power lost to the Council in the 1983 Charter
amendments, the Commission never even considered such a change. Not
only was the 1981 debacle of recent vintage, but in our view, left to their
own devices (or vices), all legislatures charged with redistricting
themselves address only the members' self-interest and pay as little heed
as possible to other considerations. Moreover, such an approach would
undermine our efforts to make the Council accountable and stronger by
encouraging competition for its seats. It could also undermine the goal of
increasing minority opportunity. Neither did we think that a strong
legislature required districting power as long as the process of districting
was not mayorally dominated. Finally, we viewed independent districting
as a reform to enhance legislative legitimacy. This latter point played into
our political strategy. Independent districting commissions generally are
high on the "good government" lists of civic and reform groups, as well as
editorial boards. The support of these groups was an important element of
our formula for political victory. Their support would have been at some
risk had we chosen another alternative. On the other hand, we had no
concern whatsoever about losing the Council's support as long as the
fundamental shifts in power were in its direction.
Consistent with strengthening the Council and making it an independent
check on the mayor, the Commission decided early to increase the size of
the independent districting commission to fifteen and to reduce the mayor's
overall appointment power from five out of nine to seven out of fifteen.83
The Commission also decided that the Council's appointments should be
direct. The political party with the largest delegation was assigned five
appointments, while the second largest delegation was assigned three.8"
Political and borough diversity were also required. A majority of the
Commission chose the chairman.

83. See Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 3-4.
84. Because the possibility existed, in theory at least, that the Council could be entirely

Democratic, provisions were made for the city's second largest party through its county
committees to make nominations (not appointments) to the mayor.
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b. The Appointees
Section 50(7)(1) of the Charter requires that the Districting
Commission "shall" include members of the "racial and language minority
groups" protected by the Voting Rights Act "in proportion, as close as
practicable, to their population in the city."s" As we discuss below, despite
the Justice Department's approval, this ultimately was held
unconstitutional-but not until after the new Districting Commission
redistricted the City for the election of the new Council in 1991. 86
The general subject was first raised by Borough President David
Dinkins' testimony before the Commission on April 4, 1989:
See, I know as a victim of apportionment back in 1966 from the
state legislature that. . . it depends on where the lines are, and
where the lines are gets to be a function of who makes the lines,
or we used to say who chooses the choosers, and so it depends.8 7
Others made many similar comments during the early months of
hearings and meetings. Given the history of discrimination, the idea of
minority participation in districting was fundamental (just as increased
diversity on the Council was fundamental for the Commission). However,
the method for effecting it was problematic. At our May 6 public meeting,
Commissioner Betanzos proposed that the Districting Commission be
"reflective of the ethnic and racial composition of the City, because I think
the lines would be very different if it were that rather than nine white
men. "88 While other members of the Commission supported this thrust,
as exemplified by Commissioner Gourdine, s9 questions were raised about
the ambiguity of such language and whether it should be more specific.
Nothing was resolved, and a similar discussion, equally as inconclusive,
took place at the Commission's May 13 public meeting. 9°

85. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2A § 50(b)(1) (1989).
86. See Ravitch v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ. 5752, 1992 WL 196735
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). For a discussion involving the Commission's acceptance of this
provision, despite Schwarz's first negative reaction, see infra notes 91-97 and
accompanying text.
87. Public Hearing, Apr. 4, 1989, at 41.
88. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 135-36. Under the old Charter, the Districting
Commission had nine members. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2A § 50(a) (1976, as
amended through 1988).
89. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 138. "[W]ho makes the decision, will often
impact on what the decision is." Id.
90. See Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 488-94.
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The topic of the Districting Commission's diversity intensified during
the period of public comment and at seven public hearings (mid-May to
mid-June) that followed release of the Commission's preliminary proposals.
In addition to the public hearings at which the issue was raised,
commissioners and members of the staff held several meetings with citizens
and various groups. While these meetings covered a vast array of topics
and took place with the full gamut of groups in the City, a cross section of
minority groups expressed a powerful sense of political exclusion and
cynicism about reform.
Our plans to expand the size of the Council and to make the "fair and
effective representation" of minorities a key districting criteria were
praised.
Nonetheless, the witnesses and various groups remained
concerned about whether future districting commissions would, in fact,
carry through on the Charter Commission's goals. For example, at a fourhour evening meeting that Gretchen Dykstra, Commissioner Paredes, and
Schwarz held in Chinatown, with some twenty-five representatives of the
City's growing Asian-American community, the participants contended that
prior City and state reapportionments had unfairly divided the City's AsianAmerican communities. They reiterated their view that a Districting
Commission without an Asian-American member would be unfair to them,
and would dampen the enthusiasm needed to foster increased voter
registration and participation. Similarly, Latino advocates and officials
meeting in Borough President David Dinkins' offices told Schwarz, Lane,
and Commissioner Betanzos that the Commission's aims for reform on
"fair representation" could not be assured without Latino representation on
the Districting Commission.
Frank Mauro initially responded to these concerns at the Commission's
June 22 meeting by saying that the Districting Commission "shall include"
minorities protected by the Voting Rights Act. 9' Mauro pointed out "[tihe
advantages and disadvantages of that: The strength is, that it insures that
there will be some representation on the Districting Commission of some
groups. What it doesn't do... some have said it doesn't insure any sort
of proportionality."'
To this, Schwarz immediately added: "I don't think we should be
writing quotas into the Charter, but we should signal that we want those
appointments to be made. "93
From Schwarz's perspective, the risk of quotas in the Charter was that
they might encourage racial controversy. From a political standpoint, how
would long-time opponents to quotas, like Mayor Koch, react?

91. See Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 25-26.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 26.
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Commissioner Gourdine challenged Schwarz's thinking by indicating
that if "quota" was the proper word, we already planned one with party
membership on the Districting Commission. He added that it was "very,
very important" that we assure "the representation of all the protected
groups" and that the Districting Commission reflect the "aspirations, at
least, if nothing else, the backgrounds of the people we are seeking to
protect."'94 Commissioner Paredes added, "I see your great interest in
being fair by serving the racial and language groups . . . ." adding
somewhat critically, that without a more concrete proposal than the one
Frank Mauro had begun with the current proposal "[s]till that doesn't
protect us."'95
During a break, Lane met with Gourdine. Lane concluded that
mandating minority participation could be legally defended as a tool to
protect voting rights goals, and that it would be desirable to accept
Gourdine's position.
Shortly thereafter, Schwarz accepted this tentative conclusion. The
reasons were several. On the legal side: (i) there had been historic-and
recent-discrimination against minorities in drawing Council lines; (ii) in
contrast to set-asides for minorities in governmental contracting or for a
governmental job, here there would be no non-minority "victim"-unlike
the nonminority contractor or job applicant who (absent a quota or setaside) presumably would take the contract or job-no person would
otherwise be entitled to a position on the Districting Commission; and
(iii) this was not to be an ongoing institution of government, but rather an
episodic (every ten years), short-term, unpaid, political function where the
task was, in part, to implement the policies of the Voting Rights Act. On
(i) was very important to the
the political side, this proposal:
Commission's minority members; (ii) would be helpful with a number of
advocates; and (iii) might be helpful with the Justice Department. In
addition, however sensitive to discrimination or attuned to the need for
fairness that a non-minority person may be, an African American, or a
Hispanic, or an Asian American can bring valuable added insights and
experiences to an issue.
On June 27, 1989, the Commission, without dissent or debate, 96
adopted the proposal that ultimately became part of the Charter.97 We
would have more than a month between this meeting and our last round of

94. Id. at 29-31.
95. Id. at 35-36.
96. This must reflect Schwarz having had some one-on-one telephone calls with
commissioners, explaining the justifications for the provisions.
97. See Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 3-7; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2A § 50

(1989).
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meetings to subject the provision to public debate and to test its
controversiality.
In marked contrast to some matters about which we received multiple
comments, however, there were relatively few comments on this provision.
Of those, all but two were favorable. 98 The first criticism was in a letter
from the Jewish Community Relations Council and in parallel testimony
from David Pollock representing that group. Pollock's testimony was very
restrained. The Commission had been "ingenious" in its work on
Nevertheless, the "proportionality" language was
redistricting.
"problematic [for] us." 99 Pollock recognized prejudice in the political
system by stating, "I hope for the day in my lifetime that prejudice will
cease against African Americans and Latinos."'10 He went on to say that
Chinese Americans, as well as Greek, Irish, and Italian Americans ("[w]e
can run the gamut"), also deserve representation.0 1
The other negative comment came from Mayor Koch in a letter to
Schwarz that arrived on July 28, just three days before we were to start our
final three days of hearings.' 0 2 The last of the mayor's four stated concerns
about the pending Charter draft related to the proportionality provision.
Again, the comment was muted. The mayor began by saying that "any
mayor, in the interest of fundamental fairness," would want to assure that
all groups are "fairly represented" on a districting commission. 3 He
echoed one of our points: This "imperative" is strongest on a body like the
Districting Commission which will "allocate political power for the ensuing
decade. " " The mayor did not agree, however, that it would be "wise" to
require membership based upon protection status under the Voting Rights
Act.'0 5 He remarked, "[a]s you know, I believe that this type of legally
in our
mandated proportionality based on race and ethnicity has no place
6
system of government. I urge you not to go down this road."'

98. Favorable comments came, for example, from Julius Chambers (Executive
Director/Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund), Roscoe Brown
(President of One Hundred Black Men), Ruben Franco (President and General Counsel of
the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund), and David Dinkins.
99. See Public Meeting, July 21, 1989, at 171.
100.
101.

Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.

102. See Letter from Edward Koch, Mayor, City of New York, to Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Review Commission 4-5 (July 28,
1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter July 28, 1989, Letter from Mayor Koch to
Schwarz].
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id.
105.

Id. at 4-5.

106. Id. at 5.
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This letter, although muted, caused us concern. Serious opposition
from Mayor Koch, particularly on an issue such as this, could have spelled
disaster for our attempts to avoid-indeed to bridge-racial tensions. It
could jeopardize our referendum chances.
We thus went with some foreboding to Gracie Mansion for an outdoor
meeting on a beautiful summer weekend morning to go over the mayor's
four concerns with the mayor, Deputy Mayors Bobby Wagner and Stan
Brezenoff, and others. This was just one or two days before our final
meetings were to be held. What would we do if the mayor decided to
oppose the Charter on this basis? Was compromise possible? Schwarz
explained the context of our decision, particularly the prior discrimination
and "no victim" points, and urged the mayor-despite his well-known and
deeply felt principles-to accept what the Commission had done. The
mayor did not voice disagreement. We left reasonably assured that, while
we may not have convinced the mayor, he would support our overall effort.
This he did as soon as the Commission had finished its work.10 7
A couple of days before the meeting with Mayor Koch, Schwarz met
with Commissioner Gribetz to urge Gribetz to support the overall Charter
despite having lost on a few issues. Gribetz told Schwarz that Pollock and
some others had been pressing him on the issue of the Districting
Commission's composition. Schwarz reminded Gribetz of the arguments
in favor of our position. Gribetz responded that he had told the protestors
to "cool it."
In retrospect, it is unfortunate that we were not pressed harder on the
issue. If we had been, a compromise was available. We could have
limited the proportionality requirement to the first districting for the new
Council. This was, after all, what the Commission was concerned about.
As a remedy for past discrimination, moreover, a one-shot requirement
such as that should have sailed through the courts.
The Justice Department specifically approved the proportionality
requirement. The argument later failed with the district court, and this
decision was not appealed. 03 The plaintiffs did not challenge the
application of the provision to the districting for the new Council's 1991
election; the court's decision came after that. Effectively, therefore, the

107. During the Charter referendum campaign, the mayor did not say anything about
this provision. But in 1990, during a public panel on the new Charter with Schwarz and
others, he attacked the challenged provision, while still supporting the Charter overall.
108. See Ravitch v. City of New York, No. 90 Civ. 5752, 1992 WL 196735
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). Richard Ravitch, who was the lead plaintiff, had been the Commission's
prior chairman. See NEW YORK, N.Y., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CERTIFICATE OF
APPOINTMENT TO CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION

(Dec. 16, 1986).

During the

referendum, Ravitch remained silent on the issue-a course of action that had been urged
upon him by Schwarz at a luncheon during the referendum campaign.
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proper compromise solution was what happened. Schwarz later felt that he
had, in this instance, been asleep at the switch and had not thought through
the issues adequately.
E. No Term Limits
In an early article, Schwarz was quoted as characterizing the City as
a one-party state where incumbents hold office for life. 9 We did not do
anything about the "for life" part of this characterization. The Ravitch
Commission had discussed whether to add term-limits provisions to the
Charter. It had decided not to.
We had no inclination to reopen the issue. Both of us opposed term
limits, particularly for legislators."' Moreover, we were working in the
year of a contested mayoral primary where one candidate had been in office
for three terms. Therefore, even if the Commission had favored term
limits for executives, to decide that in the summer of 1989 might have
appeared to be intervening in the primary battle."'
F. The Powers of the New Council
The Council was charged with exercising the City's legislative powers,
Prior to 1989, the Council
as defined by state law and by the Charter.
shared budget enactment authority with the Board of Estimate. It had no
responsibility for City zoning, land-use decision making, contracts, or
franchises.
1. Lawmaking Powers
The abolition of the Board of Estimate required distribution of its
powers to other institutions of government. The assignment of the budget
and zoning powers, both fundamentally legislative, to the Council was an
obvious decision-consistent with our goals of empowering the legislature,

109. See Purdum, Officials Defend Their Posts to CharterPanel,supra note 2.
110. See Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Editorial, Term Limits Is an Idea Whose Time
Hasn't Come, DAILY NEvs (N.Y.), Oct. 28, 1993, at 51. The editorial opposed the term
limits referendum put on the ballot by Ronald Lauder's efforts (and money). The
referendum succeeded.
111. The Charter was subsequently amended to provide for term limits. See N.Y.
CITY CHARTER ch. 50 § 1138 (1989, as amended through 1993).
112. See discussion infra Chapter VI.
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making it more representative, and creating a more traditional legislativeexecutive model.
The difficult decisions were whether to allocate to the Council the
Board's individual decision making on land use, contracts, and franchises.
In land use, for example, the Board was charged with deciding all sorts of
particular land-use issues, such as whether a special permit for a developer
should be issued. These decisions were not questions of broad policy.
Such decisions almost always compromise legislative deliberation.
Legislatures work best when their efforts are directed at broad lawmaking,
and where most of the members have a representative stake and interest in
the outcome. Legislatures work at their worst when the subject is narrow,
relating, for example, to a single member's interest or district. In this
situation, the public is often denied legislative deliberation. Systems of
member prerogatives tend to arise, and the member whose district or
interest is effected tends to control the issue. Other members accede
because they expect to exercise a similar prerogative when an issue affects
their districts. Failure to attract the full body's attention can also make
such decisions the breeding grounds for corruption. In fact, in 1905 the
Council's power to approve individual franchises was ended after a scandal
erupted over the Council's exercise of that power." 3
Not every decision results in the same dynamic. For instance, a
decision to block putting a shelter in a particular district touches the entire
legislature. As long as shelters are needed, they must go somewhere, and
one legislator's refusal to permit a shelter in his or her district means that
it has to go to another, ultimately making the question of shelters the
legislature's-and not a particular legislator's-issue.
On this basis, we initially opposed any such grants of authority. This
remained the Commission's final determination on contracts and franchises.
Thus, while the Board of Estimate had to approve all noncompetitively bid
contracts, the Council has no such power.
Some members of the Commission and a great many advocates differed
with us on this point regarding land-use issues. They argued that such
decisions were often highly controversial in the neighborhoods that they
affected, and that they required political oversight. With this view we had
little problem, and we arrived at a procedural method to determine whether
a particular project was controversial. Under this approach, if government
participants in the land-use review process could not reach consensus,
Council review could be triggered. This "triple no" approach, as it came
to be known, provided the additional advantage of enhancing the role of the
affected borough president in local land-use decision making because their
position would be the trigger for Council review. This solution satisfied

113.

See SAYRE &KAUFMAN,

supra note 22, at 629.
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almost all members of the Commission, but not some advocates,
particularly those associated with a number of reform groups. The Puerto
Rican Legal Defense Fund argued that our failure to grant the full power,
once held by the Board of Estimate, to the Council would violate the
Voting Rights Act. In the end, as we discuss at greater length in Chapter
VII, " the position of the reform groups and the legal issues led us to allow
review any land-use item if fifty percent of the
the Council to "call-up" for
5
Council voted to do so.1
2. Power over the Council's Own Budget
A somewhat obscure issue, but one of significant importance to our
goal of an independent legislature, related to the Council's budget for its
own operations. Most legislatures create their own budget, which is then
included in the budget bills sent to the executive for his or her
consideration. 1 16 In New York City, however, the Council was
traditionally treated as an agency, just like the Transportation or Sanitation
Departments. Thus, the Council's proposed budget first had to be
submitted to the mayor before it was included in a budget bill. The mayor
could effectively control the Council's budget by controlling what went into
the budget bill and the form it took.
Our change, modeled on the state system, was to give the mayor only
one shot at the Council's budget through the mayor's power to veto budget
items, subject then to a Council override.
G. The Council's Rules of Procedure
While an arcane subject, legislative rules are an extremely important
part of the legislative process: assigning power, defining procedure, and
shaping policy. Every house of every legislature operates under procedural
rules that govern everything from the form of a bill to the method by which
it is introduced and considered. For the most part, legislative rules are not
found in constitutional documents, but in the standing rules of the particular
legislature, promulgated pursuant to the almost generic constitutional grant
that each legislative body should determine its own rules. In response to
public dissatisfaction with legislative practices, these broad grants of

114.
115.
116.
52-65.

See discussion infra Chapter VII.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 §197(a)-(d) (1989).
See Public Meeting, May 13, 1989 at 511-12; Public Meeting, May 15, 1989 at
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authority have historically been limited by the addition of procedural rules
to constitutions.
Such changes often have limited impact on the legislative process. For
example, the New York State Constitution requires a state bill to mature on
legislative desks for three days before passage, 117 but in Albany almost
every important bill is passed on the last day or two of the session under
a gross misuse of the governor's power to issue a "message of
necessity.""l I8 Some constitutional rules also introduce the courts in the
legislative process. Where the rule is clear, but ignored, this may be of
value. Where the rule is unclear, however, judicial imposition on
legislative practices is not something to be encouraged." 9
In 1989, the Charter contained a number of such rules, including rules
providing for a vice chairman (now speaker);' 20 requiring a majority of all
Council members for enactment of a bill;'12 mandating that the vote of each
imposing single subject, title, and aging
member be recorded;
requirements;"' 3 and requiring professional budget staff. 24
The abolition of the Board of Estimate and ascension of the Council
to a central policy-making role created a serious debate over rules relating
to the power of the Council's leadership, the accessibility of its processes,
and the responsibilities of its members. The Council had a long tradition
of excessive leadership dominance. To many, Vallone, while greatly
improving the quality of the Council's work, maintained this tradition. The
Council also had a long and shabby tradition of reducing opportunity for
the public to participate and observe its processes. Frequently, for
example, it held committee meetings without meaningful notice and
provided little information as to what occurred. Finally, the Council's new
governmental centrality raised questions concerning the appropriateness of
its members serving "part time"-a misnomer, as we illustrate below.
Against this background, many of the participants in the Charter
revision process expressed concern that our goal of a meaningful legislature

117. See N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 14.
118. See Editorial, What's the Rush? The State Constitution Gives the Public Three
Days to Review Legislation; Budget After Budget, the Governor Takes that Right Away,
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), June 6, 1996, at A8 ("It has been common practice for
the governor to issue messages of necessity that allow the three-day requirement to be
circumvented.").
119. See, e.g., King v. Cuomo, 613 N.E.2d 950 (N.Y. 1993); Heimbach v. State,
454 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1982).
120. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 44 (1989, as amended through 1997)."
121. See id. § 34 (1989).
122. See id. § 35(b).
123. See id.§§ 36, 41.
124. See id. § 37.
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would be frustrated by a procedural framework that allowed the
concentration of too much power in the hands of the legislative leadership,
denied the public the opportunity to observe legislative efforts, and allowed
members to pursue second careers that could divert their attention from the
legislative task and possibly create other forms of conflicts. Schwarz
characterized some of these concerns at the June 22 public meeting: "[T]he
specter that has been mentioned [by a number of reform groups] is, that the
mayor and one person (the legislative leader) [will be] able ... to control
everything in the City."'" Responding to the criticism from Commissioner
Richland that imposing any rules on the Council would undercut its
"standing and dignity," Commissioner Leventhal said that, as a "matter of
general principle," we should not impose specific rules on the Council.
However, because there was "a major shift in power and responsibility,"
the standards we suggested seemed "very reasonable" and should actually
"enhance the ability of the Council to get the public confidence in its
expanded role." 26 Schwarz said the same-and added that we were being
"responsive" to concerns "from a number of quarters." 2 7
1. A Little Decentralization
Our primary goal was to create a strong legislature. This may include,
but is not the same as, strong legislators. While we wanted the members
of the Council to be of the highest quality (and we wanted the full support
of the reform community), central to our own policy view was a legislature
that would assert itself as a body both in its policy-making and its
investigatory functions. This required the type of discipline that was
difficult to achieve without a strong leadership structure, particularly in a
unicameral, largely one-party, legislative body.
Additionally, our own view was that as strong as a speaker was, he or
she could only exercise leadership power with the approval of a large
number of legislators. On the other hand, it became evident that we had
to adopt some changes to accommodate the demands of a number of good
government groups who were our potential allies-and to do so regardless
of whether these changes were only symbolically important. Attention
focused on the Council leader's power to appoint committee chairs, and to
control committee and legislative floor agendas. Legislation could not
move without the leader's approval, regardless of the support in the
Council for that legislation. This appeared to be an extraordinary power

125. Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 94.
126.

Id. at 93-95.

127. Id. at 93-94.
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for a single individual. To address this situation, we proposed the
following changes, found in section 46 of the Charter:
The council shall determine the rules of its own proceedings .
Such rules shall include, but not be limited to, rules that the chairs
of all standing committees be elected by the council as a whole;
that the first-named sponsor of a proposed local law or resolution
be able to require a committee vote on such proposed local law or
resolution; that a majority of the members of the council be able
to discharge a proposed local law or resolution from committee..
128

Facially, each of these changes provides an opportunity for members
to circumscribe overly strong leadership. However, certainly on the rules
relating to discharge of a bill from a committee to the floor, the act of
discharge would signal a breakdown in leadership that would probably
mean the end of that leader's tenure.
2. More Public Accessibility
Legislative accessibility presented an entirely different and much
clearer issue. Meaningful participation in the legislative process requires
information about its activities. The Council-like most legislative bodies
when left to their own devices-had been sloppy, at best, about assuring
opportunities for public observation and participation. Many advocates
commented on how hard it was to find out what went on at the Council,
particularly at its committee meetings. This was a real problem and needed
a remedy.
The Commission added provisions that required: (i) reasonable notice
of all committee meetings and that all committee votes be recorded and
publicly available; 2 9 (ii) Council meetings to be reasonably noticed and that
such notice include a list of proposed local laws to be considered; 3 ' and
(iii) complete transcripts of each Council meeting and committee hearing
13
be made available to the public.'
Council committee budgets were also
32
1
published.
be
to
required

128.

N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 46 (1989).

129.

See id.

130.
131.

Seeid§42.
Seeid. §45.

132.

See id.
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Finally, Council members were required to vote personally, rather than
by proxy. 33 This reflected the Commission's disdain for the proxy voting
practice of the Board of Estimate. Hearing of the Board's proxy voting
became, as Fred Friendly
34 said, "one of the most shocking moments" in the
Commission's history. 1
3. "Full Time" Versus "Part Time" Council Members
Given that we were about to increase greatly the powers,
responsibilities, and status of the City Council, some people-mostly
outside the Commission, but some inside as well-pushed very hard for us
to require that Council members work "full-time" on the Council. Harriet
Michel found it "absolutely inconsistent" with empowering the Council,
and giving it increased responsibility and visibility, not to "require that
those who
will be doing this important job, give it their full-time attention
,135
As phrased, it was hard to argue with the position. However, the
terms "full-time" and "part-time" were misleading. The real question was
whether we wanted to compel people on the Council to have no other
source of earned income. 36 This would:
get into all of the issues that are bedeviling the United States
Congress of how you define proper income versus improper
income. You get into class distinctions, where people who happen
to be wealthy because they clip coupons, have a favored status
over people who, consistent with the obligation to work hard,
make some money from some other work. 131
Moreover, of the existing Council members who worked "full-time,"
some were very good, and others were "not very good and not very
productive.' ' 38 Similarly, there were members with another source of
earned income who are "very good and who work enormously hard,"
whereas others flopped on both counts. 13' Thus, the factual record had not

133.

See id. § 35.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 39.
Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 105-06.
See Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 107-10.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id.
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established a "clear litmus test" between "people who are productive and
the people who are not."140
Historically, as Judah Gribetz pointed out, this country has a tradition
of "citizen legislatures," mixing people who had outside jobs with those
who did not. 141 The assumption was that42both were expected to devote
"equal time" to their duties as a legislator. 1 This is still true for a number
of state legislatures.
In addition to these historical and conceptual difficulties, there was the
practical and political concern that if Council members could not have any
outside earned income, it would be unfair not to recommend a substantial
increase in pay. Given all the other issues we needed to ask the voters to
focus on, "recent history tells one" that to put the question of "what
politicians ought to be paid" to the voters would "not serve the end" of the
public accepting the reforms we believed were necessary and
appropriate. 43 We did, however, make one change in the Charter to
increase attention to the issue. Over the previous several years, changes
in pay for elected officials had been based upon recommendations by a
panel of distinguished outsiders. As Gene Russianoff-the unflappable and
indefatigable reform advocate from New York Public Interest Research
Group ("NYPIRG")-pointed out to us, the Shin Commission (known for
its chair, insurance executive Richard Shin) had in its most recent review
decided that it did not have legal authority to consider the outside income
of Council members.44 We changed the Charter to make clear that the
next such pay Commission could consider the issue. 145
4. Vice President to the Speaker
The leader of the Council had the title "Vice President of the Council,"
reflecting the presence of the "City Council President." Both titles were
misleading, and the leader's title was demeaning. We changed the Council
leader's title to "Speaker," and subsequently the council president's title
was changed to "Public Advocate."

140. Id. at 110.
141.

See id. at 115-16.

142. See id. at 116.
143. See id. at 108-09.
144.

See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 17-25.

145. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 26(c) (1989).
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H. Accelerating the FirstElection of the New Council
A Council election would take place in 1989. Because the 1989
election would also decide whether the new Charter would go into effect,
this would be, by definition, an election of the existing thirty-five person
Council using existing district lines. The next regularly scheduled Council
election would not be for four years. Unless we could accelerate the next
election, the old Council with greatly increased responsibilities, but without
the representational benefits of expansion and our other reforms, would be
in place until 1993.146
In her remarks on June 27, the last day of our second round of
Commission meetings, Harriet Michel emphasized the importance of
accelerating. After recognizing the difficulties, she said:
I just have to tell you, I have a discomfort level. Assuming that
this is the last thing that will happen .... that is, the selection, the
expansion... of the new Council, and in between, over the next
three years with phasing in all of these new powers with,
essentially, the same thirty-five people that are there now . . . I
am just uncomfortable with that ....
Because acceleration was both important and difficult, we had been
working on it for some time. Commissioner Michel's remarks were an
added spur.
The subsequent public testimony of Roscoe Brown, president of One
Hundred Black Men as well as president of the Bronx Community College,
drove home the same point-and was of great political significance. Brown
testified that acceleration to 1991 was "extremely important" because
"[t]his is the greatest change that has been made in New York City
government in decades"
and "more empowerment to minorities, the sooner
1 48
...the better."
The new point in Brown's testimony was that acceleration was so
important that it should be done even if it was necessary to redistrict based
on 1980 Census data. 149 Brown also said that, assuming we continued to
"make progress," the referendum on the new Charter should take place
in
146. Under state law, moreover, local elections cannot be held in even-numbered
years, the years inwhich elections for state offices are held. This meant that if we were to
accelerate the election of the new Council, it would require an election in 1991. See N.Y.
CONST. art. XIII, § 8.
147. Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 184.
148. Public Meeting, July 21, 1989, at 180-84.
149. See id. at 181-83, 88.
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1989.150 As Schwarz pointed out, this would be the only way a new
Council could be elected in 1991.151
A newspaper article captures the political implications of the exchange.
It described Schwarz listening "intently" to Mr. Brown, and noting
"pointedly" that the expanded, more representative Council could only be
52
elected in 1991 if the new Charter was approved "this year.'1
According to the article, Mr. Brown agreed, but Schwarz had a
different audience in mind-the minority civic leaders who endorsed a
delay on the Charter referendum. "A black political leader from Brooklyn
noted the political significance of the dialogue between Mr. Brown and Mr.
Schwarz a few moments later. 'This is going to put a lot of pressure on the
delay faction,' he said in a hallway. 'So now what exactly do we get from
a delay?"" 53
It was clear that if we could find a way to accomplish redistricting in
time for the 1991 election, we could win substantial additional support for
a 1989 referendum. Through prodigious work and creativity, Frank Mauro
came up with a highly detailed schedule that would permit redistricting,
using 1990 Census data, to occur for a 1991 election of the new fifty-one
54 This multistep schedule is set forth in
member Council.'
section 52-2 of
55
1
Charter.
the
Harriet Michel noted the substantive and political importance of
achieving acceleration:
I'd like to say how pleased ... I am that we've been able to do
two things here. First is to not allow all of the new responsibilities
and powers that we've given to the City Council to, I use this word
advisedly, be fumbled until 1993, but to in fact allow for greater
inclusion by providing for an earlier date.
Two, what I think it does is it will encourage a lot of groups who
thought that perhaps we needed to take more time to look at our
proposals and talk about the issue of delay, I think it will
encourage them that inclusion of minority groups will happen at an

150. See id. at 184-85.
151. See id. at 185-86.
152. Alan Finder, Next Task: Explaining and Persuading, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1989, at B4.
153. Id.
154. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 73-86.
155. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2A § 52 (1989).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 42

earlier date and encourage the support [for] going forward in
November.' 5 6
Schwarz, seeking to broaden the positive impact beyond minorities, said
that acceleration would "increase the opportunities for representation for
people who traditionally have not had the same opportunities, and that's
also good for every single person in New York.....
'"'I Acceleration of
the election to 1991 passed without any "no" votes.
However,
Commissioners Alvarez and Molloy puzzlingly abstained without
explanation. 158
The political benefits of the acceleration began immediately. On the
evening of the day the Commission voted to accelerate the election, the
New York State branch of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People ("NAACP") delivered a position paper to Schwarz's
apartment. 5 9 The first substantive point in the letter was that the Charter
referendum should take place in 1989.'6 The letter concluded with a
much-appreciated compliment:
The Charter Revision Commission has undertaken a most serious
and daunting task. It has done it with a significant amount of
pressure from the myriad of interest groups with a stake in the
future of New York. Despite the knotty and complex issues and
the pressures, the 1Commission
has served with openness[,]
61
sensitivity and class.
The acceleration of the next Council election to 1991 is a clear example
of where good policy made good politics.

156. Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 87.
157. Id. at 88.

158. See id. at 103.
159. See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 5-6. The paper was dated July 30, but the
timing of its delivery, and conversations held at the time, support the conclusion that the
Commission's action on July 31 contributed to the NAACP's helpful letter being actually
delivered.
160. See Position Paper of New York State NAACP to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.,
Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (July 30, 1989).
161. Id.
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II. PRESERVING A BOROUGH VOICE-CHANGING THE STAGE

The Commission paid a great deal of attention to how a borough voice
should be expressed in New York City. This was both substantively and
politically difficult.
A. Reasons to Preserve a Borough Voice
Theoretically, one could posit a city government limited to a mayor and
council, without borough presidents. This is the basic structure in most
American cities. However, New York's history, our view of the needs of
the City in 1989, the seemingly uniform view of commissioners, political
reality, and possible issues under the Voting Rights Act, led us to assume
throughout that there should be a borough voice, and that it should not be
expressed only through Council borough delegations. The issue was not
whether, but how, a borough voice would be expressed in the post-Morris
era with no Board of Estimate.
While history ought not imprison thought, it is relevant. The City was
created in 1898 by the amalgamation of the long-established and very large
cities of Manhattan (already called New York) and Brooklyn-each with
extensive existing government structures and each becoming a borough in
New York City-and the communities that became the boroughs of Queens,
the Bronx, and Richmond (Staten Island). 62 While many of the sponsors
of the greater City created in 1898 thought that consolidation would result
in breaking the hold of the Democratic party on New York, they were
wrong, as the first mayor of the consolidated City was Democrat Robert
Van Wyck. The Republican forces, which controlled Albany then, teamed
again with the City's reform movement to enact a second Charter, under
which a second election in the new City was held, resulting in the election
of the fusion candidate Seth Low. This second Charter, promulgated in
1901, redistributed power in the City. The power of the mayor was
reduced; the power of borough governments was enhanced. The primary
vehicle for effecting this goal was the reconstitution of the Board of
Estimate to include the City's elected officials and borough presidents. The
borough presidents were also given considerable power over public
improvements in their boroughs.
In the decades between that revision and 1989, the borough role in City
government changed substantially.
Most important, the borough
presidents' role in service delivery was repeatedly reduced until the 1961
Charter, which transferred all remaining public improvement powers of the
borough presidents to the City's Departments of Highways and Public

162.

See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 22, at 11.
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Works. Despite these sorts of changes in the details, by 1989, a significant
governmental voice for the boroughs had become a fixture of the City's
government.
Borough identity was, in the years after consolidation and still in 1989,
particularly important for the four boroughs other than Manhattan. There
were powerful feelings that Manhattan had dominated, and fears that it
would continue to dominate, any new government. Many witnesses from
all over the city consistently expressed this theme. While the testimony of
borough presidents themselves could be seen as tinged by self interest, they
were by no means the only voices expressing this concern. It was deeply
felt by many in the City.
The newly expanded City Council would have about eighty percent of
its members from outside Manhattan; comparatively, the 1989 Board of
Estimate had seven of the eleven votes (or more than sixty-three percent)
held by people living in Manhattan. Nonetheless, no one on the City
Council spoke for-or at least represented-boroughs as a whole. An
added reason in 1989 to keep a borough voice was that the new Council
was untested. We were also concerned about one-party domination of New
York City. People elected to represent boroughs could add to the
competition of ideas and could challenge the mayor and other citywide
officials.
Sustained lobbying and diverse testimony urged a meaningful borough
role; only a few witnesses or persons who sent us position papers or letters
urged elimination of borough presidents.
Reverend Johnnie Ray
Youngblood called for their elimination. He called borough presidents
"self-serving political machines," often selected by Council delegations
rather than elected. 163 The borough presidents, Youngblood said, were
responsive to the party machine and to contributors, and only "when time
permits, as an afterthought, represent[ing] the rest of us."" 64 Richard
Emery, the lawyer who had brought and won Morris, suggested that, rather
than a borough voice, coalitions of communities in the Council (e.g.,
Bedford-Stuyvesant and Southern Queens, or Riverdale and Staten Island),
would be the way to protect interests smaller than the City but bigger than
a single Council district. 165

163. See Public Hearing, June 1, 1989, at 69. There was substantial truth to this
comment. The 1989 Charter changes ended this practice by requiring elections for all
vacancies. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 4 § 81(e) (1989).
164. Public Hearing, June 1, 1989, at 69.
165. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, CharterPanelLooksPastRuling andSees Far-Reaching
Changes, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 1989, at 1. This suggestion led to a fair amount of
rhetoric about fostering racial or class dissension. See also Editorial, The Future of a
Delusion, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, June 23, 1989, at A24 (referring to Emory as "the
Robespierre of this unwanted revolution").
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While a number of editorials urged eliminating the Office of the City
Council President, none (as far as we recall) advised eliminating the
borough presidents. For example, the Daily News editorial board (which
recently ' has
called for the elimination of borough presidents as a useless
"rip-off 166) appealed for a vote in favor of the Charter, in part because,
under the new Charter, "the beeps will retain significant influence in City
Hall." 67 Throughout our long process, the Times' editorials frequently
expressed concern that powers proposed to be given to borough presidents
or neighborhoods would curb the essential central powers of the City, but
they never called for elimination of a borough voice. New York Newsday's
editorials made an adequate borough voice the litmus test of their
support. 16s

Given all this, whether a proposed Charter without a borough voice
could have passed muster with the voters is dubious. 69 In any event,
neither we, nor any commissioner, gave serious thought to this question.
As Schwarz said on the day the chairman's initial ideas were introduced:
[I]f [the borough presidents] didn't exist, we would want to invent
something akin to them, because what they provide is an
intermediate role between those who are elected in the smallest
constituencies and those who are elected in the city as a whole.
And with [a] government as big as ours, covering as large a
physical area, covering as many people, we need that intermediate
voice.

And we need it substantively . . . [not] because one is

focusing on what do you do about people who are in current
positions. 170
David Trager, the most articulate and consistent proponent of a
borough voice, described as a "key agenda" a "borough perspective" to be
"an intermediatory buffer between the power of the City and the local
communities .... "'v On the day the Commission voted to eliminate the

166.
167.

See Editorial, Deep Six These Six, DAiLY NEws (N.Y.), Nov. 3, 1997, at 32.
Thumbs Up on the Charter,DAILY NEws (N.Y.), Oct. 29, 1989, at 36.

168. See discussion infra Chapter XIII, n.283.
169. Equally, there would have been a question whether elimination of borough
presidents would have passed muster with the Voting Rights Section of the Civil Rights
Division of the Justice Department. While elections held on a boroughwide basis in some
boroughs created voting rights problems, those in other boroughs resulted in minorities
being elected-David Dinkins in Manhattan being the latest example.
170. Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 50; see also Public Meeting, May 2, 1989,
at 64.
171. Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 110; see also Public Meeting, May 2, 1989,
at 82-91.
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Board of Estimate, several other commissioners stressed that in light of this
decision, it was particularly important to find new ways to express a
borough prospective. 7 2 Trager particularly pressed "borough economic
survival. 173 He argued that, with only citywide officials and local Council
representatives, "no one will be pushing that issue, [and] no one will be
pushing the boroughs' cultural institutions."' 74 Without a borough
perspective, "all the resources are Manhattan oriented." 75 Whether this
was logical-with the overwhelming majority of the Council and of the
City's voters coming from outside Manhattan-is somewhat beside the
point. The general conclusion that a borough perspective was needed was
convincing.
Trager saw the issue as "a borough perspective" in a very large City,
and not as what to do about borough presidents per se.176 Nevertheless,
Trager and others doubted the sufficiency of borough delegations. There
seemed to be no compelling idea for how to build in a "borough
perspective" without the use of the borough presidents.
B. The Nature of the New Borough Voice
At the outset, we faced a threshold issue: Should the borough
presidents have a legislative or an executive role? Their role on the Board
of Estimate had been legislative with respect to the budget and zoning
matters and a hybrid between legislative and executive on the particular
contract and land-use (including site-selection) matters that came before the
Board. The rhetoric of several, if not all, borough presidents was that their
"vote" on the Board made them effective advocates for their boroughs.
When the Ravitch Commission suspended operations, it was about to
discuss David Trager's idea of placing the borough presidents on the City
Council, but with each borough's delegates proportional to its relative share
of the City's population.
For these reasons, it seemed sensible first to discuss whether a new
legislative role should be structured. After a brief flurry of exploration,
however, this was dropped because it seemed to risk undercutting the
Commission's goal of fair representation for minorities on a newly
empowered Council.

172. See, e.g., Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 57-58, 62-63.
173. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 9.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 10, 115-18 (arguing that the Brooklyn borough presidents were responsible
for reviving several Brooklyn institutions).
176. Id. at 10.
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We first discussed the idea of a bicameral City Council with an
"upper" house of approximately nineteen members, including the five
borough presidents. This would allow the borough delegations to reflect
closely the varying populations of the boroughs. On April 24, Schwarz
opened the discussion of bicameralism by saying that we should look at the
"governmental pluses or minuses only if it would, and would be seen as
likely to result in fair representation for everybody in this city, including
minority people in this city ....I don't believe, as a person, and I don't
believe collectively we would want to propose an innovation[,] even if it
were seen as having significant governmental advantages, unless it will, in
fact, open doors and will be seen as opening doors.
On the "be seen" part of this threshold test, we had met on April 22 to
discuss Charter issues with Congressman Major Owens and colleagues on
the Coalition for Community Empowerment. They reacted dubiously to a
bicameral legislature. While this initial reaction from one group was not
conclusive, it did sharpen the issue. 8
At our May 2 meeting (where the Commission decided to eliminate the
Board), the Commission decided not to pursue bicameralism. Schwarz said
that "[o]n the plus side, it had seemed.., a method to balance power, and
another center of power, [and a source for] competing ideas .... ")179
However, it did not meet the threshold test of being "something that would
open doors for minorities, and [be] perceived as doing so .
".1.."'80
The Commission agreed next to look at David Trager's idea of a
unicameral City Council with the borough presidents serving on it. Trager
argued that the concept could satisfy the need for a borough voice, and
through the clash of six "gorillas"-the leader
of the Council and the five
8
borough presidents-produce better ideas.' '
At our meeting of May 6, the Commission voted (with one dissent and
two abstentions) not to have the borough presidents sit as members of the
Council. Schwarz described the concept as "the most innovative idea that
has come before our body," but expressed concern that it would end up
"diluting and weakening the Council." Schwarz also said that the clash
among "gorillas" would lead to "guerilla warfare and not consensus," that
"there is some concern about dilution of the enhanced opportunity for
minorities that we hope to derive from the new City Council," and that the

177. See Memorandum, titled On Bicameralism, from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.,
Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (Apr. 24, 1989) (on file with
the New York Law School Law Review).

178. See April 14, 1989, Letter from Congressman Owens to Schwarz, supra note 61.
179. Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 109-10.
180. Id. at 110.
181. See id. at 102-03.
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proposal was "neither fish nor foul nor good red herring."" 2 Several other
commissioners expressed similar concerns. 83
Shelving the suggestions of a legislative role did not end the need to
work out an appropriate borough voice. Trager, again giving a good
summation of reasons for a borough perspective and disagreeing with some
of the points made against the proposal of a role for the borough presidents
on the Council, voted in favor of his proposal."4 He had earlier suggested,
however, putting "together a package of roles for the Borough Presidents
• . . [and] a package of executive function and legislative function that
would make a meaningful role for them." 8 5 Vice Chair Michel voted to
"shel[ve]" the legislative-role concept, but "with the understanding" that
if proposals for an executive role did not meet her "threshold interest of
guaranteeing that Borough Presidents, in fact, have
significant power" then
86
we should come back to service in the Council. 1
Lane and Frank Mauro had already worked on ideas concerning
possible executive roles for the borough presidents. Schwarz suggested the
ideas to the Commission for preliminary discussion.' 87 At least two
commissioners who voted against the idea of borough president seats on the
Council said that those preliminary ideas were "significant and
meaningful,"'8 8 and a "start. "189 However, the Commission was clearly not
yet near a workable consensus on the borough-voice issue.
The details of how we developed that consensus and worked out the
executive role for the borough presidents are covered in Chapter VII's
discussions of the Charter provisions on budgeting, land use, contracts, and
service delivery. " In addition, Chapter I describes how the Commission

182. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989 at 3-5.
183. See, e.g., id. at 109-21. Commissioner Murray said: "[B]ring about paralysis
of the City Council"; Commissioner Gribetz said: "[D]oesn't do the trick of achieving
...a meaningful borough perspective"; Commissioner Gourdine said: "[W]ould be a
dilution of minority representation"; and Commissioner Richland said: "[W]ould be
demeaning [to the borough presidents]." This last concern was expressed by Commissioner
Richland, and echoed elsewhere by Brooklyn Borough President Golden. It reflected, in
part, a reluctance to let go of the old order and, in part, a skepticism about (or even
contempt for) the Council. But see id. at 53-54 (containing responses to Richland's negative
comments about the Council).
184. See id. at 115-18.
185. Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 83-88.
186. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 119-21.
187. See id. at 14-107.
188. Id. at 108.
189. Id. at 113.
190. See discussion hifa Chapter VII.
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came to a consensus. Some general points can nonetheless usefully be
made here.
Some of our aims obviously conflicted. The solutions were not easy.
We had to devise a legal solution. Some of the proposals made to us were
blatantly illegal. We wanted a borough voice, not a veto. Yet, if it were
only a voice, without some power, how could it be meaningful? How
much power could be given to a borough voice without hampering the
City's overall needs? We wanted the borough presidents to play some role
in each area they had covered on the Board-but it would necessarily, and
for policy reasons, be a different role.
Our aim was to have their role be proactive rather than reactive, as it
often was on the Board. The borough presidents could be more useful this
way, whatever the loss of the drama of the last minute, usually feckless,
votes on the Board. An important question remained, however: Could we
convince people that the borough president would have meaningful power
without a vote?
In a sense, no issues were wholly local. This is best illustrated by land
use. The location of a shelter, a prison, or a landfill is profoundly local to
its neighbors, or perhaps a whole borough. The location is citywide as
well, because such facilities meet citywide needs. Similarly, changing
zoning may harm a locality, but help the overall city by improving
economic development.
III. CITYWIDE ELECTED OFFICIALS

Our thinking about the offices of mayor, comptroller and city council
president (now public advocate) must be seen as a whole. The great power
of the mayoralty under the new, as well as old, Charter was relevant to the
continuing need for the other offices as countervailing forces. The role we
saw for the comptroller-or more precisely the role we did not want the
comptroller to play-was also relevant to why we preferred to retain a
council president.
A. The Mayor
Throughout the history of greater New York City, the mayor has been
the most powerful elected official in the City. While each Charter change
has increased the mayor's power marginally, the central role of the mayor
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has remained unchanged.' 9' Through powers over the budget and the
appointment and removal of department heads, the mayor manages almost
all of the day-to-day affairs of the City. While the City Council has
considerable power in the legislative arena, the City, unlike states and the
federal government, mostly delivers direct services, almost all of which are
under the mayor's management. Additionally, the mayor often sets the
agenda for the City Council through the power to propose and the veto
power.
Our efforts did not run against this history. The abolition of the Board
of Estimate itself affected the mayor least of any elected official, although
it did raise many issues as to the mayor's powers with respect to, for
example, budgets, land use, and contracts. Basically, the question became
which of the Board of Estimate's powers should be granted to the mayor.
Our answer was to assign to the mayor all executive decisions (e.g., letting
contracts) to promote our goals of efficiency and accountability. These
shifts of power are discussed throughout Chapter VII.
There were hard questions about the relationship between the powers
of the central administration and the Council and borough presidents. In
addition, there was sharp disagreement-mostly outside the
Commission-on whether our changes would strengthen or hobble the
mayor. In our view, the mayoralty needs to remain strong.
B. The Comptroller and the City Council President (PublicAdvocate)
From a structural point of view, the continuation of a strong
mayor-and the likelihood that a single political party would continue to
dominate the city-favored continuing the other citywide offices as added
checks on the mayor. Furthermore, the Council was still untested. In
addition to serving as sources of competing ideas, the other citywide offices
could be springboards for people to build a record to run for mayor. Given
that the Commission was going to keep the offices-though, as we show
below, with repetitive and contentious debates about whether the Office of
Council President should survive-there were some common themes in how
we thought about the two offices. We wanted each to have a sphere, but
a somewhat separate sphere, in which to check and balance the mayor-the
comptroller for fiscal issues and the council president for service issues.'92

191.

See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTERREVISION COMM'N, BRIEFINGBOOK (Jan. 12,

1988) [hereinafter

BRIEFING

BOOK] (providing a brief history of the mayor's powers) (on

file with the New York Law School Law Review).

192.

See Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 44-45; Public Meeting, May 13, 1989,

at 422; Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 314.
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We wanted to encourage both to suggest improvements and not be mere
gadflies. Finally, we wanted more attention to procedural fairness.
1. The Comptroller
In theory, starting from scratch, the City-as the United States-could
have had an unelected chief fiscal officer, just as the City-in contrast to
the state-has a chief legal officer who is not elected. There was no
inclination, however, to have a nonelected comptroller either on or outside
the Commission.
Importantly, there was a very strong sentiment on the Commission that
the comptroller should concentrate on issues of fiscal concern and not the
substance of City policy.
Here, the experience of many of the
commissioners with comptrollers on the Board of Estimate clearly affected
their views of what a comptroller should, and should not, do. Given a vote
on the Board on contract, land-use, and budget issues, comptrollers had
ranged far beyond auditing concerns.
Furthermore, a number of
commissioners felt these votes and other actions were outside the proper
expertise of a comptroller and had become overly "political," particularly
if a comptroller was contemplating a run for mayor.
We clarified and enhanced the comptroller's audit powers, making
clear, for example, the power to audit any agency-the majority of whose
members were appointed by City officials (removing any doubt about the
power to audit the Board of Education, an agency created by state law).1 93
We also increased the comptroller's obligations by requiring an audit of
every City agency at least once every four years.1 94 As part of our
emphasis on procedural fairness, we required the comptroller to furnish
draft copies of all audit reports to the head of the affected agency and to
include any response in the final version of the audit.195 As part of our
emphasis on openness, hearings that the comptroller held had to be made
available to the public.' 96 Finally, with respect to audits, the comptroller
had to make an annual report to the mayor and Council describing all maj or
audits and what corrective actions had been recommended and taken.197

193. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 5 §§ 93 (b), (c) (1989).
194.
195.
196.
197.

See id. § 93(c).
See id.
See id.
See id.§ 93(f).
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2. The City Council President (Public Advocate)
While there is no bright line between service and fiscal issues, the idea
that the comptroller should focus on fiscal matters led, as a matter of
symmetry and substance, to the conclusion that the council president should
emphasize service issues. In contrast to the comptroller, however, the
issue of whether there should be a city council president was sharply
disputed outside the Commission and was divisive within the Commission.
So serious did these internal disputes become that two members told us,
in moments of passion, that their support for the Commission's revisions
was contingent upon the preservation or abolition of the Office of City
Council President. This was extraordinary, considering that this was not
the most important question in light of our overall task. It was also
extraordinary considering that abolition of the position might raise a
problem with the Justice Department. Whether the second commissioner
really would have voted against the whole Charter if the office were
abolished, and whether preservation of the office in fact underlay the
negative vote of the first commissioner, cannot, of course, be definitively
98
known. There certainly seemed to be puzzling passion on this issue.
We opted for keeping the office for the several reasons set out below.
A threshold question arose from the Charter's provision that the council
president was to succeed the mayor in the event the mayoralty became
open. Therefore, if not a council president, there had to be an alternative
successor.
The principal proponents of abolishing the Council presidency
suggested the successor come from a new office, a vice mayor, running on
the ticket with a mayoral candidate (analogous to the vice president of the
United States). 9 These proponents, however, inadvertently framed the
question in a way that helped lead four of the six minority commissioners
to oppose the vice mayor idea-five of six supported retaining the Office
of Council President. Thus, Judah Gribetz, in a long and articulate
argument against retaining the council president, quoted a City Council
member who said he spoke for the Council's minority caucus: "[g]iven the
City's demographics," mayoral candidates were likely to be white, and a
black or Hispanic would likely be selected as the "running mate. ,20

198. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 177-78 (a "kind of ... strange air that
obscures this discussion") (statement of Commissioner Paredes); see alsoid. at 251 (urging
"less heat" among the commissioners) (statement of Chairman Schwarz).
199. There was mention of, but no support for, having the comptroller or the speaker
of the Council be the designated successor.
200. Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 215.
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This led to concern that "the ticket would always be a majority as
Mayor, minority as Vice Mayor, " 201 or as Commissioner Arch Murray
said:
I think the idea of a vice mayor was probably a good idea twenty
years ago, but as the minority community begins to produce
candidates that have realistic opportunities for Citywide success,
I'm afraid this notion of a Vice Mayor can be abused, and used as
a device for saying, Joe, you're a nice guy, but why don't you run
for this number two spot this time, we will look at you again next
time around.2 °2
We did not assume that an ethnically mixed ticket would automatically
have a white running for mayor. Additionally, Simon Gourdine supported
having both a vice mayor and the city council president as a way to
increase opportunities for minorities: 20 3 "[W]e are at a very unusual stage
...

[the opportunity] ...

may not come again for another twenty or thirty

years .... ." 204 Nevertheless, the vice mayor proposal was somewhat
soured at the start. 20 5
The discussion of a vice mayor as an alternative to the council
president continued off and on for several meetings. This debate, however,
was subsumed by the discussion of whether to eliminate the Office of the
Council President. 6
Apart from the idea of substituting a vice mayor, the proponents of
abolishing the Office of Council President argued:
(1) The ombudsman function of the council president would be better
performed by an appointed, rather than an elected, official;
(2) Oversight of the mayor's service delivery function would be better
performed by the Council, and, moreover, an oversight role for the council
president would undercut the Council; and
(3) A council president would not have enough to do. 0 7

201.

Id. at 227.

202. Id. at 230-31.
203. See id. at 221-22.
204. Id. at 222.

205. See Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 291-317.
206. The Commission debated, in some detail, whether to retain the office at parts of
four separate meetings. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989; Public Meeting, May 13, 1989;
Public Meeting, June 20, 1989; Public Meeting, July 31, 1989.
207. In addition, several commissioners, most persistently Fred Friendly, pointed out
that the name "City Council President" was misleading. The City Council regarded the
name as an affront. Although we agreed with the point, we chose not to press for the name
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Whether an ombudsman should be elected could be argued either way,
but the record showed that elected council presidents performed this service
usefully.
The argument that the Council would be undercut seemed a
makeweight. Additional checks on the City's service delivery performance
help, not hurt, the City. How vigorous the new Council would be on
oversight matters could not be known in 1989.
Finally, it was clear that, given our desire for an additional citywide
official as an added check on the mayor and the huge mayorally controlled
City bureaucracy, it would be important to focus on additional specific
responsibilities, as well as the general oversight function.
The crucial issue for us, ultimately, was the additional check on
powerful mayors. 0 8 It was a huge city, with a huge central administration
having very wide-ranging responsibilities for service delivery. The mayor
would remain very powerful. Some normal sources of criticism were
rather weak-we had essentially a one-party state-and the Council's
oversight vigor was untested. Moreover, in response to an argument about
cost, a study showed that the City had fewer elected officials per resident
than the surrounding counties of Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk.2 °9
In support of continuing the council president, we had "political" and
legal considerations as well. We did not want to lose the support of the
commissioner, who had indicated that he would not join an overall
consensus without retention of the office. We thought that eliminating one
of the three citywide elected positions would be seen as a negative
factor-perhaps not by itself enough to lead to a negative result, but
nevertheless a negative factor-by the Justice Department in its analysis of
whether potential opportunities for minorities had been decreased. We also
believed that having three, as opposed to two, citywide elected officials,
increased the opportunities for diversity among the City's elected officials
and for aspiration of all elements of the city's diverse population.

change. We knew the Council could change it (as they did to public advocate). See NEw
YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No. 19 (1993). In addition, we knew that this issue gave rise to
emotional reactions from some commissioners, and we chose not to exacerbate them.
208. In a recent case upholding the public advocate's right to Police Department files
bearing on the department's handling of complaints of police abuse that had been sustained
by the Civilian Complaint Review Board, the New York State Supreme Court relied on the
Charter Commission's record as making it "evident that the intent of the Commission was
to make the public advocate a 'watchdog' over City Government and a counter-weight to
the powers of the mayor." Green v. Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1997), aff'd as modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998).
209. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 232-33.
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Finally, political and substantive reasons supported an added check on
the mayor. As Commissioner Leventhal said on the day of our first debate
on this issue:
[T]he day the Supreme Court made its decision, the very likely
possibility emerged that whatever this Commission does, would be
subject to the charge that we are giving too much power to the
Mayor . . .

To take the only other Citywide official who can

voice opposition, on a policy basis, to the Mayor, and convert that
Dan Quayle-like
into-if you will pardon the
210 expression-a
position, has me concerned.
As with the comptroller, the Commission wanted the council president
to serve as a "watchdog" on the mayor on service issues and to propose
solutions, rather than merely point out "inadequacies, inefficiencies,
Thus, section 24 (f)(2) of the
mismanagement and misfeasance ....,,211
Charter, in addition to requiring review of complaints relating to "services
and programs" of a "recurring and multiborough or Citywide nature,"
required the council president to "make proposals to improve the city's
response" to service issues. 212 We recognized that this language would not
ensure useful solutions. Here, we relied on the public's good sense to
assure the performance of such responsibility on an elected official who
could challenge a mayor: "[I]f the public heard four years of someone
being just a gadfly, just saying, you stink, without coming forward with
workable and affirmative ideas, I think they'd say,
213 well, you make a good
gadfly, but you wouldn't make a good Mayor."
Preserving the office as an additional check on the mayor, for its
oversight of services, and for its ombudsman role would probably have
been sufficient for us in 1989. However, we believed in addition that the
maintenance of the office would help to build a coalition in favor of the
Charter outside the Commission.
IV. COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE

As a result of an immense effort to decentralize and to increase
community control of the City government, the 1975 Charter Revision
Commission (the Goodman Commission) established an extensive

210. Id. at 201-02.
211.
212.
213.

Green, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 234.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 24(f)(2) (1989).
Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 236.
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community governance system. Although the 1976 Charter did not
decentralize authority, it did provide for command decentralization over a
number of local issues. No longer would every local service issue need to
be resolved at City Hall. The 1976 Charter also provided for a community
voice, although no veto power, in City land-use decision making through
the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure ("ULURP"). The line between
advice and decision-making is clear in New York's scheme of community
governance. The Goodman Commission did not provide for a direct
community power, but only for a meaningful opportunity for the expression
of community views. The result of this arrangement was that community
governance has remained a somewhat ambiguous concept in practice, with
a number of community boards, mostly the wealthiest or best organized,
becoming persuasive advocates of their community's interests to
government agencies.
We approached the subject of community governance with considerable
political anxiety. Our initial sense was that community activists were
dissatisfied with their advisory role in City government and longed for
more power in the process. This view was shaped by complaints gathered
by the Ravitch Commission and by reporting of community dissatisfaction
with either private development projects or City uses of land disfavored by
the community where the land was located. On the other hand, from the
beginning, neither we nor other members of the Commission were prepared
to enhance community power at the expense of citywide authority or to
undermine our efforts to strengthen the City Council. We anticipated that
this would lead to conflict with a well-organized and vocal segment of the
Fortunately, no
City's political structure-its community boards.
significant conflict developed. It seems, based on our review of the
testimony before the Commission, that many members of community
boards did not advocate increased power, and that much of the attention of
the activists was directed toward advocating a strong role for the borough
presidents, particularly in Queens. In the end, many community board
members asked for increased resources and greater opportunities to
participate in the decision making in which they were involved. Along
those lines, the Commission did adopt a number of revisions to enable the
City's community boards to better perform their existing functions.
The basic vehicles for community governance were community districts
and their community boards and service districts, which together are
intended "for the planning of community life within the city, the
participation of citizens in city government within their communities, and
the efficient and effective organization of agencies that deliver municipal
services in local communities and boroughs."" 4 Community district lines
were to be drawn to satisfy certain criteria, including conformity with

214.

N.Y.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 69 § 2700 (1989).
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historic communities, suitability for the delivery of certain services, and,
if other criteria were satisfied, population equality.2" 5 The goal was to
create a sensible relationship between the districts and delivery of services.
In 1989, the fifty-nine community districts had huge population
discrepancies. (This did not violate the "one person-one vote" rule,
because the districts were deemed to be advisory.)2" 6 For example, six of
the twelve districts in the Bronx had populations below 100,000, while in
Manhattan two were above 200,000. These population discrepancies were
a product of the primacy of the service criteria and of population movement
since the original map was adopted in the mid-1970s. One consequence of
these population discrepancies was the Commission's inability to seriously
consider creating fifty-nine Council districts based on community district
lines. The Commission did require evaluations of community district maps
to measure the effectiveness of the districts.2 7
Atop each community district was a community board, which in 1989
included no more than fifty individuals appointed by the borough
presidents, at least half of whom had to be chosen from names suggested
by Council members whose districts overlapped the community districts.
This meant that if a community district covered more than one Council
district, each Council member could submit nominations for half of the
community board members, regardless of the population within the
community board a particular Council member represented. This situation
produced considerable criticism from a few members of the Council, who
had watched some borough presidents ignore their nominees and instead
choose nominees of other favored Council members. Under this scheme,
it was possible for a Council member to have none of his or her nominees
appointed to any community board if he or she shared a community district
with another Council member. Some people testified that some borough
president appointments were remarkably monochromatic. We resolved this
issue by limiting each Council member's list of nominees to his or her
district's proportion of the population in the community district.
The borough president was also required to ensure that each
community board member have a significant interest (usually business or
residence) in the district and that membership reflect the different
neighborhoods of the districts.2 8 The Commission added the requirement

215. See id. §§ 2701(a)(1)-(2), (b).
216. See generally Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693 (1989).
217. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 69 § 2702(a) (1989) (requiring the mayor to prepare
and present a report to the Council every ten years commencing on October 1, 1993).
218. See id. ch. 70 § 2800(a)(1)-(2).
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of
aggregate
that borough presidents "shall consider whether the mn
-",,219
appointments fairly represents all segments of the community.
One concern of community board representatives was the absence of
sufficient staff to support the many technical functions that the board
required. This was especially true of the less wealthy community districts
in which volunteer professional help was not readily forthcoming. We
addressed this issue by authorizing community boards to hire not only a
district manager but also "other professional staff and consultants" within
their budget. 22
Finally, as a result of several complaints we received about a growing
secretiveness of some community boards, we required all community
publicly accessible records of their proceedings and
boards to maintain
transactions. 22'
CHAPTER

VII. THE PROCESSES FOR BUDGETS, LAND-USE, FRANCHISE,
AND PROCUREMENT DECISION MAKING

The abolition of the Board of Estimate required the Commission to
determine which of the Board powers would be assigned to which elected
official or governmental institution and compelled a detailed review of the
array of processes through which those powers were granted. Though the
goals we had adopted provided a rough framework for our decision
making, the numerous detailed changes that we made reflected, beyond the
application of these goals, the thoughtful and studied efforts of the
Commission members and staff in close association with a variety of city
officials, outside experts, and advocates. Several themes are common. We
wanted policy making to be primarily the responsibility of the Council
because of the Council's representativeness and accessibility. We wanted
executive decisions to be exclusively the role of the mayor to improve
efficiency and to assure accountability. We wanted also to find a
meaningful role for the borough presidents as executives. Finally, we
wanted to find a way to impose some level of planning discipline on the
government. We clearly achieved some, but not all, of these goals. In
some instances, for example, our initial judgments about what was
exclusively executive or exclusively legislative were wrong, and we
changed our minds. In other instances, we made compromises to secure
support for our overall efforts. These efforts and their results are explored
in the following sections.

219. Id.
220. Id.§2800(f.
221. See id.ch. 47 §§ 1058-1060.
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I. THE CITY BUDGET

A. The Legal Framework
Day to day, year by year, the most fundamental decisions that
American governments make involve which services to provide and who
should bear the costs of those services. As Justice Kennedy recently wrote,
"Money is the instrument of policy and policy affects the lives of
citizens."22 This is particularly true at the local levels of government
because, despite the primary regulatory powers of the federal and state
government, it is at the local level where most services are actually
delivered.
These decisions over what services to render and how to fund them are
not abstract. It is through them, at all levels of American government, that
the intense rivalries among vast arrays of advocates for conflicting or
competing policies are resolved. As Schwarz noted at an early public
meeting:
A budget is the annual opportunity for debate between the various
public officials among themselves and for the public to have a
chance to think about what we are doing as a city. What are our
values? What do we think is important and how are we going to
get there? So, a budget is not lifeless, a lifeless, boring
accountant's document. A budget is the heart and soul of the
values of the people who live in New York.3
A budget includes decisions on whether to reduce or raise taxes, add
police, raise City employees' wages, extend library hours, provide more
or less for the homeless, repair the city streets or sewers, repair the parks,
close a fire house, reduce 911 response times, provide tax incentives for
businesses, or support the arts. All these decisions must be subject to
calculations concerning the effects of the policy including its political and
fiscal costs, and all invariably compete for limited, often scarce, dollars.
The choices among competing values are often hard to make. For
example, during the summer of 1998, the mayor and the City Council
struggled with a difficult budget impasse, with the Council having
overridden the mayor's veto of its proposed budget and the mayor
seemingly refusing to spend the money appropriated by the Council for

222. Clinton v. New York, _U.S._, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2109 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
223. Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 16-17.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

certain services. 4 While this battle was obscured by technical budget
terms, the battle centered on issues concerning the exercise of power in the
City and competing visions for the City. This debate was largely a
consequence of the power of the newly empowered, more representative
Council exercising its responsibility for setting City policy, and a strong
mayor resisting such legislative forays.
Such debate can have a significant impact on city residents. For
example, the mayor's acts caused a number of not-for-profit corporations
to lay off staff and reduce services,' despite the override of the mayor's
veto and the consequent inclusion of appropriations for these services in the
enacted budget. 26
Decisions over raising and allocating funds are made through a
complex, non-stop City budget process, which is the primary subject of this
section. This process reflects the City's evolution from a weak to strong
mayoral government. Since at least 1936, the mayor has dominated the
budget process through the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). 2 7
In effect, OMB is responsible for providing all of the information necessary
for the mayor's tasks of preparing, submitting, reviewing, and
administering the budget. 228 OMB became so pervasive by 1989 that many
critics, including governmental officials, saw it as hindering initiative and
change?229 Reflecting on his service as a City commissioner, Professor
Ross Sandier told the Commission that "[t]he only person who has a stake
in your success as a Commissioner is you yourself and the Mayor, [OMB]
has none, and in fact ... their stake is almost in your failure as opposed
to your success. "' While perhaps the product of a particular government
agency's disappointments, this comment reflects a concern that was shared
by many about OMB's dampening role. Nevertheless, OMB had played a

224. See Dan Barry, Council Overridesthe Mayor to Restore Fundsto Budget, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1998, at Al.
225. See Mike Allen, Small ProgramsFall Victim to Budget Battle in City Hall, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1998, at B6.
226. See Barry, supra note 224.
227. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 15, 1989, at 54-55; How The City's BudgetMaking ProcessEvolved, CHARTERREVIEW (N.Y. City Charter Revision Comm'n), Spring

1989, at 7.
228. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 15, 1989, at 52.
229. See id. at 197 (statement of Jerald Posman, former Deputy Chancellor, Board
of Education, asserting, "I don't have very much respect for the city budget process, I don't
have very much respect for OMB as an organization.").

230. Id. at 196.
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major role in keeping the City financially stable in the years since the
City's 1975-1978 fiscal crisis. 23'
This crisis had lingering effects and affected the Commission's
decisions on a number of budgetary issues. Years of tinkering with
revenue estimates, pushing expense budget items into the capital budget
when revenues were insufficient to meet perceived programmatic needs,
and an overall lackluster management of the budget by elected officials
resulted in near insolvency for the City during the mid-1970s. 2 The
consequence was not only a series of restrictive state laws, described
below, but also a political and fiscal climate that a decade later in 1989 still
required exercising caution in approaching changes in budget procedures
or allocation of budget powers.
This climate was reinforced by numerous fiscal watchdogs.2 4 In this
context, mayoral authority to constrain and manage the budget was a
dominant theme.
Gordon Davis, a former Commissioner of the
Department of Parks, illustrated this point in an answer to a question
concerning his advocacy of strong mayoral budgeting powers:
[W]e all say [that fiscal conservatism is important] and we don't
say it because we're theoreticians. We say it because we were all
around in 1975, and we know what the real bottom line is in this
discussion. The real bottom line is the city goes broke because
nobody is managing what's coming in and what's going out. 35
Finally, some saw mayoral budget domination as a counterweight to
legislative spending tendencies fueled by the City's role as the direct
provider of services. As Professor Sandier noted:
The demand in my department, we don't provide human service,
we provide infrastructure services so huge that without very strong
city-wide leadership given by the Mayor, we could not function.
It's-I think it's the level of demand that comes to us. People want
free transportation, they want every street perfect, everything;

231. See generallyMARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRIsis/FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF NEW YORK CITY (1985).
232. See generally id.
233. See generally id.
234. For example, the Citizens Budget Commission ("CBC") played a major role as
a fiscal watchdog. For a discussion of the CBC's role, see Ray Horton, PanelFour: Will
the Structure of City Government Be Able to Meet the Next Generation's Demands, 42
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1041 (1998).
235. Legislative Hearing, Mar. 15, 1989, at 246.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

there has to be a strong central Mayor to meld those virtually
unlimited demandsY 6
On the other hand, others felt the City's budgetary disputes failed to do
justice to the City's compelling human needs.3 7 They hoped, at the very
least, for changes in priorities.
The Commission, thus, grappled with a number of budgetary issues.
After the removal of the Board of Estimate, we believed combining
lawmaking and budgetary powers would make the City Council more
effective on policy matters and allow it to act as a better counterweight to
mayors on budgetary disputes. Combining these powers, however, did not
answer the question of how much budget power the Council or borough
presidents should have to fulfill their envisioned roles.
In the end, after we removed the Board of Estimate and made the
Council the sole legislative body of the City, our other changes to the
budget process were relatively modest. The mayor's budget powers were
not significantly reduced.2 8 The Council's powers were increased, but not
substantially?239 The borough presidents were given roughly the same
opportunities to influence the budget as before, although they had to work
harder-and more openly-to get results because they no longer had a vote
in a legislative body and could not operate at the last minute behind closed
doors.
Other reforms concerned providing more information to the Council
and the public about the contents of the budget and involved the creation
of the Independent Budget Office,2 4' which is discussed in a later chapter.242
Had we witnessed the attempts of the present mayor to frustrate Council
policy initiatives, as described earlier, the Commission might have been
less cautious.
In the following section, we will describe the budget process as we
found it. This description requires attention to the formalities. Of course,
these are only the required steps in the budget process. They do not tell the
story of budget making or of the flurry of human activity that surrounds
each step. Gordon Davis again provided an apt observation:

236. Id. at 264-65.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
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See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. I § 8 (1989).
See id. ch. 2 § 28.
See id. ch. 4 § 82.
See id. ch. 11 §§ 259-60.
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The budget is too mutable to be science, too ragged to be art, too
persuasive to be wisdom, too discordant to be music, too petty to
be just, too inelegant to be philosophy, too precise to be religion,
too incestuous to be love, therefore it must be politics.243
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, local finances have faced
tight state constitutional controls. Article VIII of the State Constitution
describes the limits of local debt, 2" how local governments can contract
debt,245 and the time and method by which they must repay debt.246 Article
VIII also contains limits on the amounts localities can raise through the real
estate tax. 24 7 In fact, as Professor Richard Briffault points out:
[Tihe entire subject of local taxation is subject to state regulation.
The power to tax is not one of the home rule powers of local
government. Indeed, Article XVI expressly provides that the
"power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended or
contracted away" and state laws which delegate the taxing power
"shall specify the types of taxes which may be imposed thereunder
and provide for their review." This prohibits blanket enabling acts
24 8
empowering localities to impose taxes at their own discretion.
The City has been authorized to raise property taxes on its own, subject to
a ceiling in the state constitution. 249 To change other taxes, the City must
petition the state legislature." 0
The City's budget process also faces a variety of statutory restraints.
The City's 1975-1978 fiscal crisis resulted in extraordinary state regulation
of the City's financial activities to enable the City to regain access to the
credit market. Among the statutes enacted to address the emergency were
the Financial Emergency Act of 197525' and the Municipal Assistance
Corporation Act of 1975.252 In 1989, an amended Financial Emergency

243.
244.

Legislative Hearing, Mar. 15, 1989, at 182.
See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.

245. See id. § 2.
246. See id.
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Act" 3 provided a backdrop to City fiscal activity, though its special
controls were not active because the City's finances had remained stable for
a number of years.5 4 Yet a state-controlled financial control board
(FCB)' 5 remained ready at any time to assume effective control of the
budget if certain statutory conditions were not satisfied 56 The FCB's
views continued to be extremely influential and its three "Private
Members" were engaged with the Commission on financial issues.
This statutory regulation had substantial political consequences. Any
changes in the budget process would be studied and commented on by the
FCB and other budget watchdogs.5 7 Their views would affect members of
the Commission and a variety of opinion makers. This point was driven
home to the Commission in a letter from the Private Members of the FCB
to the Chair and Members of the Commission: "[U]nlike the State and most
other local jurisdictions, the special history of this City and its fiscal crisis
imposes a special burden on the City-that of never being wrong
(budgetarily). There is virtually no margin for error.""
B. The Budget-Making Processas We Found It
In 1989, and since 1936, the City's budget process actually produced
two budgets: expense and capital?5 9 The expense budget covered the costs
of running the daily operations of the City, including the wages of City
employees, rent for City offices, the costs of most services and supplies
bought by City agencies, including such costs as foster care services,
2
homeless services, and the cost of repaying loans taken out by the City. 60
The expense budget was funded through City tax revenues, various fees,
and monies from the state and federal government. 26' The projected
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See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 5401-20 (McKinney 1997).
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257. See id. § 5408.
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revenues from these sources for the 1989-1990 fiscal year (July 1 to June
31) totaled $26.8 billion. 262
Through the capital budget, the City financed the construction,
reconstruction, and acquisition of structural improvements such as its
buildings, parks, bridges, and streets. 263 Expenditures for major pieces of
capital equipment such as garbage trucks, street cleaners, and computers
were also authorized. 26 Most of the money for the projects and equipment
covered by the capital budget came from the sale of City bonds. 265 Some
capital money also came from state and federal sources. 266 For fiscal year
1990, the proposed capital budget was about $4 billion.267
The budget process in place in 1989 was largely a product of the 1936
Charter reforms, which centralized substantial power in the Office of the
Mayor. It did so by assigning the power and responsibility to prepare and
manage the budget to the mayor and removing it from the then-Board of
Estimate and Appropriation.26 8 The 1936 Charter also established the
City's present July 1 to June 30 fiscal year, divided the budget into expense
and capital, and provided a detailed schedule and process for how the
budget was to be prepared. 269 Finally, the 1936 Charter set up the Board
of Estimate and Council as two legislative houses for budget enactment.27 °
As the Commission began working in 1989, the basic outlines of the
1936 processes remained intact with the following major Charter changes.
The Council and Board's budget powers were equalized in 1961 .271 The
mayor's ability to vote on the budget as a member of the Board of Estimate
was removed in 19 7 5 .272 In 1975, the Charter limited the mayor's veto to
legislative increases in the budget 73 and established that a mayoral veto
could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of either the Board or Council and
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then a confirmation by a majority of the other. 27 4 Finally, the 1976 Charter
provided more community input during budget preparation.275
The painstaking details of the budget process as it existed in 1989 are
too technical and arcane for this forum. Instead, we offer a general outline
and some details of the more significant procedural steps.
By no later than January 16 of each year, the mayor was required to
submit a preliminary budget statement ("preliminary budget") to the Board
of Estimate and the Council. Such statements were to include proposed
expenditures and anticipated revenues for the ensuing fiscal year. 27' The
timeliness of submitting these statements was important because the final
budget was to be enacted by the end of June, and sufficient time was
needed for a variety of forms of review. 27
This preliminary budget consisted of three constituent statements: (1)
departmental estimates of agency expenditures for the next fiscal year; (2)
a plan to balance the expense and revenue budget, if the tentative plan was
not in balance;
and (3) a four-year financial plan covering estimates and
278
revenues.
Departmental estimates formed the heart of the preliminary budget.
They were the product of each City agency and were submitted to, and
revised by, the director of OMB (subject to "appeal" to the mayor).279 In
preparation of these estimates, the agencies worked with projections from
OMB on how much they would have to spend. 280 Agencies might have
been informed, for example, that they would have ten percent more or less
to spend than they did in the prior fiscal year. Or they might have been
told by OMB or the mayor's Office of Operations that they would have
more to spend in a particular area that the mayor wanted to emphasize.
Through this process, mayoral policy preferences were honored by the
agencies in the initial budget presentation.28 1 The departmental estimates
were also required to include statements of the budget's impact on the level
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of services provided,28 2 and agencies that delivered local services were
required to consult with relevant community boards about the estimates.283
The departmental estimates were divided into proposed units of
appropriation ("UAs") for both personal services ("PS"), including salary
and benefits, 284 and for other-than-personal services ("OTPS"), including
materials, supplies, and non-capital equipment.285 In theory, units of
appropriation were a breakdown of an agency's budget by separate
categories of spending. "Each proposed unit of appropriation for personal
service" was supposed to "represent the amount requested for a particular
program, purpose, activity, or institution., 286 Despite the Charter's
requirements, the personal services categories were subject to substantial
For example, the Police Department could
agency discretion. 287
characterize all of its PS expenditures as one UA called "policing." Or it
could break them down into a variety of PS categories such as traffic,
public transportation, patrol, investigation, internal affairs. Choices on
how to define a UA could be of enormous political importance in
executive-legislative relationships and, as will be discussed, commanded a
considerable amount of our attention in 1989.
After the mayor presented the preliminary budget, community and
288
borough boards were required to hold public hearings on its contents;
then the Board of Estimate and City Council were required to hold joint
hearings on the preliminary budget and comments of community and
borough boards.289 Subsequent to these hearings, the Board and Council
were required to submit their findings and recommendations to the
mayor.2
In late April, the mayor was required to submit an executive budget
and budget message to the Board of Estimate and the Council. 29' The
executive budget was similar to the preliminary budget with changes
resulting from additional information about revenues, the formal public
hearing process, and the extensive lobbying by agencies and various
The budget
advisory groups during the preceding months.292
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message-which by Charter was not part of the budget that was
adopted 2 93-was in effect the mayor's narrative on the budget, which
included explanations of budget policies and goals, schedules, revenue
estimates and proposals for changes in revenue sources, comparisons
between the prior year and the proposed year spending, and information
about local service district spending. 294 Additionally, as a result of changes
proposed by the Ravitch Commission and adopted in 1988, the expense
budget and message had to contain information relating to appropriations
and expenditures for the maintenance of capital projects. ' This provision
was intended to instill some accountability in the government for the
ongoing care of its capital structure, and was the result of a crisis in bridge
maintenance that paralleled the deliberations of the Ravitch Commission.
The late-April date for the inclusion of the mayor's executive budget
and message itself had more significance than simply measuring the
opportunity for public comment. Because the state fiscal year ends on
March 31 of each year, 296 an accurate determination of the amount of state
revenues for New York City could be determined after that date.
However, the routine delays in the State's budgets over the last decade
have removed this advantage.
Once the mayor sent the budget to the Council and Board of Estimate,
both bodies were required to hold budget hearings. 297 The Council and the
Board had the power to increase, decrease, add, or omit any unit of
appropriation in the budget and to add, omit, or change any terms or
conditions on expenditures. 298 A term or condition on an expenditure is,
in effect, a limitation on that expenditure.
After the hearings, the Council and Board had until early June to adopt
a budget by concurrent resolution. 2' The end date for legislative action
was an important statement of policy in the 1989 Charter. If the deadline
was not met, the budget of the current fiscal year would continue to operate
until the adoption of a new budget. 3' By continuing the prior budget, the
City could avoid the type of budget crises seen at both the state and federal
levels, where because of budget impasses, a government shut-down has
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been threatened or has occurred.3"1 From a political perspective, this end
date placed considerable pressure on the parties to resolve budget
disputes-unless living with the old budget became a politically attractive
policy alternative.
After the Council and the Board approved the budget, the mayor had
no power to veto any reductions, but could veto any increase or addition
or any change in any term or condition. 0 2 Vetoes required a return of that
item to the Board and the Council, with objections being placed in
writing. 3 Either body could then override the veto by a two-thirds vote
of either body and a majority vote of the other body.3° Failure of the
legislative bodies to act on a veto or vetoes by June 20 resulted in the
expense budget-as modified by the disapprovals-being deemed
adopted.30 5 On June 22, if the budget was out of balance based on the
mayor's estimate of the ensuing fiscal year's revenues, property taxes
would have to be raised to cover any deficit.30 6
Mayoral authority to manage an enacted budget was very broad.
Recall that the budget is based on revenue estimates, not cash in hand.30 7
This is a complex effort that basically can never be correct. As Alan
Proctor, Deputy Director of OMB, told the Commission:
I'd say probably three quarters to four fifths of our effort is an
ongoing effort to try to balance risks. We know that we will be
wrong on every single revenue item. What our effort focuses on
is to try to make sure that in aggregate our upside risks are
balanced by our downside risks so that the highest probability is
that we will come close in total to the A revenue in the budgets.30 8
As the budget had to be balanced by year's end, the mayor's foremost
fiscal management responsibility was to assure this. The Charter provided
a number of tools to support that effort. Among them were the mayor's
authority to establish quarterly allotments for each agency for each of its

301. See, e.g., Jerry Gray, 2 Sides in Senate Disagree on Plan to End Furloughs,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1996, at Al (discussing a several-week shutdown of the federal
government beginning December 15, 1995).
302. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6 § 121(a) (1976, as amended through 1988).
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units of appropriation. 9 Through this process the mayor created a
spending plan for agencies that allowed a watchful eye on the City's actual
revenues as the year progressed.31 0 If revenues were lower than predicted,
the agencies would have less to spend. But what if the mayor wanted to
reduce spending in one agency or on one unit of appropriation, but not in
another, in the event of a prospective deficit? Or what if the City's
revenues were higher than estimated? The Charter also provided the mayor
with authority to modify units of appropriation.'
Without approval by
others, the mayor could increase or decrease a unit of appropriation within
31 2
an agency-but only by up to 5% of that unit of appropriation.
Moreover, if the mayor wanted to move money among agencies or charge
more than 5 % of a unit of appropriation within a single agency, legislative
approval was required.3" 3 Either the Board or Council was empowered to
block such transfers within thirty days of notification of the mayor's
proposed modification. 3 4 The expenditure of new revenues, on the other
hand, required more than a simple notice and opportunity to disapprove.
Here, the requirement was the same as for the original budget enactment:
an affirmative legislative vote, an opportunity to amend or condition the
proposals, and an opportunity for the mayor to veto and the legislature to
override.3 15
To a large extent the broad outlines of the expense budget process
described above were also applicable to the preparation, enactment and
administration of the capital budget. A few differences warrant comment.
The first is that the capital budget appropriated spending for physical
improvements that usually take more than a year to complete,3 16 while the
expense budget spending was only for the ensuing fiscal year.317 As the
revenue source for most capital projects is money borrowed through the
sale of bonds, the ability of the City to borrow was limited by caps on its
borrowing authority and by the market's willingness to accept City bonds
at an affordable rate.
Another important distinction between the two budgets was the
involvement of the City Planning Commission and Department in the
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capital budget process.318 While an impasse over the expense budget
resulted in extension of the current expense budget until a new budget was
enacted, 319 a.failure to agree on a capital budget would yield a different
result: if projects were acted upon by the Board and Council, they would
be deemed to have been adopted at the lower amount of any item in
dispute.32 °
C. The 1989 Changes
The decision to abolish the Board of Estimate necessitated a review of
its budget role, and also provided an opportunity to review budget decision
making generally, all within the framework of the Commission's adopted
goals. Should, for example, the new Council simply replace the Board as
the sole body for budget enactment? If so, should there be any specially
mandated legislative processes? If so, also, were the Council's budget
powers sufficient to meet its new role as sole legislative body? What role,
if any, should the borough presidents play in the budget process? What
impact would any proposed changes have on the ability of the mayor to
manage the budget? Of course, these questions were interrelated. Any
change in the budget power of one office or entity impacted the power of
the others. This reality presented the Commission with some substantial
conflicts among our three goals of adequately empowering the "new"
Council, of establishing a meaningful vehicle for assuring a borough
perspective in the budget process, and of maintaining the mayor's strong
hand as helmsman of the process and as presumptive guardian of fiscal
responsibility.
1. The Role of the Council
The transformation of the Council from one house in a bicameral
legislative process on the budget to the only legislative body in a
unicameral legislative process added enormously to the Council's budget
power. Mayors could no longer reduce the Council's sway or frustrate its
will by playing Council and Board against each other. Aside from this
change, however, we made only a few other changes to enhance the
Council's power, but did attempt to improve its deliberative process
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through requiring that more information be provided to the Council and
implicitly to the public. 32'
Despite our desire that the new Council have all tools necessary for
performance of its representative and other functions, we were, as
discussed earlier, 322 acutely concerned that too much tinkering with the
budget procedures might be fiscally irresponsible. Also, it would
unquestionably result in an outcry from the fiscal community and their
influential constituencies.
2. Revenue Estimating
The most significant budget power possessed by the mayor was the
exclusive authority to estimate revenues for the forthcoming year.32 3 This
was a power not held by either the President of the United States or the
Governor of the State of New York. We had received strong testimony
that the continuation of this exclusive authority would undermine our
efforts to make the Council strong and independent. For example, Penelope
Pi-Sunyer, Director of the City Project, testified in March of 1989:
The fundamental problem is that the City Council and Board of
Estimate have no power over revenue estimates. I think this is a
really very fundamental, even with the greater City Council
capacity now, and they really have developed a great deal of
expertise with new staff and new committee leadership to look at
revenues and think of ways that the City could raise and increase
its revenues or improve them or make them more equitable.3 24
Lane and Frank Mauro were particularly sympathetic to considering
change, based on their state experience. For the City, this meant that if the
legislature wanted to spend more money than the mayor had estimated,
they had to take it from other programs, take responsibility for raising
property taxes, or secure additional taxing authority from the state.325
Whether or not this exclusive mayoral power was appropriate in the
abstract, we decided that of all the budget powers of the mayor, this one
was sacrosanct. Given the fiscal crisis, it was not possible to change this

321. In this connection, our addition of the Independent Budget Office discussed in
the next chapter was an important step. See discussion infra Chapter VIII.
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mayoral power in 1989. Giving such power to an untested Council, in our
view, would have raised grave concerns about upsetting what was
perceived as the City's fragile hold on fiscal integrity-a view almost
hauntingly emphasized by the Private Members of the FCB
3 6 in the statement
cited earlier: "There is virtually no margin for error." Z
So certain were we of the volatility of this issue that, for almost the
only time in the Commission's work, Schwarz preempted debate. This is
illustrated by the exchange with Commissioner Sullivan at the meeting at
which the Chairman's Preliminary Proposals were submitted. In response
to Bishop Sullivan's suggestion of a role for the comptroller in revenue
setting, Schwarz quickly declared:
Where I would come out on that . . .is to force the Mayor's
assumptions out on the table . . .[and to] require the Mayor to
professionally ... respond to any other elected official ... who

comes up with a different figure based on methodology.
Let the debate then play out as an informed debate, but not take
away from the Mayoralty the ultimate . . . responsibility for
revenue estimates . . . . [F]irst, I think it would be wrong

substantively. Second, I think very much we do not want to do
something that raises, [for] .. .the bonding agencies and other

people who judge the City of New York, the specter of removing
things that have come in as part of the fiscal restraint that is in
response to the fiscal crisis."
And again on May 10, in response to Nat Leventhal's query concerning the
comptroller's revenue estimating authority, Schwarz stated: "I think we
ought to . . .require the Comptroller to comment about the budgetary

figures. I believe that for reasons of fiscal conservatism, we ought not to
change the way the system has worked, which leaves the ultimate authority
on setting revenue estimates with the Mayor ...

32

We did institute two major changes beyond the provisions designed to
require more "sunshine" and increase the likelihood of informed discussion
of revenue estimates. First, the Commission provided in section 1515 that
any "person or organization" may set forth alternative revenue estimates
for consideration by the mayor. 329 Also, the mayor "shall" consider any
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such alternative if it is "accompanied by a statement of the methodologies
and assumptions upon which such estimate is based in such detail as is
necessary to facilitate official and public understanding of such
estimates. 330 Second, the Independent Budget Office was also required to
provide the Council, the comptroller, and other elected officials with its
analysis and information concerning estimated revenues.33' Of course, in
leaving in place the final authority with the mayor, our assumption was that
mayoral power to estimate revenues would be exercised only on a good
faith, professional basis and not as a tactical ploy in a potential battle with
the City Council.
3. Impoundment Power
Another change requested by the Council, borough presidents, and a
number of witnesses before the Commission was to clarify whether the
mayor's authority to impound money included an impoundment power
other than to insure a balanced budget. Or, as Frank Mauro stated in
describing a proposal to prohibit impoundments for "policy" reasons:
impoundment would not be possible under this is where the
legislature adds an appropriation to the budget, the Mayor does not
line item veto it, and, then, later on during the year, for reasons
other than balancing the budget, or other than being able to
accomplish the [same] purpose for less, the Mayor for policy
disagreement
reasons, prohibits the agency from spending the
332
money.
We used the word "clarify" throughout our presentation and documents 333
because of our view that the Charter's existing language did not authorize
any policy impoundments. Indeed, it was our view that the Charter could
not authorize policy improvements because such authority would conflict

330. Id. § 1515(c).
331. Seeid. ch. 11 §260(a)(2).
332. Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 248-49.
333. See, e.g., Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at245; N.Y. CITYCHARTERREVISION
COMM'N, SUMMARY OFPRELIMINARY PROPOSALS 9 (May 1989) (suggesting a requirement
that the mayor "spell out in writing . . . the reasons for 'impounding'-refusing to
spend-money appropriated by the Council") [hereinafter SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY
PROPOSALS].
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with the state constitutional requirement that every local government have
a directly-elected legislative body responsible for initial policy making.334
We began with two proposals. The first, the clarification, and the
second, a sunshine provision under which the mayor would have to inform
the Council of any impoundment along with its impact on services and
service goals. The sunshine proposal survived debate; 335 the clarification
proposal did not.
At the May 13, 1989, public meeting, David Trager urged that the only
requirement be one of sunshine. 336 Trager was worried about creating a
cause of action for any private agency which had money withheld by the
City. 337 The weakness with the clarification proposal was not really the
litigation question, but that the proposal itself was too abstract. In essence,
Judah Gribetz's question-"why are we addressing this issue, and what has
been the experience with impoundment up to now, which would furnish the
basis for considering the issue" 33 8-could not be answered. It appears from
the Commission's record, however, that, if the Commission had been
acting based on a record of impoundment abuse, the Commission would
have gone on to wrestle with trying to devise substantive limitations.
4. Budget Modifications
Another somewhat abstruse budget issue on which we spent
considerable time at the Council's urging was the process of mid-year
budget modifications. The Council wanted all budget modifications of five
percent or greater to be subject to the enactment process that the existing
Charter required only for new revenues.339 In simple terms, the Council

wanted to be able to add its own policy judgment to the deliberative mix
and not be limited just to saying no. 4° We initially agreed with this
position because of our view that such authority would further our goal of
empowering a more diverse Council. We thus made this proposal part of

334. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § l(a) ("Every local government ... shall have a
legislative body elective by the people thereof.").
335. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6 § 106(e) (1989) (requiring that "the mayor shall
notify the council of [impoundment] determination[s] and the implications and consequences
of those impoundments . .

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

").

See Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 252.
See id. at 252-53.
Id. at 250.
See id. at 267-68.
See id. at 259-60.
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the Chairman's Initial Proposals presented to the Commission on May 13,
1989. 341
In the ensuing weeks, the proposal was subject to substantial criticism
particularly from the mayor and the private members of the FCB.
According to the mayor:
[T]here would be a dramatic and unnecessary increase in the
number of budget modifications that would require approval of the
City Council. This alone would entail substantial delays in the
provision of needed services as well as require a large increase in
legislative staff. Second, the procedure would limit the flexibility
of the City commissioners. Managers must have the ability to
revise their budgets and operation to meet agreed-upon goals.
Without this flexibility no manager can succeed. Last, by
permitting the opportunity to launch new or enhanced programs,
the new Charter would encourage the government to emphasize
short-term political gain at the expense of such fiscal practices
and the achievement of broad objectives. For example, if public
assistance expenditures are below the required increased
expenditures for jails, what purpose other than a narrowly political
one, can be served by the legislature's intervention to prevent an
appropriate shift of funds and require instead a new program.
Ultimately, how would increases in mandated expense not
anticipated in the budget be paid for?342
This latter point was also echoed by the Private Members of the FCB:
This does not appear to be a structure designed to foster disciplined
budget administration. In particular, it could easily lead to
circumstances where a modification to transfer funds from the
General Reserve to cover the cost of an unpopular mandate (e.g.,
rising welfare caseload) could be siphoned off for more popular
uses, leaving the General Reserve inadequate to meet its statutorily
required purposes.343

341. See id. at 256-70.
342. Letter from Edward I. Koch, Mayor, City of New York, to Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission 11 (May 31,
1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review) [hereinafter May 31, 1989,
Letter from Mayor Koch to Schwarz].
343. Letter from Private Members of the Financial Control Board to the Charter
Revision Commission, supra note 258, at 4-5.
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Again, our concern about undermining, or appearing to undermine,
mayoral control of budget administration cautioned against pushing the
issue without refinement. At the June 26 meeting of the Commission, we
presented a new iteration of the proposal. 3" This time, in answer to the
mayor and FCB members, the proposal maintained the current rejection
process to the transfer of money for the continued operation of current
services at the level at which they were currently being operated, but
allowed full Council review of the transfer of monies for additional
services 34 -for example, if the mayor proposed transferring money for
additional police.
The debate on this new proposal led to its abandonment.
Commissioner Leventhal's simple question at the June 26 meeting killed the
issue: "Why don't we let the process of negotiation take place?," asked
Leventhal.346 "If the mayor wants to move money and the Council says
'Well, that's not a bad idea but really I think this should be included too'
and if they feel strongly about it they [the Council] could, essentially,
require the Mayor to change his modification." 347 In other words, the
existing just-say-no policy represented real power and, when exercised,
could force meaningful negotiation on the Council's alternatives.348
5. Appropriation Authority
Finally, in one other area we thought it necessary to strengthen the
Council's budgetary hand. We had received some testimony that there
were a number of funds controlled by City agencies from which
expenditures could be made without appropriations. Inbudget parlance this
was known as off-budget spending, and we proposed to stop it. As
Frank Mauro described to the Commission:

344. See Public Meeting, June 26, 1989, at 109-42.
345.
346.

See id.
Id. at 115.

347. Id. at 115-16.
348. See id. at 141-42 (reflecting the vote to "leave the Charter the way it is" in this
area). The modification powers of the Council were tested in a lawsuit. See Council v.
Giuliani, 621 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994). The consequence of this lawsuit
was a negotiated settlement between the mayor and Council.
349. Spending that is not subject to the Council's control is commonly referred to as
'off-budget spending." See Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989
New York City Charter Revision Commission, to Barry H. Weinberg, Acting Chief, Voting
Rights Section, U.S. Department of Justice 8, 14-15 (Sept. 29, 1989) (on file with the New
York Law School Law Review).

NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42

What this captures is, it makes sure that all funds and accounts
directly under the control of City agencies and officers, would be
subject to appropriation, and we sent out as an example,
Comptroller Regan's audit of the Department of City Planning's
management of the monies it collects as amenities from developers

The proposal was also intended to cover City-created not-for-profit
corporations, such as the Public Development Corporation, created by
Mayor Lindsey through an executive order. 35 After an intense debate on
our coverage of these entities as well as grants and gifts from private
entities to government agencies, the Commission decided not to require
changes relating to private entity gifts or grants.352 We did, however,
subject to coverage any entity a majority of whose board members were
directly or indirectly appointed by City officials.353
6. More Information About the Budget
The Commission proposed four changes to the budget process intended
to provide more meaningful information about City spending. 354 None of
these changes elicited serious criticism or debate.
The first proposal addressed the executive practices in establishing
units of appropriation.355 We viewed the executive's efforts to fulfill the
Charter's existing dictates as spotty at best. An exchange between Frank
Mauro and Charlie Brady, OMB's Associate Director, at the legislative
budget hearing makes this point:
Mr. Mauro: It appears.., that the Department of Juvenile Justice
has more than one program, purpose, activity or institution under
its jurisdiction, yet it presents its personal service request as one
unit of appropriation.

350. Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 220.
351.

See id. at 223-24.

352. See id.
353. See id.; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6 § 111 (1989).
354. See N.Y. CITY CHARTERREVISION COMM'N, SUMMARY
13 (June 1989).

355. See id.
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Mr. Brady: Units of appropriation are rather static over the
years.356
We thought this "static" condition needed to be changed in order to
make it easier for elected officials and the public to understand and
influence the expense budget. Our proposal, which remained relatively
constant throughout the process and which was included in section 100 of
the new Charter, was that a unit of appropriation (whether for personal or
other-than-personal services) could not extend beyond a single program,
purpose, activity, or institution, unless the Council adopted (either on the
recommendation or with the approval of the mayor) a resolution "setting
forth the names, and a statement of the programmatic objectives, of each
program, purpose, activity or institution to be included in such a
Resolution, a proposed unit of appropriation.""' We also required that
each unit of appropriation in the departmental estimates, "the preliminary
expense budget and the executive expense budget" be accompanied by a
statement of programmatic objectives. 5 8
The second change designed to provide more information about the
budget was the requirement that a contract budget be included within the
expense budget. 59 This reform was first urged during the Ravitch
Commission by the public service unions, concerned about the levels of
work that the City was "contracting out." In 1989, it was also advocated
by a number of civic organizations.
Given the decision to place
responsibility for entering into particular contracts with the executive
branch (which meant the decision-making role of other elected officials that
had been played by the Board of Estimate would disappear), we believed
that the Council should have an annual opportunity to participate in setting
contract policy through the contract budget. The goal was to provide a
policy check on City contracting and a public understanding of the
amounts, categories, and justifications for contractual spending programs.
A third change, intended both to provide additional public information
and to impose some additional discipline on the budget process, was the
requirement that local laws and budget modifications be accompanied by
a fiscal impact statement, which was to include a statement of the fiscal
impact
of any law or modification on the revenues or expenditures of the
3
City. 60

356.

Legislative Hearing, Mar. 15, 1989, at 80-81.

357. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6 § 100(c) (1989).
358. Id. § 100(d).

359. See id. § 104.
360. See id. ch. 2 §§ 33(a)-(b).
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Finally, a number of critics had expressed concern about what seemed
to them a cascading quantity of tax relief being granted by the City to a
variety of businesses and other entities. Our response to these concerns
was to include the requirement of a tax benefit report. 61 Under this
provision, the mayor was to provide to the Council each February a
detailed accounting of tax benefits for the prior year.36 2
7. Legislative Oversight
One final change we made regarding the Council's budget role was 363
to
require all standing committees of the Council to hold oversight hearings.
Our goal was, at a minimum, to "leave the message that the Council, with
its responsibilities, ought to be carrying out an important role with respect
to how well or how poorly the Executive Branch is doing . . . . ,364 The
criticism of this proposal was that it constituted an impermissible level of
Council management by the Charter, but we were looking for some way to
decentralize the Council and to respond to the criticism of some of our
critics who were potential allies, such as Citizens for Charter Change, that
the Speaker was too strong. As Schwarz stated, "[W]e should lay on the
Council that element of public accountability." 365
8. Borough Presidents
The most intensely contested question we faced regarding the budget
was the role the borough presidents were to play. Inside the Commission,
Dean Trager and several members were pushing hard for a substantial
borough voice in the new government, most likely through a strong office
of borough president. 366 Outside the Commission, the borough presidents
lobbied hard for considerable power, particularly in budget and land-use
processes. This was echoed by many community representatives who
testified to support them. In fact, so central to our mission was devising
an appropriate role for the borough presidents on the budget and other
topics that at our May 10 public meeting we took the unusual step of

361.

See id. ch. 10 § 240.

362. See id.
363. See id.ch. 2 § 29(a)(2).
364. Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 43.
365.

Id.at 123.

366. See, e.g., Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 8-10; Public Meeting, May 13, 1989,
at 198, 206-07.
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allowing two borough presidents, Ferrer and Schulman, to speak to the
Commission on their proposals for their own roles.367
As Schwarz stated at the May 13, 1989 public meeting, our view was
to try "to find a way to let the Borough Presidents exercise a discretion
similar to what they exercise today. , 368 On the budget front, this meant we
had to find a way for the borough presidents to have a meaningful
opportunity to seek for their boroughs certain amounts of money from the
capital and expense budgets.
The Chairman's Initial Proposals reflected only a vague approach to
this because the Commission had not yet settled on the role that borough
presidents were to play. But by the end of the process, after rejecting a
legislative role for the borough presidents, we had a proposal that was very
controversial-at least until it was understood. First, the mayor was
required to include in the executive expense budget items recommended by
the borough presidents, amounting to 5% of all discretionary spending
increases.369 Discretionary spending increases were defined basically as
increased expenditures over which the City had discretion, but not
including increased costs of existing programs or increases due to federal
or state mandated programs.3 70 Our estimate was that this amount would
equal between $150 and $180 million each year. Second, the mayor was
required to include in the capital budget those projects recommended by the
borough presidents amounting to 5 % of all requested increases in capital
spending. 37' Both of these borough president allocations were to be divided
among the borough presidents by formulas .372 Additionally, the mayor was
to include in the expense budget an amount equal to 0.9% of the borough
presidents' capital allocation for expense budget (e.g., planning)
requirements of such capital projects.3 73 Third, the mayor was required
to submit additional borough president budget recommendations (not
included in the executive budget) to the Council, with an explanation of
why those expenditures had been omitted.374
These additional
recommendations were required to be kept within the mayor's revenue
estimates, so that for every addition a cut or new revenue had to be
identified. Finally, the Council was required to vote on all borough

367.
368.
369.
371.

See Public Meeting, May 10, 1989, at 23-24.
Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 204.
See id. at 209, 215.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6 § 102(a) (1989).
See id. ch. 9 § 211(a).

372.

See id. ch. 6 § 102(b); ch. 9 § 211.

373.
374.

See id. ch. 6 § 102(b).
See id. ch. 9 § 211(d).

370.
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president proposals either through its vote on the executive 375
budget or by
independent vote on proposals outside the executive budget.
Regarding the role of the City Council in the budget proposals of the
borough presidents, in all instances, the City Council would have the final
say, as they would with the mayoral proposals. As the borough presidents
were now to be executives, they could only propose either in the executive
budget or in separate proposals their expenditure preferences. 376 For these
proposals to become law, the Council would have to adopt them.377 The
Commission had rejected, on May 10, a proposal that borough president
budget items would require a super majority of Council members for
rejection rather than the simple majority for all other budget items.378 Our
view was that such items were entitled to no greater preference than those
proposed by the mayor, and that for a borough president to succeed he or
she would have to have the political and policy clout sufficient to convince
the Council of the virtues of the proposal.
These final proposals were challenged on many fronts, reflecting some
misunderstanding of their respective rationales. Most significant was the
challenge to the 5 % allocation of the executive expense budget. For
example, after our first discussion of this idea at our May 10 public
meeting, the mayor wrote:
The budgetary consequences of this formula are far-reaching and
damaging. In my view, this automatically creates a five percent
surcharge on new, non-mandated expense budget programs.
Consider the following example: At some point in the future, a
mayor decides to increase police expenditures by $100 million. In
fact, this program will cost $105 million, with five million dollars
to be divided up among programs chosen by borough presidents.3 79
Among a few members of the Commission, this proposal was also received
with some skepticism. Bishop Sullivan, at the May 13 public meeting,
stated: "It's gimmicky budgeting .... I think it's very bad government,

375. See id. ch. 10 § 254.
376. See id. ch. 4 §§ 82(7)-(8).
377. See id. ch. 10 § 254.
378. See Public Meeting, May 10, 1989, at 180-82.
379. Letter from Edward I. Koch, Mayor, City of New York, to Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission I (May 15,
1989) (on file with the New YorkLaw SchoolLaw Review). The letter was actually received
by the Commission on May 13, 1989, and was therefore available for discussion at the
meeting on that date.
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it's government by formula."38 ° Nat Leventhal declared:
"I remain uneasy
38
about the 5 % as it applies to the expense budget." 1
Our view, on the other hand, was that the proposal did not have the
impact the mayor urged, that it was important for the Council and the
public to hear a borough perspective on the budget, and that the proposed
system was better than the old system in which borough presidents simply
added their money to the budget without the opportunity for public
debate. 38' Finally, we believed that it would have been a serious political
error to deny the borough presidents a meaningful opportunity to play a
role in the budget process. For these reasons, we were determined to stay
the course on this proposal despite the substantial criticism it was receiving.
As Schwarz stated at the May 13 Commission meeting:
With respect to the philosophical or conceptual issues, it is fair to
say that the proposal runs contrary to the basic idea of executive
budgeting which has been the cornerstone of budgeting theory in
this country for most of the Twentieth Century.
On the other hand. . . this proposal does facilitate a balancing and
blending of community, borough and Citywide perspectives in the
budget process and, at least, I would hope that it can be structured
in a way that is positive...
Thus, despite the fact that it is a departure from the norm ... we
are ... dealing with an unusual situation where we are changing
from the current system ....
[and later] Now, this is a device designed to continue to give them
that opportunity, subject to the disposition of the City Council,
which, if they do something foolish, is going to refuse to accept
the foolish thing.
And, I think, further, it has a public policy benefit over where we
are today, because where we are today is, what the Borough
Presidents add, is done ... in the dark of night on the last day.383

380. Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 189.
381. Id. at 207.
382. See id. at 199-200.
383. Id. at 181-82, 199.
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We also responded directly to the mayor's criticism that this 5% was a
surcharge on the mayor's budget:
I think the proposal was created and is consistent with history in
the City of New York and with the strange phenomenon that, in
this huge City, we, sort of, have different levels of government

I think the word, "surcharge" really, in a way, begs the question
of whether this is good public policy. If you think it's good public
policy, it's not a surcharge. If you think it's bad public policy, it
is a surcharge.384
On this basis the proposal was initially adopted by vote of ten to four. 385
However, this was not the end of the matter.
During the public comment period between our first and second round
of public meetings, the mayor intensified his pressure on the Commission.
In a letter dated May 31, 1989, he laid out what he characterized as "a
fundamentally different view . . . regarding the appropriate relationship
between the City's elected officials" 386 which he described as follows:
When I took the oath of office . . . twelve years ago, I said that
New York City is a stroke of genius ... .Although we reflect
over a hundred different nationalities, speak dozens of different
languages, and live in five different boroughs and hundreds of
different communities, we have always been able to find common
ground despite our differences and to find a common purpose that
outweighs our parochial concerns.
We are fortunate that the founders of our City chose to establish a
"strong Mayor" form of government. With a strong chief
executive, we have created a unified City out of five boroughs
It is essential that the Charter Revision Commission... retain this
form of government, balancing the executive powers and
responsibilities of the Mayor against the legislative powers and
responsibilities of the City Council .... To accomplish this, the
new Charter must retain-not diminish or dilute-the powers of the
Mayor while strengthening the City's legislative branch ....

384. Id. at 214-15.
385.

See id. at 216.

386. May 31, 1989, Letter from Mayor Koch to Schwarz, supra note 342, at 2-3.
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In significant respects, the Commission's preliminary proposals do
not do this ....
I think the idea of a Borough President set-aside injects budgetary
and political mischief into the relationships between elected
officials . . . . Borough Presidents, with no executive
responsibility for carrying out the laws, or legislative responsibility
for passing the laws, are given a cost-free role in the budget
process.387
Added to this voice was a Daily News editorial calling on us "to dump
plans to give borough presidents discretionary power over 5 % of the city's
capital budget. 388 Additionally, the Private Members of the FCB and the
Citizens Budget Commission criticized the proposal, particularly as it
applied to the expense budget.389 Of course all of these critics erred in
referring to the proposal as a "set-aside." It was not; the borough
presidents could only propose, but the Council still had to approve.
But for all of this concern from influential voices, we were determined
to maintain our position for both policy and political reasons. Schwarz's
opening comments at the June 26 public meeting stated strongly our
position:
To really generalize, I feel satisfied that what Frank [Mauro] has
done makes the proposals responsible, good government . . .
focusing on the Borough Presidents for a moment, their role in the
expense budget and the capital budget is [now] done at the last
minute and, in effect, figuratively, in the dark of night, whereas
this role will be done up front at the time the budgets are presented
to the Council for the Council's disposition and in the full light of
day to the public, the press, any critics.
It seems to me it is a useful way to make the Borough Presidents
players in the budget process. It makes them real players that
causes people to come together with them, and the things they
propose will have to pass the test of being useful. 3' 9

387. Id. at 3-4, 10.
388.

Editorial, Koch on the Charter,DAILY NEWs (N.Y.), June 6, 1989.

389.

See Letter from Private Members of the Financial Control Board to the Charter

Revision Commission, supra note 258, at 2-6.
390. Public Meeting, June 26, 1989, at 3-4.
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To accomplish this purpose the Commission wanted to be sure that
providing this power to the borough presidents would not significantly
weaken the mayor's budget power. As Commissioner Leventhal stated,
"[W]e voted against a number of things the Mayor wants, and that's okay,
but I want to understand what his objection is." 39 We were prepared for
this task, and at the June 26 meeting we undertook a several hour
examination and defense of every detail of the proposal. 3" Included in that
examination was some attention to the definition of "mandated
expenses. 393 On that date, the proposal was adopted by a vote of nine to
one to one, leaving for the last days of our meetings only the formula for
allocating the expense budget pronounced among the borough presidents .9
9. The Capital Budget
We made a few changes in the capital budget process designed to be
opportunities for planning. These changes were not substitutes, however,
for the commitment to planning that had to be made by the City's elected
officials. Primarily, we re-introduced the City Planning Commission
("CPC") and the City Planning Department ("CPD") to the process, but
not to the extent they had been included prior to 1975, nor to the extent
they wanted. 395 The Koch administration had adopted the practice of
issuing a ten-year capital plan every odd year with the executive budget.396
We added this as a requirement in the Charter, calling it a ten-year capital
strategy.397 More importantly, our proposal required City Planning to issue
and the Director of CPD to issue a draft ten-year capital strategy by
November 1 of each even-numbered year, and required the CPC to hold
hearings on the strategy. 398 The CPC was then to submit its comments on
the draft to the mayor. 399 The theory was that this attention to long-range
planning should influence the next executive budget.

391. Id. at 39.
392. See id. at 39-107.
393. See id. at 80-82.
394. See id. at 107-08.
395. Seeid. at 118-19.
396. See Cerisse Anderson, Capital Housing Budget Upheld: Appellate Division
Dismisses Environmental, Discrimination Claims, 205 N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 1.
397. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 9 § 215 (1989).

398. See id. ch. 10 § 228.

399. See id.
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II. LAND-USE DECISION MAKING
Land-use regulation is among the most important of New York City's
governmental functions. Land use touches many of the central concerns of
the City's life: its economic well-being, the vitality or decay of its
neighborhoods, the quality of its citizens' lives, and the ability of the
government to provide essential services. With respect to essential
services, the productive use of land enhances tax revenues. Land is
essential to the provision of many government services. Land is scarce and
competition for its various private or public uses is often fierce. Through
City decisions about land use, communities can be uprooted or preserved,
new communities can be created, fortunes can be made or lost, and the
power of various political offices or agencies can wax or wane. Added to
the day-to-day disputes that arise from the placement or nature of particular
projects are the historic structural tensions between planners and
politicians, and between advocates of decentralized decision making and
those that favor centralized decision making.
The fierceness of such competition assures that the processes through
which land-use decisions are made are continuously subject to intense
scrutiny from the multitude of groups that have an interest in land-use
decisions. Such scrutiny assured that whatever proposals we were to offer
(and there were many) would precipitate an intense debate which would
require considerable attention. As Todd Purdum reported in May 1989,
only part-way through the process, "None of the initial recommendations
. . . for reshaping city government have changed more in response to
public debate and criticism than [Schwarz's] ideas on how to control land
in a place that he has called a 'land town.'""'
The long debate over land-use decision making and the evolution and
changes in our recommendations evidenced the wisdom of the initial
decision to make the Commission's process as open, extensive, and
participatory as possible. Our initial knowledge of land-use decision
making was somewhat abstract; without the extensive public exposure and
public reaction, preliminary ideas might have prevailed with little change,
at a substantial cost to City governance. As reported by the Times after the
introduction of the Chairman's Preliminary Proposals, "Of all Mr.
Schwarz's proposals; none seem to generate more confusion or controversy
than his ideas on how to control land in a City where land might be its most
contested commodity. ,401

400. Todd S. Purdum, Schwarz Yields to Critics on Land Use, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1989, at B1.
401. Todd S. Purdum, From Jailsto Cityspire:Schvarz Provides a Vision ofZoning,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1989, at Bl.
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In the end, after an array of proposals, the Commission settled on a
scheme that shifted some mayoral powers to the Council and borough
presidents, 40 2 broadened membership on the CPC,403 required attention to
be paid to fairness among communities in the siting of City facilities, 4°4
increased planning opportunities and obligations, 40 5 and attempted to build
some efficiencies into the process.40 6
A. Land-Use DecisionMaking Process as We Found It
Since the 1936 Charter, New York City's land-use decision making
process had been mayorally dominated. This had been done to assure a
single City view of land use and to attempt to introduce some planning
expertise into the City's never-ending "development." Through the CPD
and CPC, the mayor controlled the City's land-use decision-making
agenda, with the Board of Estimate, at least in theory, providing a political
check on land-use decisions. 4 7 In short, the basic land-use decisionmaking process contemplated the following: applications for change by
parties named in the Charter; a gate-keeping function by the CPD; advisory
community comments; a decision by the CPC; and final-almost always
perfunctory-approval or modest changes by the Board of Estimate.40 8
At the heart of this process was the CPC and CPD, which had seven
members, all mayorally appointed. 4" Six were appointed for staggered
terms of eight years.410 The mayor also appointed the director of the
CPD41 1 who served (at the mayor's request) as the CPC's chair. 412 The
CPD was a mayoral agency responsible for providing advice on physical
planning and public improvement to elected officials and staff assistance to

402. See SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS, supra note 333, at 12.
403. See id. at 11.
404. See id.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 3 § 69 (1936). After 1975, a formal community
voice was added through the establishment of community boards and their roles; the boards
exist in the current Charter at N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 §§ 197-a, 197-c (1989).
408. See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 (1976, as amended through 1988)
(governing city planning).
409. See id. § 192(a).
410. See id.
411. See id.
412. See id. § 191(a).
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the CPC. 413 The CPD served as the gate-keeper for the Uniform Land Use
Review Process ("ULURP"), determining what projects or land-use
changes were moved into the process and when.41 4
The Charter charged the CPC with responsibility for "the orderly
growth, improvement and future development of the city, including
adequate and appropriate resources for the housing, business, industry,
transportation, distribution, recreation, culture, comfort, convenience,
health and welfare of its population" 41 5 and with initial approval of a variety
of land-use projects. Created in 1938, the CPC was seen as an independent
voice for experts, in a period in which expertise was thought to be the
solution to every problem. By 1989, the CPC-referred to in one study as
this "coup d'etat by the planners and their allies" 4 6-had become, despite
the good efforts of many of its members, in effect a mayoral agency,
dependent on the political power of the incumbent mayor for any success.
Additionally, the press of daily business, including state-imposed
requirements of environmental review, 47 resulted in little attention to broad
planning issues.
This system was the subject of considerable criticism. To start with,
there was almost universal criticism of the gate-keeping processes of the
CPD, which, depending on the particular critic's perspective, took far too
long, did not share enough information, or was too committed to projects
before the review process began.
Some community advocates judged the advisory roles of the community
boards insufficient and argued for more power." 8 Then Assemblyman
(now Congressman) Jerrold Nadler, for example, proposed a supermajority requirement for a final decision-making institution to reverse a
community board's decision except in certain cases "where no one wants
[the particular use] in their backyard." 419 Others argued that they were not
provided enough resources to fulfill even their advisory roles, particularly
regarding complex land-use decisions.420
On the other hand, developers and City officials were becoming
increasingly concerned about the concessions that well-organized and

413. See id. §§ 191(b)(1)-(5).
414. See id. § 197-c(b).
415. Id. § 197-a.
416. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 22, at 372.
417. These requirements exist in the current Charter at N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 §
192(e) (1989).
418. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 2, 1989, at 330-50.
419. Public Hearing, May 7, 1987 (testimony of Jerrold Nadler to the Charter
Revision Commission).
420. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 2, 1989, at 442-50.
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affluent community boards were able to extract from developers in return
for their support.42 ' Many wondered whether the validity of projects ought
to depend upon extracting some unrelated benefit for the community,
particularly as the communities that usually benefitted were the most
affluent. A similar concern was that poor, particularly minority,
communities were the chosen site of a vastly disproportionate number of22
undesirable City uses, such as shelters or sanitation department garages.
B. The 1989 Changes
The decision to abolish the Board of Estimate necessitated a review of
the land-use functions it performed. This also provided an opportunity to
review land-use decision making generally, all within the framework of the
Commission's adopted goals. For example, should the new Council simply
replace the Board as the final arbiter of all land-use decisions or only for
some of them? If not, to which institutions of governance should these
powers be distributed? Should these various institutions or their decisionmaking processes be modified? What would be the balance between
mayoral and non-mayoral appointments to the CPC? Running though all
these questions was the question of how centralized or decentralized landuse planning and decision making ought to be.
Some of these questions could not be answered in isolation. For
example, a decision to replace the Board with the Council might lead to a
decision to maintain a mayorally-dominated CPC, while a decision to limit
the Council's land-use decision-making authority might lead to a more
decentralized CPC.
1. The Balance Between the City Planning Commission and the City
Council
Our initial proposals attempted to separate legislative from executive
power, and to balance citywide, borough, and local interests and planning
and political interests. The key elements were to limit the Council's
authority to changes in the general zoning resolution (the purely legislative
land-use function, which we thought constitutionally and politically
belonged to the Council-subject, of course, to a mayoral veto and
potential override), and to establish a Land Use Commission ("LUC") of
eleven members to succeed to the Board of Estimate's more specific land-

421. See Public Hearing, May 7, 1987 (testimony of Steven Spinola to the Charter

Revision Commission).

422. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 2, 1989, at 330-50.
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use decision-making authority. 42 We also hoped that by creating LUC we
would provide the CPC with more opportunity to plan, by removing some
of their day-to-day responsibilities. All LUC's eleven members were to be
appointed by the mayor, but seven were to be nominees of other elected
officials: one each from the city council president and comptroller, and
one each from the five borough presidents. 424 LUC's site-specific zoning
changes would be subject to a Council call-up procedure by which the
Council could review such decisions upon the vote of two-thirds of its
members. 4 25 This same majority would be required to reverse LUC's
decision.
On the ULURP front, in addition to determining the final decision
maker for land-use decisions, our intention was to open up the CPD's
certification process to community boards and borough presidents to give
them early warning of projects within their domains.426 Boards could also
hire a planner in addition to their district manager. 427 Finally, all amenities
extracted by community boards would have to be disclosed, as we required
for many other governmental decisions.428
This arrangement satisfied a number of our goals. First, and most
important, it preserved the Council's legislative function. As Schwarz
stated at the May 2 public meeting: "[L]et's have the Council, with its
budget power and its legislative power, think about how we cure
homelessness, and not about whether there's a shelter in one member's
district. 429 It also guarded against corruption by limiting the Council's
power over specific projects. LUC, on the other hand, would serve the
important purposes of maintaining an array of voices in land-use decisions
and making those decisions more efficient. LUC also helped preserve a
borough voice in one of the City's most important decision-making
processes. Finally, LUC was intended to free the CPC to do more
planning.
These proposals had a reasonable theoretical base, but faced problems
of definition and workability. Several also ran into considerable criticism.
The proposal for the dual Commission arrangement was withdrawn prior
to the Commission's debate on the proposals,430 due to concern that the

423.

See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, THE CHAIR'S RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR CHARTER REVISION 41 (Apr. 24, 1989) [hereinafter CHAIR'S RECOMMENDATIONS].

424. See id.
425. See id.at 26.

at 28.
426. See id.
at 29.
427. See id.
at 28.
428. See id.
429. Public Meeting, May 2, 1989, at 164.

430. See Purdum, Schivarz Yields to Critics on Land Use, supra note 400.
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intended amalgamation of Board of Estimate and CPC functions was
unworkable. Critics argued there would be neither mayoral accountability
for day-to-day land use decision-making nor broad political accountability
for controversial decisions.
By the May 10 public meeting, we had decided there should only be a
single commission, the CPC.43' Given the substantial limits on Council
review then contemplated, the CPC would be reconstituted with eleven
members-four appointed by the mayor, two by the city council president,
and one by each borough president.432 We gave two appointments to the
city council president because we thought that the audit function of the
comptroller should preclude an appointment to an executive line agency.433
This shift from a Planning Commission entirely appointed by the mayor to
a multi-appointed CPC with a mayoral minority reflected our view that
because the CPC would have the final say on a number of land-use
decisions, it should not be mayorally dominated.
Reaction to this plan was immediate and intense, but it came from
diametrically different directions. For example, Citizens for Charter
Change, a coalition of labor unions, elected officials, and good government
groups, announced in a memo that our proposal should fail for two reasons:
The City Council should be able to review decisions on how cityowned land is used-and what major projects get built on private
land. The Council should be able to block inappropriate projects
by a simple majority vote.
A new Planning Commission should be independent and foster
long-term planning. The mayor should have no more than two
appointees and the Commission chair should be elected by its
members.434
This position reflected fear that centralized power would suffocate
community voices and overwhelm opposition to unfair land-use sitings.

431. See SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS, supra note 333, at 11.
432. See CHAIR'S RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 423, at 44; Todd S. Purdum,
CharterPanel,ForNow, FinishesReshaping the Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1989,
at B4.
433. See Richard Levine, Schwarz Foresees No Sceptered Mayor in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1989, at B1.

434. Memorandum from Citizens for Charter Change to Concerned Citizens and
Groups (May 24, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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This view was heightened by what many of these advocates viewed as an
imperial mayoralty.435
From the other direction, Mayor Koch complained in a letter to the
Commission:
What is lost in this new City Planning Commission is a unified,
citywide perspective on land use issues. This perspective has been
the hallmark of our City Planning Commission. It has kept the
development of land use policy above the political fray and beyond
the reach of narrow, parochial concerns. It is essential that this
citywide perspective be maintained under the new Charter....
In my view, where there is no change in the zoning text, the
zoning map or an urban renewal plan, final authority over land use
decisions, including special permits, authorizations and site
selections, should rest with the City Planning Commission....
I fear that your proposal will give legislative legitimacy to the
NIMBY reaction that now threatens to block any socially
responsible land use policy. The legislative tradition of comity and
deference, which grants one legislator, in essence, the power to
determine the collective vote on matters affecting his or her
district, means that any time a member of the City Council does
not like a land use decision in his or her district, that member will
have no difficulty mustering the required votes to take jurisdiction
and vote it down. This is a sobering thought. We would run the
risk of land use paralysis.43 6
This view reappeared in the joint testimony of the incumbent and five
former chairpersons of the CPC at the public hearing on June 6, 1989. 4"'
Their testimony, read by Robert Wagner, Jr., was a closely-reasoned call
for mayoral control of the land-use process.438 At this and other hearings,
however, representatives of the Coalition for Charter Change and other
advocates testified in precisely the opposite direction.4 39 So substantial

435.

See Editorial, Borough Power: Moving Toward a Fairer, Broader View of the

City, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 19, 1989, at 44; Alan Finder, Critics of First Charter Plan
Praise Proposed Revisions, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1989, at A27.

436. May 31, 1989, Letter from Mayor Koch to Schwarz, supra note 342, at 5, 7-8.
437. See generally Public Hearing, June 6, 1989 (advocating City Council review of
land use and calling for more centralization).

438. See id. at 3.
439. See id. at 12.
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were the differences between the two views and so adamantly were they
presented that one member of the Commission, Fred Friendly, announced
himself "shell shocked.""' Others lined up on various sides of the issue
with considerable intensity." 1
After this round of testimony, we still saw good reasons to limit the
Council's land-use authority to legislative decisions and not extend it to
administrative, project-specific questions. But we had become convinced
that some administrative decisions were so controversial that they required
review by elected officials and should be resolved by the Council. Finally,
we were beginning to agree with the critics who declared that we had gone
too far in decentralizing the CPC. We attempted to balance these
considerations in our proposals to the Commission as we began our second
round of public meetings on June 15, 1989. 44'
As we show below, 443 the June 15 meeting was the Commission's
single most important meeting, and the changes proposed at this meeting,
especially on land use, were crucial to building the Commission's overall
consensus. 4 Focusing on the balance between Council review and CPC
composition (though other land-use changes were proposed as well), we
proposed expanding the Council's general jurisdiction from changes in the
zoning resolution to all zoning changes, urban renewal plan changes, and
dispositions of City-owned residential property. 445 The Council was
required to act within forty-five days-failure constituted an approval so the
process could not be stalled-and a Council action was subject to veto,
which it could override." 6 The policy basis for such expansion was
that-as with zoning changes-such changes could have a dramatic impact
on city communities and should be subject to political review.
We also proposed that the Council be permitted to review other
controversial land-use decisions. After much discussion on how to define
a controversial land-use decision, we suggested a procedural test. During

440. See id. at 37.
441.
442.

435.
443.
444.

See id. at 112.
See Finder, Critics of FirstCharterPlan PraiseProposedRevisions, supra note

See discussion infra Chapter XI.
See Finder, Critics of First CharterPlan PraiseProposedRevisions, supra note

435 (stating, for example, "disputed city projects could be reviewed by the city council").
445. The last addition showed how a wide-ranging exchange at public hearings helped
the Commission. From listening to these sources, we had become convinced that for "poor
communities where the City owned blocks of housing, . . . a potential change in the nature
of the housing is the functional equivalent of a zoning change for a middle class or wealthy
community. .. ." Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 139.

446. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 15-18; Public Meeting, June 21, 1989,

at 155.
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the ULURP process, if the relevant borough president (now included in the
process) and the relevant community board voted against a particular land
use, which was nonetheless then approved by the CPC, the borough
president could force Council review if he or she reiterated opposition to
the project. 44 7 This process-which became known as the "triple
no"-recognized that the term "controversial" was not objectively
definable; it also created opportunities for useful negotiation among
affected groups by using potential Council review as an incentive for
negotiations.44
The political basis for these changes was the clamor from a number of
Commission members, and from advocates, including many we initially
hoped would be allies. Some critics also warned that failure to provide a
political check on land-use decision making raised voting rights questions
because such a check had existed previously through the Board of
Estimate. 4 9
The decision to extend the Council's jurisdiction had an important
collateral effect. It logically compelled and justified a strengthening of the
mayor's hand on the CPC; we proposed giving one of the city council
president's appointments to the mayor, for a total of five of twelve
members.450
While these new proposals received favorable reviews, we soon
decided to adjust the balance among the various land-use interests by giving
the mayor still greater influence on the CPC in light of the enhanced
Council review. Schwarz presented these changes at the June 20 Public
Meeting:
As

. .

. you know, there are views that come from really quite

opposite directions. There is a group of people who passionately
take the view that the Mayor should appoint 6, a majority of the
11. And that group of people includes the former chairs of the
Planning commission, it includes the Mayor, it includes the New
York City Bar Association, it includes a number of other civic
groups....
And their argument is that the central administration retains
principal responsibility for land uses; and the chief executive is

447. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 15; Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at
105, 163-64.
448. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989 at 13; Public Meeting, June 21, 1989 at 125.
449. See Public Meeting, June 21, 1989 at 112, 131, 139, 147.
450. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 280-82, 297.
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accountable; and that the accountable person should be able to
carry out the responsibility.
The argument on the other side is: Well that makes it too easy for
the mayor to, or the mayor's designees to accomplish something,
albeit the changes I proposed last Thursday put less pressure on
that question because of the appeal rights that community boards,
borough presidents have and a number of things that go to the City
Council. But that is a powerful argument also .... And the way
I believe we can answer both concerns is to have the Mayor have
6 appointees and to have the borough presidents and the council
president each to have 1, so you have a 12 person body.45'
This arrangement was tentatively approved with little dispute, except
for a strong challenge by Commissioner Judah Gribetz at the June 21
meeting to the role of the Council on land-use decision making.452 Gribetz
condemned the "triple no" and wanted all land-use decisions that had been
under the jurisdiction of the Board of Estimate to go to the Council,
undermining our attempts to limit the Council's land-use jurisdiction to
legislative and controversial issues and to strengthen the hand of the
borough presidents in land-use decisions. 453 But after a long exchange, the
Commission agreed on June 21 to support the proposal as presented,
subject to continued public comment.45 4
Our compromise solution on the roles of the mayor, borough
presidents, and the Council remained the subject of substantial-but
inconsistent-criticism during the public comment period in July. Borough
President Ferrer wrote that "[t]he testimony I submitted ... addresses the
serious flaws of the Commission's proposals, which I believe effectively
foreclose meaningful participation of county government in the process of
New York City governance. 455 And specifically about land use:
In the strongest possible terms I restate my objection to the present
voting profile of the proposed Planning Commission. It is almost
unheard of for a governmental entity to be allocated a voting
formula of even numbers ....

451. Id. at 281-82.
452. See Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 117-18, 124-25, 142.
453. See id-at 125, 131, 135, 138, 213.
454. See id.at 181-82.
455. Letter from Fernando Ferrer, Bronx Borough President, to Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission 1 (July 27,
1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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The 11 person configuration is simply more reflective of New
York City and affords a reasonable forum for borough land use
planning.
I am further distressed that the Commission has limited the areas
requiring Council review and vote on land use matters. . . . In
short all land use matters that now come before the Board of
Estimate, should be required to be reviewed by the City Council,
and such review should trigger a Council Vote.
The Charter Commission's land use proposals are further flawed
because as it now stands, the Planning Commission can effectively
"check" community input and the voice of local government by
halting land use projects at the Planning Commission level....
[The borough presidents'] right of appeal is compromised by the
fact that the Commission's proposals do not require the City
Council to vote on the Borough President's appeal. . . . The
practical outcome will be that the voice of the communities will be
unfairly quieted. In a borough such as mine which is "majority
minority", foreclosing meaningful community participation in
county land use determinations presents serious questions of
disenfranchisement such as might warrant Justice Department
consideration.456
We found this letter nettlesome. We had spent considerable time and
effort trying to win Ferrer's support. Many of his ideas had influenced
Charter changes. But our efforts at compromise often drew only new
requests for additional power or other changes. Ultimately, we concluded
that Ferrer would simply be unwilling to support the
Commission-although whether he was motivated by his substantive
reasons or some political concern or aim was unclear. Ferrer's July 27
letter evidenced the wisdom of that conclusion, particularly in light of his
seeming willingness to give up his power under the "triple no," the very
type of power for which he had been fighting for many months in the name
of his ideas about borough or county government. His playing the Justice
Department card was also disconcerting given the significance of their
review to our process and the fact that he had never raised such an issue
before. Our own calculation, at this time, was that his support was
unsecurable.
Nonetheless, a number of advocates, who generally

456. Id. at 2-3.
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supported our efforts, shared Ferrer's criticisms concerning the Council's
limited right of review.
Criticism was not confined, however, to advocates who sought more
Council or borough president power. On July 28, for example, we received
a letter from Mayor Koch, with an equally dire beginning: "I continue to
believe that in significant respects, the Commission's proposals are
4 57
fundamentally flawed. This is particularly true in the area of land use.
More particularly, the mayor argued:
I was troubled to learn that the latest proposal of the Charter
Revision Commission will ensure that virtually every land use
decision will be reviewable by the City Council....
In earlier correspondence with the Commission I have expressed
my fear that an overly broad legislative power to review land use
matters will lead to the transcendence of parochial concerns, will
result in logrolling, and will ultimately threaten to bring rational
development in the City to a halt....
If,despite the force of these objections, you decide to subject
every decision to City Council review, you must by force of logic
and common sense, rethink your position regarding the
appointments to the City Planning Commission. If every decision
now goes to the City Council, on what basis would you continue
to deny the mayor a majority of the appointments to the City
Planning Commission? It becomes even more critical... that the
City Planning Commission express a citywide perspective on land
use matters in order to be an effective counterweight to the more
narrow concerns reflected by the fifty-one members of the City
Council.45 8
Joining the mayor in this view was the New York Times Editorial Board:
Nor would the mayor have a majority on the new City Planning
Commission. The newest draft makes an expanded and inevitably
more parochial Council the final arbiter on most land-use issues.
That makes more essential the need for a professional Planning
Commission controlled by an accountable, citywide official - the

457. July 28, 1989, Letter from Mayor Koch to Schwarz, supra note 102, at 1.
458. Id.
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mayor. Otherwise, it's hard to see how the city could ever build
facilities it needs, like jails.459
Comment by the Times editorial board mattered because one prong of
our political strategy was a Times endorsement. While some disagreements
with the Times over an array of issues were inevitable, the Times' view on
land use was of particular import because of the paper's long commitment
to a central City voice in land-use decision making.4 6'
Apart from this wave of divergent criticism and concern over our
proposals, we came to the view that if the Council's review powers
increased, mayoral appointees ought to be a majority on the CPC (although
staggered appointments and five-year terms would reduce the power of any
one mayor). Our reasoning was not that without a mayoral majority the
CPC would be unprofessional or that its decisions would be more
parochial. In fact, there was no logic or evidence to support the view that
controversial decisions left to the CPC itself would pit the mayor against
all others. Our concern was that the mayor be justly accountable for landuse decisions, since the mayor would be held responsible for them.4 6'
In one of our closest calls, we decided we needed to broaden Council
review, despite the reservations of the Times, Mayor Koch, and a variety
of others. This view had the support of a number of our strongest potential
allies within the political, civic, and labor communities. Claire Shulman,
the borough president of Queens and a tentative ally, was pushing this
position even though it would reduce her own power. Shulman's support
was another element in our election formula, particularly in light of the
unflagging and intemperate opposition of the borough president of the
City's other large borough-Brooklyn. We were also concerned that
casting the Council's land-use decision making authority as a voting rights
issue-the Board of Estimate had this power, the Council does not-might
trigger some problems at the Justice Department, if the Council could not
at least "call up" the remaining land-use decisions.
In the end we decided to increase the size of the CPC to' thirteen and
give the mayor the additional appointment, for a total of seven mayoral
appointments, 462 and to provide an opportunity for Council review of all of

459. Editorial, The Trees, and Tilt, in the Charter,N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1989, at 22.
460. See, e.g., Editorial, New York City's Land-Use Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,

1989, at 24.
461. The Commission adopted a reduced term of office for CPC members-from eight
to five years-consistent with its view that there ought to be more mayoral accountability.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 192(a) (1989).
462. Members were to be "chosen for their independence, integrity and civic
commitment." Id. Each appointment (other than the chair) was to be subject to Council
confirmation. See id.
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the land-use decisions formerly decided by the Board of Estimate.463
Automatic review of these newly-added land-use decisions was not
required; rather we provided a majority call-up mechanism that would
allow the Council to review what a majority wanted. 4' As with all Council
review, decisions were subject to veto and the veto to a two-thirds
override.465
The Council call-up justified creating a mayoral majority, and the
mayoral majority provided reciprocal justification for the Council call-up.
Schwarz introduced the new proposal, in slightly different language, at the
Commission's August 1, 1989, meeting, at which it was adopted:
This is a matter which is, if you use an image of a balloon, it's
something where as one pushes at one part of the process, it affects
one's analysis of another part of the process. Our effort has been
to find a way to appropriately balance the interests of local
perspectives, the interests of Citywide perspectives, to
appropriately balance the opportunities and procedures for review
by the City Council, and as we've worked through the months, I
think our own thinking has evolved. 4 6
2. Planning Versus Politics
In New York City, if not elsewhere, planning and politics are
frequently at odds. Short-term political goals frequently trump longer-term
planning interests.4 67 This is a natural consequence of electoral politics and
of human nature-a tendency to resolve issues of the moment and leave
long-term issues for the future when someone else will have to decide. We
could neither change human nature nor do away with elected leadership,
but from the beginning of the process we asked the question: "[W]hat can
we do, in a charter, to 'help' . . . make the government concentrate on
planning, concentrate on problem alleviation, and not only concentrate-or,
not predominately concentrate on crisis resolution. 46 7 In answer, the
Commission adopted a number of changes, except for the proposal to

463. See id. § 192(f).
464. See id. § 197-d(b)(3).
465. See id. § 197-d(g).

466. Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 6-7.
467. See generally Annmarie Hauck Walsh, Public Authorities and the Shape of
DecisionMaking, in URBAN POLITICS, NEW YORK STYLE, supranote 31, at 214 (suggesting
that major cities such as New York have difficulty accomplishing objectives in city
government).
468. Public Meeting, Apr. 24, 1989, at 8-9.
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establish a new agency (LUC) to handle the day-to-day affairs of land-use
decision making and freeing the CPC to plan.469 Our hope was that these
changes, while not a470guarantee of perfect planning, would put "a little
thumb on the scale.
a. Strategic Planning
The Commission spent considerable time and effort looking for ways
to impose some planning discipline on the City. One proposal was to
appoint a deputy executive director of strategic planning in the CPD.4 71
Similarly, the new Charter required the CPD to assist the mayor in the
preparation of strategic plans, including the report
472on the social, economic,
473
and environmental health of the City," the strategic policy statement,
and the ten-year capital strategy.474
The Commission's thinking about planning had many roots, of which
we mention two. A joke (current when the Post was an afternoon paper)
poked fun at the City's short-term view: "Planning is worrying about this
afternoon's Post; long-term planning is worrying about tomorrow
morning's New York Times. 47 The report of the Commission on the Year
2000 expressed the concern more soberly:
New Yorkers need a long-term view of what New York is all
about: that requires strategic planning ....
Strategic planning is
particularly important when aggressive development is causing the
face of the city to change far more rapidly, and drastically, than
planners are willing to control or even comprehend. Strategic
planning would not only permit city government to plan service
delivery to match development and change, it would also enable
neighborhoods and citizens to participate in a more rational and
humane process, understanding how discrete
projects and programs
476
fit into the overall plan for the city.

469. See id. at 12-57 (detailing all of the proposals), 57-120 (discussing the various
proposals).
470. Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 21.
471. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 191(b)(7) (1989).
472. See id. ch. 1 § 16, ch. 8 § 6.
473. See id. ch. 1 § 17, ch. 8 § 6.

474. See id. ch. 9 § 215.
475. See generally Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 26-28 (containing a discussion
of the need for longer-term planning).
476. N.Y. CITY COMM'N ON THE YEAR 2000, NEW YORK ASCENDANT: THE REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON THE YEAR 2000, at 177 (1988).
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b. 197-a Plans and Zoning Planning
Section 197-a provides for the proposal, review, and approval of plans
for the development of the City. 47 7 It was included in the 1976 Charter as
a means of inviting more community-based planning. As Lane explained
it to the Commission:
Originally, [the 197-a plans] were put into the '75 Charter as we
moved away in the City from the idea of master planning ...
[T]his was sort of a compromise response [to those who wanted
only community-based planning] by allowing both the Planning
Commission or Community Boards . . . to propose something
called 197-a plans, which have not been well defined yet, but they
are being defined in the process of their being used by Community
Boards and by other groups, in the evolution of this section.
Originally, they were used by the City Planning commission for
478
mall development, like the mall on Wall Street ....
Despite the good intentions of the Goodman Commission, 479 we heard
considerable testimony about the inability of community boards to exercise
their planning authority because any effort was being met by the CPD with
either dismissal or a request for an unaffordable Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) unpder state law.480 Our solution was to require the City to
pay for an EIS, if a community board's proposed plan satisfied CPC
standards and were sound. 481' These conditions were established to ensure
that all parties knew the standards for plans and to protect the City from
having to pay automatically for an EIS for any plan submitted.482
The Commission also authorized borough presidents to submit 197-a
plans.483 This greatly enhanced borough president power, because with five
members of the CPC appointed by the borough presidents, a submission by

477.
478.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 197-a (1989).
Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 18.

479. See generally, Joseph P. Viteritti, The Tradition of Municipal Reform: Charter
Revision in HistoricalContext, in RESTRUCTURINGTHENEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 28 (Frank J. Mauro et al. eds., 1989) (referencing
the encouragement of citizen participation in local government).
480. See Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 30-31.
48 1. See id. at 31-34.
482. See id. at 31.
483. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 197-a (1989).
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one might be seriously considered by the CPC. 4 4 Without this change,
Borough President Ferrer, for example, would have had no formal way to
propose useful changes for blighted sections of the Bronx. Thus, the 197-a
changes were designed to draw more creative local voices into land-use
planning.
Of course, any plans approved by the CPC were subject to Council
review.4 85 The Council also had authority to overturn CPC disapprovals by
a two-thirds vote, and the mayor could force the CPC to expedite its
decision making. 486 These provisions addressed a concern among
Commission members, particularly Commissioner Trager, that a more
diverse CPC might try to block efforts that the mayor felt was in the best
interest of the City.4 8
The new Charter also required
the CPC to prepare a zoning and
118
planning report every four years.
This required a statement of the CPC's
planning policy, analysis of portions of the zoning resolution that merited
reconsideration in light of the policy, and proposals for implementing the
planning policies.4 89
c. Environmental Review
Attention to environmental issues had been legally required and
substantively important for some time. We attempted to improve the City's
compliance.
The CPC was required to join the Department of
Environmental Protection in assigning staff to an office of environmental
coordination to assist City agencies in fulfilling their environmental review
responsibilities. 4"
3. Accelerating Certification
Several advocates, notably Queens Borough President Shulman,
persuaded us that the CPD and the CPC were ignoring or delaying
applications for certification required before the ULURP process could

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

See id. § 192.
See id. § 197-a(d).
See id.
See Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 37.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 192(f) (1989).
See id.

490. See id. § 192(e).
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start.49' We were told this was either because they were overworked or
because of a "not-invented-here" attitude. Shulman also contended that
big, spectacular proposals relating to Manhattan were consistently given
priority. The Commission's response was to provide that, under certain
conditions, a borough president could force certification of an application
with only five of the CPC's thirteen votes.492
4. "Fair Share" and the Citywide Statement of Needs
Many community advocates contended, and the Commission agreed,
that some communities were overburdened by undesirable City facilities (as
well as being under-served by desirable ones). This was a particular
concern of poor and minority communities, but others as well. For
example, Staten Islanders felt they were also overburdened, principally
because of the Fresh Kills landfill.
There was early attention to this issue in a lengthy legislative hearing
on March 2. Advocates such as Wendy Brown of the Medgar Evers Center
for Law and Social Justice and Marla Simpson of New York Lawyers for
the Public Interest 93 made the point effectively. Melvyn Hestor, first
deputy administrator of the Human Resources Administration, also
provided factual support for the conclusion that poor communities were
overburdened. 4 4
The Commission responded to these concerns by the adoption of
Charter sections 203 ("Criteria for Location of City Facilities")" and 204
("Citywide Statement of Needs"). 4' The sections combined a number of
key Commission aims: (1) more attention to fairness among communities;
(2) more attention to planning; and (3) opportunities for decentralizing
land-use decision-making. 97
Under section 203, the City may promulgate rules establishing criteria
for the location of new City facilities, as well as for the closing, expansion,
498
or reduction in size or capacity for service delivery of existing facilities.

491. See Shulman Callsfor MajorImprovements in CharterRevision, PR NEWSWIRE,
July 19, 1989.
492. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 197-c(c) (1989).
493. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 2, 1989, at 390-93, 488-93. The fair share
concept won praise from a wide variety of communities, however. For example, Staten
Islanders felt they were also overburdened, principally because of the Fresh Kills landfill.
494. See id.
495. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 203 (1989).

496. See id. § 204.
497. See id. §§ 203-204.
498. See id. § 203(a).
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The criteria shall be designed to further the fair distribution among
communities of the burdens and benefits associated with city
facilities, consistent with community needs for services and
efficient and cost effective delivery of services and with due regard
for the social and economic impacts of such facilities upon the
areas surrounding the sites. 49

These criteria-which became known as "fair share" criteria 00-had
both a general and a specific purpose. The general purpose was to help
focus more attention on land-use decision making. The specific purpose
was fairness.
At the Commission's crucial meeting of June 15, ° fair share was one
of the proposals made by Schwarz. 50 2 The Commission accepted it and
then discussed how to apply it without being too rigid. Charter section
203(a), quoted above, was the result. 5 3 The City must consider the
relative fairness of burdens-as well as benefits-during the land-use
process, much as the environmental laws of the late 1960s and 1970s
required governments to consider environmental factors without mandating
specific results.
Each year, the mayor must submit to the Council, borough presidents,
and borough and community boards a citywide Statement of Needs
concerning City facilities prepared in accordance with the fair share
criteria.5 ° This statement also had to explain the public purpose of any
new or significantly expanded facility and describe its size, location, and
"the specific criteria to be used in locating" it.5 5 Similar information was
required for closings or significant reductions of City facilities. 0 6

499. Id.
500. Legislative Hearing, Mar. 2, 1989, at 391; Memorandum from Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission, to Charter
Revision Commission Members 3 (June 15, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School
Law Review) (regarding land-use proposals).
501. See generally Public Meeting, June 15, 1989.
502. See Memorandum from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New
York City Charter Revision Commission, to Charter Revision Commission Members, supra
note 500, at 11-12.
503. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 203(a) (1989).
504. See id.
505. Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Changes Proposed by the Chair to the Adopted
Preliminary Proposals as the Result of Public Testimony and Comment 2 (June 15, 1989)
(on file with the New York Law School Law Review).

506. To fit with the budget preparation cycle, this information had to be presented
each year by November. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 § 203(a) (1989).
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In support of the planning objective, the Statement of Needs had to
cover the current and the following two fiscal years.50 7 For planning and
disclosure reasons and to facilitate a fair share analysis, the Statement of
Needs had to include a "map together with explanatory text, indicating
•.. the location and current use of all city-owned real property" ' as well
as state and federal health and social service facilities in the City. 9 Each
City agency had to submit to the mayor its own plan. The mayor would
review all of them with the CPC and Department of General Services
("DGS") before issuing the Statement.5 10 For all of these steps, the mayor
had to apply fair share criteria.
Section 204 also had elements designed to foster more local influence
on land-use planning. First, agencies preparing their statements of need
had to "review and consider" needs statements and budget priorities
submitted by community boards. 1 " Second, borough presidents could
propose locations for facilities in their respective boroughs.512 If the
borough president certified that these met fair share and location criteria set
forth in the Statement of Needs, 1 3 the borough president's proposed
location was either accepted or nine of the CPC's thirteen members had to
approve another location. 1 4
This change, which also had its roots in proposals made at the June 15
meeting, 5 5 reflected the view of borough presidents and many advocates
that local officials may know more than the central administration about the
local impact of City facilities. Because they "do know something about
how to meet City needs," we wanted to "give a little edge to that." 5 6 (Of
course, choosing to accept an unpopular facility requires a borough
president to exercise political will and courage.)

507. See id. § 204(a).

508. Id. § 204(d).

509. See id.
510. See id. § 204(e).
511.

See id.

512. See id. § 204(f).

513. See id.
514. See id. § 197-a(d) (outlining the procedures by which the CPC may approve or
disapprove any plans).
515. See generally Public Meeting, June 15, 1989.
516. Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 86.
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III. FRANCHISES, REVOCABLE CONSENTS,
CONCESSIONS, AND LICENSES

The City possesses inalienable rights to its streets, highways, avenues,
parks, wharves, and other public property.5 17 There is enormous demand
for the use of this property. Through franchises, revocable consents,
concessions, and licenses, the City has established techniques to grant
permits to private entrepreneurs, such as cable, bus, and ferry companies;
restaurants; and newspaper purveyors, for use by the city's residents. The
distinction among these uses provokes uncertainty, but we offer our view
(which is now part of the Charter), 51" and caution as Schwarz stated at one
public meeting: "[N]either the King nor the deity, in fact, has laid down
immutable rules on what is a franchise, and what is a concession, and what
is a revocable consent ....
A franchise is a right granted to a private party to use public property
for a public service.52 ° Cable television systems, bus routes, and bus
shelters are all examples of franchises. A revocable consent is a right
granted to a private party to use public property for a private purpose. 52'
Examples of revocable consents are a bridge over a street that connects two
private buildings and a sidewalk cafd. A revocable consent, unlike a
franchise, is revocable at any time. A concession is similar to a revocable
consent, but it is generally a right granted to a private party for the use of
property that is generally under the jurisdiction of a particular agency.
An example of a concession is a vendor in a park or a parking lot. A
license (or permit) is also similar to a revocable consent and concession,
but it is usually granted without contract and for a fee that is unrelated to
the value of the economic benefit that comes from the use of the
property. 5 2 Examples of licensed uses of property are tour buses,
newsstands, street vendors, and carters. To illustrate the confusion
concerning these rights, note that a hot dog stand in a park requires a
concession, while a hot dog stand on a street corner requires a license.
As with land-use decisions, disputes over the private use of public land
can be fierce. Lewis Hartman, President of the Junior Tennis League, a
witness at our legislative hearing on franchises, made this point clearly:

517. See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 15 § 383 (1989).

518. See id. § 362.
519.
520.

Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 12.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 362(b) (1989).

521.

See id. § 362(d).

522.
523.

See id. § 362(a).
See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 14, 1989, at 11-26.
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In most other places in the United States, there is enough private
land available to do all sorts of things. We have very tough quality
of life issues in New York City because we need to get the most
out of public land for rich people as well as poor people, in order
to have just a half-decent quality of life ....524
The City had been particularly criticized for allowing cable companies
to serve the richer communities without giving adequate attention to the
poorer ones. As Commissioner Friendly commented at a public meeting:
[R]ight now, cable.., follows the dollar; if you are rich you get cable in
most parts of the City; if you're poor, you don't."5" Bus franchises and
outdoor caf6s have also caused community complaints. Parks advocates
have protested private food vendors. And, recently, the mayor has
unsuccessfully attempted to block both artists and food vendors from using
the streets.526
The Commission made two major decisions on the subjects. First, the
Commission placed responsibility for franchise policies in the Council
(subject to mayoral veto and Council override).52 7 Second, for the
application of these policies, we provided clear procedures for the granting
of each of the rights and made the mayor responsible for their final
execution.5 28 These efforts did not occupy extensive Commission time.
Although we did hold a legislative hearing on the topic 529 and also
committed considerable staff time, most of the particulars with which we
dealt did not engender much debate. The brevity of our discussion reflects
this phenomena. We made no changes in the City's licensing processes,
and we omit any further reference to this subject.
A. The Public PropertyDecision-Making Processes
as We Found Them
The processes for public property decision making we found 53 were
almost unrecognizable because of a general confusion over definitions and
a broad, agency by agency, array of processes and practices. The fullest
524. Id. at 274-75.
525.

Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 157.

526. See Mike Allen, Vending Ban Widens: Not Just Food but also Books and Art,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1998, at BI.
527. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14

§ 363(c) (1989).

528. See id. § 372.

529. See generally Legislative Hearing, Mar. 14, 1989.
530. See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 (1976, as amended through 1988);
Legislative Hearing, Mar. 14, 1989.

1998]

THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING

picture that can be presented is the transcript of the legislative hearing held
on March 14, 1989. 53' In this section we attempt only to present the broad
outlines of what we found.
1. Franchises and Revocable Consents
All franchises had to be approved by the Board of Estimate, with staff
work handled by the Board's Bureau of Franchises.5 32 The terms of a
franchise were embodied in a contract that could not exceed twenty-five
years. 3 The process for obtaining a franchise was commenced by an
applicant submitting a petition requesting a particular franchise.534 The
Bureau of Franchises distributed that petition to various appropriate City
agencies, including the CPD for the purpose of initiating the environmental
quality review. Once the proposal had been approved by the agencies or
modified pursuant to any objections, the petition was submitted to the
ULURP, with two procedural differences.5 35 First, approval of the
franchise required a three-fourth vote of the Board of Estimate, 536 and
second, that vote did not conclude the process. After the Board approved
a petition, a contract incorporating the terms of the franchise had to be
approved by the Board, again by a three-fourths vote, after a public
hearing. 37 Finally, the mayor had an additional time period to approve or
disapprove of the Board's resolution on the contract.
The failure of the
mayor to act was deemed a disapproval.539
The procedure for approval of revocable consents corresponded to that
of a franchise, except that the Board only needed to approve the revocable
consent once (no contract required) and by only a majority vote. 4
2. Concessions and Licenses
The granting of concessions, while seemingly charged to the Board's
jurisdiction under the Charter, was routinely handled by agencies on their

531.

See id.

532. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 §§ 363,366-a (1976, as amended through 1988).
533. See id. § 364.
534.

See id. § 366-a(a).

535. See id. § 366-a(b).
536.

See id. §§ 371, 372.

537. See id.
538. See id. § 373.
539. See id.

540. See id. § 374.
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own. 54' After some criticism of the Parks Department's processes for
granting concessions,542 Mayor Koch, in 1978, established a Concessions
Review Committee, which was required to approve most concessions.543
By 1989, the committee had mandated certain provisions for all
concessions, including a limit of two years (in most cases) and a
requirement that all capital improvements come at544the expense of the
concessionaire and become the property of the City.
B. The 1989 Changes
The decision to abolish the Board of Estimate (and its Bureau of
Franchises) both dictated and provided an opportunity to review the various
processes for granting uses of public property, particularly franchises and
revocable consents, which both required Board approval. As noted earlier,
unlike land-use decision making, our proposals on franchises, revocable
consents, and concessions provoked little dispute or debate.545 Despite this,
the Commission adopted substantial reforms in an attempt to separate the
policy and implementation aspects of these decisions and to unravel the
existing knots produced by years of inconsistent decisions and practices.
Broadly stated, we established definitions of each of the uses of public
property 54 6 (except licenses) and then established standard procedures to be
followed for awards of the uses. 547 These procedures are described below.
1. Franchises
Most importantly, we required that no franchise could be executed,
without the City Council first adopting a general authorizing resolution in
the same manner by which a law is enacted.548 The resolution was intended
to provide the Council the opportunity to debate whether a particular type
of franchise was valuable and under what terms and conditions it should be
let. The insertion of the Council into the franchise process was intended
to further our goal of diverse and broad public participation at the policy-

541.
note 191,
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.

See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 14, 1989, at 6-30; see also BRIEFINGROOK, supra
at V-D.
See Public Hearing, Mar. 14, 1989, at 6-30.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 529 and accompanying text.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 362 (1989).
See id.
See id. § 363(c).
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making level. But we did not allow the Council to initiate an authorizing
resolution. The Commission required that there be a determination of need
by the responsible agency and the mayor.54 9 A responsible agency, under
the Commission's definition, is an agency with the expertise and
responsibility for a particular type of franchise (or revocable consent).5
For cable, we created a new department of telecommunications and charged
it with primary responsibility for all aspects of cable franchises. 5 ' The
establishment of a department of telecommunications552 reflected the
growing attention on the importance of telecommunications. Indeed,
Commissioner Friendly had been advocating such an agency for the City
for many years. 553 As observed by Nat Leventhal, "The recommendation
to establish a separate cable agency . . . was one of the earliest
recommendations that was made, and it was frustrated from the554beginning
[by the Bureau of Franchises]. We are talking 20 years ago.
After the adoption of a general authorizing resolution, the responsible
agency would shape a request for proposals consistent with the terms of
that resolution.5 55 The Commission's decision to require a request for
proposal, even if the idea for a franchise originated with a particular
individual, reflected the Commission's commitment to the competitive
process. As Frank Mauro described: "Somebody might come with the
idea, but I think what the City has come to conclude over the years is even
if someone comes with an idea, you've got to open it up to competition. "556
If such a proposal had land-use implications, it would be subject to the
ULURP process, including the right of the Council to review the franchise
on its own motion or subject to the triple no described earlier. Allowing
the Council to have a second look at the franchise at first seemed redundant
to some of the commissioners. But the request for a proposal, unlike the
authorizing resolution, was intended to include particulars, such as the
route for bus franchises that would be absent from the proposal. The
proposal, in most cases, would contain a broader geographic designation
or issues of safety or fiscal integrity. Of course, the Council could through
amendment to a proposed authorizing resolution, 57 delimit the geographic

549. See id. § 363(b).

550. See id. § 362(c).
551. See id. ch. 48 § 1070.
552. This office was later merged with the Department of Energy and renamed the
Department of Energy and Telecommunications. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 48 (1989,
as amended through 1998).
553. See Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 155-56.
554. Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 539.
555. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 363(e) (1989).
556. Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 208-09.
557. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 363(c) (1989).
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area for a particular franchise, but the ULURP process also gave the
Council the benefit of additional input from community boards, borough
presidents, and the CPC on the impact of a particular proposal on a
community or borough." 8
Once through ULURP, if ULURP was required, a franchisee would be
selected, pursuant to any processes set forth in the authorizing resolution. 5 9
Each selection by an agency would then be subject to the review of the
newly created Franchise and Concession Review Committee, comprised of
the mayor, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, the
corporation counsel, the comptroller, and an appointee of the mayor.5 6
The borough president for the borough in which the franchise or concession
was located was also made a member.5 6 ' If more than one borough was
intended to be covered by a particular franchise, the relevant
borough
5 62
presidents must choose one of their number to represent them.
The Commission required affirmative votes of five members of the
Franchise and Concession Review Committee for the approval of a
franchise. 63 Notwithstanding this vote, we also required that the mayor
separately approve every franchise agreement. 5 6 This provision was
intended to assure mayoral responsibility and accountability for every
individual franchise agreement. Finally, once a franchise agreement was
completed, it had to be registered with the comptroller as if it were a
contract under section 328 of the Charter. 5
2. Revocable Consents
Revocable consents, as before, continued to parallel the franchise
process. But, importantly, because they are for private, and not public,
uses, we did not require an authorizing resolution by the Council, nor any
requests for proposals. Consideration of a revocable consent was to be
initiated by the party who wished the revocable consent.566 All such
petitions were to be submitted to the Department of Transportation and

558.
559.
560.
561.

Seeid. § 197(c).
See id. § 363(f).
See id. § 373(a).

See id. Mayor Koch's original Concession Review Committee had had an
appointee of the Council's majority leader. In our view, this provided the Council with too

much of an executive role.
562. See id.
563. See id. § 373(c).

564. See id. § 372.
565. See id. § 375.
566. See id. § 364(d).

19981

THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING

ultimately approved by the Department of Transportation. 67 We chose that
department to serve this function because most revocable consents involve
use of the city's streets. For historic reasons, we exempted sidewalk cafes
from the Charter process and made them subject to existing provisions of
local law.5 6 8 This assignment of responsibility to the Department of
Transportation did not exclude other agencies from reviewing revocable
consents. Indeed, the new Charter required the Department of
Transportation to forward petitions to all responsible agencies for their
initial review.5 69 Before the final approval of any revocable consent, the
responsible agency must first hold a public hearing on the petition.5 70 If
during the review process the CPD determines that a revocable consent had
land-use impacts or implications, it would be subject to ULURP in the
same fashion as a franchise. 71
3. Concessions
Concessions were and remain one of the most confusing rights to
public property granted by the City. Both the proposal for a Grand Prix
Racetrack in Flushing Meadow Park and a proposal for a hot dog stand in
Van Courtland Park would be concessions. They were defined as "a grant
made by an agency for the private use of city-owned property ...except
that concessions shall not include franchises, revocable consents and
leases."572 In one sense this answered a question posed by Commissioner
Friendly to Frank Mauro: "In twenty words, say why you couldn't make
concessions franchises." 57 3 Aside from this "definition," because of a
dispute that occurred while Donald Manes was the borough president of
Queens over a concession for the Grand Prix Racetrack in Flushing
Meadow Park, we provided that all "major" concessions pass through
ULURP 74 We defined a major concession as one that had significant
land-use impacts, as determined by the CPC, or those for which an
environmental impact statement was required by law. 575 Finally, we

567. See id.
568.

See id. § 364(e).

569. See id. § 364(d).
570. See id.
571. See id.
572. Id. § 362(a).
573. Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 14.
574. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 14 § 374(b) (1989).

575. See id.
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provided that concessions be issued only pursuant to procedures established
by the Franchise and Concession Review Committee or with its approval." 6
IV. THE PROCUREMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES5 77
Each year the City spends close to twenty-five percent of its budget on
goods and services contracts with vendors throughout the country. 78
Through these contracts the City buys everything from pencils and paper
to bullets and fire hoses. It also hires private businesses to provide child
care and food and shelter for the homeless, to repair roads, and to supply
all other goods and many services required to make the city work. In
1989, the City spent over $6 billion of its $30 billion budget on
procurement. 579 Both the quality of City services and the integrity of the
City's finances depend on the processes used to determine the prices and
providers of goods or services. Despite the significance of these
procurement processes, they do not generate the drama of the budget
process or the fierceness of land-use decision making. As a consequence,
they garner less attention, which can open the way for waste and
corruption.
Concern about City contracting had already arisen by 1989, when we
started our efforts. The Parking Violations Bureau corruption scandals had
been exposed in 1986.180 For this reason and others, as reported in a 1988
CharterReview:
During 1986, the State-City Commission on Integrity in
Government (the Sovern Commission, [after its Chair Michael
Sovern, President of Columbia University]) made city contracting
one of its principal subjects of inquiry. It urged a "through
overhaul of the contract and procurement procedures" that it
characterized as "highly fragmented, complex and opaque." A
1986 report by State Comptroller Edward Regan found a disturbing
lack of record- keeping and written guidelines by the city agencies

576. See id. § 374(a).

577. For another treatment of the City's procurement processes, see Joseph A.
Cosentino, Jr., Note, New York City's Procurement System: Reversing the Cycle of

Corruptionand ReactionaryReform, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1183 (1998).
578. See City Contracts andthe City Charter, CHARTER REVIEW (N.Y. City Charter
Revision Comm'n), Late Spring 1988, at 1-3.
579. See Frank Anechiarico & James B. Jacobs, Purging Corruptionfrom Public
Contracting:The "Solutions"Are Now Part of the Problem, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 143,
143 (1995).
580. See id. at 148-49.
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responsible for administering contracts. And a 1987 citycommissioned report by the Institute of Public Administration, a
non-profit consulting firm, identified the city's contracting policies
and practices as a major cause of hidden costs, deficient quality
and delays in the city's purchase of goods and services. 58'
Such criticisms were confirmed during our legislative hearing on contracts
on March 1, 1989.582
During the years 1986 to 1988, the City attempted to address some of
the concerns raised by its procurement critics. In 1986, it began building
a central computer record of vendor performance, 8 3 and, in 1987, it
created an Office of Contracts to review, standardize, and advise on
contract procedures. 84 Despite these changes, the procurement process
remained in substantial disrepair. As described by the New York State
Commission on Government Integrity,585 after making an exhaustive study
of procurement in the City in 1989 (paralleling our work):
The Commission has found that the City's contracting system is
fragmented and chaotic. The City's contracting operations are
awash in a sea of paper, plagued by inordinate delays and clouded
by unclear and inconsistent rules and procedures which slow City
business to a crawl and discourage vendors from stepping forward
to bid. As a result, the City often pays far more than it should for
goods and services, wasting millions of taxpayers dollars. At the
same time the widespread reluctance of vendors to do business
with the City offers opportunities for bid-rigging and corrupt sidedeals.58 6

581.
582.
583.

City Contracts and the City Charter, supra note 578, at 1, 3.
See generally Legislative Hearing, Mar. 1, 1989.
See City Contracts and the City Charter,supra note 578, at 3.

584. See id.
585. This Commission, also called the Feerick Commission, had been established by
Governor Mario Cuomo in 1987 based on a recommendation by the Sovern Commission.
Its mandate was "to investigate weaknesses in existing laws, regulations, and procedures
... relating to such areas as campaign financing, judicial selection, conflicts of interest, the
solicitation of government business and approvals, and the use of public and political party
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Commission on Government Integrity, in GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990S:
THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT

INTEGRITY 1, 2 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991).
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The growing concern about the integrity of the procurement process
assured that whatever changes we proposed would have to address the
chronic and important problems described by these observers. Unlike landuse or budget decision making, the questions we had to answer did not
attract broad public attention. Nor did the Commission believe there was
much doubt about which branch of government ought to be responsible for
procurement. The Board of Estimate had voted on all contracts not
competitively bid. 8 7 Whatever happened to the Board, the Commission
was going to change this, and no one thought the Council should make
individual contract decisions. It was clear from the start that mayors
should handle procurement.588 No function could be more administrative
and none could be more in need of clear accountability. The approach to
contracts under the Board of Estimate system had been one of
"nonaccountability," according to a high ranking member of the Koch
administration, speaking to Lane, Frank Mauro, and Richard Ravitch in
early 1988. Similarly, Schwarz stated the following when he testified
before the Feerick Commission:
In terms of integrity, one of the problems [the Board of Estimate]
leaves for the City is, if something does go wrong, nobody can be
held responsible because each [of the Board members] can say,
"Well, I don't know, we all did it," and then they point to each
other. Specifically, it lets the Mayor off the hook, and I think that
is a severe fault from an integrity point of view ....589
Assuming mayors could be made responsible for procurement, a
remaining question, posed by David Trager at a legislative hearing on
March 1, 1989, was whether there were ways to "streamline the process"
without "compromising the public sense" of the need for oversight.59"
A. The ProcurementProcess as We Found It
The former Charter had contained a detailed procedure for
contracting.5 91 Despite the detail, a full understanding of the process

587. See id. at 477.
588. See id. at 463.
589. Id. at 466 (quoting statement of Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989
New York City Charter Revision Commission, before the New York State Commission on
Government Integrity).
590. Legislative Hearing, Mar. 1, 1989, at 127.
591. See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 (1976, as amended through 1988).
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requires reference to the City Administrative Code9g (the City's collection
of local laws) and to a variety of regulations. Here, we review the Charter
essentials.
The 1976 Charter employed competitive sealed bidding as its primary
means of contracting. 93 The elements of public letting were public
advertisement, sealed bids, and letting to the lowest responsible bidder. 94
A responsible bidder was measured by capacity, character, and capability,
meaning that if they could perform the contract close to the bid price they
bid, they would be considered responsible. 95 If an agency determined that
a low bidder was not responsible, the rules of the Board of Estimate called
for review by a Board of Responsibility consisting of the comptroller, the
corporation counsel, and the head of the agency.596 The agency could also
reject all bids if it deemed the rejection was in the City's best interest. The
Board of Estimate, by a two-thirds vote, could also choose other than the
lowest bidder "for the public interest."'

97

Under this authority, for

example, the Board could reject a bidder who refused to comply with the
if another bidder within five percent of the
City's anti-apartheid provision,
5 98
comply.
to
agreed
bid
low
The preference for competitive sealed bidding was intended to
maximize competition and reduce waste and corruption. Its weaknesses
were that it was slow, and it constrained the purchasing agency to consider
only the price of goods submitted by a qualified bidder. 5 9 Therefore, the
Charter also provided five exceptions to competitive sealed bidding: (1)
low cost purchases, where the cost of the public bidding might have
outweighed the value of the goods or services to be purchased; (2)
emergency purchases, where the delay in bidding might have been more
costly than the benefit; (3) sole source purchases, where there was no
competition for the goods or services required; (4) consultant contracts,
where the particular skills of a particular party might be required; and (5)
special case contracts, a catch-all for purchases otherwise considered
inappropriate for public letting.'

592. See generally N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE, tit. 6 (governing the City's procurement
processes).
593. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 343 (1976, as amended through 1988).

594. See id. § 343(b).
595. See id.; see also, e.g., Picone v. City, 29 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1941); Martin Epstein Co. v. City, 100 N.Y.S.2d 326 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950).
596. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 343(b) (1976, as amended through 1988).
597. Id.
598. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 6-115 (1988); BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 191, at
VII-A-19.
599. See A Ship Without A Captain, supra note 586, at 477-80.
600. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 (1976, as amended through 1988).
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6°1
Publicly let contracts constituted about sixty percent of all contracts.
Consultant and special case contracts which had to be approved by the
Board accounted for most of the other forty percent. They were used to
obtain most of the City's social services and architectural and engineering
consultants, as well as specialized goods and equipment. 2
The Charter assigned responsibility for the procurement of services to
the agency charged with providing those services and for the procurement
of goods for all agencies to the DGS. °3 DGS was also charged with
construction contracts. 6°4 Since the 1936 Charter, the Board of Estimate
had been responsible for regulating publicly let contracts, approving
contracts to other than the lowest responsible bidder, and, for the most
part, approving contracts not publicly let. 6' 5
Other than the requirement for Board approval, there were few rules
governing consulting and special case contracts. The Board was supposed
to approve the processes for letting the contract and then to approve the
contract. 606 In fact, however, the Board only approved the contract after
it had been let, leaving the contracting agency to determine the
procedures.' °7 From this abdication of responsibility flowed an agency-byagency practice of procurement. This was one reason for Mayor Koch's
establishment of the Office of Contracts in 1987." 0 Typically, these
contracts would be let either following a request for proposals or on a sole
source basis. 609 Sometimes the City would consult a pre-qualification list
for special case or consultant contracts. 610 The list included providers who
had proven competent and responsible.
After 1987, except for social service renewal contracts, emergency
contracts, and low-cost purchases, any contract not subject to open bidding
had to be submitted to the Office of Contracts first for a review of the
reason. After the vendor had been selected and before submission to the
Board of Estimate, there was another review to confirm that the required
procedures had been followed.61'

601.
602.

603.

See BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 191, at VII-A-2.
See id. at VII-A-27.
See N.Y. CITYCHARTER ch. 13 §§ 344(a)-(b) (1976, as amended through 1988).

604. See id. § 344(b).
605.
606.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 (1936).
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 349 (1976, as amended through 1988).

607. See id. § 343(b).
608. See City Contractsand the City Charter,supra note 578, at 3.
609. See Richard Ravitch, Letter from the Chair, CHARTER REVIEW (N.Y. City
Charter Revision Comm'n), Late Spring 1988, at 3.
610. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 318 (1989).
611. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 343(b) (1976, as amended through 1988).
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Once a contract had been executed, it had to be registered by the
comptroller. 6 2 At a minimum, the purpose for this registration was to
make sure that there was an appropriation for such a contract. No contract
could be effective unless registered. The comptroller had thirty days in
which to perform the task, after which the contract was deemed
registered .6.1 As we will see, there were questions about whether the
a contract based on a belief that
register
comptroller could refuse to 61
4
something was wrong with it.
Once executed, under the City's Administrative Code, agencies were
required to monitor the performance of every contractor and to maintain
performance evaluations at a central spot open to agencies and members of
the Board of Estimate and Council. 61 In the mid-1980s, the City began to
develop contractor databases and to require that these databases be checked
prior to contracting.6 16 The City could also debar contractors for a period
of three years, 617 but there were few rules governing how this was to be
done.
B. The 1989 Changes
The decision to abolish the Board of Estimate made it easier to do what
the Commission would probably have done anyway-make the mayor
accountable for procurement. We and the overwhelming majority of the
Commission shared the view of State Comptroller Ned Regan:
Once you put a purely administrative function into that kind of a
quasi-legislative body . . . that is the source of the problem.
[R]egardless of... how you feel about the... Board of Estimate
and borough presidents . . . . they should not, under any
circumstances, have the power over contracts that they do....
It is an administrative function if there ever was one. It ought to
be placed with the administrator, and the administrator as we know
[it should] runo for office every four years. That is where the
judgment comes [from].61

612.
613.
614.
615.
616.

617.
618.

See id. ch. 5 § 93(n).
See id.
See infra notes 622-28 and accompanying text.
See BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 191, at VII-A-29 to VII-A-30.
See City Contracts and the City Charter,supra note 578, at 3.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 345 (1976, as amended through 1988).
Legislative Hearing, Mar. 1, 1989, at 312-14.
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Richard Ravitch had reached the same conclusion in 1988, listing as one of
his proposals for a new government: "[To] hold the mayor clearly
accountable for the procurement activities and decisions of the
administration while subjecting the process to checks and balances which
do not diffuse responsibility.,619
Our own goals, building upon those recommended in the Ravitch
Report, were for a more rational, more competitive, more open, and more
accountable procurement process. Put simply (probably too simply) we
saw a process in which: (1) the services intended to be contracted for (but
not specific contracts) would be debated annually through the contract
budget (discussed in the budget section of this chapter) ;62 (2) the
responsibility and accountability for contracts would be assigned entirely
to the executive branch and, in some cases, the mayor himself; (3) greater
opportunities would be offered to potential vendors through the required
provision of more information in a more sensible way and through attention
to prompt payment; and (4) post-contract monitoring would include an
opportunity for borough president involvement, as well as oversight by
other elected officials. 621
1. General Municipal Law Section 103
The decision to abolish the Board of Estimate did raise one serious
legal question: whether its demise triggered the applicability of a state law
requiring that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided ... by a local law
adopted prior to September first, nineteen hundred fifty-three, all contracts
for public work involving an expenditure of more than twenty thousand
dollars and all purchase contracts involving an expenditure of more than ten
thousand dollars, shall be awarded . . . to the lowest responsible bidder.
.622 The Charter process in place in 1989 had been adopted prior to
1953;623 our concern was that substantial changes might trigger the state
law-an extremely undesirable consequence given the extent and

619. Memorandum from Richard Ravitch, Chairman, 1988 Charter Revision
Commission, to All Members of the Commission (Mar. 28, 1988) (section titled
"Contracting & Procurement") (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
620.

See supra text accompanying note 359.

See CHAIR'S RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 423, at 6-7.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(1) (McKinney 1987).
623. See Changes to the City Charter, 1653-1989, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
YORK CITY, supra note 32, at 203, 207.
621.

622.

OF NEW
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sophistication of the City's procurement needs.624 Lane believed that the
statute would not be applicable for two reasons: first, because of its text
and context, and second, because of a view set forth in a state comptroller's
opinion that minor changes in procurement practices would not trigger the
applicability of this statute. 6'
There was an interesting story in our attempt to change the
procurement process and obey state law. As noted earlier, State
Comptroller Ned Regan had been a rigorous critic of the City's
procurement process and urged many of the changes we had made.62 6 In
August, after the final approval of the new Charter, we received a
congratulatory letter from the comptroller, a press release, and an attached
analysis from his staff. But the staff analysis suggested that at least some
of our good work might violate state law for the reasons suggested above.
Lane called the comptroller, who acknowledged some surprise at the
situation. Within an hour, Lane received a return call from Regan
promising to halt distribution of the document and requesting a staff
meeting. The meeting in the offices of the corporation counsel convinced
the comptroller's staff that the process would not violate state law.
Unfortunately, at least with respect to the best-interest exception to the
low bid requirement for public work, the New York Court of Appeals has
not agreed with our legal analysis. In DiamondAsphalt v. Sander,627 the
court held that granting the mayor power to bypass the low bidder for the
best interest of the City under section 313(b)(2) triggered the applicability
of General Municipal Law section 103(1), under which no such bypass is
authorized.62 8 The City submitted a motion for reargument, which was
denied.
2. The Mayor and the Agencies
From the start, our goal was to make the mayor and the City's agencies
and departments accountable and responsible for contracts. This was
consistent with our overall efficiency and accountability goals and would
remedy one of the main criticisms of the procurement process. Schwarz
made our position clear on this point immediately: "It's to make the

624. See Eric Lane, The Sorrows ofSeabury or How Not to Read a Statute, CITYLAW
(Center for N.Y. City Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Sept./Oct. 1995, at 73, 77,
79.

625. See id. at 78.
626. See OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, REFORMING
CONTRACT PROCESS IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (Report 17-87, Sept. 11, 1986).
627. 92 N.Y.2d 244 (1998).
628. See id. at 264.
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Mayor clearly accountable ...for procurement decisions so that it will not
be possible, in the future, for people to say, 'Well, gosh, it's not my

responsibility. "'629
We made the agencies responsible for procurement, and we required
the mayor or designated deputy mayor to approve basically all
noncompetitively bid contracts over $2 million.60 This requirement
stemmed from a Commission discussion that included an alliance between
Commissioners Leventhal and Gribetz that both acknowledged was
unusual.
THE CHAIRMAN: Now, Nat has an item with respect to contracts
that I think we should focus on.
SECRETARY LEVENTHAL: It's actually Judah and me together.
We would like, it's unprecedented.
COMMISSIONER GRIBETZ: No yawning. Now be alert, it is
coming from the two of us.
SECRETARY LEVENTHAL: [A]ll we're saying is that we should
fix responsibility, at least in certain instances, for certain contracts
above the Commissioner level, within the executive, so that we
know we are taking a second look at some of these contracts. 63'
We made one exception to the principle of mayoral procurement
accountability. For independently elected officials and the Council, the
Charter designated the elected official and the speaker or a member of the
Council designated by the speaker as the one accountable for the contracts
of their office or institution. 632 We wanted these offices and institutions to
act independently of the mayor, but they also had to be accountable for
their procurement decisions.
Agency exercise of contract power was not to be done in the dark. For
most non-competitively bid contracts of more than $100,000, the head or
deputy head of an agency611was required to hold a public hearing before
Some Commission members were concerned
entering into the contract.
that such hearings would waste agency time and add the very inefficiency

629.
630.
631.
632.

Public Meeting, Apr. 25,
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER
Public Meeting, May 15,
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER

633. See id. § 326.

1989, at 10-11.
ch. 13 § 317(b) (1989).
1989, at 208-12.
ch. 13 § 310(1) (1989).
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we were trying to avoid. But this dissent was quelled by the observation
of former First Deputy Mayor Nat Leventhal at the April 25 public
meeting:
Well, I start with the fundamental assumption that one of the
positive aspects of the Board of Estimate ... is that there has to
be a public hearing before a major contract is entered into, at least,
other than through competitive bidding. . . . [T]here ought to be
some requirement that the Commissioner, before he signs a
contract, at least, of certain size, have the same obligation to hear
what other people might want to say and, hopefully, it could be
done in such a way that it's no more burdensome to the process of
contracting ... than the current Board of Estimate ....
But the concept of . . . [letting] everybody enter into contracts
without this requirement where he has to sit there, or she has to sit
there and hear the criticism and take it and know what they're
doing and maybe have their mind[s] changed, I think would be a
shame.634
For efficiency reasons, our initial proposal exempted contract renewals
from such hearings.635 We thought criticism of such contracts could come
through the borough president monitoring process described below.636 But
Commissioners Leventhal and Gribetz joined forces again to persuade the
Commission that the hearings would not be very time consuming. As
Commissioner Gribetz said, "That's about four meetings of the Board of
Estimate if the calendar is about 300 or 400 items each, that it used to be
in my day. It doesn't impress me."637
In the end, there was a compromise. The renewal exemption was
removed, and the Procurement Policy Board ("PPB") was granted the
power to:
exempt from this public hearing requirement contracts to be let
which do not differ materially in terms and conditions, as defined
by the board, from contracts currently held by the City where the

634. Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 84-85.
635. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 325.
636. The Human Resources Administration (the City's main social service department)
had said that if renewals were excluded, the Commission's proposal would cover
approximately 175 contracts a year compared to 1100 to 1200 hearings they would need to

hold if renewals were included. See id. at 332-33.
637. Id.
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parties to such contracts are the same; provided, that under no
circumstance may such exemption apply to any contract in value
exceeding ten million dollars. 38
3. General Procurement Rules and Exceptions
Within an environment designed to promote executive responsibility
and accountability, the new Charter maintained competitive sealed bidding
as the normal method for the procurement of goods and services, along
with the special case, small, and emergency purchase exceptions.6 39 This
decision sparked some debate, because many of the City's most important
contracts-those with social service agencies-were let through requests for
proposals to insure that price was not the only determinative factor. 140 The
concern, expressed most clearly by Commissioner Leventhal, was that "by
focusing on competitive sealed bids as though that were the best way of
making awards of contracts ....
we are a little behind the times."641 On
this point, we thought our hands were tied by state law. 42 As Schwarz
noted: "State law.., creates the preference for competitive sealed bidding
and ... [we are] trying to keep ourselves in the grandfather protection. "643
To which he then added:
[A]s a matter of legislative history . . . is it useful to say that we
are not. . . trying to stack the deck in terms of how the agencies
are meant to proceed; they have to follow these procedures, but
we're not implying ... that we think one system is better than the
other. 644
The special case exception was expanded to cover consultant
contracts .6
Without the Board of Estimate, agencies were free to
determine their own use of the special case exception within the new
standards set forth in the Charter and under the rules established by the
Procurement Policy Board ("PPB").646

638. N.Y. CITY CHARTERch. 13 § 326(a) (1989).
639. See id. § 312.
640. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 152-54.
641. Id. at 148.
642. See id. at 151-54; see also N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(1) (McKinney 1987).

643. Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 150.
644. Id. at 150-51.
645. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 312(b)(1) (1989).
646.

See id. § 311(b).
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Also noteworthy was our expansion and amendment of the City's
disclosure obligations for opportunities for contracts and awards of
contracts.6 47 We hoped both to improve opportunities for bidders and to
increase competition. For example, contract information had to be listed
by type rather than by agency. 648 Also, agencies were required to reach out
to vendors continuously by identifying every category of goods and
services regularly procured, and by publishing in the City Record49 a
notice soliciting the names of vendors interested in future procurement
opportunities for those goods. 6 0
Finally, with respect to competitively bid contracts, the agency letting
the contract was given authority to determine whether the successful bidder
was responsive and responsible. 65' This was intended to eliminate the
Board's burdensome processes to expedite determinations of nonresponsibility and any court challenges to such decisions. 652
Among the most significant procurement process changes was the
definition of the special case circumstances that justify the use of
procurement methods other than competitive sealed bidding. 65 3 As noted
earlier, this was a very important process for the City, particularly because
of its extensive procurement of social services. Along with critics of the
process, we had concluded that case-by-case determination by the Board of
Estimate had produced no systematic approach to such choices. Nor did
an agency even have to justify-publicly, or in most cases even
privately-a decision to avoid competitively sealed bids. We attempted to
fix this by defining special case situations as those in which "it is either not
practicable or not advantageous to the City to use competitive sealed
bidding." 4 We added a list of circumstances intended to describe
situations in which price should not or could not be the sole determining
factor. 655
In addition to defining the circumstances under which alternative
procurement methods could be used, agencies were required always to use

647. See id. § 325(a)(3).
648. See id.
649. CITY RECORD is published weekdays and includes the City's public notices. Its
mandate is found in section 1066 of the Charter. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 47 § 1066
(1989).

650. See id. ch. 13 § 325(a)(3).
651. See id. § 313(b)(2).
652. See id. § 313(b)(3).
653. See generally id. §§ 314-16.
654. Id. § 312(b).

655. See id.
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the procurement method most competitive under the circumstances. 6 6 The
alternative methods, ranked by competitiveness, were: (1) competitive
sealed bids from pre-qualified vendors; 6 7 (2) competitive sealed
65 9
proposals; 65 8 (3) competitive sealed proposals from pre-qualified vendors;
(4) sole source; 6 ° and such other alternative as defined by the PPB. 661 The
PPB was also authorized to identify types of goods and services for which
competitive sealed bidding is not possible or advantageous.662 We intended
this authority to remove the burden on agencies of making such
determinations themselves and to force consistency. To choose an
alternative method, an agency had to justify its decision in writing, to be
filed with the PPB and summarized in the City Record. 663
A word about prequalification is in order. Prequalification of vendors
permits agencies to evaluate the capability and qualification of potential
vendors before issuing requests for bids or proposals for specific
Particularly in the area of construction, prequalification
contracts.'
produces a more efficient procurement process. An agency can limit its
selection to those on the prequalified list without public advertising and the
same level of concern over capability. One concern, however, was how
potential new vendors, including minority-owned and women-owned
businesses, might make the list. As Commissioner Michel noted, "we have
to be careful as we draft this that those who are currently doing business
with the City [do not] have a leg up and get locked in forever as their
suppliers."'
We addressed this concern by requirig that "entry into a
pre-qualified group shall be continuously available."
Also for the first time, the Commission adopted standards for requests
for proposals, the second on the list of procurement alternatives. Generally
such an approach is appropriate when price alone is not a sufficient
measure of the product to be purchased, but historically the City had used
such an approach in a wide variety of situations. This specific approach is
very important to the City because of the broad use of not-for-profit entities

656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.

See id.
See id. § 318.
See id. § 319.
See id. § 320.
See id. § 321.
See id. § 322.

662. See id. § 317(a).

663. See id. § 322.
664. See id. § 324 (outlining the process for prequalification).
665. Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 156.
666. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 324 (1989).
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for an extensive array of social services. 667 Price alone should not
determine the vendor of such services. So serious was the issue of not-forprofits to the Commission (several members were knowledgeable because
they ran or worked for not-for-profits, and many were on the boards of notfor-profits) that we required the PPB to address those circumstances in
which "the use of procurement is

. .

.desirable to develop, maintain or

strengthen the relationships between non-profit and charitable organizations
and the communities where services are to be provided."" 8
The Commission required a number of steps to ensure that notification
of such opportunities was broad and that information about what the City
wanted to buy was equally and fairly shared with all potential suppliers. 669
Finally, the Commission adopted a number of provisions that were intended
to ensure that sole source contracts would be employed only when there
really was just a single source. 670 All of these changes were adopted with
a broad consensus among the Commission members.
One matter that did receive considerable discussion, though in the end
little dissent, was our attempt to deal with the thorny question of access to
the contract process of minority-owned and women-owned businesses. 67'
We discuss this issue in Chapter VIII. 672
4. The Procurement Policy Board
One of the most substantial criticisms of the City's procurement
process was that, notwithstanding the Charter framework, the procurement
system was "fragmented and chaotic" 673 and not understandable or
Our answer was to establish an agency to develop
consistent.
comprehensive rules for all contracts let under the Charter. 674 This PPB
was to be comprised of five members, three appointed by the mayor and
two by the comptroller. 675 To increase outside expertise, one appointee of
each elected official could not be employed by the City.676 All of the
appointees had to have demonstrated appropriate business or professional

667. See generally Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 34 (discussing the preferred
forms of procurement procedures employed by New York City).
668. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 311(b)(4) (1989).
669. See, e.g., id. §§ 313(b)(1), 334.

670. See id. § 321.
671.
672.
673.
674.
675.

See Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 49-65.
See discussion infra Chapter VIII.
A Ship Without a Captain, supra note 586, at 461.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 311 (1989).
See id. § 311(a).

676. See id.
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experience. 6' We decided to have appointees from the comptroller, at least
in part, out of the concern over triggering the more rigid procedures
required under the General Municipal Law section 103.678 But as Schwarz
expressed, we also thought that "through the audit responsibility, the
... expertise in the field
comptroller has now,
679 and will continue to have
...of contracts."
5. The Role of the Comptroller
680
We also clarified the comptroller's authority to register contracts.
Should the function be basically a ministerial act, as the executive branch
contended? There was considerable debate on this question, during which
Commissioners Leventhal and Gribetz returned to their customary opposite
sides. Some reference is important to explain the ultimate definition of the
comptroller registration function and to describe the Commission's
dynamics.
Richard Ravitch had proposed that the role of the comptroller in
registering contracts should be to verify the appropriation, the honesty of
the process, and the integrity of the contractor. 61 Lane had helped craft
that suggestion, but by the beginning of 1989 he had decided the
comptroller should simply verify the appropriation.
In general, commissioners felt that comptrollers should confine
themselves to fiscal issues and not play the wide-ranging policy and
political role they often had during the Board of Estimate era. 82 But on the
registration of contracts, this line was not clear. In any event, our initial
proposal in April 1989 was that to help promote efficiency and
accountability, the comptroller's role on contracts should be
ministerial-limited to verifying the availability of the appropriation.683
This view was shared by Leventhal: "I don't think this should become an
contract should be entered
opportunity for a de novo review of whether the
68 4
into. You'll never get a contract registered."

677.
678.
679.
680.

See id.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(1) (McKinney 1987).
Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 80.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 328 (1989).
See Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 100.

681.
682. See generally id. at 94-115 (discussing the comptroller's duties and
responsibilities regarding contract registration).
683. See id. at 95.
684. Id.

THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING

1998]

Gribetz responded: "I'm not offended by the phrasing that we used last
year.""'68 Essentially, it had been suggested during the debate of the
Ravitch Commission that the comptroller have the power to block a
contract based on the integrity of the process and its participants. Gribetz
continued, "I think that has more of a benefit and less of a downside of
I think that it is
obstructionism in a specific case. . . . To my mind ....
and balances
of
checks
the
business
...
in
do
he
should
that
something
,,686

The issue was taken up by Commissioners Trager and Murphy.
Trager, as we have noted, had been the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, and Murphy had been Deputy Commissioner of the
New York City Police Department. Together, their view of such an issue
carried weight. Trager's view was:
[T]he Comptroller... would have the bully pulpit of being able
to say .... "I don't think this contract was arrived at by proper
procedures," but I still would not want to allow him to use that as
a device ...

to delay.

I want the clarity that the Mayor is responsible.687
Murphy added, "I don't think we should really build it in to give him that
kind of power to stop the process. 688 While the sense of the meeting
clearly favored this position, we agreed to keep studying the issue. 9
We returned to it again at the public meeting of May 13. 690 Gribetz
restated his position: "[T]o me, the value of the integrity of the contract
process ...

in a government without a Board of Estimate outweighs the

other value. , 691 In support of this position he offered the New York state
model under which the state comptroller has considerable authority to block
a contract. 692 We continued to maintain our commitment to a more limited
role for the comptroller and offered a modest compromise to resolve the
issue. As presented by Schwarz:

685. Id. at 99-100.
686. Id.

687. Id. at 102.
688. Id. at 106.
689. See id. at 107.

690. See Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 378-79.
691. Id. at 384.
692. See id. at 379.
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Could we get a combination of those two . . . By limiting the
registration power to the availability of the appropriation ... but
stating that the Comptroller-if the Comptroller has any doubt
about the other items [integrity of process or participants] the
comptroller should bring those forthwith to the attention of the
executive. 693
This was the gist of the ultimate resolution. The new Charter provided
that the comptroller could object to a contract on grounds that either the
process was corrupt or that a vendor was corrupt. But the mayor could
insist on the registration of such a contract, after answering the
comptroller's objection in writing. 6" This compromise reduced the friction
and kept the policy goal of mayoral accountability intact.
6. Slow Pay
One point of concern at public hearings was the City's tardy payment
of its contract obligations.69 This was not only unfair to vendors, but
many critics also thought it cost the City money and reduced the
availability of high quality goods and services as potential contractors either
decided not to do business with the City or tried to cover the cost of
Slow pay was
anticipated slow pay in their contract proposals.69
particularly harmful for not-for-profit providers of social services. As
described by Darwin Davis, Executive Director of Black Agency
Executives:
If, in fact, the City will continue to delay payment for services,
and you have to understand community based organizations are not
wealthy organizations, very few of them have endowments, very
few have monies that they might roll over to deliver services while
they are contracted to deliver them . . . . How do you pay staff?
How do you even submit the reports you have to submit to be
evaluated in that interim. 6 7

693. Id. at 385.
694.
695.
696.
697.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 328(c) (1989).
See Public Meeting, June 26, 1989, at 262-63, 265.
See id. at 270.
Legislative Hearing, Mar. 1, 1989, at 212-13.
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Some commissioners, especially Amy Betanzos, wanted to introduce
an interest penalty for slow pay on contracts.698 We were concerned that
such detail was beyond our function as charter writers. As Nat Leventhal
put it, "There are a lot of operational problems out there" not addressed in
the Charter and if we "pluck this out" as "worthy of special consideration,
I would feel better knowing how much money is at stake. , 699 Lane did
determine, through consultation with the Koch administration, that an
interest requirement would not "inadvertently cause some terrible fiscal
impact." 7' Believing that the Charter should not be overly legislative,
however, we concluded that the best approach would be to instruct the PPB
to make rules "for the expeditious processing of payment vouchers...
70
including ... a program for payment of interest to vendors." '
7. Oversight
With procurement responsibility moving entirely to the mayor (subject
to the Council's annual contract budget), we had to provide that the
performance of contracts would be monitored and evaluated. Agencies
would have affirmative responsibility for monitoring contract performance
as set forth explicitly in section 333(a). 7° 2 Such evaluations had to be
included in an agency contract file,7 °3 which had to be maintained and
publicly accessible under section 334.704 Also, the comptroller had the
power to conduct post-contract audits of any contract. 7 5 We also knew that
without the Board of Estimate, the Charter should include some formal way
for borough presidents to assess the performance of contracts in their
respective boroughs before any renewal of such contracts. 7 6 Ravitch had
proposed that a borough president could force a hearing on an objection to
renewal of a contract.7" 7 There was good reason to believe that borough
presidents with their close ties to community boards and other active
groups and citizens would have a good sense of contract performance in
their boroughs.

698. See Public Meeting, June 26, 1989, at 266, 269.
699. Id. at 285-86.
700. Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 138.
701. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 332 (1989).
702. See id. § 333(a).

703. See id. § 334(a).
704. See id.
705. See id. § 330.

706. See id. § 333(b)(1).
707. See Public Meeting, May 6, 1989, at 90.
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We decided to work with the Ravitch proposal. Schwarz proposed a
monitoring function for borough presidents at our May 6 public meeting,
indicating in response to an inquiry from Commissioner Richland that it
should be limited: "We don't want to give them a veto, that's wrong in
principle...."7 08 Not surprisingly, borough presidents disagreed. Bronx
Borough President Ferrer urged that: "[T]he . . . Mayor's Office of
Contracts must be reorganized to include an appointee of each Borough
President. This office would be responsible for holding hearings and
approving contracts currently covered under section 349 [special case] of
the City Charter."7°9 But such an approach was so inconsistent with our
insistence on mayoral accountability that it was not seriously considered.
For the Commission, the task was to determine an appropriate and useful
post-contract role for the borough presidents.
At the May 13 public meeting, we proposed that, if a borough
president concluded that a particular contract in his or her borough should
not be renewed or be renewed only with particular terms or conditions, he
or she should notify the executive branch.71 0 If the borough president was
not satisfied with the executive response, he or she could convene a panel,
consisting of an appointee of the mayor, the comptroller, and an
administrative judge from the City's Office of Administrative Trials and
Hearings (OATH), to hear the borough presidents' claims."' The panel's
judgment would not obligate the executive branch in any way. But as
Schwarz stated, "I can't imagine if the three people say71 the
contract ought
2
[not] to be renewed that that wouldn't be persuasive."
The OATH judge suggestion drew fire from Commissioner Trager,
who believed this would make the process too judicial or formal. He
favored a more flexible process.7 13 Commissioner Gribetz proposed that
the borough president alone be the hearing officer and that the agency be
forced to come before the borough president. 1 Trager replied as follows:
[W]hat I think may happen, Judah, and the reason I don't go along
with it is that they'll end up with less of a voice, because I think it
will [be] viewed by the Mayoral agency as just a hoop to get

708. Id. at 102.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.

Public Meeting, May 10, 1989, at 54.
See Public Meeting, May 13, 1989, at 336-37.
See id. at 337-38.
Id. at 338.
See id. at 341-42.
See id. at 351-52.

19981

THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING

through. They'll send down whoever will be necessary to give an
answer and they'll dismiss [it].715
But in another of those infrequent alliances with Commissioner Gribetz,
Commissioner Leventhal responded: "We're talking about an advisory
procedure at best, and, therefore, I think

. .

. [that we should] let the

borough presidents control the process and make their point as strongly as
possible and not have to plead their case to the City Council President, the
Mayor's representative or anybody else. , 716 But the Trager view carried
by an eight-to-five vote; 717 there would be a mixed panel consisting of the

mayor, city council president, and comptroller.7

8

8. Public Information
Throughout the process, we paid considerable attention to making
information about City government public. With our interest in expanding
opportunities for new vendors and also for public monitoring, we needed
a way to make contract information easily available. We borrowed a
section from the American Bar Association's model procurement code.719
Section 1064 requires the mayor to maintain a central contract registry with
a copy of every contract, information on how it was let, and other details
important for public review.72
CHAPTER VIII. BEYOND THE BASICS

The prior chapter describes how the Commission redistributed the
Board's functions with respect to the budget, land use, franchises, and
contracts. As discussed previously,"2 for both substantive and political
reasons, the Commission did much more than "just" fix the Board in
reallocating its responsibilities.
This chapter describes a potpourri of additional Charter changes that
went beyond the reallocation of the Board's powers and responsibilities and
beyond the changes relating to the Council and other elected officials.

715. Id. at 354.
716. Id. at 355-56.
717. See id. at 362.
718. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 333(b)(2) (1989).
719.

See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOv'TS

202 (Feb. 1979).
720. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 47 § 1064 (1989).
721.

See discussion supra Chapter VII.
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While each of these changes is independently important, they all relate to
the new Charter's goals: first, countervailing sources of power were
necessary to balance the enormous powers of the mayor and the mayor's
bureaucracy; second, increased information about government would
empower voters and enhance the quality of debate about City affairs; and,
third, increased opportunities needed to be provided for all New Yorkers
to seek government business and jobs.
In addition, we hoped that each of these policy driven changes would
also help build the constituency necessary to increase support for the
proposed new Charter.
The new programs and policies described below are the following: the
Independent Budget Office ("IBO"); new requirements relating to open
government and regular reports on the social, economic, and environmental
health of the City; the delivery of services; programs relating to equal
opportunity; limits on high City officials also holding high political party
posts; civil service issues; and decentralization of the City's delivery of
services.
I. THE POWER OF INFORMATION AND INDEPENDENT IDEAS

Before and after the 1989 Charter changes, the city had a powerful
mayor, supported by a large, strong bureaucracy. On certain matters (e.g.,
revenue estimates), the mayor had greater powers than governors or the
President.7' No institution could match the ability and strength of the
mayor's analytical capacities on fiscal issues, such as those in the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB"). 7' Under the new Charter, the City
Council would have substantial powers to check the mayor, but these
powers were only potential powers whose actual use was untested. To
effectively exercise these powers, the Council would need more access to
information and independent analysis. While the media devoted much
coverage to New York City government, the media focused primarily on
spectacular, short-term issues and not on how well New York City
compared with other cities and how communities within the city compared
with each other. City residents were not well informed about the workings
of their government, and the City government did little to direct residents'
attention its way.
To address these concerns, we created the Independent Budget Office
and added measures for ensuring greater access to public information to the
City Charter.

722.
723.

See id. ch. 10 § 225 (1989); U.S. CONST. art. II; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 10 § 225 (b) (1989).
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A. The IndependentBudget Office
Chapter XI of the new Charter created the IBO.724 The IBO provides
fiscal analyses to the public and responds to the requests of the Council, its
members, and elected officials other than the mayor. 725 It provides
independent revenue estimates and other analyses at crucial points in the
Charter-mandated budget cycle and issues research findings on fiscal
matters facing the City. 726 It serves as an independent, nonpartisan check
on the mayor's OMB. 27 It is not an additional fiscal monitor like the
Financial Control Board, but rather an independent budget office modeled
on the respected Congressional Budget Office and the California Legislative
Analyst.'.
The IBO had its genesis in one of the Commission's early legislative
hearings held before the Supreme Court decided Morris. During a meeting
addressing oversight of the City's government, a panel discussed
independent budget offices in other cities. 729 The witnesses included
former directors of the Congressional Budget Office, the California
Legislature's independent Legislative Analyst, and an analyst from Suffolk
County.7 0
Research conducted by Frank Mauro also corroborated our view that
City legislators and other elected officials received less information
concerning budgets and fiscal analysis than did mayors, putting the
legislators and other officials at a disadvantage in dealing with mayors.
We believed an independent, nonpartisan budget office could even the
balance, allowing legislators and other officials to more effectively and
responsibly check the mayor's budgetary powers. Moreover, the public
would be better equipped to evaluate fiscal issues when provided with more
than one competent source of analysis.
The Chairman's Initial Proposals to the Charter Commission included
an IBO. At the end of our first round of Commission meetings, we decided
not to include it among the Commission's preliminary proposals because

724. See id.ch. 11 § 259.
725. See id. § 260 (a).
726. See id.
727. See In re New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Giuliani, 214 N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 11, 1995, at 29.
728. See id.; see also David Kaplan & Christina Pretto, Independent N.Y. C. Budget
Office CalledMore Than Monitor, 316 THE BOND BUYER, 29868 (Apr. 2, 1996).
729. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 3, 1989, at 167-243.
730. See id.
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there was not yet sufficient Commission support.73 ' Instead, we waited
until after the first round of public hearings to revisit the question. 732
During the first round of hearings, we heard public testimony
supporting the merits of an IBO. This testimony, in conjunction with
public input and additional reflection, convinced us to include an IBO in the
proposals to the Commission.733 Thereafter, the IBO sailed through the
Commission."3
On June 22, the Commission discussed the policy reasons favoring an
IBO.735 Frank Mauro again described the IBO as responding to the concern
that the OMB, "which works for the executive branch," was "overly
dominant" in the City's dialogue on fiscal matters.736 As David Trager
added, the IBO was designed to give the "other institutions of government
an institution of high standing to which they 737
can turn for analysis, just as
the executive branch can turn to the OMB.
At this time, the assumption was that the new office, while nonpartisan
and independent, would be tied to the Council in the same way as the
Congressional Budget Office was tied to Congress. 738 Peter Vallone,
however, did not want an independent budget office within the Council,
preferring to control all budgetary analysis for the Council through the
speaker's own central Council staff.739 We found this institutional desire
for a monopoly on fiscal analysis no more persuasive than the idea that the
mayor should have such a monopoly through the OMB.

731. See Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 40-41.
732. See id.
733. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 7; see also Memorandum to
Commissioners: Changes Proposed by the Chair to the Adopted Preliminary Proposals as
a Result of Public Testimony and Comment, June 15, 1989, at 3 (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review).
734. There were only two dissenting votes. Commissioner Gribetz voted no twice.
On the initial vote, he was joined by Mario Paredes. On the final vote, Paredes voted in
favor, and Gribetz was joined in dissent by Aida Alvarez. See Schwarz Commission
Record of Minutes and Votes, June 22, 1989, at 2, and Aug. 1, 1989, at 12.
735. See Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 101-03, 114-31.
736. Id. at 114. This concern about OMB's unbalanced power was, moreover, shared
by Commission members who had worked in the executive branch. This was true for
Schwarz, despite his great respect for the people at OMB. (Indeed, when young people
seeking to work in government ask where to start, Schwarz would always advise nonlawyers to work at OMB.) Nat Leventhal, the city's former first deputy mayor, indicated
he was "not a big fan of OMB, as everybody knows." Id. at 118.
737. Id. at 126.
738. See In re New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Giuliani, 214 N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 11, 1995, at 29.
739. See Kaplan & Pretto, supra note 728.
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As a result, we moved to an independent office outside of the Council,
but available to serve it, its members, other elected officials, and the
public.740 The IBO director was to be appointed for a four-year term by a
majority of a committee consisting of the comptroller, the council president
(now public advocate), a borough president chosen by the borough
presidents (added at the suggestion of David Trager), 4 and a Councilmember chosen by the Council.742
The day before the Commission finished its work, we added a Charter
provision protecting the budget of the IBO.743 This is the only City office
whose budget is protected by the Charter. We added this provision because
we could foresee a future mayor and speaker, each jealous of their
monopoly on budget information and analysis, seeking to eliminate an
independent and respected rival source. Some told us that this led to the
demise of the similar office which had been added to the Charter by the
Goodman Charter Revision Commission in 1977, but eliminated in the
City's budget negotiations of 1981.7'
In any event, we were concerned (with good reason as subsequent
events show745) that those who controlled information and analysis would
seek to defund the IBO-as had been done to the prior charter
commission's work-because they feared a non-partisan, independent,
competent rival. We believed that these fears were actually good reasons
to have an IBO.

740. See Public Meeting, June 22, 1989 at 101-02.
741. See id. at 120-24.
742. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 11 § 259(a) (1989). In addition, chapter 11
requires an IBO Advisory Committee consisting of various experts. See id. § 259(d).
743. See id. § 259(b).
744. A more pointed allegation was made during the March legislative hearing by
Charles Brecher, director of research for the Citizens Budget Commission, who had said
the office had been eliminated in 1981 as a trade-off for additional dollars for other elected
officials. See Legislative Hearing, Mar. 3, 1989, at 202-10. When this was later repeated,
Commissioner Leventhal, who had been the City's first deputy mayor at the time, said "I
can't let that stay in the record. I was there at the time" and it was not what happened. See
Public Meeting, June 22, 1989, at 118.
745. A series of two cases over two years held that the Dinkins and Giuliani
administrations had illegally refused to fund the IBO. See New York Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Giuliani, 644 N.Y.S.2d 38 (App. Div. 1996); New York Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Dinkins, 83 N.Y.2d 377 (1994). After finally bowing to these court rulings,
Mayor Giuliani still made unsuccessful attempts to get the state legislature to amend the
Charter to eliminate the IBO and recently asked his 1998 Charter Revision Commission to
do so. See Clifford J. Levy, For CharterPanel, a Meaty Idea, but Will It Work?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at B1.
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B. Requiring More Openness
Chapter 47 of the Charter ("Public Access to Meetings and
Information") adds a number of provisions relating to open government and
citizen access to information.746 A new Commission on Public Information
and Communication was created with responsibility for enhancing the
availability of public information about the workings of City government. 74
The Commission was also required to publish annually a directory of
computerized information produced or maintained by City agencies, which
was required by law to be publicly available and include specific
descriptions of the content of the information and the format and methods
of accessing it.748 The public proceedings of the City Council and the City
Planning Commission had to be made available for cable casting and
broadcasting.749 Further, the City was required to include in all future
cable franchises and franchise renewals a requirement that channels be
designated for governmental use and that the franchisee provide the
interconnections necessary for public broadcasting and cable casting of the
proceedings of the Council, its committees, and the Planning
Commission. 750
In addition, City officials had to promptly furnish copies of papers on
demand" and make their books, accounts and papers available for
inspection."
Similarly, the mayor had to assure public access to
information about City contracts and contractors.753 Various agencies and
the Council and its committees had to hold open meetings. 754 All budget
documents required under the Charter had to be public and widely
available.7 55
The sources of these provisions were many. We shared the conviction
of James Madison that "[a] popular government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy, or perhaps both."756 From outside the Commission, Gene
Russianoff was one of many pushing for more openness. Inside the

746. See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER ch. 47 (1989).
747. See id. § 1061.
748. See id. § 1062.
749. See id. § 1063(b).
750. See id. § 1063(a).
751. See id. § 1058.
752. See id. § 1059.
753. See id. § 1064.
754. See id. § 1060.
755. See id. § 1065.
756. Letter to W.T. Barby, Aug. 4, 1822, 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (Hunt
ed. 1910).
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Commission, Fred Friendly had a particular interest in information
technology and a general understanding from his years as a journalist that
governments needed to be pressed to open up.
Public access to information being vital to the health of any democracy,
it was particularly important where the government, like New York City's,
had an unusually powerful mayor and mayoral bureaucracy. Moreover, in
a City which had "essentially a one-party government, one wishes to
maximize the opportunities for the newspapers and citizen groups to be able
to have information
so they can perform the function, in effect, of the
757
fourth estate.
Finally, at a citizen meeting in Jamaica, Queens, a "wonderful woman"
described how she did not know what City services were available for her
children.758 Generalizing from this, we added a requirement that the
Commission on Public Information and Communication make
recommendations concerning "the distribution of information to the public
about the purposes and locations of the city's service delivery facilities. 7 59
C. Requiring More Substantive Information
Our job was to write a Charter dealing with governmental power and
responsibility, not legislation addressing citizens' daily needs. Of course,
we hoped that many changes, including a more representative legislature,
would impact favorably upon those daily needs. But structure, not
services, was our direct responsibility. Not surprisingly, however, many
people who testified or came to meet with us passionately pressed for better
health care, a cleaner environment, better housing, better services for all,
and a fairer shake for the city's poor and disadvantaged.
For example, Marshall England, the Director of the Health Action
Resources Center in Harlem, pressed us in meetings to have the Charter
guarantee health care essentials to every New Yorker.7' It was obvious
both from studying the subject and listening to England that, as with so
much else, there were vast disparities among New Yorkers regarding both
access to, and the outcomes of, health care. Additionally, with the
correlation between poverty and race, the health care available to, and
health of, minority New Yorkers was both comparatively and relatively
poor. Despite this correlation, it was not our job to legislate solutions.
Moreover, even if it was our job, we did not know enough to do so.

757. Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 428.
758. See id. at 430-31.
759. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 47 § 1061(d)(6)(ii) (1989).
760.

See Public Hearing, July 20, 1989, at 295-99.
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Our response, therefore, was to unleash the power of information to
help inform and motivate voters, who in turn could influence their
legislators.
This response was the genesis of what is now section 16 of the Charter.
Section 16 requires the mayor to submit an annual report to the Council,
borough presidents, and community boards analyzing the "social, economic
and environmental health" of the City and proposing strategies to address
issues raised by the analysis. 6 The report is to include "generally
accepted indices of unemployment, poverty, child welfare, housing quality,
homelessness, health, physical environment, crime," and other similar
issues.76 Most importantly, the report is required to show comparisons on
these matters among the City's "subdivisions" and between the City and
relevant national, regional, or other standards or averages. 763
The Commission's work had shown that there were unfair disparities
on all the issues covered by section 16 among the communities of the City.
Moreover, these disparities were not only unfair but, unless addressed,
would increasingly harm the city by dividing it into "two cities. 764 We
also believed that the approach taken in section 16 would help garner
support from two of our key building blocks as we looked toward the
referendum minorities and good government groups.
After his meetings with us, England testified at the Commission's
Public Hearing in the Bronx on July 20, 1989.765 The dialogue during this
testimony was an example of how, as the summer progressed, the hearings
were a two-way street. The Commission was continuing to receive and
learn from comments and ideas from the witnesses. At the same time, the
Commission was seeking support from witnesses, like-minded people, and
the general public.
Before England started his testimony, Schwarz expressed "personal
great appreciation" to England for "having called our attention to the power
of information" leading to a "potentially enormous powerful section of the
Charter. 7 In response, England started his testimony by saying "you just
disarmed me," and added that "we express those same statements when we
make public statements about the Charter."767 England went on to add how
impressed he was that only the night before, the Commission had sent a

761. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 1 § 16 (1989).
762. Id.
763. See id.
764.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, THE REPORT ON THE COMMISSION

ON THE YEAR 2000, at 181 (1987).
765. See generally Public Hearing, July 20, 1989.
766. Public Hearing, July 20, 1989, at 295-96.

767. Id. at 296.
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representative to a Harlem Hospital community board meeting and "we
have seen the Charter listen to local groups."768
Subsequently, during England's substantive remarks, Schwarz
interjected that:
the philosophy we have expressed [in Section 16] [is] in the line,
I think, from St. John, 'know the truth and the truth shall set you
free,' and what we want to do is to empower the argument with the
facts. I believe that the facts that you have put forward when
admitted by the government are undeniable in their force... [our]
belief is that facts drive justice.769
Our work on chapter 47 and section 16 illustrates a more general point.
A fair, open, and extensive process is critical to the legitimacy of any
charter revision commission's work. As the Marshall England, and
wonderful-lady-from-Jamaica stories illustrate, the Commission members
had to be open to listening-sometimes over a long period of time-to
benefit from and creatively react to citizen ideas.
II. SERVICE DELIVERY

We heard from many citizens about their feelings that City services
were inadequate and government bureaucrats too remote. 77 Although
much of this was outside our Charter mission, the concerns did have a
relationship to the portions of our work that focused on working out the
proper role for borough and community government.
The Commission took few specific steps to address service delivery
concerns. We provided that agencies delivering services in neighborhoods
should have "Borough Commissioners" to increase attention to local
needs."7 Similarly, borough presidents were given some discretion to shift
services among community districts in their boroughs. 7 2 These changes
were made in recognition that while the Charter "can't pave the streets,"77
we might be able to increase attention given to the quality of local service
delivery and, at the same time, add to borough presidents' new executive
responsibilities. However, the Commission tread lightly on service
delivery matters because we recognized that matters concerning service

768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.

Id. at 296-97.
Id. at 299-300.
See discussion supra Chapter IV.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 69 § 2704(f) (1989).
See id. § 2704(g).
Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 31.
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delivery should be addressed more by legislation than by the Charter. Nat
Leventhal and Pat Murphy also expressed concerns about not
overburdening City agencies? 4
Finally, we spent some time discussing whether the current system of
decentralization was working as intended by the 1976 Charter Commission.
However, given all else that we had to do to fix, as promptly as possible,
the City's unconstitutional government and all the correlative related
changes, it was not practical for the Commission to take on the task of a
"full investigation of decentralization and what might be done to improve
it."1 75 Therefore, the Charter required a one-time task force to report to
the mayor and Council its conclusions on such matters and its
recommendations for changes. 776

III. DUAL OFFICE HOLDING
Section 2604(b) of the Charter prohibits elected officials and certain
high-ranking administrative officials from serving as a political party leader
while they hold their governmental job. r n During the Commission's
debates, two theories in favor of the ban were discussed. First, it would
serve to diffus[e] power, and "cut down on concentration of power" to
have multiple sources from which "arguments can be developed." 778
Second, as best expressed by Arch Murray:
[W]hen you elect someone to governmental office, you expect that
person to give you his or her best efforts in that office ... seeking
with all of their energy to advance the interests of those
constituents. When a person is elected to party office, I think the
expectation is that he or she will seek to advance the interests of
that political party .... [I]t strikes me as being less than totally
fair to the other constituents who happen not to be a member of his
political party. 79
At the very end of the Commission's proceedings, Amy Betanzos,
joined by Harriet Michel, expressed concern that applying the rule to
Council members who were party district leaders would adversely impact
minorities; seven of the nine members who would be affected were

774. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 25-96.
775. Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 174.
776. See id. at 175-81.
777. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 68 § 2604(b)(15) (1989).
778. Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 223.
779. Id. at 224.
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minorities.78 Nat Leventhal argued that we should think of the principle,
not the person. 8 ' Schwarz added that, as a pragmatic matter, if the
prohibition were applied, two people would be elected, one by the party,
and one to the Council, with the result that "other people will have an
opportunity to thrive and to grow., 782 Nonetheless, the proposal with
Council members as district leaders included in the ban failed. Once this
proposal was deleted, the ban passed.783
IV. ISSUES OF FAIRNESS AND OPPORTUNITY

The new Charter included four offices related to equal opportunity and
non-discrimination. 8 These inclusions reflected the importance of the
issue of race in the City when we were working,785 the centrality of these
issues to many Commission members, and the shadow of the Justice
Department. The new Charter also included an Office of Language
Services.786
On April 25, the Commission began its discussion of what became the
Office of Economic Opportunity, which focuses on opportunities for
minority-owned and women-owned business enterprises to compete for City

780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
1.

See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 584.
See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 14-15.
Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 590.
See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 16-25.
These were:
The Office of Financial and Economic Opportunity designed to "enhance the
ability of minority and women-owned business enterprises to compete for
city contracts, to enhance city agencies' awareness of such business
enterprises, and to ensure their meaningful participation in the city
procurement process." N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13-A § 340(1) (1989).
The office also was to administer any programs for "small and locallybased" business. See id. § 343;
2. The Office of Labor Services designed to assure that contractors doing
business with the City afford equal opportunity and do not discriminate. See
id. ch. 13-B § 350(3);
3. The Department of Personnel was given a number of new requirements to
monitor the fairness of the City's own employment practices. See id. ch. 35
§§ 813(a)(12)-(15) and (b)(8). Also, agency heads were given correlative
responsibilities. See id. at §§ 814(a)(19)-(20) and (h-k); and
4. The Equal Employment Practices Commission, which was to review the
fairness of the employment practices and procedures of City agencies and
the Department of Personnel. See id. ch. 36 § 830(a).
785. See discussion supra Chapter III.
786. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 1 § 15(4)(c).
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contracts. 8 7 We made clear that we "can't sit here and say a certain
percentage of the contracts should be done by... [such] organizations."'7 88
This would be "wrong in principle. 7 9 A month later, Commissioner
Richland asked, "It doesn't provide for preferment, does it?" 7" Schwarz
replied that it does not, explaining that its purpose is "to enhance
" ' The question of "principle" was,
opportunities."79
of course, also a
question of law, because the Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. 792 had already held that in the absence of a specific showing of
discrimination a municipality could not constitutionally require that a set
percentage of contracts go to minorities, women, or any other group.793
Thus, even if we had wanted to put in set-asides or quotas, which we did
not, we could not do so. Harriet Michel, an expert on the subject,
responded with some pique to Commissioner Alvarez's question, which had
suggested that the language might call for quotas, by saying that "[t]his is
not a set-aside. The purpose of this office is to [be a] matchmake[r] ...
.Please do not in your questions at all suggest794that this is a set aside, a
quota for sheltered markets, because it is not.
Running through our discussions of equal opportunity for minorities
was the broader theme of decentralizing power. As Schwarz said, "[a] way
of decentralizing power is to increase the likelihood that people from all
income elements and 795
all areas have an opportunity to participate in the
delivery of services.
To some extent, the City already had offices dealing with some of the
subjects we covered in the Charter. For example, an Office of Labor
Services-focusing on equal opportunity in the work force of businesses
who contracted with the City-already existed. This was only established,
however, by executive order. We believed that "charterizing" it would not
only sharpen and improve the office, but also ensure that policy "not796be left
to the whims of each individual Mayor as he or she was elected. "
Leading up to the Commission's three final meetings in late July and
early August, Lane had some tense and difficult discussions about these
chapters with Mayor Koch's Commission liaisons. They urged us to avoid
any implications that the Charter language required quotas. We had the

787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.

See Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 1-65.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 25.
Id.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
See id. at 488-89.
Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 293-94.
Public Meeting, Apr. 25, 1989, at 59.
Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 294.
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same desire, both as a philosophical matter and to avoid potentially "killer"
opposition from the mayor and others. Although time consuming and
tense, these negotiations did not frustrate our goals.
When the four Chapters were voted on for the final time, Harriet
Michel preceded the motion to adopt with this summation:
Joe Klein wrote in the New York Magazine a couple of weeks ago
that race is the most important issue in this city and threatens to
divide us as a city ... [W]e, as a city[,] have not always presented
our best face in terms of what city administrations could have and
might have done, with regard to race relations. [Today] I am proud
to be part of a Commission that has taken the opportunity to write
into its charter, to assure that we face the realities of today and that
the demographics of this city are changing and that our minority.
. . population has not always gotten its due. That we have taken
the time, in this charter to do our best-not as far as I personally
would have liked to see us go, in fact-but we have taken the time
and this Commission and this staff has supported, introducing
factors into the charter that would make sure that minority New
Yorkers get what they are due in this city.797
Schwarz responded to Michel's summation by agreeing that what we
were proposing was "among the most important things" we were doing for
the City.
He stated, "[I]t's good for every single person in the city that
we address these issues of discrimination that have existed for too long[,]
and work on our hope of equal opportunity for all persons. 99
CHAPTER IX. AVOIDING KILLER ISSUES
As part of our responsibility to produce a Charter that would pass
successfully at the polls, we had to avoid "killer" issues. By "killer"
issues, we mean matters that were not necessary to decide, but which, if
decided wrongly, could kill all the proposed reforms in a referendum.
To determine which issues were "killer" ones, we relied on common sense,
as informed by a relatively recent experience in New York state. The
state's 1967 Constitutional Convention proposed many sensible reforms,
including a new system of redistricting using a bipartisan commission

797. Id. at 351-52.
798. Id. at 352.
799. Id.
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instead of the legislature itself.80° Nevertheless, the enterprise failed.
According to many, it failed because of the Convention's proposal of one
particular change: to eliminate the state constitution's so-called "Blaine
Amendment," which prohibited state and local support of schools "under
the control or direction of any religious denomination. "801 Instead, the
amendment would substitute the looser standards of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. 8" As stated thirty years later by Professor Ross
Sandier:
The 1967 Convention foundered on its leadership's failure to gauge
accurately the political environment in which the voters would
ultimately judge their proposals. A climax of a public referendum
distinguishes charter writing from other legislative processes, and
the 1967 Convention misjudged what was needed to win.8 3
We had an even greater responsibility not to "misjudge what was
needed to win." We were not proposing wholly discretionary changes in
the government. We were charged instead with responsibility to create the
necessary fixes for an unconstitutional government. If the Charter failed
at the polls, the situation would have been chaotic, and important
constitutional rights would have continued to be suppressed. Failure to win
would have been irresponsible.
Some of our necessary issues that we had to deal with, if mishandled,
could have led to a loss. For example, failure to address the need for fair
representation for all New Yorkers would have been inconsistent with our
personal priorities and values, and could have led to defeat at the polls (as
well as with the Justice Department). Similarly, failure to present a
workable balance between the needs of the City as a whole and its
constituent units would have prevented the Commission itself from coming
together as well as it did, and probably would also have resulted in a loss
of the referendum. Another issue, which, if mishandled, could have led to
a loss, relates to fiscal responsibility and cost. As discussed earlier, the
memory of the fiscal crisis was clear; editorial writers and opinion makers

800. See

HENRIK

N.

DULLEA, CHARTER REVISION IN THE EMPIRE STATE:

THE

POLITICS OF NEW YORK'S 1967 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1997); Robert Stone,
Education, in DECISION 1997 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INNEW YORK (Gerald Benjamin

& Henrik N. Dullea eds., 1997).
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1893).
802. See Stone, supra note 800.
803. Ross Sandler, The Convention Referendum, CITYLAW (Center for N.Y. City
Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), May/June 1997, at 3.
801.
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would have been quick to criticize us if we had risked reopening those selfinflicted wounds.'s 4
While we had to address these major issues, we also politically had to
decide how to address some questions unnecessary to presenting a new
government. These issues are: (i) the Landmarks Law as applied to
churches and synagogues and (ii) the Civilian Complaint Review Board and
police brutality.
I. THE LANDMARKS LAW AS APPLIED TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Initially, we had planned minor Charter changes relating to landmarks.
One of these changes was to end the Landmarks Commission's anomalous
status as part of the Parks Department and give it the prestige of a separate
agency. This change was done together with some procedural changes
relating to opportunities for public comment and Council review. 85
Separate agency status was intended to reflect the importance of landmarks
and the Landmarks Commission to the City. We also thought it would
have the added benefit of possibly attracting support from the many
passionate devotees of landmarks.
During our round of public hearings on the preliminary proposals,
however, a new demand was pressed upon us, a demand that threatened to
divide the Commission itself and which, if mishandled, could have risked
our success in the referendum.
This new issue reflected a tension between secular government and
religion, between helping the needy and preservation of history and beauty.
A coalition of religious leaders, the Interfaith Commission on Landmarking
Religious Property, testified that landmarking of churches and synagogues
violated freedom of religion and led to costs and lost opportunities that
limited the ability of the religious institutions to carry out their mission,
including providing for the poor. 806 The attack was on both the initial
designation of religious structures as landmarks and on the difficulties
churches and synagogues had in getting "hardship" relief after they were
landmarked. 807

804.

805.
806.
292-94.

807.
292-94.

See discussion supra Chapter VII.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 21-A § 534(7)-(9) (1989).
See Public Hearing, June 7, 1989, at 334-41; Public Hearing, July 19, 1989, at

See Public Hearing, June 7, 1989, at 338-39; Public Hearing, July 19, 1989, at
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The attack on the Landmarks Law, and the Landmarks Commission,
was often thoughtful and principled, but always angry. 808 Even though the
demands were more legislative than structural, they could not be ignored.
In part, this was because of the passion and strength of the advocates, and
in part because several members of the Commission itself shared the
advocates' passionate feelings. 8°
Arrayed on the other side of the issue were equally passionate and
committed advocates, devotees of the Landmarks Law for whom even to
discuss changing one jot or title in the Landmarks Law was apostasy.
Many witnesses came forth to denounce any changes. Advertisements were
run on the radio warning "Mr. Schwarz" that any proposed Charter that
undercut the Landmarks Law would be opposed and defeated. Some of the
witnesses on behalf of the status quo hurt their cause by seemingly accusing
the religious institutions of greed and avarice, by accusing commissioners
of bias,8 10 and by responding to the arguments
of the religious institutions
"quite frankly in a less polite way." 8 '
The defense of the status quo, however, was not limited to secular
voices. Some church leaders who testified disagreed with the Interfaith

Commission. One said that "[i]f anything happens to weaken the landmark

808. Many witnesses came to present their grievances. (Often during this testimony
there was extensive dialogue between commissioners and the various witnesses.)
Representative examples are the testimony of Rev. N. J.L'Heureux, chair of the New York
State Interfaith Commission on Landmarking and Religious Property, together with
colleagues. See Public Hearing, June 7, 1989, at 334-69. Although the presentation was
principled, we picked out some of the stronger statements to show the passion and anger.
For example, L'Heureux said that the landmarks law was used "for the purpose of abusing
the civil and property rights of religious congregations .... [which are] singled out in a

discriminatory manner.. . ." Id. at 337. He also asserted that landmarking imposes an
"intrusive financial burden... [which] destroys the congregation's ability to provide the
essential spiritual and human services for which the church and synagogue exists." Id. at
340. Finally, George McCormack, counsel for the Archdiocese of New York, remarked
that the average Landmarks Commission hearing was like a "circus." Id. at 347.
Rev. Wilbur T. Washington, pastor of the First Reformed Church of Jamaica, citing an
example of money that he believed was wasted on "gratuitous [church] ornamentation," also
alleged that the Landmarks Commission required funds to "preserve three cute curves,
measured by a micrometer, hundreds of feet above the street level where they can be
appreciated only by an elitist handful of citizens with binoculars." Id. at 296.
809. See, e.g., Public Hearing, June 7, 1989; Public Hearing, July 18, 1989; Public
Hearing, July 19, 1989.
810. See Public Hearing, July 18, 1989, at 174-90. Fred Friendly reacted to one
attack, which he considered "a rude assault on [his] colleague [Judah Gribetz]," by saying,
"I start out on your side. You have for the first time given me a little push in the other
direction." Id. at 181, 184-85.
811. Public Hearing, July 19, 1989, at 315.
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law ... New York will be in real trouble.""1 2 This split among religious
leaders mirrored the bitter schism among the parishioners of St.
Bartholomew's, the elegant landmarked church and vestry building, located
at Park Avenue and 50th Street."1 3
This was a classic killer issue. True believers were on both sides,
focusing on a single question and threatening to make its resolution the
litmus test of support for the Charter as a whole. Both sides could count
on the passions of large numbers of people.
Our discussions began on June 21. They did not begin well. Some
of the same fervor from outside the Commission was reflected, though
somewhat more gently, inside the Commission. Bernie Richland,
describing himself as "a devout agnostic," expressed his annoyance at
"being snowed by fancy people who have a great interest in art and
architecture and they don't really think there is anything serious about the
problems of small churches and small religious institutions." 8 4 Mario
Paredes denounced a "secularist mentality today in society that wants to get
rid of religious issues and everything that has to do with religion and
church and God, or whatever, immediately." 1 5 Fred Friendly responded,
"[T]hink again before you brandish those of us who don't see it your way
as necessar[ily] sacrilegious." 1 6
A motion to exempt religious institutions from landmarking without
"the express consent" of their congregations was made. 1 7 Bishop Sullivan
made the most striking statement in the ensuing debate. The Bishop
expressed respect for the Landmarks Commission's service of beauty,
saying the Church has "a common cause with them, to maintain beauty in
the community."

'

8

He said, however, that their "criterias . . . are

812. Public Hearing, July 18, 1989, at 171 (statement of Reverend Stephen Garmeu,
Director of St. Georges Episcopal Church in Manhattan).
813. One side of the schism (the leadership of the church and vestry) wanted to tear
down St. Bartholomew's vestry building, sell it to a developer, and use the proceeds for the
church's religious mission, including serving the needy. The other side, composed of some
church members, believed that to do so would undermine the church and hurt the City.
The church leadership ultimately lost its court challenge to the application of the
Landmarks Law. See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351
(2d Cir. 1990); see also Letter from J. Sinclair Armstrong, Chairman and President, The
Committee to Oppose the Sale of St. Bartholemew's Church, Inc. to Chairman and
Members, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (July 21, 1989) (urging
disqualification of Commissioners Gribetz, Murray, Sullivan, and Paredes) (on file with the
New York Law School Law Review).

814.
815.
816.
817.
818.

Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 264-65.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 286.
See id. at 278.
Id. at 267.
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somewhat different from ours."8 19 Religious institutions' mission to serve
poor people will become more important in "a tremendously changing
City" and more difficult if property were landmarked and locked into
landmark status. 2° Mario Paredes followed, referring to excessive
landmarking as raising "a question of human life," and a "question of
survival . . . . [i]n any inner city." 82' When the exemption motion was
debated, however, it was Bishop Sullivan who most forcefully urged
caution. Referring to the issue as "very personal, because there is a strong
desire to see us exempted," the Bishop warned about "entanglement"
issues, and expressed concern about "caus[ing] jeopardy [to 'our cause']
because we reach too far. " s8' The Bishop exhorted, "I have a major
concern that what we do as a body does not get so weighted down that it
[removes] the possibility of us putting... an agreed-upon proposal on the
ballot in November." 8 3 The Bishop urged the Commission to come up
with a "middle ground.'824
After the debate, the motion was pressed to a vote: three members
voted in favor, three voted against, 8' and four abstained.82 6 As Fred
Friendly said, "The abstentions win. "87
On the designation aspect of the problem, a "middle ground" on the
Commission in fact emerged from a proposal by Commissioners Friendly
and Trager on June 27. They proposed that, in deciding whether to
approve the Landmarks Commission's designation of a property as a
landmark, the City Council should be specifically allowed to include "the
impact of the designation on the provision of education, charitable and
social services," not only to religious institutions. 828 This proposal would
allow ultimate decision makers to weigh the concerns of the religious

819. Id.
820. Id. at 266-67.
821. Id. at 268.
822. Id. at 284-86.
823. Id. at 285.
824. See id. at 286.
825. Schwarz was one of the three no votes, explaining that there was a "legal
question" in providing a special exemption for religious institutions and that we lacked
sufficient information in any event. A hint of concern about such a provision being a killer
issue was also given. See id. at 281-82.
826. See id. at 288.
827. Id.
828. Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at256; Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 270-74
(the dialogue between Schwarz and Judah Gribetz moved in this direction).
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institutions. Its phrasing had the added benefit of avoiding legal829questions
that might arise if religious institutions alone were singled out.
With minor changes, this proposal was the ultimate solution on
designation, 830 although no solution to the hardship review aspect of the
problem had yet been discussed. David Trager concluded his remarks with
hope that the proposal would "have a healthy impact on people starting to
talk to each other instead of taking very rigid positions."" Unfortunately,
the proposal did not lead to this.
The Friendly-Trager proposal on designation was made available for
public comment at a series of public hearings held in July. At the hearings,
the opposing sides continued to debate with each other. Schwarz, who had
engaged in dialogue with witnesses on both sides, expressed frustration at
the continued gulf and asked the parties to try to settle their differences.
Eventually, the Chair of the Landmarks Commission and the leaders of the
Interfaith Commission met with Schwarz in his law office.
During the evening of August 1, the Commission's penultimate meeting
that started at 9:45 a.m. and finished at 11:30 p.m., we revisited the
landmarks/religious issue while discussing many other Commission issues.
Schwarz reported that the discussions between the parties on
designation were fruitful; on hardship review, however, "respectful
disagreements" continued. 32 On designation, the religious community
needed only to be assured that the Council would not be "inhibited in its
review, and could conceivably reject a designation for any reason,
including the effect on the entity's ability to perform its mission.833 This
necessity was clarified by a letter from Corporation Counsel Peter Zimroth
and by the legislative history of the Commission.834 On hardship review,
the Interfaith Commission made a relatively modest proposal. A separate
administrative panel would be created to hear appeals by any institution that

829. See generally Public Meeting, June 27, 1989. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970), a New York statute provided real property tax exemptions to, among others,
religious organizations for properties used solely for religious purposes. The statute also
exempted any property owned by a wide range of not-for-profit organizations involved in
educational or charitable activities. Critical to the Court upholding the statute was the
breadth of the New York statute not being limited to religion. See id. at 673.
Two decades later, in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court struck
down a Texas statute that exempted religious magazines from sales tax. The Court stated
that when a statute was so narrowly drawn as to confer benefits only to religious groups,
there is an impermissible sponsorship of religion. See id. at 11. This was precisely the
problem the Commission sought to avoid. See Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 281-82.
830. See Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 260.
831. Id. at 268-69.
832. See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 406-09.
833. See id. at 409.
834. See id. at 410-13; Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 85-86, 91.
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was "tax-exempt" (the phrasing thus avoiding the legal problem created
by singling out religious institutions).83
This proposal, argued the
Interfaith Commission, would result in speedier decisions, involving less
cost. The Landmarks Commission agreed to give the proposal "serious
'
good faith consideration."836
As
837 Commissioner Betanzos observed,
however, "that's no agreement. ,
The Commission sought a consensual result, but with just one day left,
the chances seemed slim. Earlier in the evening, David Trager suggested
that we resolve the issue after our August 2 Justice Department deadline to
give the parties more time to negotiate.838 Schwarz initially believed this
idea was "creative" and "sensible," and Lane opined that the hardship issue
did not have to be submitted to the Justice Department.839 Later in the
evening, however,
Harriet Michel argued compellingly against
postponement. Although she agreed that the landmark issues were hard
and that it would be desirable to allow time for agreement,840 she argued
that it would be indefensible to allow for delay on this subject but not for
the far more comprehensive issues on which the Delay Movement focused:
[to delay the landmarks question] opens us up to a whole range of
criticism that I personally, as an individual minority member of
this [Commission], do not feel prepared to face and I do not want
to ...be put in that position ... because it ruins my credibility
in my community. 84'
Commissioner Paredes countered by urging postponement because "every
rule has its exception," but Commissioners Gourdine and Betanzos agreed
8 42
delay would cause perception problems and urged a vote the next day.
Schwarz told the disputing parties that "we cannot ignore the
comments" of the members who "expressed their distress" at delay and
suggested "in the strongest possible terms" that the parties reach an
agreement that night. 43 Schwarz also signaled to the Landmarks
Commission that it would be wise to concede, because "[he] sensed from

835.
836.

See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 558.
Id.

837. Id.
838. Id. at 440-41.
839. Id. at 442-43.
840. See id. at 566-67.
841. Id. at 566.
842. See id. at 567-70.
843. Id. at 570-71.

1998]

THE POLICYAND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING

the members of the Commission that there was a good deal of equity in this
particular proposal" of the Interfaith Commission. 8'
Although the disputing parties met until 3:30 a.m., they did not reach
an agreement.84 5 Therefore, the Commission itself had to come to closure.
Clearly, the idea of a separate tribunal had the support of the Commission.
The remaining question was the tribunal's standard of review when
deciding a Landmarks Commission designation on appeal.846 Schwarz was
not willing to let this be decided hastily. We had an insufficient record; a
wrong decision could turn this matter into a killer issue. Ultimately,
however, the solution was found: create the new tribunal and allow a
subsequent local law to decide its standard of review.847
This long episode thus ended on our last day. But because of our
ongoing concerns about landmarks being a killer issue, we also agreed to
place the landmarks proposals on the referendum as a separate
question-the only question separated out from the totality of Charter
questions.8 48 As Si Gourdine stated when explaining his support for the
separation:
We have just been subjected to such a cross-barraged activity on
both sides of this issue that I personally would not want to see the
entire effort that we have been involved with subjected to the risks
of failure because of the landmark controversy.
II. THE CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD
Long before our Commission was appointed, there had been a bitter
Charter controversy over the composition of the Civilian Complaint Review
Board ("CCRB"), which was designed to review claims of police
brutality.850 In 1966, shortly after his election as mayor, John Lindsay
issued an executive order that established a civilian-controlled board to
review complaints of police brutality; if the accusations were
"substantiated," the board could make recommendations for action to the
police commissioner.8 51 The police union and its allies raged; they

844. Id. at 571.
845.
846.
847.
848.
849.

See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 99.
See id. at 80, 103, 105.
See id. at 112-18.
See id. at 139-40.
See id. at 140.

850. See Paul Hofmann, Civilian Control of Police Review is Set Up by City, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 1966, at Al.

851.

See id.
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gathered many more than the required number of petition signatures (more
than 250,000) to cause a referendum on the question whether the Charter
should be amended to forbid civilians from sitting on such a board.8 52 The
referendum campaign was nasty and racially divisive. The Charter was
amended to reverse Lindsay's change and create an all-police board
appointed by the police commissioner. 53
In 1986, a local law, passed by the Council and endorsed by Mayor
Koch, further amended the Charter to permit one half of the members of
the Review Board to be civilians. 54 While opposed by the police union,
this change was not particularly divisive.
At our public hearings, many witnesses came to urge changing the
Charter again to make the Review Board all civilian. Their testimony was
often graphic and always emotional. This was also a demand of Coalition
for Community Empowerment, a group led by Congressman Major
Owens, 5' among others. Of course, many of the commissioners did not
need testimony or letters to realize that while most police officers were not
abusive or brutal, too many were-and that minorities bore a
disproportionate share of both the verbal and physical abuse. This
disproportionality was known56to many commissioners either through life
experience or through work.
The Police Review Board issue was potentially even more divisive for
the City than landmarking religious structures. 5 Racially divisive issues
had been raised in the City once before, and if we addressed the issue, it
clearly could have jeopardized our obligation to right the City's
constitutional wrongs and create a new government structure.
We had separately talked to some commissioners individuallyincluding Si Gourdine, who had briefly raised the issue at the

852. See Robert D. McFadden, Review Board's Stiffest Test Posedby Tompkins Sq.
Riot, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1988, at B4.

853. See id.
854. See id; see also Todd S. Purdum, A Handful of Touchy Issues Continue to Plague
CharterPanel, N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 1989, at 33.
855. See April 14, 1989, Letter from Congressman Owens to Schwarz, supra note 61.
856. For example, as corporation counsel, Schwarz's awareness of the issue had been
heightened by police brutality cases brought against the City, and even more so by work

done in connection with Congressman John Conyers' congressional hearing on the subject
held in the City. See Wayne Barret, Mayor, Media Ignore Conyers Hearing on Police
Brutality, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Dec. 2, 1997, at 24. In the course of preparing for this
hearing and for a speech on the subject, Mayor Koch convened a meeting of all his highranking black officials; every single one described incidents of police mistreatment that had

involved themselves and their family members. See Ronald Smothers, Blacks, after
Howard Beach, Unite on Goals, Split on Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1988, at Al.
857. See Purdum, A Handful of Touchy Issues Continue to Plague CharterPanel,
supra note 854.
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Commission's June 15 meeting 858-about reasons for not acting on police
brutality as part of the Charter process, as well as about the likely harm to
the Commission's overall effort if we did act. These commissioners had
strong feelings about the Police Review Board issue, but eventually
accepted our reasoning for excluding it. It seemed likely that we would not
wrestle with this particular issue.
Then, as we were ending our June 27 meeting-the last day of the
Commission's second round of meetings and immediately before we were
to issue the Commission's Revised Proposals-Mario Paredes called for
discussion of police brutality, "addressing this question to [Schwarz]
personally." 59 Commissioner Paredes reminded us that "in every
"'6°
borough," witnesses had urged the Commission "to talk about it.
Although he contended that we should discuss police brutality,
Commissioner Parades said that he personally did not favor changing the
Charter. 86' Amy Betanzos, who had earlier said she accepted the wisdom
of not getting into the issue, despite her personal concerns as to police
brutality, reacted by saying, "If it's brought up, it's something to be
discussed. ,62
David Trager responded by giving substantive and political reasons for
why we should not act on the CCRB. On the substantive side, Trager had
had recent experience with the issue, both as a member of the State
Investigations Commission and as a member of a Commission that had
recently recommended to the mayor nominees for the new civilian members
to the CCRB.8 63 Trager pointed out that the new law (making the CCRB
half civilian) had been in existence for only two years and that some "really
first-rate people" had been appointed as civilian members. Trager further
noted that the CCRB, in a recent report on disturbances in Tompkins
Square Park, had "criticized some of their own procedures, [and] made
recommendations for change in their own operations and within the Police
Department." 8 64 The new CCRB "ought to be given a reasonable time to
see how it will work out ...I think it ought to be given a fair shot."'8 658
This was what Trager referred to as "the positive side" of not acting. 66
He added: "[O]n the negative side, I think if we start to go into that whole

858.
859.
860.
861.
862.

See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 61-62.
Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 291.
See id. at 291-92.
See id. at292.
Id.

863. See id. at 293.
864.
865.
866.

Id.

Id. at 293-94.
See id. at 294.
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thing we're just going to raise a political storm and we have 8enough
68
around." 867 To act would "just open[] a political Pandora's box."
The Pandora's box, however, had already been opened. We did not
want to let this issue fester and were convinced both that the Commission
could not make any great progress on the substance and that it could
severely injure the Commission to try. We called a special short
Commission meeting for July 13, 1989, to deal with a few questions that
were left open at the end of the last series of Commission meetings, but
primarily to determine whether to pursue the CCRB issue.8 69 A staff memo
surveying several jurisdictions had been sent out over Commissioner
Trager's comments. 7 0 This memorandum showed that the composition of
police complaint review boards did not seem to make a significant
difference in results; it seemed rather that the keys to effectiveness were the
non-Charter issues of resources, staffing, procedures, and political will, not
board composition.87'
Commissioner Trager made the same substantive points he had before
and said the staff memorandum added others." z Schwarz said:
I think the real question is as posed by David [Trager]. There's a
new group which seems to be working well which has the majority
of minorities on it, has the even split and has been recommending
reforms which the Commissioner, apparently, is accepting. And
I think the question is not what can we do, but whether it's
appropriate to allow the reform, which was put into effect less than
two years ago, to go forward . . . in the hopes that it does
accomplish the beneficial results which everybody seeks.873
The Commission decided not to act.874 Obviously, the problem of how
to review allegations of police brutality has not gone away. We believed,
however, that the 1989 charter revision was not the proper way to address
the issue.

867. Id.
868. Id.
869. See Public Meeting, July 13, 1989, at 12.

870. See id.
871. See id. at 12-13.
872. See id. at 12-14.
873. Id.at 15.

874. See id. at 16.
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PART III. THE PATH FROM POLICY TO LAW
CHAPTER X. THREE HURDLES TO A NEW CHARTER

Three things had to happen to create a new Charter.

First, the

Commission had to agree on the structure and the details of the largest
change in New York City's government since the turn of the century. The
Commission approved the proposed new Charter by an 11 to 4 vote on
August 2, 1989, though a consensus had formed earlier.'
Second, the Department of Justice had to decide whether the changes
had a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect on persons
protected by the Voting Rights Act. On October 30, 1989, the Department
approved the procedures for holding the referendum election.2 On
December 13, 1989, the Department approved the substance of the Charter
changes.3
Third, the voters of New York City had to approve the Charter at a
referendum held on November 7, 1989. They did so by a vote of fifty-five
percent to forty-five percent.4
While the three hurdles had different time frames and decision-makers,
they were related. A narrower consensus on the Commission would have
made it more difficult for the referendum to pass. Similarly, obtaining
support from five of the six minority commissioners probably helped with
the Justice Department.
The "case" we made to the Justice Department for approving the new
Charter and the arguments we made in the referendum campaign were
essentially the same as the points that drew the Commission together. The
Board had to be replaced. The City needed to provide fair political
opportunities for all its citizens, including minorities. Borough voices, as
well as other local voices, needed an opportunity to be heard. A strong
mayor was needed, yet the mayor had to be held accountable. And, the
City's government had to be more open.

1. See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 132; Todd S. Purdum, Panel FinishesPlan
to Revise New York City's Government, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al.
2. See Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission (Oct. 30, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review)
[hereinafter Letter from James P. Turner to Schwarz].
3. See Alan Finder, New York City CharterRevisionApproved by JusticeDepartment,

N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1989, at Al.
4. See Alan Finder, Opposition to CharterChange Diverse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
1989, at B3.
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Nevertheless, the emphasis in the referendum campaign and before the
Justice Department differed. For example, the issue of race and the effect
of the Charter changes on minorities was the central issue with the Justice
Department.' In the referendum campaign, increasing opportunities for
minorities, as well as all New Yorkers, were among the central themes,
along with many others.
From start to finish, the Commission's work generated irreconcilable
suggestions. A long article summarized the series of public hearings after
our preliminary proposals. They were described as "a numbing recitation
of diametrically opposing viewpoints." 6 For example, some said our
proposals would "cripple a mayor,' while others said we would "crown
him." 8 Some said the Council would "never live up to its [new] powers,"'
while others said the Council "would never receive the power it
deserves." 10 In the following chapters, we give several other examples of
"diametrically opposing viewpoints."
While the Commission listened to advocates and the general public and
showed its willingness to change tentative ideas in response to cogent
criticism, advocates with widely varying agendas continued to assert their
own inconsistent, irreconcilable demands. Gene Russianoff of the New
York Public Interest Group ("NYPIRG") analogized these demands to
those of lobbyists before the state budget is approved: "[B]efore final action
everyone is standing in the hallway and saying 'society is ruined unless my
bill passes' [but after final action] it is useful to call them up ... and ask
them how they really did."" This was also the case with the Charter.
After the Commission issued its final plan, many who formerly suggested
the sky would fall said that they favored the Commission's plan and urged
a "Yes" vote. These latter-day conversions included public interest groups
such as NYPIRG, politicians such as Queens Borough President Claire
Shulman and Mayor Koch, and editorial boards such as New York Newsday
and the New York Times. Every one of these proponents had been pushing
us in very different directions during the Commission's deliberative
process.
We believe that the decisions made during the Commission's
deliberative process were driven by the best interests of the City. The

5. See Alan Finder, New York City CharterRevision Approved by Justice Department,
supra note 3.
6. Todd S. Purdun, Charter Plan and Critics: Opposition Slowing Process il New
York, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13, 1989, at BI.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Alan Finder, CharterPanel's Test, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at B4.
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decisions supported our case before the Justice Department and in the
referendum. As the Daily News stated in its editorial endorsing the
Charter, "The best politics is good government."' 2 Suggesting that the
Commission's decisions were an abstract exercise in political philosophy,
however, would be naive. We needed to prevail; principle and politics had
to work together. Many specific and substantively useful changes in the
Charter were aimed at gaining support from the Commission, the public,
editorial boards and other influential opinion makers, advocacy groups, and
the Justice Department.
The Commission's unprecedented open deliberations and interactive
public process also helped us jump over all three hurdles. The
Commission's substantive decisions improved as a result. Moreover, the
Commission's openness and responsiveness helped both with the Justice
Department and with many opinion makers, who, in turn, wrote helpful
editorials and influenced the voters in the referendum. The fairness and
responsiveness of our process also took some of the animus out of some
opponents' critiques.
One final generality also applies to all three hurdles: the dissenters on
the Commission and the Charter's opponents before the Justice Department
and in the referendum continued to be miles apart in their views. For
example, the referendum opposition consisted very substantially of, on the
one hand, die-hard defenders of the Board of Estimate who pined for the
past (altered only by weighted voting), and, on the other hand, advocates
who despised the old Board of Estimate and thought the City needed a
radical change-though precisely what changed was never detailed. The
varying views of the opposition were somewhat more subtle than this
simplification. Nonetheless, the opposition's lack of a coherent counterplan or unified vision of the City made it difficult to mount an opposing
case. Their lack of unity also suggested the Commission had probably
found a sensible middle ground.
CHAPTER XI. BUILDING A CONSENSUS ON THE COMMISSION:
SUBSTANCE AND COLLEGIALITY
I. COLLEGIALITY HELPS
Building a consensus among fifteen independent and strong-willed
people from different backgrounds can be a daunting assignment. It was
particularly so with Charter revision: the commissioners had a one-time
assignment, the power of major city players was at stake, the issues were

12.

Editorial, Thumbs Up on the Charter,DAILYNEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 29, 1989, at 36.
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hard and hotly contested, and all the work had to be done in full public
view.
In such circumstances, building a collegial atmosphere becomes a
necessity. Despite the fast pace, the long hours, the intense and unceasing
public and private pressure from powerful forces and persistent advocates,
and the difficult and important issues, the Commission's meetings were
remarkably free of rancor. There was even humor. The discussions of
substance were substantive. Commissioners-certainly all those who voted
for the Charter-believed that their ideas were listened to and taken
seriously. None, including the chair, prevailed on every issue. Members
felt, however, that ideas were taken seriously and that the dialogue was
respectful and fair.
At the final vote, some commissioners went out of their way to praise
the Commission's teamwork. 3 Even Commissioner Richland, who had
promised to dissent since May when the Commission voted against
weighted voting and thus to abolish the Board, praised the Commission's
collegiality and openness. 14
The commissioners' willingness to compromise was crucial. As Arch
Murray said on our last day, "[Tihe present can be the enemy of the good
5 This was true for
....[W]e also have had to make some compromises."
6
Charter.'
the
for
voted
who
commissioner
every

II. SUBSTANCE CONTROLS
Good will alone was not enough for consensus. However, it allowed
for the exchange of ideas that produced consensus. It also helped members
accept some results that were not what they would have written as a
"philosopher King sitting in a cave without hearing from anyone else and
just scribbling on the wall of the cave."' 7
A. FourEarly FoundationalBlocks
By May, the Commission had begun to form a consensus in four broad
and vital areas:

13. See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 60, 61, 64, 71, 189.
14. See id. at 185; see also Public Meeting, June 27, 1989, at 290.
15. Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 71.
16. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at201; Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at27172; Public Meeting, Aug 1, 1989, at 221, 351-52; Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 49-50,
119-20, 141-42.
17. Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 49.
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a. All fifteen members were convinced we should strive to place a new
Charter before the voters in November.
b. Fourteen of the fifteen members were convinced we should abolish
the Board of Estimate.
c. Those fourteen believed there should be a strong legislative body to
balance mayoral power.
d. All commissioners wanted to increase opportunities for minorities
in the City's political system.
With these foundation blocks in place, the Commission had given itself
a deadline, had committed itself to a broad review of government
operations, had decided to empower the legislature, and had a core theme
of legal and moral significance to the City's future. These four key initial
decisions did not resolve every detail of governmental structure and
operations, and their implications had to be worked out if the
Commission's consensus was to bear fruit in time for a referendum in
November. The Commission also had to strike the balance between central8
and local power, while ensuring a meaningful voice for the boroughs.
After our June 15 meeting, it was clear we could reach consensus on this
issue as well. 9
B. The June 15, 1989, Meeting
This probably was the Commission's single most important meeting.
It certainly was our most dramatic. We issued our preliminary proposals
one month earlier.20 In the intervening month, the Commission held seven
public hearings, 2 where 372 witnesses from all over the City commented
on the proposals and offered their own ideas. We also received 168 written
comments, 22 and commissioners and staff members met with interested
groups all over the City. 3
We, working closely with staff, worked hard to prepare for the June
15 meeting, our first meeting after receiving all of these comments. Our

18. See Editorial, Borough Power: Moving Toward a Fairer,Broader View of the
City, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 19, 1989, at 44.
19. See Alan Finder, Critics of First CharterPlan PraiseProposedRevisions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1989, at A27.
20. See Todd S. Purdum, Charter Panel, For Now, Finishes Reshaping the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1989, at B1.
21. The first five hearings, held in each of the five boroughs, were general and
covered every topic. The last two focused on "fair representation." They were convened
as part of our effort to focus on communication with minority communities.
22. N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, CATALOGUE OF SCHWARZ COMMISSION
CORRESPONDENCE, Vols. III-V (1989).
23. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 3-4.
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goals were to find the right balance between central and local power while
preserving our support from the City's good government groups.
We made enormous progress on both fronts at the June 15 meeting, but
not without drama-drama that, fortunately, strengthened bonds among the
commissioners.
1. The Drama
The meeting, held at the Adam Clayton Powell State Office Building
in Harlem, was twice interrupted by protestors. 24 First, a very angry and
disturbed man loudly demanded to know if "[Mayor] Koch ha[d] appointed
a commission that will limit African-American and Latino power in New
York City." 25 The man physically threatened Mario Paredes who tried to
stop his tirade.2 6 When Fred Friendly, our eldest member, stood up to help
Parades, the man threatened him as well. 7 Then the man told Therese
Molloy and the chair that they would get their "ass kicked. 28 He called
the Commission "lily white," 29 and finished by yelling that "y'all make
decisions that affect this community[;] you be sensitive about people,
because we're concerned, and we love our community. We love our
children, we love our race, and we not going to apologize for it." 30
Although this cry ended the interruption, 3' the atmosphere was tense for
everyone, particularly for Friendly, Paredes, and the others who were on
the side of the table where the man had approached.
The second interruption came about ten minutes later from some
representatives of the Delay Movement.3 2 They began demanding that the
Charter revision vote be held in 1990."3 Then they vowed to make their
opinions "forcibly" known.34 Referring to the commissioners as "this

24. See id. at 42-49, 62-68.
25.

Id. at 43.

26.

See id. at 43-44.

27.

See id. at 45.

28. Id.
29.
30.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 48-49.

31. See id. at 49. Schwarz had been present at a 1983 hearing on police brutality in
the same room. At that time, the room erupted after a similar interruption occurred.

Congressman John Conyors, chairing the meeting, was unable to regain control and had to
shut the hearing down. See Sam Roberts, Hearing on Police Cut Off in Harlem, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 19, 1983, at Al.
32. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 62-68. See also discussion on decision not
to delay referendum, supra Chapter V, Part I.
33. See id. at 62.
34.

Id.
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Koch-appointed Commission,"35 they claimed that the Commission had
failed to effectively include minorities in developing ideas for the new
Charter and that the time table "limited participation from the minority
community. ,36 They also said that refusal to postpone the referendum
"would signal to policy makers across the nation that New York City
continues to be one of the last bastions of institutionalized racism in our
urban centers where people of color remain [relegated] to second class
citizens[hip]. "3 The demonstrators left chanting "Schwarz, Schwarz, Have
You Heard? [New York] is not Johannesburg. "38
How were we to view the demonstrations? On the merits, we were not
persuaded about a delay in May 39 and were later unpersuaded when we
finished in August.40 We also knew minorities had been involved in the
process 41 and that we would continue to make special efforts toward that
end. Some of us also knew that, despite the angry public words of the
Delay Movement demonstrators, a number of their members had
recognized privately that we were open and committed to fairness.42
Nonetheless, both interruptions confirmed two things we already knew.
First, there was a lot of anger and frustration in the City's minority
communities.43 Second, moving so quickly with Charter revision caused
problems for everyone-problems that were expressed forcefully by
protestors. By challenging our authority and our motives, the Delay
Movement hurt its own cause by drawing Commission members closer
together. For instance, Harriet Michel expressed empathy for the way a
"very angry man" who "cares about his community," had "handled" his
anger. 44 She added, however, "I sure as hell don't feel like I have to
defend myself as an African-American woman in my own commitment to
my community[,] and participating on this [Commission]." 45 She added
that commissioners "are not unknown to [the] people of New York...

35. Id. at 64.
36. Id. at 63-64.
37. Id. at 67-68.
38. Todd S. Purdum, CharterChairman Widens Proposals,N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
1989, at B3.
39. See discussion supra Chapter V, Part I.
40. See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 50-78.

41. See id. at 60.
42. One such private conversation was overheard by a reporter, whose later story
quoted the Delay Movement leader as saying he "wanted to commend the Chairman for his

openness and commitment to fairness." Alan Finder, What Gets CharterPanelAll Riled
Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1989, at B1. The reporter then suggested an irony that two weeks
later (at the June 15 meeting) the speaker led the demonstration. See id.

43. See id.
44. Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 80.

45. Id. at 81.
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most of the people around this table have been public servants for a very
long time. Their philosophies, their integrity, their perspective, in many
instances, are very well-known. 46 She added, "I have been called every
name. I have been accused of everything. And you know what? You
have to keep your eye on the prize."4 7
Fred Friendly said, "I think Harriet is right. I think we've had a
coming together at today's meeting. 4 8 He further pointed out that "we've
[also] been buffeted by Borough Presidents, not all of them, but many of
them, who've attacked us slightly more politely than we were today, but
not much more politely. . . ."" Friendly echoed Michel's call to keep the
Commission's "eye on the prize," and urged us on with further rhetoric
from the Civil Rights movement: "[W]e have to be resolute and proud of
what we're doing and we have to do it well and we have to give it to the
people and say, 'Its ours to propose, it's yours to dispose, now is the
time. "5
Unquestionably, there was an emotional "coming together" of the
commissioners, though all the emotion in the world would not have carried
the day without substance behind it. It was substance, particularly on landuse issues, that led Friendly to state, "I heard from some Commissioners
things today that I didn't think I'd hear, and I'm glad to hear it. '' 51
2. The Substance
The June 15 meeting began with a bow to our own process and, at the
same time, with a message to the concerns of New Yorkers. Schwarz
referred to our "unparalleled" outreach over that past month in responding
to piles of letters and holding public hearings, forums on fair representation
issues, meetings and discussions "with people in all boroughs, in all walks
of life, fully reflecting the diversity of this City." 2 Schwarz then tried to
put the comments we had received in perspective for both the
commissioners and observers. He said that we had heard from some
discordant voices that sounded some "powerful and insightful" criticism
of our preliminary proposals, and many were "trying to be advocates,
,
He said the challenge would be to
trying to leverage us ....

46. Id. at 84.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 83.
Id. at 86.
Id.
Id. at 88.

51.

Id. at 86.

52.
53.

Id.at 3-4.
Id. at 5-6.
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"harmonize, to seek the best
54 from [these] voices" and to "[seek] a balance
on these difficult issues.
The commissioners were given two proposals. One outlined proposed
changes and new ideas on eight broad topics. 5 The second was a long
memorandum on land-use policy.5 6 It was the land-use memorandum and
the ensuing discussion that did the most to foster consensus among the
commissioners.
The land-use proposals addressed several different, and sometimes
conflicting, concerns. Could a proper role be found for a borough
perspective? Would local communities, particularly poor and minority
communities, be treated fairly? And would central planning be effective?
During our earlier work on the preliminary proposals, we had rejected
various ways of ensuring a borough perspective by giving a legislative role
to borough presidents. 7 We believed that we needed to develop an
appropriate executive role. By the close of our first round of Commission
meetings on May 15, we had not yet done so. This problem had to be
solved. In terms of building the Commission's consensus, David Trager
emphasized that he was not satisfied on this issue. We needed Trager's
support. He was an effective advocate and analyst on the borough voice
issue and an influential and balanced Commission member.
Fortunately, the new proposals contained a number of ideas for
strengthening the borough voice on land-use. They included the "triple no"
appeal to the City Council,59 the super-majority in the Planning
Commission required to reject a borough president's proposal for an
alternate site for a proposed City facility,' and other items discussed in
Chapter VII.
When David Trager announced that "real progress",6' has been made
on land use, it was clear that we had the beginning of a consensus on the
Commission.

54. Id.

55. See N.Y. CITY CHARTERREVISION COMM'N,

CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE CHAIR

TO THE ADOPTED PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS AS A RESULT OF PUBLIC TESTIMONY AND
COMMENT, Exhibit 71-a (June 15, 1989) [hereinafter CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE CHAIR].

56. See Memorandum from Frederick A.

0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York

City Charter Revision Commission, to the Charter Revision Commission Members
(regarding land-use proposals) (June 15, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law

Review).
57. See Alan Finder, CharterPanel Tilted Scales Toward Minorities andAway From
Boroughs, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1989, at B4.
58. See Public Meeting, May 15, 1989, at 150.

59. See Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 125.
60. See CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE CHAIR, supra note 55, at 3.
61.

Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 35.
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Nat Leventhal was crucial to the Commission's success. He was
enormously influential both inside and outside the Commission. Leventhal
was fully versed in the intricacies of City government, and had a sound
understanding of the relationship among issues and the political factors that
would help win voter approval. Therefore, it was reassuring when
Commissioner Leventhal followed Commissioner Trager's comments by
saying:
[I]n a very brief paper you've done a terrific job of responding
to[,] I think[,] a very wide variety of comments .... I think most
of this stuff looks very good. I particularly had a chance to look
at land use, which I like a lot. 62
Fred Friendly, who tended more to rhetorical flourishes than Leventhal
or Trager, and who had just come through the emotions of a verbal and
near physical assault, said, "[A]bout land-use,
I think it's inventive. I
63
think it's almost [inspiring]. I love it."
The proposed land-use changes were not only directed at developing an
appropriate borough voice. They also responded to concerns of both: (i)
all of the living former chairs of the City Planning Commission that a
citywide perspective would be hampered by elements of our preliminary
proposals; and (ii) minority and other community advocates. Proposed
changes relevant to these advocates included the "Fair Share" plan for
siting facilities. They also included a provision that disposition of Cityowned residential property should automatically be reviewed by the City
Council because "for poor communities the City's disposition of its
residential property is the functional equivalent of a zoning change' in
middle-class or upper-income communities. "6
The Fair Share and City residential zoning provisions were sound
policy steps aimed at concerns of the City's poorer communities. They
were also among those changes designed to help with the City's
"progressive" and "good government" groups. Other proposed changes
put forward at the June 15 meeting that were particularly relevant to these
groups were, most importantly, the introduction of an independent budget
office; 66 the proposals relating to more openness and more democracy in

62. Id. at 40-41.
63.

64.
Council
65.
66.

Id. at 87.

We had already concluded that all zoning changes would have to go to the City
because they amounted to a change of law.
Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 14.
See CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE CHAIR, supra note 55, at 1.
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the City Council;67 proposals on Access to Information; 68 proposals
concerning the Department of Information commissioner; 69 proposals on
service delivery; 70 and proposals on dual City and political party officeholding. 7' All of these were also relevant to the concerns of particular
commissioners -especially the chair. All stemmed from repeated themes
in our recent public hearings and were an effort to "seek the best" from
discordant voices.'
The effect of these changes was also clearly beneficial in gaining
support for the City's "good government" community.
Obviously, neither our substantive nor our political work was over.
From outside, as well as inside the Commission, this meeting's proposals
were viewed as extremely important. Their importance is illustrated by a
few newspaper excerpts.
-New York Newsday, a consistent editorial voice speaking for an
appropriate borough voice, referred to a "seemingly new direction" as
"noteworthy and commendable," but added: "Something not too far from
true genius is still needed, however, to steer a correct course between the
sometimes conflicting goals of five-borough empowerment and centralized
government. "73
-The New York Times reported that the range of widely varying
comments we had to address: "Mr. Schwarz's proposals were intended to
advance the [C]ommission's work by addressing objections from housing
groups, environmentalists, development lawyers, civil-rights groups,
borough presidents, Council members and Mayor Koch."'7 4
Many individuals were quoted as saying the Commission was moving
in the right direction. Unfortunately, although many commentators wanted
us to move further, they were urging us to move in diametrically different
directions. Thus, Borough President Ferrer was quoted as saying that there
had been "progress . . . in the right direction" but that the borough
presidents' powers over land-use planning, as well as over the delivery of
services and the award of contracts, should be increased. 75 Sylvia Deutsch,
the chair of the City Planning Commission, also described the land-use

67. See id.
68. See id. at 4.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 5.
71. See id.
72. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 5.
73. Editorial, Borough Power: Moving Toward a Fairer,BroaderView of the City,
supra note 18.
74. Purdum, CharterChairman Widens Proposals,supra note 38.
75. Finder, Critics of FirstCharterPlan PraiseProposedRevisions, supra note 19.
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provisions as "moving in a direction that is more comfortable"
but said that
76
the mayor should have more say over land-use planning.
The June 15 meeting was short but extraordinarily productive. Most
reactions from the discordant outside voices were positive. Clearly, the
Commission had come more together. There was, however, still an
enormous amount to do. After the June 15 meeting, it was clear to us that
we should be able to put together a Commission consensus.
III. SMALLER ISSUES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO PARTICULAR
COMMISSIONERS

Common ground on the major substantive issues facing the
Commission, as well as the respectful, collegial Commission process, were
the keys to building the Commission's consensus. In addition, several
commissioners-sometimes building upon staff analysis and proposals that
developed at our earlier legislative hearings-came up with ideas for useful
reforms on a number of subjects important to them. Some of these ideas
were added to the Charter.
For example, we added provisions requiring the City to pay interest for
late contract payments. 7 Late payments hurt the City because fewer people
were willing to contract with it. They also hurt contractors, particularly
smaller, non-profit and community-based organizations. Another example
was the creation of a separate Department of Telecommunications. 78 This
had been unsuccessfully proposed by Fred Friendly many years earlier.
With advances in technology, however, the idea had become more sensible.
Finally, the Charter contained a new chapter on minority and women
contractors, 79 which was one of Harriet Michel's special interests.8"
Although we would have had a Commission consensus without the smaller
changes, including them only helped.
IV. MAKING A VIRTUE OUT OF CRITICISM
During the Charter revision process, we were criticized from all
directions.
In the beginning, this criticism bothered some of the
commissioners. For example, during our first round of public hearings,

76.
77.
78.
Offices,
79.
80.

Id.
See discussion supra Chapter VII.
See Alan Finder, Charter PanelApproves Bar on PoliticalLeaders in Elected
N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1989, at B1.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 56 § 1301 (1989, as amended through 1997).
See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 295.
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Fred Friendly described himself as "almost shell-shocked" at the sharp
contrasts among various witnesses' views on the likely effects of our
preliminary proposals on land use. 8' After reviewing our new proposals on
June 15, however, Friendly was no longer "shell-shocked." He called
upon the Commission to "get going" because he felt that "now [was] the
time. " " Similarly, the minority members and others like Schwarz with
histories of concern for civil rights were disturbed by members of the
Delay Movement challenging our commitment to equal opportunity for
minorities. Critiques from old friends were also unpleasant. Schwarz's
close friends, Jack Rosenthal, the head of the New York Times editorial
board, and Herb Sturz, the former head of the City Planning Commission,
and, at the time, an imaginative new real-estate developer, used public
criticism to push us to move the process along. The Times ultimately
endorsed the Charter;83 Sturz continued to criticize it.84
We were able, however, to cope with the criticism for several reasons.
First, for every critic on an issue, we had supporters on the same issue.
Second, because the critics came at us from such diametrically different
directions, we often felt that we were in the sensible middle. On land use,
for example, some critics said that we would hamstring the mayor,
strengthen borough and local groups, and in general prevent difficult
decisions.8 5 Other critics said that we would enshrine the mayor,
emasculate local groups, and in general allow developers, or "the City" to
ride roughshod over everything and everybody.86
Third, some of the criticism could, as the Daily News reported, "be
summed up in a single sentence. Give me more power." 87 A column in
the Times said, "[i]f the arguments against the [C]harter plan are often
couched in the language of the Founding Fathers, the emotions sometimes
seem like those of cranky children."8s We knew that our job was to
winnow out the good ideas that were interspersed among "cranky" or selfcentered critiques.

81. Public Hearing, June 6, 1989, at 37; see also Todd S. Purdum, CharterPanel
Postpones Vote on Final Proposals,N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1989, at B2.
82. Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 88-89.
83. See Editorial, The Only Reasonable CharterChoice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1989,

at A28.
84. See Lou Chapman, In N.Y. Real EstateMarket, Buy orBuild?, N.Y. OBSERVER,
Sept. 25, 1989, at 15.
85. See Purdum, CharterPlan and Critics:OppositionSlowing Processin New York,
supra note 6.

86. See id.
87. Editorial, Changingthe Charter:Not a Day to Waste, DAILY NEws (N.Y.), Apr.
13, 1989, at 14.
88. Richard Levine, CharterDebate:A Glass HalfFull or HalfEmpty?, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1989, atB1.
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Fourth, the advocates on every side of every issue were vying for
advantage. There was nothing we would gain by agreeing too quickly.
When the process was over, we were confident that many advocates would
be persuaded.
Finally, we knowingly and intentionally adopted a process where we
would subject our debates and preliminary ideas to critiques and criticisms.
We were acting "in an age when sunshine laws and open meetings raise
expectations and expose unsettled interest groups and nervous officeholders
to every threatening conceit or unwieldy trial balloon that has been floated,
then deflated days later." 9 Our openness, moreover, went far beyond the
law. Open debate at meetings, announcements of tentative proposals, time
spent listening to and learning from public reactions to and criticism of
those proposals, and Commission refinement of proposals were all vital to
the development of "good policy" and "good politics."
It was also important to reassure the commissioners and the public
about our work and to help them properly weigh the conflicting criticism.
Thus, at the crucial June 15 meeting, Schwarz reminded the Commission
that, having heard "discordant" critical voices, "our job is to harmonize,
to seek the best from those voices. "9 He said:
We've been listening all over this City. We're going to continue
to listen .... We've learned a lot from people in every walk of
life .... [W]e're going to continue to. But we have to use our
judgment. We take the best of what we've heard[;] nobody has
told us something that is perfect... but we must use our judgment
to come up with what is the best that we can come up with. 9'
Thereafter, Schwarz directed his comments as much to the public as to the
commissioners, saying that New Yorkers must be willing to compromise
because "[e]verybody has to realize it can't be perfect for them, because
that's an impossibility."'
V. THE DISSENTERS
Of the fifteen commissioners, four-Bernard Richland, Therese
Molloy, Aida Alvarez, and Judah Gribetz-dissented at the Commission's
89. Todd S. Purdum, CharterPanelHas Quickly Produceda Consensus, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 1989, at A29.
90. Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 5.
91. Id. at 88-89.
92. Alan Finder, CharterPanelEdgyon FormingPublic Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1989, at 28.
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final meeting on August 2.'
Except for Alvarez and Gribetz, the
dissenters did not agree with each other. In addition, except for Richland's
plan, which was to keep the Board of Estimate but add weighted voting,
none of the dissenters presented an alternative plan, as opposed to
disagreeing on some specifics. In the ensuing referendum campaign, the
force of the dissents was weakened by there having been neither
consistency among the dissenters, nor an alternative plan from them.
Commissioner Richland made clear from the outset that he could not
support any Charter without a Board of Estimate. In the end, Richland said
we should keep the Board of Estimate and provide weighted voting. The
other three dissenters, however, supported the Board's abolition.
Despite Richland's insistence on keeping the Board alive, his
participation throughout the Charter process was always collegial. For
instance, he was often helpful with drafting details, even on chapters that
he would have rejected.'
Commissioner Molloy began her opposing comments by "thank[ing]
everybody at this table for their kindness," and by acknowledging "many
good things" that are "creative and innovative," including giving "the
legislative power to the legislature." 95 Having "prayed and asked for
direction and guidance," however, she came down against the plan because
she feared the mayor would have excessive "centralized" power, while the
boroughs would be left "with little or no power. ,96 Molloy concluded by
explaining that "the voices that are loudest to me are the voices of the
people in the city where services are not being properly distributed. ' She
said that these worries had "kept me awake nights .... I am one of the
lucky white middle class that do not have[ ] many of these problems." 98
Although, in Commissioner Molloy's opinion we had created "a good
centralized charter," we had failed "to do something really great to bring
power down to the people.. . ."99

93.

See Todd S. Purdum, PanelFinishesPlan to Revise New York City's Government,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al.
94. Schwarz-who had affection for the somewhat garrulous former corporation
counsel-thanked Richland for "preserving [his] principles and helping to sharpen the
Chapters." Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 4-5.
95. Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 67-68.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 68.

98. Id. at 69.
99.

Id. at 69-70.
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Precisely what Commissioner Molloy would have had us do "to bring
power down to the people" is not clear from our debates."° In any event,
on the decentralization and borough president points none of the other
dissenters joined with Molloy. Indeed, Commissioner Gribetz argued
throughout our post-June 15 proceedings that the borough presidents would
be given dangerously
too much power on land-use issues because of the
10
"triple no."
The separate dissenting arguments of Commissioners Richland and
Molloy each stood alone on the Commission. 0" Each of their arguments
represented one wing of the divided opponents in the referendum
campaign. In contrast, Commissioners Gribetz and Alvarez stood together
on almost everything-indeed, we cannot remember them ever having
voted differently. Their issues, however, played little role in the
referendum campaign.
Gribetz and Alvarez were passionate about getting rid of the city
council president and having a vice mayor instead-Gribetz concentrating
more on the former and Alvarez on the latter.10 3 Commissioner Gribetz
had made clear both privately and publicly to each of us how strongly he
felt about it and that to him "the issue [of getting rid of the Council
President] is central to the health of this proposed Charter and the efforts
to get it enacted into law. "14
During the Commission's debates, Commissioner Gribetz repeatedly
made the case against retaining the council president. 5 It was never clear
to us just why this issue loomed so large for him in thinking about the
Charter as a whole. His position surely could be, and was, argued with
force, but it was not "central to the health of this proposed charter. "'06

100. On June 20, Commissioner Molloy, in response to some remarks of David
Trager, had said she was "always" in favor of "decentralization," and that she thought our
new land-use plan did not "give the City to the boroughs or to the Council or to the
Community Boards." Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 306. Schwarz replied, "I hope
it doesn't give the City to anybody, but produces a balanced system of government that
allows for it to be fair to all those conflicting interests." Id. David Trager took Molloy's
comment as directed at him and said he did not regard it as "fair." Id. at 307. Trager went
on to say, "I think I have been viewed somewhat as the voice of the boroughs here, and I
think this latest proposal does achieve a balance." Id.
101. See Public Meeting, June 21, 1989, at 236-46.
102. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 300-09.
103. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 249-54.
104. Id. at 255. In fact, in the referendum campaign the retention of the city council
president was not a central issue, drawing tut-tuts from a few and praise from others, but
getting second-rank attention.
105. See id. at 249-53.
106. Id. at 255.
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Commissioner Gribetz also repeatedly argued that every land-use
decision made each year by the Board, should automatically go to the City
Council.' 7' He began, however, with a more pointed attack upon the
"triple no." ' ' S One of Commissioner Gribetz's concerns was that giving
a borough president power to decide not to challenge an important land-use
matter would give rise to a potential for corruption."'9 However, he chose
not to make this argument before the whole Commission, stating only that
he had "told Fritz""' the reasons for his opposition. When we concluded,
in the closing days of the Commission, that any land-use item that did not
otherwise go to the Council could be "called up" by a vote of fifty percent
of the Council,"' Commissioner Gribetz argued that every land-use item
should automatically go to the Council.1 2 We do not know whether the
Commission's decision to not automatically send every land-use issue to the
Council would have produced a "No" vote from Commissioner Gribetz
absent the Commission's decision to maintain the Office of the City
Council President. '3
At the final meeting, Fred Friendly unsuccessfully urged Gribetz to
change his negative vote because there were some issues that Friendly also
had lost, and "sometimes it hurt like hell to lose." 114 Friendly reminded us
that all of the "family prophets" (Madison, Hamilton, Pinkney, and
Franklin) had had disagreements with parts of the U.S. Constitution, but
nonetheless all had supported the whole."' Somewhat ironically, it had
been Commissioner Gribetz-in the course of losing one of many
arguments on the council president and urging others to change to his
position-who had first articulated the importance of commissioners being
"open-minded" and being willing to modify positions in the "spirit of all
of us coming to a consensus," 6 Nevertheless, despite the Friendly plea
and his own earlier recognition of the importance of being willing to

107.

See Public Meeting, Aug. 1,1989, at 179-86.

108. See id. at 180-81.
109. See Public Meeting, July 31, 1989, at 249-58.
110. Id. at 254.
111. See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 179-81.
112. See id. at 179.
113. Although during the referendum campaign, Commissioner Gribetz, in rather
collegial and professional private debates with the two of us before some Jewish groups,
expressed his principled opposition to the provision requiring that the Districting
Commission have at least proportional representation of the City's minority groups,
Commissioner Gribetz never voiced any such position during the Commission's debates.
114. Public Meeting, Aug. 2,1989, at 127-29.
115. See id. at 127.
116. Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 179.
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modify positions to come to consensus, Commissioner Gribetz exercised
his right to dissent." 7
Commissioner Alvarez joined with Gribetz in pressing for a vice mayor
and calling for the elimination of the city council president." 8 She voted
with Commissioner Gribetz on all the land-use matters that provided for the
"triple-no" and ultimately joined him in opposition to land-use provisions
that did not provide for all land-use items to go automatically to the
Council.'
Perhaps because her own work schedule made attending
meetings difficult for her, Commissioner Alvarez did not participate in
discussion of many of the issues. (This contrasted with Gribetz who
focused on all substantive issues and on many precise smaller drafting
issues and offered significant comments on both.)
Commissioner Gribetz chose not to state his reasons in opposition when
he voted "No" on the Charter as a whole, simply stating that "[i]t's your
day, Fritz[,]" and that "[a] lot of my reasons have come forward in the
intense activity all of us have had in the long and recent atmospheres
exchanging views."' 2 Commissioner Alvarez did give reasons. After
saying that the Commission conducted a "good process," she read several
pages claiming that "the genuine opportunity for reform has been missed,"
and that "this charter proposal is largely a patch work of political
accommodations rather than a progressive vision of the city" '
This
criticism was weakened considering that Alvarez herself did not offer any
reforms except for the vice mayor.
Commissioner Alvarez then aimed her rhetorical passion at land use
and the role of minorities, saying that "[a]pparently the City Council may
be good enough for minorities but the charter does not have the confidence
to allow the legislative body to make all the important political
decisions."'"
Harriet Michel responded: "We [minorities] are not
[monolithic] and our interpretation of what's in the charter is vastly
different, maybe it's progress and maybe not. But I suggest that it shows
some political sophistication that we don't always see things alike. "123
Alvarez's response was that the Commission was "doing nothing to

117. See Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 130.
118. This led them to vote "no" on many other chapters where the council president
would have any role, however minor. One example was the Independent Budget Office
where the council president was one of several officials involved in the appointment of the
executive director.
119. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 205-16.
120. Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 122.
121. Id. at 124.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 125.
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empower minorities in terms of the rewriting of this Charter." 24
Commissioner Betanzos's reaction to a similar earlier comment was to say,
"Then you should participate more so that we will do more.' '
It is tempting to speculate whether personal relationships in any way
affected the split on the Commission. Of the eleven supporters, Schwarz
had previously known and worked well with all except for Fred Friendly
and Mario Paredes-neither of whom he had ever met but for whom he
quickly developed a mutual respect.12 6 Certainly prior relationships of
trust, respect, and friendship help. They cannot, however, carry the day
in a highly public enterprise, vital to the future of New York, where each
commissioner's personal reputation is on the line. Thus, one cannot
imagine, for example, Nat Leventhal supporting a new Charter that did not
have an executive branch able to lead, or David Trager supporting a new
Charter that did not adequately provide for a borough perspective, or Si
Gourdine supporting a new Charter that did not expand opportunities for
minorities.
Of the four dissenters, Schwarz did not previously know Alvarez or
Molloy at all, barely knew Gribetz, and had known Richland only as a
former corporation counsel. Certainly, Richland's vote would have been
no different if his most trusted former co-worker and best friend had
chaired the Commission. With the other three dissenters, the support of
Friendly and Paredes suggests that lack of a prior relationship should not,
as a matter of logic, have made much of a difference.
VI. THE QUESTION OF THE QUESTION

Aside from the landmarks proposals as described earlier, 2 7 the
Commission decided on the last day that we would present the Charter to
the voters as a single question, as is specifically permitted by Municipal
Home Rule Law section 36 (5)(b). 2s Any one of our myriad changes could
have been stated as a separate question, but we had worked out a document
"where we have looked at every piece of the puzzle and we have tried to
balance one piece against another. The pieces fit together."'' 29 Schwarz

124. See Public Meeting, June 20, 1989, at 199.
125. Id. A newspaper article several weeks later reported the exchange, and added:
"Ms. Alvarez missed the next four meetings." Finder, What Gets CharterPanelAll Riled
Up?, supra note 42.
126. See, e.g., Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 88 (comment by Fred Friendly);
Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 74-75 (Mario Parades's remarks on the last day of the

Commission meetings).
127. See discussion, supra Chapter IX.
128. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36(5)(b) (McKinney 1997).
129. Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 134.
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gave a number of illustrations as to why it would be unworkable, and
untrue to our work, to state separate questions. For example, the
expansion of the City Council:
Now, you could think about that. . . as a separate matter[,] but
that would do violence to the way in which we came together[,]
because as we all remember our dialogue ... about shifting the
powers from the Board of Estimate elsewhere, and [it] became
clear how much new influence the City Council would have, it
became central to our thinking that we should expand the body and
make it a more representative body through the expansion and
through the heavy work we did on the district in the
Commission.' 3"
In addition, to "begin the very act of separating the questions
[themselves] is a divisive act."' 31 It would have been divisive on the
Commission because "[w]e have come together. We have compromised
together. We have tried to find the best of the arguments from all of the
competing forces ....,13 Separate questions could have been divisive
and harmful with the electorate.
CHAPTER XII. WINNING APPROVAL
FROM THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

Because three of the city's five counties were covered by section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, 33 which requires pre-clearance for any changes
affecting voting, the Commission had to submit the changes to the Justice
Department for a no-objection approval before they could go into effect. 3 4
Because the Justice Department had broadly defined voting, because we
regarded the proposed Charter changes as all interrelated, and because we
wanted to avoid time-wasting and unproductive questions about or
challenges to any failure to submit particular changes, we decided to submit
the entire proposed Charter to the Department of Justice.
We specifically submitted the proposed Charter to the Voting Rights
Section of the Department's Civil Rights Division. This section was run
by a small group of nonpartisan professionals who had an appropriate
degree of skepticism about government submissions. Their process was

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 135.
Id. at 137.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1998).

134. See id.
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exhaustive but not unnecessarily formal. Anyone could submit comments
or objections; the Department of Justice frequently solicited comments
from knowledgeable observers and relevant advocacy groups.
The referendum campaign and the Department of Justice process were
going on at the same time-one in New York, the other in Washington,
D.C.-and in lengthy written submissions to the Department of Justice.
Several times, the two of us talked about what it would feel like to lose
either one. Although the loss of either would hurt badly, a loss at the
Justice Department would hurt more.
I. A HUGE SUBMISSION AND A ROCKY START

On August 11, we jointly signed a massive submission to the Justice
Department.135 A fifty-five page brief was flown to Washington by Lane.
The accompanying eighty exhibits and fourteen appendices (which included
sixty-seven volumes of material such as transcripts and letters) and
voluminous other records were transported by van. E6
We did not believe the question facing the Justice Department was
close at all, and ultimately it was not. A law professor who had previously
practiced as an attorney for the Justice Department (and who had been a
consultant for the Ravitch Commission), was quoted on the day of our
submission as saying it looked as if the Commission had "bent over
backward to be... fair .... 137You'd think they shouldn't have any trouble,
but one just never knows."
It is true that one "never knows." The two of us flew to Washington
on September 14, 1989, for our first meeting with the Department of
Justice. To our surprise, we received a cool reception.
We were not sure why the reception was so cool, although we got an
inkling that the Justice Department had not yet focused on our lengthy
submission, and that some opponents had protested to the Justice
Department that the Commission's process and outcomes were adverse to
the political interests of protected minorities. Ultimately, when we saw

135. See Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, to Barry Weinberg, Acting Chief, Voting Rights Section,
Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug. 11, 1989) (on file with the New
YorkLaw SchoolLawReview) [hereinafter August 11, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane
to Barry Weinberg].
136.

See Todd S. Purdum, CharterPaperson the Way to Washington, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 11, 1989, atBI.
137. Id.; see also Editorial, For Voting Rights, a ClearTriumph, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 1989, at A22 (noting that the commission "has painstakingly met . . . and even
exceeded ... the commands of the Voting Rights Act").
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what various opponents submitted in writing about the new Charter and the
processes that led to it, we understood completely what had happened. If
what was contained in the submissions had been true, we deserved a cold
reception. It was not true, however, as we later demonstrated.
Before we finished our first meeting, we had begun to thaw the icy
reception. At the lunch break, we all shared some laughs. Additionally,
Schwarz attempted to weave into the discussion his civil rights credentials
and those of a number of others on the Commission. Most importantly, we
began a discussion of the Charter's merits. Despite the positive aspects of
the meeting, we left surprised, somewhat discouraged, and knowing that
we had a lot to do on both the process and the substantive issues.
Thereafter, in response to the accusations, we engaged in some
sustained, tough, and effective lawyering. This was quite unlike the softer
arts at work all through the Commission's long period of listening and
consensus building.
Despite the frustrations of defending against
misleading claims, perhaps it was a relief to be able to use a big stick
instead of speaking softly. In any event, it was clearly necessary to show,
with specificity, often using their prior inconsistent statements, that various
opponents were making misleading, untenable, and often contradictory
arguments.
II. ISSUES OF PROCESS

The attempt by opponents to show the Commission's process had been
unfair to minorities was ill-advised. It allowed us not only the opportunity
to expose numerous misstatements but also to stress many positives on our
outreach efforts to minorities and our responsiveness to minority issues.
This, in turn, probably helped our case with the Department of Justice on
the substantive merits.
The process issues were largely raised by members of the Delay
Movement. There certainly was a legitimate case for delay because the
issues were very complex. The Commission was moving fast. Would the
public be able to make an informed vote? Would minorities be particularly
disadvantaged by the pace of our work?
While the Delay Movement's issues were legitimate, for the
Commission the answer was clear. The government was unconstitutional.
Real rights of real voters, including minorities, were being abused. Delay
could cause legal problems. 13 A subsequent special election would favor
entrenched interests. There was no evidence that if there were a year of

138. See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690 (1989) (holding that the
existing apportionment of the New York City Board of Estimate violated the constitutional
"one person-one vote" requirement).
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delay, New York City would suddenly turn into a year-long New England
town meeting absorbed daily with questions of Charter revision. 139
During the Commission's extensive process, the Delay Movement
never went beyond its opening argument in favor of delay. In making its
subsequent case to the Department of Justice, the Delay Movement left
behind its principled and legitimate opening argument to make incredible
attacks on the Commission.
We were able to respond with quotes and facts that had the dual benefit
of making our substantive case, and undercutting the credibility of the
opponents' assertions to the Department of Justice about the Commission's
process. 40 A few examples are:
-The opponents had quoted at great length some early critical process
testimony by Marla Simpson, of the New York Lawyers for the Public
Interest, an advocate on low-income and housing issues. This allowed us
to quote Ms. Simpson's final testimony at the Commission's final public
hearing:
I have to say, as an advocate that works on community and issues
that affect persons of low income, I have never worked with a
governmental agency that spent as much time listening to people
as this one does. If it hasn't been enough, I share the frustration,
but I do think you deserve some amount of credit for being open
and... responsive... and to continue to ask questions well into

139. See August 11, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg, supra
note 135, at 50-55. See also Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 48-79.
140. The Commission's relevant written submissions on process were as follows:
(i) August 11, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg, supra note 135,
at 44-55 and exhibits and appendices.
(ii) Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission, to Barry Weinberg, Acting Chief, Voting Rights Section, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 28, 1989) (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review) [hereinafter September 28, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane
to Barry Weinberg].
(iii) Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter

Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission, to Mark Posner, Attorney, Voting Rights Section, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 26, 1989) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Mark Posner].

We met with the Department of Justice several times. We also had a number of
telephone conversations answering various questions.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

the night41... and I think you deserve some level of commendation
on that. 1
We were able to use similar quotes about the Commission's openness
and responsiveness from leaders of the minority community such as David
Dinkins, Roscoe Brown, and the New York State NAACP. 142
-The process objections of the Delay Movement had included the
suggestion that the Charter process had not started until after the Supreme
Court's Morris decision in March 1989; this was incorrect. One way of
showing it was incorrect was to quote comments from several signatories
of the process complaint letter to the Department of Justice showing their
sustained involvement since as early as 1987-an involvement in which
they made many suggestions that pushed in substantive directions that
coincided with the Commission's ultimate conclusions. 143
-In response to a suggestion that the Commission's hearings were not
accessible, we were able to show that two-thirds of the Commission's
public hearings had taken place in community board districts where at least
fifty percent of the population were members of minority groups. 144 In
fact, this statistic was an understatement because if one left out Staten
Island, where there were no such districts, eighty-seven percent of the
Commission's public hearings were in predominately minority
districts-and this did not include
the forums on fair representation or
45
scores of informal meetings. 1
The objections regarding the process also gave us another chance to
make a key merits-related point to the Department of Justice, saying that:
[As the Commission] worked out the details of the broad ideas,
and responded to the extensive public dialogue about those ideas,
it consistently made improvements and added details to enhance
minority representation, participation, and rights. These changes
were made because of the importance the Commission gave to
these goals ....
These changes were also made because of the

141. September 28, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg, supra
note 140, at 2-3 (quoting Public Hearing, July 21, 1989, at 275-76).
142.

See id. at 13-15.

143. See id. at 6-12.
144. See Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Mark Posner, supra note 140, at 4-5 and
Attachment D.
145. See id.
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Commission's open process and the many suggestions it received
from advocates for these values.' 46
Similarly, we were able to point out the irony of the process critics'
accusations that changes made by the Commission "made it hard to react,"
particularly when many of the changes were made in response to points
made by these same critics.147 At the last Commission meeting, after
Schwarz had summarized the constitutional, legal, and policy arguments
against delay, Commissioner Leventhal had forcefully made a similar point:
The [argument] is that this Commission has changed its mind so
often and it's hard to follow. Of course, in that sense we are a
victim of our own success. We have made modifications, because
we have listened to each other[,] and I think more importantly we
have listened to everyone out there who has come to talk to us. By
doing that[,] we have shown ourselves, I think, to be open and
responsive and that hardly seems to me to be a reason for delay.' 48
In the end, the critics' objections to the process undermined their
substantive arguments, because these process criticisms were objectively
false. Making the process objections may have represented frustration by
the objectors of "having achieved many, but not all, of their substantive
goals." 4 9 Alternatively, it may have been an auto-pilot response that
community advocates should always attack the fairness of officials with
whom they disagree. Finally, it could have been the case that counsel
presenting the arguments just did not know the record well and the clients
who signed the process submissions did not think through what they were
signing.
We were annoyed at being wrongly accused of having used an unfair
process, but engaging in the process debate ultimately helped us with the
Department of Justice.
III. ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE
The case we made to the Department of Justice was both simple and
detailed. The new Charter would enhance minority rights. It would not be
146. September 28, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg,
supra note 140, at 9.
147. Id. at 13.
148. Public Meeting, Aug. 2, 1989, at 56.
149. September 28, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg,
supra note 140, at 2.
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retrogressive. This was the case whether the proposed changes were
looked at individually, or (as the cases suggest) as a whole. 50 No issue
received more thorough care and consideration by the Commission. This
was the simple case.
In rebuttal, however, the case we made to the Department of Justice
was also very detailed. We took on each and every assertion made by the
objectors. 151
As had been true throughout the Commission's work, the critics of the
substance of the Charter were sharply at odds with each other. Thus, some
said the Board should have been retained with weighted voting, while
others said that it was properly abolished.' 52 Some critics went on to say

150. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of
Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 962
(1973). These cases involved municipal annexations of predominately white suburbs where
one retrogressive effect was to reduce minority strength in the city as a whole. The Court
nonetheless found that no legally significant retrogression had occurred because the
annexation was accompanied by a shift from at-large to ward elections for the local
legislature. This gave minorities "representation reasonably equivalent to their political
strength in the enlarged community." City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 370. We said our
case was stronger because, unlike the two Virginia cases, none of the Commission's
proposed changes were retrogressive.
151. The Commission's relevant submissions on the substantive changes were all very
detailed and are only summarized here. The submissions were as follows:
(i) August 11, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg, supra note 135,
at 44-55;
(ii) Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission, to Barry Weinberg, Acting Chief, Voting Rights Section, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 29, 1989) (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review) [hereinafter September 29, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane
to Barry Weinberg];
(iii) Letters from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York City
Charter Revision Commission, to Barry Weinberg, Acting Chief, Voting Rights Section,
Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Oct. 5, 1989) (two letters of same date)
(on file with the New York Law School Law Review) [hereinafter October 5, 1989, Letters
from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg];
(iv) Letter from Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission, to Sandra Coleman, Deputy Chief, Voting Rights Section, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Oct. 6, 1989) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Sandra Coleman].
152. Opposition opinions were generally expressed directly to the Justice Department.
See September 29, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg, supra note
151, at 7; Purdum, CharterPlan and Critics: Opposition Slowing Process in New York,
supra note 6 (paraphrasing Borough President Ralph J. Lamberti as arguing that the Board
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that the borough presidents should have been abolished, while others said
that they should have been given more power.'53 Some critics said we had
created an "imperial Mayor," while others said that the new Charter would
"weaken the power of the Mayor, increase the power of the Borough
Presidents and Community Boards and, in general, make life a lot more
difficult for real estate developers.'
Having critics sing discordant tunes was, of course, nothing new for
us. What was new, however, was critics contradicting their own previous
positions. This was most glaring with Bronx Borough President Ferrer.
To the Department of Justice, he argued that the Board should be saved by
weighted voting. Before that, however, he had argued to the Commission
that if weighted voting were to be adopted for the Board, "I probably
would toddle myself down to Federal Court, be among the first, if that
were to happen." 155 In arguing before the Commission, however, the
borough president was scornful about the Board's powers and practices.
For example, he said the Board was deficient because "it allowed too many
key players in City Government to point the other way when a major
decision was being made or when a decision that should have been made
was not made." 156 He said the Board also could not really influence landuse decisions because "[b]y the time it reaches the Board of Estimate, they
are made. One must either say yes or no. But saying yes or no is a bit like
coming to the wedding a little late."' 57 Similarly, he said that the Board's
budget power
was marginal and that the Board did not provide real decision
58
making.
Bronx Borough President Ferrer had been one of the most articulate
and persistent of the advocates appearing before the Commission. His
vision of a new "county executive" form of government presented many
of Estimate could be preserved through a particular scheme of weighted voting); Todd S.
Purdum, CharterPanel Dooms New York Board of Estimate, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1989,
at Al (reporting that W. Bernard Richland, member of the Charter Revision Commission,
was in favor of a weighted-vote system, and that the commissioners voted 13 to 1 against
weighted voting).
153. See September29, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Weinberg, supra note
151, at 7 n. 14 (citing the Statement of East Brooklyn Congregations, Queens Citizen
Organization, and South Bronx Churches, submitted on July 25, 1989, to the Department
of Justice).
154. See Comment by Herbert Sturz, quoted in Chapman, supra note 84 (submitted
as Attachment 1 in September 29, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg,
supra note 151. See also Editorial, The Only Reasonable Charter Choice, supra note 83.

155. See Public Hearing, Apr. 6, 1989, at 61.
156. Id. at 26-27.
157. Public Meeting, Apr. 29, 1987, at 165.
158. These and many other prior inconsistent statements were marshalled for the
Department of Justice. See Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Sandra Coleman, supra note
151.
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ideas about borough presidents playing an executive role and becoming
more effective and creative by being involved earlier in the process.' 59
Although the Commission moved in Ferrer's direction, we were not willing
to adopt Ferrer's full vision, because we believed it would weaken and
break up the City. His vision also involved too many distinctions that
sounded good in theory but would be difficult to apply, such as the
difference between local and citywide interests in decisions about land use.
Some of these concerns of Commission members were apparent from
discussions during Ferrer's long testimony on April 6, 1989." 6 After the
Commission's crucial meeting of June 15, however, Ferrer was quoted as
saying, "[w]e're moving in the right direction. "16 Nevertheless, not too
long after this it became clear to us that Ferrer would be an opponent.
Why he made arguments to the Department of Justice (or allowed
arguments to be made on his behalf) that were so clearly contrary to his
own prior statements is a mystery. But, as with some of what the Delay
Movement said about the Commission's process, the opportunity to use
opponents' prior words to help make our case was a gift. In any event, the
record of Ferrer's many prior negative statements about the Board was
hardly a firm platform on which to build a case for saving the Board.
Former Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton, an African
American, joined Ferrer as the only other minority who argued to the
Justice Department that the Board should have been preserved through
weighted voting. 62 Sutton argued that he had been, in effect, mayor of the
minorities, and that he had been able to steer contracts to minority
organizations.' 63
Quite apart from Ferrer's prior anti-board statements, there were many
weaknesses in the plea to save the Board in the name of minority rights.
First, no solution was even offered to address the legal problems under
both the "one person, one vote" doctrine and the Voting Rights Act. The
Board was an institution "where minorities have always been significantly

159.

See id. at 2-3 (citing Brooklyn Borough President Ferrer's 1987 PROPOSAL FOR
and 1988 PROPOSAL FOR CHARTER REFORM).
See Public Hearing, Apr. 6, 1989, at 4-105. After his initial presentation was

CONSTRUCTION OF A COUNTY BUDGET

160.

finished, Ferrer was credited with being the first of the City's "major elected officials" to
put "an agenda on the table for people to consider." Id. at 27-28. Then followed 75 pages
of interesting exploration of his ideas, including some tough questioning and discussion of

difficult hypotheticals.
161. Finder, Criticsof First CharterPlan PraiseProposedRevisions, supra note 19.
162. For Mr. Sutton's views, see Alan Finder, Coalition Opposing CharterRevision
Starts Its Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1989, at BI; Bob Liff, Charter Change Hurts
Minorities: Opponents, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 2, 1989, at 19.

163. See Finder, CoalitionOpposing CharterRevision StartsIts Campaign, supranote
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Weighted voting would make the voting rights
under-represented."'"
problems worse. It would do so because Brooklyn and Queens-two
boroughs where minorities had failed dismally in borough-wide
elections-would be the principal beneficiaries of re-weighting the borough
presidents' votes. In addition, the Bronx, with a minority borough
president, would have a greatly diminished "weighted" vote.
Second, the old Board had to be compared to the proposed new
Council. There were no minority members on the Board from 1977 to
1985. In 1989, there were two minority members on the Board, the largest
minority representation, which gave minorities 18.2 % of the Board's voting
power. 65 There was no hard evidence to support the claim that minorities
had exercised greater power on the Board than their share of votes. In any
event, minority strength on the Board had to be compared to the minority
membership expected on the new and expanded Council. "It is hard to
imagine a group with 35-41% voting strength wielding less power than one
with only 18.2% voting strength. ' As former Third Circuit Judge Arlin
Adams had advised the Commission, "such a 'less is more' theory is based
[on] highly debatable assumptions and is simply contrary to the Voting
Rights Act's goal of enhancing opportunities for minority
representation.""
Finally, we marshaled the evidence of the Board's practical
weaknesses. These ranged from the tiny number of votes where the mayor
lost anything,1 68 to its lack of staff,' 69 to its after-the-fact role, to revealing
critiques like those of Bronx Borough President Ferrer quoted earlier. This
same evidence also helped us respond to those objectors who agreed that
the Board should be abolished but held up its supposed great powers as a
about how those
benchmark to test the fairness to minorities in a debate
70
powers were to be distributed under a new Charter.'
Two other claims frequently recurred in the opponents' arguments:
first, not all of the Board's powers went to the Council; and second, the
borough presidents would be weaker than in the past.
The first claim ignored the fact that the Council, in the aggregate,
would have more power than the Board did and that it would be more
representative of minorities. We also concluded that "given the nature of
the Board ...and its unwieldy mixture of executive, administrative and

164. September 29, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Weinberg, supra note
151, at 7.
165. See id. at 22.

166. Id. at 24.
167. Id.
168.

See id. at 14-16 and Attachment 2.

169. See id. at 10 n.6.
170.

See id. at 22-26.
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legislative functions," it was "inevitable, and appropriate" that some of its
powers not be given to the Council.171 One such power was the power to
approve specific contracts. "The Council is a legislature; the Board of
Estimate is not.""7
In assessing the Council's powers under the proposed new Charter, the
objectors made two obvious mistakes. First, one of their lawyers argued
that the new Charter failed to give the Council plenary legislative
authority."7 In fact, the provision was there; it had just been moved for
sound drafting reasons. 74 Second, objectors claimed that depriving the
Council of any of the Board's powers would effectively benefit the mayor,
adding that Council action was subject to a mayoral veto, which could only
be overridden by a two-thirds Council vote. The mayor had no veto of
Board action. 7 5 This ignored the fact that the mayor had two of eleven
votes on the Board. For the Board to act over the mayor's opposition
would have required six of the remaining nine votes, i.e.,1 76the same twothirds vote necessary to override a veto of Council action.
Opponents also ignored a number of progressive changes. On land
use, for example, the critics failed to note the "fair-share" criteria," 7
designed to protect low-income and minority communities by requiring
equitable standards for the siting of City facilities. 78 Similarly, on
procurement, they ignored the creation of the Office of Economic and
Financial Opportunity. 79 On budgets, they did not mention the IBO' 80 or
numerous sunshine provisions designed to level the playing field between
mayors and others in City government. 8'
Where not every function of the Board was transferred to the Council,
we reiterated that the changes were appropriate given the different nature
of the two bodies. As we said about procurement, "different does not
mean less." 82 The Board, after all, did not set substantive contract policy
for the whole City. The newly empowered Council, however, could do so
via the annual contract budget, subject to mayoral veto, subject in turn to

171.

Id. at 18.

172.
173.

Id. at 18-19.
See id. at 26-28.

174. See id. at 28.
175.
176.

See id. at 27-28.
See id. at 28.

177. See id. at 36.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See id.
See id. at 32-35 and Attachment 4.
See id. at 28-31 and Attachment 4.
See id. at 40.
Id. at 32.
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Council override.' 83 Moreover, the Board only passed on contracts that
were not competitively bid. 84 On the contracts they did review, their
action came at the last minute. In the last three years for which there was
data, the Board defeated only one contract. 8 5 Overall, we felt our
procurement changes were not only "far more consistent with good
government and cost efficiency standards," but would also lead to "greater
186
and more permanent progress" on the involvement of minority firms.
"[T]he sporadic efforts of an individual Board member are no substitute for
legislative policies of general application."' 87
On land use, the critics referred to the new City Planning Commission
as "mayor-dominated," never mentioning that the old Commission had only
mayoral appointees. The mayor could name only seven of the thirteen
members of the new City Planning Commission. 88 Moreover, except for
the chair, all members had five-year terms, staggered to further reduce the
"domination" of any particular mayor.' 89 In addition, echoing Nat
Leventhal's debate with Judah Gribetz, we said that to require the Council
to review every land-use decision when put "in terms of actual effect, as
opposed to theoretical argument ...would arguably be retrogressive...
and certainly would be bad government. ' ' 90
With respect to borough presidents, we showed weaknesses in the
power of the Board and with respect to minorities getting elected to the
Board. We noted:
The overall thrust of the Charter Revision is not to diminish the
role of the borough presidents but to give them new executive
functions within their boroughs-functions which will enable them
to initiate proposals, require them to make fiscal, land use, and
service delivery choices, and compel public deliberation and
decision on their initiatives.
As Borough President Shulman observed, "it is anticipated that, if
anything, the obligations of the borough presidents will increase
and not diminish." 191

183. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6 § 104 (1989).
184. See September 29, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg,
supra note 151, at 32.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 32, 35.

187.
188.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 39-40.

189.
190.
191.

Id.at 40.
Id.at 38.
Id.at 46.
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Our written submissions to the Department of Justice were finished by
early October. In subsequent meetings and phone calls, the Justice
Department's interest was focused on both the substance and the fairness,
openness, and extent of our efforts to involve minorities. For one meeting
in Washington, we took Si Gourdine and Arch Murray, who helped make
the arguments that the Charter changes were positive and progressive on
fairness to, and opportunities for, minorities.
When the referendum arrived, we had still not heard from the
Department of Justice. In December, however, we received its approval
letter.
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S APPROVAL
On December 13, 1989, the Department of Justice announced that the
City had met its burden with regard to each of the changes in the
Charter. 19 While the opponents and commissioners had made voluminous
objections to the Department of Justice, the four-page decision from the
Justice Department was short and to the point.
The Department of Justice began by stating that the "decision to
replace the Board of Estimate plainly appears to have been based on
legitimate, nonracial reasons." 93 There was no further elaboration, either
on the legal problems with the Board or on its governmental weaknesses or
strengths. The bulk of the letter dealt with the allegations that the way the
Board's powers were transferred would "substantially shift the locus of
power to the mayor"-the "imperial mayor" argument, that it was unfair
to minority voters who "historically have not had a full and equal
opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice" for mayor."9
The Department of Justice noted that minorities had little more success
in electing officials to the Board. 9 5 The Department of Justice assumed,
however, for the purpose of its analysis, that the Board had usually
operated by consensus, and further that this would have magnified the
power of its minority representatives.1 96 We did not accept either
assumption. They concluded that the Charter amendments achieved "a
complex division of powers and duties, with the mayor and [C]ouncil as the

192. See Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman,
1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (Dec. 13, 1989) (on file with the New
York Law School Law Review).
193. Id. at 2-3.
194. Id. at 3-4.
195. See id.
196. See id.

THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF CHARTER MAKING

1998]

principal recipients of the [B]oard of [E]stimate's responsibilities, but with
the [B]orough [P]residents and other citywide officials retaining important
roles." 197 The Department of Justice then adopted as its own the points we
had stressed. It noted the importance of the new Council. Minority voters
"likely will have an increased opportunity to elect members of the enlarged
and more powerful [C]ity [C]ouncil."' 9 s The Justice Department said the
Council will have "substantial decision-making authority in the major city
government areas of the budget, land use, contracts and franchises."" 9
Moreover, the Justice Department said:
Since the Board of Estimate exercised executive as well as
legislative functions, significant powers are allocated to the mayor,
but not without checks and balances provided to other elected
officials which, it appears, should avoid any retrogression in the
opportunity for minority participation in city government. "°
Then the Department of Justice
noted the
recent mayoral victory of
,,
,,201
David Dinkins, called "a minority-sponsored" candidate. However, they
said that their "determination would
20 2 have been no different had another
individual been elected this year."
Finally, the Department of Justice analyzed the requirement for
selection of minority group members to the Districting Commission. They
approved this requirement, referring to it as a "flexible goal" that "serves
a legitimate remedial purpose." 203 The need for remedial action was
proven by the attorney general's objection to the 1981 councilmanic
districting plan. 20 4 "The record shows" that this provision was "a
recognition of the need to insure that a broad cross-section of the
electorate
20 5
will participate in development of council districting plans.
The news accounts of the Department of Justice's approval quoted,
among others, Schwarz, Bronx Borough President Ferrer, and Richard
Emery, who had brought the Morris0 case.207 Ferrer said he was not

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

203. Id. at 4.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 498 U.S. 688 (1989).
207. See Alan Finder, New York City Charter Revision Approved by Justice
Department, supra note 3.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 42

surprised: "I don't cry over spilt milk."2"' Emery said the new Charter
represented "a major step in the direction of government integrity and a
new era of openness and equality for New York citizens. 20 9 Schwarz said,
"I'm really, really happy," 210 and added, "I would have been personally
distressed to the utmost to have anybody conclude after a rigorous
investigation that we had not carried out our desire to deliver a more fair
and more representative government. ,21 "We did our job well," Schwarz
2 12 "Now it is up to the elected
concluded.
officials to carry forth the
213
effort.

)

CHAPTER

XIII. THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

Our job was to fashion a new Charter; only the public could transform
it into law. Because the Morris decision meant the City's Charter had to
change, and because we believed the City would be harmed if the issues
were not resolved in 1989, our responsibility was to fashion a proposed
Charter that would pass muster at the polls. While the formal "campaign"
did not come until after the Commission finished its work in August, we
had our eye on how to win the referendum from the earliest days. For
example, as we set out in Chapter V, we rejected Mayor Koch's March
plea to hold the referendum after November 1989, not only because we
thought delay was bad for constitutional, legal, and policy reasons, but also
because we thought an election in 1989 increased our chances of winning
a referendum vote. 1 4
From the beginning, we had a nascent strategy for how to develop a
winning coalition. This strategy began with relatively vague principles but
over time became increasingly more focused on individuals, institutions,
and groups who ultimately could help pull together a majority of the
people.
We knew that unless our work was sensible and produced by a fair
process, it would not be supported at the polls. Beyond this connection
between good policy and good politics, we believed from the outset that we
could not prevail without substantial minority support. Absent substantial
minority support, we believed we would lose much support from others-as
we also would if the Charter issues became racially divisive. Although

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Chapter V.
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support from minorities had to be widespread to achieve this goal, David
Dinkins' individual support was particularly important because he was
running for mayor.
We also believed that to prevail at the polls, Charter changes had to be
seen as reform. The support of "good government" groups, who had a
record of interest in Charter-type issues and who had access to and
influence with editorial boards and other opinion makers, was a vital
element in achieving this goal.
Another category of supporters that we knew from the early days
would be crucial was more amorphous. It consisted of those most likely
to vote on Charter issues-citizens who were more attentive to public
issues, and likely assiduous readers of newspapers. We knew that Charter
issues were hard to grapple with even for this group. Therefore, to
develop support from this group of voters, we felt that the views of opinion
makers would be vital. Of these opinion makers, we believed the New
York Times editorial board would be most important.
To succeed, our proposed changes had to be seen not only as reforms
but also as responsible revisions-fiscally as well as in the sense of not
making the difficult work of running a complex City even more difficult.
To achieve this somewhat amorphous goal, opinion makers were again
important. Of those who could affect this group's opinions, we saw Mayor
Koch as particularly important.
As it evolved, our strategy was focused primarily on types of voters
more than voters from particular geographic areas. We understood that
winning in Staten Island would be most difficult, and that Manhattan
contained a disproportionate number of the types of voters most likely to
vote, but that there were plenty in the other boroughs as well. By midsummer, however, we were also, for reasons discussed below, particularly
interested in maximizing our chances of winning in Queens. This led to
substantial attention toward gaining Borough President Claire Shulman's
support.1 5 It also was one of the reasons for working hard to get the
editorial support of New York Newsday.
The next section elaborates on what we have just summarized: the key
elements of our strategy to build a coalition for the referendum.
Ultimately, we wanted support from as many politicians and other opinion
leaders and groups as possible.
The coalition of core supporters that our strategy aimed to develop was
broad, and in some ways not made up of natural allies-for example,
minorities and Mayor Koch; groups who emphasized change and those who
were most concerned with responsibility; or the editorial boards of the

215. See Alan Finder, About New York; Borough Leaders and the Charter:A Winding
Road, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1989, at B1.
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Times and Newsday, who pressed the Commission from diametrically
opposite directions. 2"6 By the end of the process, as more and more people
picked sides with the referendum vote nearing, the coalition of support was
even more clearly one of strange bedfellows.217
How was it possible to pull together such a broad and surprising-in
terms of usual alliances-coalition? Clearly what pleased one group might
disappoint or anger another. It was also clear that no one group was
entirely pleased-indeed, we believed that ". . . if anybody were 100
percent pleased, we'd be 100 percent wrong." 218 Many factors could be
singled out for success in pulling together this disparate core coalition. To
single out one as most important is difficult, but we believe it was our
process. By listening intently, by respectfully exchanging ideas with
people having widely varying priorities, by finding ways to pick-and often
further develop or change-some, but not all, ideas pressed upon us by
advocates coming from different directions, by the Commission openly
debating the merits of ideas, and by articulating broad goals that resonated
with the best of America's founding ideals and responded to the City's
current needs, we believe the Commission was able to develop good will,
respect, and support.
The referendum opponents of the Charter were also extraordinarily
diverse.21 9 While supporters coalesced, opponents did not. Thus, we were
helped-as we were during both the Commission's work and before the
Justice Department-by two facts. First, the opponents were deeply
divided in their critiques of the proposed new Charter. Second, the
opponents had no coherent, broad-gauged, alternate vision of Charter
change to propose to the voters.
To be sure, one wing of the divided opponents offered the "vision" of
sticking close to the status quo-keeping the Board with weighted voting.220
While the status quo may have been fine with some politicians, a few
insiders, and many Staten Islanders, 22' it was not a very exciting platform
for most voters.
Finally, in attracting support and presenting our case to the voters, we
were helped by the concern that if the Charter were not approved, the
situation would be unsettled at best. The government would still be illegal.
Others, such as the courts or the state legislature, might move in to impose

216. See discussion infra Chapter XIII, Part I.
217. See discussion infra Chapter XIII, Part II.
218. Todd S. Purdum, A Handful of Touchy Issues Continueto PlagueCharterPanel,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 1989, at 33.
219. See Alan Finder, Opposition to CharterChange Diverse, supra note 4.
220. See Joyce Pumick, Officials Angered by Conflict over Estimate Board, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1988, at 34.
221. In fact, weighted voting would not have helped Staten Island.
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a solution. These other bodies, however, would be less able to provide a
wide range of reforms,' m or less caring about the special needs of New
York City. During the referendum, we played this tune-which could be
called a substantive form of negative campaigning-along with our positive
case for the new Charter.
I. BUILDING THE CORE COALITION

A. Minorities
We start with minority votes not because they were key to the
referendum majority-although they were important and we won in every
district that was predominately African American-but because had the
Charter become racially divisive, the effects throughout the City would
have been harmful enough to lead to a referendum defeat or a victory of
which we would not have been proud.
Enhancing fair representation was the Commission's "first and
foremost" goal.
We also believed, and asserted throughout the
Commission's meetings and in the referendum, that we had delivered on
this goal.
Remember that Schwarz's initial step after being asked to be chair was
to urge the mayor to add two more minority members to the
Commission.223 This was done for the substantive reasons discussed
earlier. 4 It also had a useful political effect on the Commission's working
relationship with minorities.
For example, very shortly after the
appointment of the new Commission, Hulbert James-who was active in
Citizens for Charter Change and close to David Dinkins, and who had
administered a voter registration campaign inspired by Jesse Jackson during
the 1988 Presidential Primary-told Schwarz that it would now be easier
to work with and trust the Commission because of its more representative
character. James later endorsed the Charter.?

222. For example, a judicial solution would almost certainly have to be limited to a
narrow fix of the "one person-one vote" rule violation. This would mean no expansion of
the City Council, no fair-share land-use criteria, no Independent Budget Office, no change
in the composition of the City Planning Commission, no role for the borough presidents in
the budget, and no increased role (and thus accountability) for the executive branch on
contracting.
223. See discussion supra Chapter I.
224. See discussion supra Chapter I.
225. See generallyList of Supporting Organizations and Individuals as of October 19,
1989 (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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As we set out in many places earlier, the story of the substantive
development of the Charter after the Commission began formulating its
proposals is replete with provisions added to carry out our view of good
policy that also amounted to good politics with minorities. While there
were minority opponents of the Charter, there were more supporters. This
was particularly so after the Commission had accelerated the next Council
election to 1991-a decision which itself is a prime example of how good
policy made for good politics. Thus, in the referendum, we were
supported by the following minority leaders: David Dinkins; Roscoe
Brown, head of 100 Black Men 226; the NAACP2 7 ; Stanley Hill, head of
District Council 37; New York Democratic Congressman Floyd Flake; and
Rev. Calvin Butts, Pastor of Harlem's Abyssinian Baptist Church, among
many others. All of these were African Americans. There were Hispanic
and Asian public-figure supporters as well, though they were fewer in
number. This difference may have been explained by the fact that except
for the Delay Movement, there were fewer Hispanics and Asians deeply
involved in the Charter process than there were African Americans. Also,
the eventual opposition of Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer, the
highest elected Hispanic official in City government, may have been
relevant.
Our hope with respect to minorities was not only to gather every
supporter we could, but also to affect the tone of any opposition-to make
sure it was focused on the substantive issues. This hope was fulfilled.
Those minorities who opposed the Charter did not make gut-wrenching
claims of prejudice; their issues were important but rather dry and
technical. Their recognition that we had been open and committed to
fairness probably mitigated rhetoric and passion during the referendum
campaign.
One example of this is Esmeralda Simmons, Executive Director of the
Center for Law and Social Justice at Medgar Evers College in Brooklyn,
and a leader in the Delay Movement. Like Hulbert James, Simmons told
Schwarz early on that the change in the composition of the Commission
was an important step. She also said that, in general, she found the 1989
Commission's process and tone refreshingly open and attentive on issues
of concern to minorities. Although she opposed the Charter because she

226. 100 Black Men is an organization of prominent black professionals. See
generally John Kifner, Hasidim Won't Try to Stop a West Indian Celebration, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 1991, at B3.
227. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund ("LDF") (on whose board Schwarz sat) did
not take a formal position. (LDF is a separate organization from the NAACP.) But behind
the scenes during the referendum, Julius Chambers, LDF's director/counsel, was helpful
in highlighting the Charter's positive aspects and in calming some members of the Delay
Movement.
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felt the vote should be delayed and that the changes strengthened the
mayor, gave too much power to the speaker, and should have done more
to decentralize decision making, she also praised the Commission's work
as enhancing political opportunities for minorities.
Another opponent who mixed praise with criticism was Congressman
Major Owens. In the late spring or early summer, during a long and
difficult meeting with a group of about twenty persons at District Council
37, Owens came up to Schwarz in a corridor during a break, smiled, and
alluded that Schwarz had the most difficult job in New York. Although he
later opposed the Charter, he did so in a very muted way.
Still another example of recognition by minority opponents that we had
been open and committed to fairness came from Ruben Franco, president
and general counsel of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund. Franco had played a major role in articulating the Voting Rights
implications of limiting the extent of the Council's land-use review
powers, 2 8 and had opposed the Charter before the Justice Department.
Nonetheless, Franco wrote Schwarz saying that:
The resulting Charter is not a perfect one, as I am sure you will
agree. Indeed, we at the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc., strenuously objected to parts of it.
However, it is much better than we have had. Importantly, it
provides for the demographic changes that are occurring in this
City. I think that Latinos, African-Americans, Asian-Americans,
and other so-called minorities, will benefit. 9
On our process, Franco was even more complimentary, saying that
"you were very democratic and made a very serious effort to reach as
many people as possible," and that "[y]ou did the best you could to be as
all-inclusive and informative as possible.""°
The force of this letter could be said to be weakened somewhat because
it was written after the Charter process was over. Nonetheless, the
substance of the letter was consistent with many private comments made by
opponents to us throughout the process. Furthermore, the tone of the letter

228. See supra Chapter VI, n.98.
229. Letter from Ruben Franco, President and General Counsel, Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc., to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New
York City Charter Revision Commission (Dec. 28, 1989) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review).

230. Id. Similar praise for our process from an opponent came this year from
Borough President Ferrer in testimony criticizing the process of the 1998 Charter Revision
Commission.
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was consistent with the fact that, except for the interruption of June 15, 21
the minority opponents of the Charter did not unleash the sort of rhetoric
that would have fulfilled the Gracie Mansion prediction of a racially
divisive campaign.3 2
David Dinkins was important to us because he was a mayoral
candidate. His importance was heightened because he was an important
minority leader. With Dinkins, as with Koch, 3 the timing of the Charter
referendum (coinciding with a mayoral election year) was important in
garnering his support. Indeed, this was probably even more so with
Dinkins. Although Mayor Koch might have tried to press harder on some
issues, we are confident that he would have supported the Charter even if
it was not an election year when he was running for mayor (as he continued
to do after he had lost the primary to Dinkins in September). With David
Dinkins, however, it is at least possible that if he had been planning to stay
as Manhattan borough president, he would have opposed the Charter.
David Dinkins was a devotee of the Board of Estimate. Had he not
decided to run for mayor, it is certainly possible that he would have joined
Percy Sutton-his friend, business colleague, and predecessor as Manhattan
borough president-in urging weighted voting and opposing the Charter
both in the referendum and before the Justice Department.nI It may also
be revealing that Dinkins' formal endorsement of the Charter did not come
until after he had won the Democratic primary against Koch, 5 though this
may also simply reflect David Dinkins' more cautious style.
After Dinkins had decided to run for mayor, and after Morrishad been
decided by the Supreme Court, Dinkins engaged in the Charter process in
ways that seemed to reflect that there would be a new Charter and that, as
the Commission's recommendations crystallized, he found a good deal to
praise.236
On August 2, shortly before the Commission's last meeting, Harriet
Michel and Schwarz had breakfast with David Dinkins and Barbara Fife,

231. See Public Meeting, June 15, 1989, at 42-49. An unidentified person disrupted
the meeting and loudly criticized the apparent lack of racial mix of those present, and voiced
the need for sensitivity toward African-American issues. See id.
232. See discussion supra Chapter V.
233. See discussion supra Chapter V.
234. See Purnick, OfficialsAngered by Conflict overEstimateBoard, supra note 220.
235. See Manhattan Borough President David N. Dinkins, Statement by David N.
Dinkins on Charter Revision (Oct. 27, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law
Review) [hereinafter October 27, 1989, Statement by Dinkins].
236. See Public Hearing, Apr. 4, 1989, at4-66; Public Hearing, June 6, 1989, at 192210; Public Hearing, July 21, 1989, at 148-69. The testimony these last two hearings (with

the exception of the first three pages of the June 6 transcript) was given on behalf of
Dinkins by his aide, Barbara Fife.
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a principal assistant who had been involved in the Charter process herself.
The only substantive concern that Dinkins expressed was his view that
party district leaders should not be banned from also holding City elected
office or vice versa. Driving over to Brooklyn for the Commission
meeting, Harriet Michel and Schwarz commented both that the dialogue
was not very wide ranging and that it seemed as if Dinkins would be
supportive of the overall Charter.
Dinkins let his support be known shortly after the September 12th
primary, 2 7 but it took him some time to give a more formal statement.
That statement did not come until October 27, 1989.231 Presumably,
Dinkins was under great pressure from Percy Sutton; possibly he hoped the
Justice Department would have definitively acted one way or the other.
His own careful, deliberative style was very likely to have contributed to
the delay.
When the Dinkins release came, it was not flamboyant. He began with
a gesture to opponents; he had "listened to.. .concerns" and "found many
are warranted and legitimate." 239 Although a "reorganization of this
magnitude" would "understandably evoke public controversy," he
commented that an "overly extended process can serve to fragment the
binding, unifying spirit of consensus that is needed to implement a
workable City Charter." 24 0 Dinkins was indirectly communicating to the
Delay Movement, whose members presumably were overwhelmingly his
supporters in the mayoral race. He added that delay would raise questions
about the legitimacy of government actions, contribute to a "general sense
of uncertainty that might impact on New York's standing in the financial
community," and lead to intervention by others "less empathetic to... our
city's government." 241
Dinkins then expressed his "hope that the new Charter [would] provide
a government that is fully representative; that the distribution of resources
and power will be equitable, and, that the system will encourage maximum

237. See Alan Finder, Coalition Opposing CharterRevision Starts Its Campaign,
supra note 162.
238. See October 27, 1989, Statement by Dinkins, supra note 235.
239. Id. at 1. The concerns listed later in the release, however, were neither central
nor particularly clear. These include the following: conflicts of interest on the City
Planning Commission and the Council; a need for more guidelines on equal employment
opportunity; "limited public review" of sole source contracts; absence of an appeal process
of the Board of Standards and Appeals decisions; and "need for a clear borough-based voice
in land use planning . .

. ."

Id. at 2. Although Dinkins said that if he became mayor he

would address these matters by executive order or proposed Charter amendments, he did

not.
240. Id. at 1.
241. Id.
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public participation. , 242 In any event, because institutions are "not static"
and are "capable of responding effectively to the challenges facing New
York City," Dinkins said that "the overriding best interests of the citizens
will be able to prevail" under the new Charter. 43
Though we would have liked more praise for the Charter reforms, the
Dinkins endorsement-with its prudential focus on potential harms if the
Charter were defeated, and its confidence in the Charter's potential-was
probably more useful for the referendum. The tone was consistent not only
with David Dinkins' usual style, but also with what may have been seen as
his immediate political needs in the closing days of the mayoral race: an
emphasis on, and recognition of, the importance of fiscal caution and
governmental responsibility.
B. Good Government Groups
The second part of our hoped-for coalition to support a new Charter
was "good government" groups. Without their substantial support, we
would have had a tough time characterizing the proposed changes as
reforms. Showing consistent concern for Charter-type issues and having
ready access to editorial boards and opinion makers, their voices were even
more important than their members' votes.
Throughout our process, we met frequently with these groups. Their
interests varied on substantive questions. What they did share was an
interest in the process. Without many of our substantive changes, we
would not have won their support. Clearly, their respect and admiration for
our process helped.
We won overwhelming support from the good government groups.
The New York Public Interest Research Group ("NYPIRG"), Citizens
Union, the Citizens Budget Commission, the League of Women Voters,
and the Women's City Club were among many civic groups actively
engaged in supporting us. NYPIRG mounted an election day campaign at
the polls. Citizens for Charter Change and its co-Chairs, Ruth Messinger
and Stanley Hill of District Council 37, were closely linked with the44
advocacy of established good government groups. We discuss Messinger2
and Hill 45 below.
These organizations, consistently monitoring the interests of New
Yorkers and particularly attuned to "good government" and process issues,
were among the spirited groups of the public. For some, their zenith in

242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 3.
Id.
See discussion infra Chapter XIII, Part I.
See discussion infra Chapter XIII, Part II.
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City politics may have been decades earlier. Others needed to diversify
their membership and their appeal. Together, their role in the Charter
process was sustained and substantive.
C. EdwardKoch
We certainly wanted Mayor Koch's support. We were particularly
worried that if he were to oppose the Charter on the grounds of fiscal
irresponsibility or excessive bureaucracy, he could hurt us substantially.
This was true whether or not he won the Democratic Party primary.
Koch was substantively and substantially involved throughout the
period the Commission was meeting to hammer out its proposals. In
addition to the meeting at Gracie Mansion-where he had unsuccessfully
urged us not to finish in 1989 24 6-the mayor sent the Commission six
lengthy letters commenting on drafts and urging changes or clarifications
in various provisions.247 Each of these letters was reasoned and thoughtful.
Some points were persuasive; others were not.
Only two of the concerns raised made us worry about losing the
mayor's support. These were expressed in the July 28 letter, about (1) the
entitlement of minorities being appointed to the Districting Commission;
and (2) the lack of a mayoral majority on the City Planning Commission,

246. See discussion supra Chapter V.
247. See Letter from Paul Dickstein, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to
Edward I. Koch, Mayor, City of New York (May 5, 1989); Letter from Paul Dickstein,
Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Eric Lane, Executive Director, 1989 New
York City Charter Revision Commission (May 12, 1989); Letters from Edward I. Koch,
Mayor, City of New York, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York
City Charter Revision Commission (May 15, 1989; May 31, 1989; July 28, 1989) (letters
on file with the New York Law School Law Review); see also discussion supra Chapter V.
The mayor and his colleagues also communicated indirectly through the press and
others. One example is the Times editorial opposing our initial proposal of a borough
presidents' 5% budget role. See Editorial, Misfire by the Charter Commission, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 1989, at A20. Another example is the letter from the private members of
the Financial Control Board. See Letter from Donald D. Kummerfeld, Heather L. Ruth,
and Stanley S. Shuman, Private Members of the New York State Financial Control Board,
to the Chairman and Members of the 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission
(June 12, 1989) (letter on file with the New York Law School Law Review) [hereinafter
Letter from Private Members of the Financial Control Board to the Charter Revision
Commission].
Although after the Gracie Mansion meeting in March, the mayor's suggestions to us
were made by letter, we met with him twice thereafter. On June 19, we described to him
the changes we had proposed to the Commission at the crucial meeting of June 15, and later
we met to discuss the criticisms in his letter of July 28. See supra notes 457-58 and
accompanying text.
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particularly if all land-use matters could be "called up" to the Council.248
The mayor was either persuaded to accept, or chose not to oppose, the first
issue, and we resolved the second in favor of a mayoral majority, for
reasons both merit-based and political.249
In any event, while Mayor Koch was capable of being stubborn on
matters of principle and unpredictable, it would have been politically
difficult for him to oppose the Charter, at least until the end of the
September primary. First, he had appointed its chair and members. This
fact, although relevant, was not dispositive. Second, he was in a primary
race with David Dinkins. Given that much of the Charter was aimed at
increasing opportunities for minority political representation, and given that
challenges were being made to the mayor's racial sensitivity in the primary
race, it would have been difficult for Mayor Koch to oppose the Charter.
Despite these political drawbacks, however, Mayor Koch would have
opposed the Charter if he had not been convinced of its merit.
In winning the mayor's support, it was also helpful that he had no
empathy whatsoever for the arguments made by either wing of the
opposition and no affinity for the opposition leaders. Thus, he had no
particular love for the Board of Estimate, and he certainly would not have
favored further decentralization of the City.
Whatever the motivation, we were pleased to get the mayor's
endorsement; it was prompt and clear. Thus, on August 3, the day after
the Commission finished its work (and while he was engaged in the
primary race), the mayor announced his support. ° Although he disagreed
with some provisions-not specifying which-he offered what a reporter
characterized as "mostly praise," and said, "'[O]verall . . . what the
commission has done is to be commended and supported."'' During the
referendum campaign,
the mayor continued to step forward in support of
52
the Charter.
D. Claire Shulman
In order to understand Shulman's importance to us, we need to review
the position of the other borough presidents-and to do so in the context of
248. See Letter from Edward I. Koch, Mayor, City of New York, to Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (July 28,
1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
249. See discussion supra Chapter VII, Part II.
250. See Alan Finder, Ferrerto Fight CharterPlan at the Justice Department, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1989, at B4.
251. Id.
252. See Alan Finder, Would New CharterCreate Throne Room at City Hall?, N. Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1989, at B1.
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the fear of Manhattan domination. 53 Brooklyn Borough President Howard
Golden was an angry opponent from the start. He chose not to engage in
suggesting provisions for a Charter without the Board. Although Ralph
Lamberti of Staten Island was quoted the day after the Supreme Court's
Morris decision as supporting Staten Island's secession, 54 he later engaged
in the process of offering some ideas about running the City without the
Board. We met with him in Staten Island's Borough Hall several times.
Unfortunately, the fear in Staten Island about the Morris decision and the
loss of the Board prevented him from ultimately supporting the Charter.5 5
Although Bronx Borough President Ferrer was heavily and creatively
involved in the Charter process at first, he later decided to oppose the
Charter.256 This was very disappointing to us for two reasons. First, we
had worked extensively with Ferrer exploring his ideas, and even derived
the gist of a number of Charter changes from them. Second, he was an
important minority leader.
There were ironies about the positions of Ferrer, Golden, and
Lamberti. As shown above, Ferrer's ultimate position supporting the
preservation of the Board through the use of weighted voting was blatantly
inconsistent with his own previous positions.5 7 Although Brooklyn voters
were the principal victims of the "one person-one vote" violation, Golden
was an adamant defender of the prior Board.5 8 Finally, Lamberti
supported weighted voting even though the only possible scheme-one that
would still be unconstitutional-would reduce Staten Island to a non-entity
on the Board.5 9
Ruth Messinger, who clearly was going to become Manhattan borough
president, had been heavily involved in thinking about Charter change and
proposing ideas. She was instrumental in founding Citizens for Charter
Change, of which she was co-chair. She had close relations with the good
government groups and with David Dinkins. We met with her several
times. After the June 15 changes, she became a likely supporter.
Although she continued to push on some core issues, including giving the

253. See discussion supra Chapter III, Part I.
254. See Dick Zander, New York Politics: Putting Secession on Back Burner,
NEVSDAY (N.Y.), July 10, 1989, at 16.
255. However, Guy Molinari-who left a safe seat in Congress to run for borough
president, and who defeated Lamberti-endorsed the Charter.
256. See Letter from Fernando Ferrer, Bronx Borough President, to Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (July 27,
1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
257. See supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Howard Golden, New York Forum About Politics No Requiem for
Heavyweights, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 16, 1989, at 90.

259. See Purdum, CharterPlan and Critics:Opposition Slowing Processin New York,
supra note 6. Lamberti privately admitted that his scheme was unconstitutional.
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City Council the right to "call-up" land-use issues, she ultimately gave
substantial support to seeking a "yes" vote in the referendum.
Therefore, of the four non-Manhattan borough presidents, three were
openly opposed as the Commission ended its work. Thus, we thought it
important to get the support of Claire Shulman, borough president of
Queens. Her support was important because Queens was second only to
Brooklyn in the number of voters and was more politically wellorganized. 2 6 Perhaps even more important than the number of votes,
however, was that her support could counteract the notion that the Charter
favored Manhattan. The logic in such an idea was weak, given that a shift
of power to the Council would greatly increase the power of the City's nonManhattan majority.
Claire Shulman became Queens' deputy borough president in 1986.261
In early 1986, she was designated [by the Council] to replace Donald
Manes as borough president after Manes committed suicide while facing
corruption charges.
Shulman was a tough and effective negotiator. She
was also widely liked as a person and was very popular in Queens.
Shulman was heavily involved in the Charter process, as evidenced by
her testimony and long letters.263 Particularly in the beginning, Shulman
was cantankerous both in her written and oral communications. During

260. At the July 19, 1989, public hearing in Queens, Borough President Shulman,
before agreeing to support the Charter, organized many witnesses to praise the borough
presidents and express concern that the changes we were contemplating would harm
communities.
Council member Walter McCaffrey-one of the most forceful and
resourceful advocates for the Council-spoke with Schwarz during a break and said not to
worry because this is a "Council-dominated" borough. Nonetheless, we were worried that
Shulman might organize and motivate opposition in Queens. See Public Hearing, July 19,
1989, at 104.
261. See generally Maurice Carroll, The New York Newsday Interview: Claire
Shulman: Wy Borough PowerMust Be Preserved, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 10, 1989, at
65.
262. See Eddie Borges, The Evolution ofPeter Vallone, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Sept.
8, 1998, at 53.
263. See Public Hearing, Apr. 4, 1989, at 182; Public Hearing, June 7, 1989, at 17;
Public Hearing, July 19, 1989, at 14; Public Meeting, May 10, 1989, at 24. (Shulman and
Ferrer made a presentation and were questioned at a Commission meeting.); see also Letter
from Fernando Ferrer, Bronx Borough President, Ralph Lamberti, Staten Island Borough
President, and Claire Shulman, Queens Borough President, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz,
Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (May 8, 1989); Letter
from Fernando Ferrer, Bronx Borough President, and Claire Shulman, Queens Borough
President, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter
Revision Commission (June 20, 1989); Letter from Ralph Lamberti, Staten Island Borough
President, and Claire Shulman, Queens Borough President, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz,
Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (July 18, 1989) (letters
on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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early Commission meetings, her displeasure was evident. For example, at
one meeting where she and Ferrer were allowed to interrupt the
proceedings and make a presentation, she responded to Schwarz's
"welcome" by saying, "You have welcomed me many times... [t]o [no]
avail. We have even shared food together, and had, socially, very
enjoyable times." 2" She made it very clear that enjoyable times aside, she
did not like the changes we were considering with respect to the powers of
the borough presidents.265
Despite her occasional cantankerousness, Claire Shulman was unable
to keep her good nature down. Although she, like Ferrer and Lamberti,
made many suggestions that influenced the Commission's eventual
proposals, there was an important difference. Unlike Ferrer's county
executive form of government and some of Lamberti's clearly
unconstitutional ideas, Shulman did not make radical, unrealistic, or illegal
proposals.
One Sunday evening, the two of us, Frank Mauro, and Andy Lynn, the
staff member primarily concentrating on land use, met for dinner at Claire
Shulman's home. The purpose was to review Shulman's ideas about land
use. The substance of the meeting was frustrating. While genial,
Shulman's approach was to push her own ideas and to reject the ideas of
the Commission.
Nonetheless, we believed that at the end, Shulman could decide to
support the Charter. After all, while on the Board, Shulman had been
accustomed to pushing for advantage until the very end and then declaring
victory and becoming a supporter. Lane's meetings with Nick Garufis,
Borough President Shulman's counsel, gave him hope that she would
ultimately endorse the Charter. Important supporters of Shulman on the
Council such as Peter Vallone and Congressman Thomas Manton, the
Queens Democratic Party leader, were also pushing for her approval. In
any event, on July 28th, just three days before the start of the
Commission's final set of meetings, the two of us went out to Queens to
meet in Borough Hall with Shulman and Garufis. We reminded them of
the many ways in which Shulman's concerns had already led to Charter
reforms. We warned of the potential harm to the City if there was no
solution this year. It was clear that this point did concern the borough
president. She responded by pushing on a few more relatively small
points. We said "no" to some of her suggestions. To others, we said that
we would urge the Commission to make the adjustments requested. 266 In

264. Public Meeting, May 10, 1989, at 24.
265.

See id. at 26.

266. These were: (1) requiring that the decisions on where the City would rent office
space would be made using a process that would allow boroughs (in reality the nonManhattan boroughs) to argue in favor of location in their borough to foster economic
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return, Shulman said she would support the Charter. We failed, however,
to have her say when she would offer her support. This was a mistake.
The changes were made.267 Shulman, however, moved glacially
toward announcing her support. A wrap-up newspaper report after the
Commission finished its work in August included her picture and described
her as taking a "more conciliatory tone"; her spokesman described her as
"pleased" that some "major issues" were changed during the Commission's
last round.268 Shortly thereafter, she wrote a letter to a constituent saying
that, under the new Charter, borough presidents' responsibilities would be
"different but substantial" and "if anything, the obligations of the Borough
Presidents will increase and not diminish.'
This statement was fine-it coincided with our view that an executive
role early in the process had far more potential than the last-minute, usually
feckless show of power on the Board. It was also helpful in making one
of our points to the Justice Department. But as an individual letter to one
constituent it was not helpful in the referendum and did not fully deliver on
Shulman's commitment to us.
To get the full commitment, it took some prodding directed at both
Shulman and Garufis.
It was clear the borough president had a
problem-one of her own making. During the spring and early summer,
she had energized a number of community supporters to decry the Charter
changes that were being discussed.27 How was she going to now support
the Charter? That opposition remained among some of her supporters as
illustrated by an editorial in The Wave, the Rockaway local paper. It urged
a "no" vote on the Charter because there would be an "imperial mayor."
The article also stated:

development; (2)making clear that borough presidents would be able to start the certification
process for development; and (3) allocating among the five borough presidents their share
of the five percent of discretionary funds in the mayor's proposed expense budget. (This last
item added land area to the existing factors of population and poverty; each factor played
an equal one-third role in the allocations.) See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 77-78,
502-03.

267. See Public Meeting Aug. 1, 1989, at 77-83, 98,217-18,502-26; Public Meeting,
Aug. 2, 1989, at 3-4.
268.

See Finder, Ferrerto Fight CharterPlan at the Justice Department, supra note

250.
269. Letter from Claire Shulman, Queens Borough President, to Richard A. Pfefferle
(Aug. 23, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review). This letter was an
exhibit to a letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg of the Justice Department.
See September 29, 1989, Letter from Schwarz and Lane to Barry Weinberg, supra note
151.
270.

See Todd S. Purdum, Queens Citizens Lobby CharterPanel, N.Y. TIMEs, July

20, 1989, at B4.
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Rockaway has learned the hard way that the Manhattan view is
often diametrically opposed to what we want and need for
Rockaway. In the past, the protection of Claire Shulman and
Walter Ward has kept the Manhattan wolves from our collective
door.
Now, they will have little power, paper tigers with lots of
"advisory power" and no vote.2 7'
Aside from the legal problems with any borough president "vote," and
the creative opportunities of a borough president being an executive with
a role at the front end when projects get started, what is most revealing
about this editorial is the reference to Walter Ward. As a Council member
under the new Charter, not only would he have a vote, but he would have
it as part of a substantially strengthened Council. This editorial is an
example of why we were right in believing that it would be important to
have a non-Manhattan borough president endorsing the Charter.
Despite her dilemma, Shulman was not the sort of politician who would
fail to honor a commitment. Thus, although she had to be prodded, she
announced her support on October 24-almost two months after she had
promised it.272
The phrasing of the endorsement was rather tepid. The press release
was headed Shulman 'reluctantly' backs Charter changes; says she
'negotiated best provisions possible for communities.273 Moreover, her
decision was described as "personal"; each voter should decide for himself
or herself how to vote. 27 4 Finally, addressing people she had earlier helped
to motivate against the Charter, she said she "fully under[stood] and
sympathize[d] with their position" in campaigning against the Charter.275
271. Editorial, Say 'No'to CharterRevision, THE WAVE (Rockaway, N.Y.), Oct. 19,
1989, at 20.
272. See Queens Borough President Claire Shulman, Shulman 'Reluctantly' Backs
Charter Changes (Oct. 24, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
273. Id.
274. See id.

275. Id. After saying, "Many of our civic organizations, which are the best in the
City, are campaigning to defeat the proposed Charter," Shulman singled out Patricia Dolan
and Camille Rye. Id. at 2. As Shulman correctly observed, they had "attended and
monitored virtually every meeting held by the Charter Commission." Id. They also
testified at four public hearings held in June and July. The thrust of this testimony was as
follows: the power of borough presidents should be increased, land-use decision making
should be further decentralized; the mayor should only have two appointments on the City
Planning Commission; the Council should not be expanded; all land-use questions should
go automatically to the Council for review; and the vote on the Charter should be delayed.
Despite this litany, Dolan and Rye both praised the Commission's frankness, openness,
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Such organizations had "'made it possible for me to negotiate from a
position of strength and to win improvements in the final proposal which
will help to insure the survival of Borough government .... 276
Despite these qualifications and acknowledgments to opponents,
Shulman's attached letter described the new Charter as "the best Charter
provisions possible for our communities "-provisions which should "afford
us a fair share of City services and protect us from a potentially
overreaching and insensitive City government." 2'
As with David Dinkins' endorsement three days later, the text was
certainly not what we would have written. The fact of endorsement was
what mattered.
E. Other Politicians
Once we had decided to abolish the Board and to make the Council
an empowered legislature, Council members were going to support us.
Some did not like expansion of the Council, and few welcomed acceleration
of their next election to 1991. The Council leadership wanted the Council
to have more budget powers, while some Council members wanted to limit
the leaders' powers. Despite all of these gripes, however, the Council
would be the greatest institutional beneficiary of Charter revision. Its
members greatly helped in the referendum.
No other politicians were really part of the core coalition that we
sought to create. Nonetheless, we mention a few that were involved
substantively in the Commission's deliberations or whose ultimate
endorsement is worth more than just passing reference.
As part of our effort to win voters concerned about whether the Charter
changes would be responsible, it helped that we won the support of State
Comptroller Ned Regan, City Comptroller Jay Goldin, and Elizabeth
Holtzman, who won the Democratic Party primary and eventually became

patience, and qualified staff. See Public Hearing, June 1, 1989, at 212-15; Public Hearing,
June 5, 1989, at 210-17; Public Hearing, June 7, 1989, at 100-05, 143-52; Public Hearing,
July 19, 1989, at 183-86, 254-57.
Despite their persistent criticism, on the last day of the Commission's deliberations the
Commission members signed a placard for Dolan and Rye that recognized their attendance
at more Charter meetings than anyone other than the chair. See Purdum, PanelFinishes
Plan to Revise New York City's Government, supra note 93 (with accompanying picture of
placard signing).
276. Queens Borough President Claire Shulman, "Dear Neighbor Letter" 2 (Oct. 24,
1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review). This letter was attached to
Shulman's statement backing the Charter. See Shulman 'Reluctantly' Backs Charter
Changes, supra note 272.
277. Id.
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city comptroller. All offered detailed and sensible suggestions on
provisions relating to the city comptroller's role. Ned Regan, who was
included in many substantive issues, was also an early and important
advocate for the procurement reforms that the Commission made.
While plenty of Democratic officials were involved, supportive, and
important, the Democratic Party itself was basically irrelevant. We did
think about the Republicans. Thus, winning the support of State Senator
Roy Goodman-Chairman of the Manhattan Republican Party and chair of
the 1975 Charter Revision Commission-was helpful. Goodman was
particularly interested in changes (including those suggested by Council
Minority Leader Susan Molinari) that would increase opportunities for
political diversity. (Incidently, Ned Regan also happened to be a
Republican.)
As the Republican nominee for mayor, it would have been unfortunate
not to have Rudolph Giuliani's support. Into the month of September,
Giuliani had been involved in a bruising Republican primary fight with
Ronald Lauder in which Lauder spent a lot of money trying to smear
Giuliani. The Charter was not an issue. Further, Giuliani did not testify
before or submit anything to the Commission.
Apart from his
preoccupation with the primary, Giuliani had not been immersed in the
workings of City government, as had both Koch and Dinkins.
On a few occasions, Schwarz and Lane separately met with Jennifer
Raab, Giuliani's Issues Coordinator, 279 to answer questions and make points
about the Charter. Furthermore, during the campaign, Schwarz was on a
couple of panels with Giuliani, at which Schwarz ultimately discussed the
Charter. Giuliani, then a mayoral candidate, endorsed the Charter. 8 0
The Charter was not an issue in the campaign between Dinkins and
Giuliani. This was not surprising: both were supportive; there would be
little gain from trumpeting their disagreements with Charter opponents;
Charter issues were hard to reduce to sound bites; and, they probably
thought the Charter would prevail so that it was not necessary to stress the

278. See Dick Zander, New York Politics: Waiting to Hear Grand Old Plan,
(N.Y.), June 26, 1989, at 20; see also discussion supra Chapter VII note 618.
279. Ms. Raab had previously worked for Schwarz at his law firm.
280. See Finder, CoalitionOpposing CharterRevision StartsIts Campaign,supranote
162. After more than four years experience working under the Charter, Mayor Giuliani
said he was satisfied with the balance of power under the Charter and that "it should be left
NEWSDAY

alone for a while." Vivian S. Toy, A Move to Shift Balance of Power in New York City,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1997, at Al. Shortly thereafter, Mayor Giuliani appointed a charter
commission as a devise to keep a Council-sponsored referendum, regarding keeping the
Yankees in the Bronx, off the ballot.
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risks of defeat to the City. 281' By the end, both Dinkins and Giuliani had
other things on their minds.
Andrew Stein, the incumbent city council president, lobbied very hard
in support of preservation of that office and also seemed to have solicited
testimony to that effect from some political and civic leaders. Presumably,
Stein understood that if the office were eliminated, it would not happen
until after the 1989 election, and probably not until 1993. Stein was
probably also concerned, however, that a decision by the Commission and
voters to eliminate the office would hurt his aspirations to run for mayor
in 1993. Although Stein was persistent in his lobbying, it did not affect our
views on the question of whether to preserve the office. Stein advocated
adoption of the Charter during the referendum.282
F. EditorialBoards
This is a long story, reflecting both the importance of particular
editorial board endorsements, and also some stories more generally about
the difficulties of pulling together our coalition and the varying kinds of
arguments that succeeded in attracting editorial support from different
papers.
From the first days, Lane believed and persuaded Schwarz that an
endorsement from the New York Times would be important, and probably
carry great weight. The logic was that Charter issues are complex; voters
need help in making up their minds, and editorial endorsements would be
particularly important because the voter profile on referenda-as compared
with elections for president, governor, or mayor-tends to have a higher
proportion of relatively careful newspaper readers.
We also thought editorial support from the other major dailies-the
Daily News, New York Newsday, and the Post-would be important,
although support from the Post seemed the least likely. This section begins
with the Times and New York Newsday because their role during the
Commission's process is illustrative of how editorial boards, like other
advocates, can become players in the process.
Players is the right word. Long ago, Schwarz had believed that
editorials were probably the product of isolated pundits, sitting, thinking,
and then writing. He believed their ideas emerged fully formed like
Athena from the brow of Zeus-sort of a secular immaculate conception.

281. On this last point, the impact of the last-minute, opposition television
commercials paid for by Borough Presidents Ferrer and Golden did not carry the day. See
discussion infra Chapter XIII, Part II.
282. See Alan Finder, Ferrerto Fight CharterPlan at the Justice Department, supra
note 250.
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Dealing with the press-as a hember of the Church Committee
investigating the FBI, CIA and other intelligence agencies, later as a probono lawyer attacking the constitutionality of the census undercount, and
as corporation counsel-had long since disabused Schwarz of these naive
thoughts.
Editorial writers are engaged in the affairs of the day. They welcome,
or at least accept, facts and arguments being urged upon them. Moreover,
just like politicians, they may negotiate, threaten, bargain, and bluff using
their own bully pulpits.
1. The New York Times and New York Newsday: Contrasting Approaches
Experience with the Times and with New York Newsday during the
Charter process is a textbook illustration of two editorial boards'
contrasting approaches. Both pushed on many issues. Both knew they
could not get everything they wanted, so each had a core principle that was
essential to winning their ultimate support. One rather enormous problem
in getting the support of both papers, however, was that they were pushing
in the opposite direction. The Times' central concern was whether the
City's central administration would be able to get difficult things done.
New York Newsday's central concern was whether the "outer boroughs" in
general, and the borough presidents in particular, would be able to have
sufficient influence to protect communities from the central
administration.283 Thus, the story of eventually getting the editorial support
of both these papers reflected a tension that also ran through the
Commission's work.
The Times and New York Newsday both wrote editorials right after the
Supreme Court's Morris decision. Neither mourned the loss of the Board
of Estimate. Newsday said action this year would be best;284 the Times said
the "threshold question" of when to move was "portentous., 285 Both said
our challenge would be enormous. 28 6 The differences between the two
papers over the succeeding months helped prove that point.

283. See Editorial, And the Court Says It All, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 23, 1989, at
80.
284. See id.
285.

See Editorial, The Right Way to Rule New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989,

at 28.
286.

See id.; Editorial, And the Court Says It All, supra note 283.
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The Times' editorial board was run by Jack Rosenthal.287 Joyce
Purnick was the member of the board most focused on City issues.288
Purnick had covered City Hall as a reporter when Schwarz was corporation
counsel.28 9 Schwarz was a close friend of Rosenthal's and friendly with
Purnick. Prior to the Charter revision work, the Times editorials had been
very kind to Schwarz. 2' ° Editorial support, however, does not follow from
friendship.
The Times wrote numerous editorials during the Commission's process
as well as during the referendum campaign. With two reporters assigned
full time, the paper performed a public service far exceeding any other
paper and dwarfing the piddling and superficial efforts of television.
Despite the admirability of this public service, what really mattered to us
was getting their ultimate editorial endorsement. The Times editorial
board, like politicians such as Claire Shulman, held their cards close to
their vests and continually pressed and pushed for their points of view.
The chairman's Initial Proposals were described as a "thoughtful,
provocative plan," and "remarkably ambitious." 291 However, they needed
"clarity, streamlining and careful vetting." 21 It would be right to get rid
of the Board-weighted voting was "a wistful exercise almost certainly
doomed as impractical and insufficiently democratic." 293
294 But the city
council president should also "go the way of the Board. ,
A little over two weeks later, the Times thundered against our first vote
to continue the position of council president. 295 There would be nothing to
do, absent a vote on the Board. It would likely "dilute" the Council's
role. 2 ' The risk is creating a "costly, potentially irresponsible critic with
a platform for self-promotion. "21 Shortly thereafter, the Times

287. See Jack Rosenthal, OnLanguage;DilutingtheAwe by Some, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 1989, at 30 (stating that Jack Rosenthal is editorial page editor of the New York Times).
288. See Joyce Purnick Is Appointed to the Times EditorialBoard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
12, 1988, at B2.
289. See, e.g., Joyce Pumick, PublicFinancing: Will It Be No? Yes? Or a Yawn?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1988, at B1.
290. See discussion supra Chapter II.
291. Editorial, FirstDraft of Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1989, at A26.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. By 1998, the Times had changed its mind, referring to the public advocate
(and the Independent Budget Office) as "provid[ing] independent assessments ... under
the Mayor's powerful mantle, institutional reason enough to keep them both alive."
Editorial, A Rush to CharterRevision, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at A22.
295. See Editorial, An Unpresidentforthe City Council, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1989,
at A30.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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editorialized against the idea of giving the borough presidents what it called
"discretionary authority" or "control" over part of the City's expense
budget (although approving the same concept for the capital budget). 298
The Times reported that the proposal could lead to "needless chaos" and
"institutionalizes the pork barrel. "299
This language might have been appropriate if, under our proposal, the
borough presidents did, in fact, have "authority" or "control" over five
percent of discretionary increases in the City's expense budget. As set
forth in Chapter VII, however, they did not. 300 They could propose, but
their proposal had to be included in the mayor's budget. Moreover, the
City Council eventually "controlled" whether the particular expenditures
would be accepted or not.3 '
The Times' mistake about the proposed borough presidents' five
percent expense budget role was the same mistake made by Mayor Koch
and the private members of the Financial Control Board. 30° This similarity
was likely not coincidental. While we do not know this for certain, based
upon the chronology and our prior experience in government, it is probable
that the Koch administration-as well as others pushing in different
directions-was lobbying the Times editorial board in the hopes of getting
it to write editorials that would affect the Commission. Joyce Purnick,
moreover, was a great admirer of Robert Wagner, Jr., one of Mayor
Koch's deputy mayors, and Schwarz's former colleague. Wagner had run
unsuccessfully for Manhattan borough president against Andrew Stein in
1977, and there may have been some hard feelings left. We do not know
whether this had any effect on the Times editorials regarding the council
presidency (held in 1989 by Stein). At one point, however, Schwarz was
told that Judah Gribetz's passionate position against the Office of City
Council President was to some small degree affected by his aversion to
Stein and that this, in turn, was affected by some slight to the Wagner
family.
It seemed to us, however, that the major and continuing theme in the
Times' editorials during the Charter process was not about specifics like the
council president or the borough presidents' five percent budget role, but
rather a more amorphous expression of concern about whether Charter
changes would make it harder to get difficult things done in an already

298. See Editorial, Misfire by the Charter Commission, supra note 247.
299. Id.
300. See discussion supra Chapter VII, Part I.
301. See discussion supra Chapter VII, Part I.
302. See Letter from Edward I. Koch, Mayor, City of New York, to Frederick A. 0.
Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989 New York City Charter Revision Commission (May 15,
1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review); Letter from Private Members
of the Financial Control Board to the Charter Revision Commission, supra note 247.
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fractious city. Apparently, Joyce Purnick's past in covering City
government on a daily basis had burned this concern into her mind. This
was also, perhaps, a worry of Robert Wagner, Jr., whose June 6 testimony
to the Commission on behalf of all the living former chairs of the City
Planning Commission had highlighted this issue.3" 3 This concern was
expressed particularly in the Times' editorial comments about land use.3 '
Initial expressions were mild. The Chairman's Initial Proposals were
wise to "change the emphasis endemic to the present system: from latenight shouting at the end of the process to broader appraisal at its start. 30 5
But would the process be too "cumbersome? 3 6 As the Commission began
to work out ideas for an appropriate borough voice without the Board,
editorials began to warn the Commission to be careful. The warning was
directed toward a proposal by borough presidents "who have been cajoling,
even bullying commission members .... "307 The editorial then argued the
Commission could "tilt the balance toward communities" and that
"[w]eakening the central government in the pursuit of community
empowerment hurts everyone-including communities in legitimate pursuit
of influence." 30 8 In early June, the Times called the Commission's
preliminary proposals "an improvement," but noted that it had "one grave
flaw. It so lavishly doles out responsibility to the borough presidents and
the City Council president that it weakens the mayor."" The borough
presidents' five percent budget role was again criticized, and again
misunderstood. On land use, the editorial reported that the proposal
"diffuse[d] authority." In addition, picking up on Joyce Purnick's worry,
"How would anything unpopular ever get built? 3 10 Focusing on land use,
the editorial then called for a mayoral majority on the Planning
Commission, 31' echoing the testimony of Robert Wagner, Jr., and other
former Planning Commission chairs.
In its editorial written just before the Commission's final set of
meetings, the Times editorial board gave a very clear signal of what really
mattered to it, and presumably to its decision on whether or not to endorse
the Charter. While a nod was given to continuing concerns about the

303. See Public Hearing, June 6, 1989 at 6.
304. See Editorial, New York City Land-Use Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1989, at
24.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
at A26.
310.
311.

Editorial, FirstDraft of Government, supra note 291.
Id.
Editorial, New York City's Land-Use Puzzle, supra note 304.
Id.
Editorial, The Charter: Wait, Weight or Improve?, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1989,
Id.
See id.
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council president and about the borough presidents' five percent budget
role, the paper concentrated on what it saw as two flaws reflected by the
editorial's title, The Trees, and Tilt, in the Charter."2 The "trees" referred
to "matters best left for the Council to legislate," citing as examples the
Commission on Public Information and Communication, the new provisions
on equal opportunity, and the requirement of an annual report comparing
City services with national standards.31 3 The editorial continued: "The
second flaw is a repeated tilt against mayoral power. It arises from the
commendable desire to make government more responsive to people and
communities. However, the tilt is so pronounced as to raise fears of
political paralysis. The most notable example concerns land use."31 4 Many
things were criticized about our land-use proposals: the City Council
review authority; the planner for each community board; the allowance of
borough presidents and the Council to introduce zoning change proposals;
and-in reference to the Fair Share requirements-"impos[ing] [of] an
ambiguous concept of community fairness onto siting of city facilities. "315
The editorial seemed rather blatantly to signal that the Times' editorial
support in the referendum would be tied to changes. Thus, it said: "It's not
too late to correct both flaws [the "trees" and the "tilt"] and thus encourage
conscientious voters to approve the charter proposals in November. "316
Despite the importance of a Times' endorsement, nothing critiqued in
editorials was changed by the Commission. The Commission had decided
upon all of their criticized matters after debate. In addition, there would
have been too much to lose both on and off the Commission to consider
changing them. However, one final Times' criticism focused on a matter
that we had already become concerned about: the lack of a mayoral
majority on the City Planning Commission, particularly given the3 recent
17
change to allow the Council to "call up" any land-use siting issue.
Would changing this be enough to help get what we regarded as a
crucial endorsement, even if we did not do any of the other things the
Times had been urging upon us? Could we get support from New York
Newsday, which had been pushing the Commission in a different direction
than the Times-Newsday concentrating on protection of the boroughs and
local communities, the Times on the importance of the central
administration not being unduly hampered by local concerns?
New York Newsday was started by Newsday to cover New York City.
It sought to make inroads in the City market, particularly in Queens, where

312. Editorial, The Trees, and Tilt, in the Charter, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1989, at 22.
313. See id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.

317. See id.
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it sought to uproot the two other tabloids, the Daily News and the Post. Its
coverage of City affairs was well written and comprehensive, often more
extensive than the Times', though not in covering the Charter. New York
Newsday's editorial page was run by Tom Plate.
The fact that Newsday would be focusing on the boroughs was clear
from the day after Morris was decided. On its editorial page, Newsday
published Bronx Borough President Ferrer's proposed Charter changes. As
its accompanying editorial stated, these or other thoughtful provisions must
be adopted since all five boroughs must not "be deprived of their individual
voices at the high table of government."'318 After the Commission's crucial
meeting of June 15, Newsday described the Commission as "moving
toward recommendations that reflect a real sensitivity to borough and
community needs
.
3 9 On the other hand, Newsday wrote that
"[s]omething not too far from true genius is still needed, however, to steer
a correct course between the sometimes conflicting goals of five-borough
empowerment and centralized government. "32°
Not surprisingly, the Times also recognized the importance of steering
this same course and that both "goals" were important. Where the Times
would steer more toward the central government, however, Newsday would
steer more toward the boroughs. We wanted the support of both papers.
We sought the Times' support for the reasons given above. We sought
Newsday's assistance in showing that borough presidents would have a
useful and creative future role, and in rebutting the case that the new
Charter would somehow enshrine Manhattan above the other four
boroughs. Schwarz spent many meetings, both during the Commission's
process and later during the referendum, trying to persuade Plate and his
colleagues of the good sense of what we had done and the good reasons for
what we had not done.
2. The Endorsements by Key Newspapers
Earlier we described the contrasting pressures coming from the
editorials of the New York Times and New York Newsday during the
Commission's deliberations. Would we win support from either, and could
we possibly get the support of both? What about the Daily News and other
key papers?

318. Editorial, And the Court Says It All, supra note 283.
319. Editorial, Borough Power: Moving Toward a Fairer,Broader View of the City,
supra note 18.

320. Id.
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a. New York Newsday
New York Newsday came out first. Accompanied by pictures of
Schwarz and Claire Shulman-proof her endorsement was at least
helpful-the editorial's title was: The Charter No One Loves: But You
Don't Have to Love it to Vote for This Important and Necessary City
Reform.32 ' Noting that to vote "no". "would be to sacrifice the good on the
altar of some unarticulated ideal that might never be realized," Newsday
reported that the very nature of the Board's considerable powers
"compelled a rather extensive redesign of city government. " 3 ' The
redesign was "less a sleek Porsche than a four-door gas-guzzler-but it is
very far from the Edsel that its opponents claim it is. 323
Adopting our theme that the people should trust democracy, Tom Plate
and his colleagues opined that "to balk at placing power and accountability
in the institutions of mayor and council is to run away from democracy for
fear that it might not work. 324 With respect to the future role of borough
presidents, one of Newsday's key concerns, the editorial accepted our
theme that the new roles could be more useful: "[Tihe bottom line is that
a new beep role has been carved out and the city should be the better for
it.
If the beeps would bring even a modicum of imagination,
resourcefulness and determination to the new ball game, they should find
their jobs meaningful and important . . . . ,,3 Finally, in a conclusion
almost as pleasing as the endorsement itself, the editorial came back to our
process: "The commission has worked hard to elicit citywide comment and
criticism-and to explain patiently to citizens what
326 precisely its proposals
would do. We think it has done its job well.
b. The New York Times
As early as October 13, the Times had endorsed the separate landmarks
question as "balanc[ing] both sides so carefully that it satisfies neither. But
it could make modest improvements and merits support." 3 7 In fact, what
we had wanted to do when faced with irreconcilable demands from

321. Editorial, The CharterNo One Loves, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 2, 1989, at 76.
The title echoed Schwarz's earlier comment that if anyone thought we were 100% right, we
would be 100% wrong.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.

325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Editorial, Say Yes to the Landmarks Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1989,
at A32.
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implacable adversaries was, as the doctors' oath says, "First of all, do no
harm"-no harm to the landmarks system or to our larger purpose of
reforming the City's basic government.
The main Charter changes, however, were the main event. On these,
the Times kept silent. The two of us and Si Gourdine had a last meeting to
make our case with Jack Rosenthal, Joyce Purnick, and a couple of their
colleagues on October 19. While we were optimistic, we truly did not
know whether or not we would get the endorsement.
Finally, on November 1, six days before the vote, we read the good
news in the Times.3"' Our proposals were characterized as "conscientious"
and "reasonable. "32 9 In addition, our emphasis on the risks to the City
from failure to approve the changes had worked. According to the Times,
"[T]here isn't much choice"; defeat would "risk" a judge imposing "a
temporary solution[,]" and "paralyzing uncertainty" should be avoided.33
The changes were simply characterized as: "[A] plan aimed at
increasing minority representation and maintaining a strong central
government while still providing for communities to be heard. It abolishes
the Board of Estimate, shifts many of its powers to a strengthened and
potentially more representative City Council and preserves the borough
presidents. "33 '
Conceding "room for disagreement on the details," the editorial
concluded that "the commission's broader decisions reflect wise
choices. , 332 The Times then turned its fire against our opponents, echoing
the points we had been making for months. It suggested that saving the
Board through weighted voting could violate the law, and made "no
practical sense. 333 Moreover, the critics' arguments were labeled "oftenconflicting. ,33' For example, some said we had created an imperial mayor,
others a weakened mayor. The argument of "[s]ome black and Hispanic
officials" that the changes could "prevent minorities from emerging as
political leaders" was characterized as "a hard argument to follow[,]
[because] the Charter plan would continue, even expand, [minorities']
opportunity for election as borough presidents and as leaders of the new
Council. 335 The editorial then continued: "What the varied concerns about
the new charter have in common is a discomfort with change that is so

328. See Editorial, The Only Reasonable Charter Choice, supra note 83.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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strong it impels a romanticization of the Board of Estimate."33 6 This
statement was followed with a sentence that must have come straight from
the pen of Joyce Purnick, who had covered City Hall for several years.
"No one who has stayed up till 3 a.m. watching that untidy institution
eke
337
out one bargain after another is likely to mourn its demise.
c. The Daily News
The Times and Newsday have been highlighted because of their
contrasting focuses during the Commission's deliberations. We also saw
the Daily News as very important, and we worked hard to get its editorial
support.
During the Commission's long process, the Daily News had written
several editorials that were critical of the status quo and generally favorable
toward our work. As we entered the referendum campaign, however, we
did not know whether the Charter would get the Daily News' endorsement.
Schwarz had several meetings with Bob Laird, who had responsibility for
drafting the Daily News editorial. Laird, formerly Mayor Lindsay's press
secretary, was the paper's deputy editor of the editorial page. He had a
friendly way, but he also asked many probing questions.
The Daily News editorial came out on Sunday, October 29.338 Using
a car metaphor, which Newsday later echoed, the Daily News said that this
"car will run well" and "[w]hy buy new-why not keep the old jalopy?
The answer is that
the transmission-the Board of Estimate-is busted
339
beyond repair.
The editorial then took on the critics. Those who called for weighted
voting as "a quick fix" were wrong-"[e]very possible cure would be
worse than the problem" and the death of the Board "is no great loss[,]
[since] [tihe current 3structure
favors political deal making over sensible
40
long-term planning.
Other critics who agreed a new Charter was "necessary," were
characterized as utterly inconsistent. For example, some critics argued that
the Charter was "too sweeping," while others claimed that "it doesn't go
far enough." 34' Similarly, some critics stated that "[i]t's undemocratic-the
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338. See Editorial, Thumbs Up on the Charter, supra note 12. An accompanying
editorial urged a "No" vote on the landmarks question. See Editorial, Thumbs Down on
No. 3, DAILY NEvs (N.Y.), Oct. 29, 1989, at 36.
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mayor and City Council majority leader will run the show," while34 others
2
claimed that "it's too democratic-nothing will ever get decided.
The editorial conceded that " the document was written not by saints
and visionaries, but by men and women who sought reasonable
compromises on a long, long list of governance issues."34 It went on to
state that "overall" the Commission "has sculpted a government that will
be balanced, effective, fair and accountable."34
The Daily News then addressed two questions described as going "to
the heart of civic life. 345 They were: "Will the voice of the ordinary
interests of the city as
citizen be heard in City Hall?"; and "Will the3 best
46
a whole normally prevail over parochialism?
The answer to the first question was "yes "-referring to the new role
for borough presidents and saying that "citizens should find potent new
allies in their Council representatives, who will347be members of an enlarged,
strengthened, more racially balanced body. ,
The answer to the second question depended substantially on "how well
the Council exercise[d] its new powers. 3, 48 There was reason for optimism
because: "[T]he Council is a democratic institution-far more so than the
[Board of Estimate]. So it's reasonable to expect it to evolve into a
heeds democracy's
responsible legislature. Not perfect. But one that 349
practical rule: The best politics is good government.
Those last six words could have been the title of this article if it did not
seem a bit presumptuous. This pithy, well-written editorial, made our
hearts sing.
d. A Few Other Papers
The Charter was opposed by the Post, the city's fourth major daily.350
It opined that the Board, if not "ideal," was "better than anything else
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Id. Beyond the core of its endorsement, the Daily News also praised the

Charter's "muscular mayor [who] will be around to scrap for a citywide agenda," a
"Council president and controller whose duties will be more sharply focused on
watchdogging the public interest," and "several provisions [that] will give New Yorkers

more government information and access," including the Independent Budget Office. Id.
350. See Editorial, No to the Revised City Charter,N.Y. PosT, Nov. 1, 1989, at 24.
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under consideration," and could have been "adapted-perhaps via weighted
voting . . . . "3' It also stated that if the Charter is defeated, "nothing
terrible is going to happen to the city. ' 352 Criticizing the changes as
creating "a vast bureaucratic morass," the Post focused on land use,
opining that the provisions "would severely restrict, some say paralyze,
of unpopular uses such as jails "would become
development," and 3siting
53
all but impossible."
Of all the ultimate editorials from papers other than the four major
dailies, we pick out just three-two against the Charter, from Crain'sand
the Staten IslandAdvance, and one for the Charter, from the Village Voice.
We pick these, not because we know whether they were influential, but
because they help make wider points.
Crain's"vote no" editorial made the point that the various opponents'
arguments were at war with each other, and were all vastly different than
Crain s.35' The editorial confessed that in urging defeat of the Charter:
"[W]e identify ourselves with an unholy alliance. Many who oppose this
charter do so because they want nothing less than community veto power
over city actions ....Others do so in hopes of keeping power centered in
the borough presidencies, something we doubt is legal. We find ourselves
linked with those who charge that this plan creates an imperial mayor. We
endorse a strong mayor and we believe the City Council, whatever its past
failings, will emerge as a strong check on the mayor." 35 5 This candid start,
perhaps reflecting the intellectual honesty of Crain's publisher Alair
Townsend, 35 6 was not very different from the way we were characterizing
the opponents.
Crain's concluded, however, that even though they were joining an
"unholy alliance," the Charter should be defeated.357 Its concern centered
on land use where, in Crain's opinion, (and echoing the critical views of
Schwarz's friend, Herbert Sturz, Schwarz's and Townsend's former
colleague in city government): "[T]he mayor's power has been significantly
weakened, despite his ability to appoint a majority of the planning
commission. Indeed, our fear is that this charter provides so many checks
on the mayor that it represents a severe dilution of executive power. "358
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Recognizing that "[d]efeat of the Charter would mean uncertainty for
New York," Crain's took an indirect and undocumented slap at Mayor
Koch and expressed hope that a "new mayor will take an aggressive role
in a new round of charter deliberations. With a strong counterweight to
those who would dilute power, 359
we believe a [new] charter will emerge that
will benefit all New Yorkers.
The Staten Island Advance had absolutely no self doubt or
introspection. The Charter changes were "profoundly detrimental to Staten
Island's future., 360 City residents had "precious little time to study and
understand them ... 36 Staten Island residents should all turn out to
vote because voters in other boroughs were both "mostly indifferent" and
"being stampeded into approval of the charter changes by a high-powered
propaganda campaign."562
Although it was not surprising, this editorial was nonetheless
disappointing. From the early days of our process, we had worked very
hard to try to persuade the editors of the Staten Island Advance that the
Board could not legally be saved, and, further, that if one accepted that
premise, the Charter changes would not hurt Staten Island. This premise,
however, was simply not acceptable to them. Though no reasoned counter
case was ever presented, and no lawful alternatives to the status quo were
offered, Staten Island was by definition the borough that was hurt most by
Morris.
The Village Voice was at the polar opposite extreme. For the Village
Voice, getting rid of the Board was not just a legal necessity for which no
tears should be shed, but rather an unadulterated blessing.363
According to the Village Voice, the "single most important
achievement" of the "most radical reshuffling of city government since the
beginning of the century" was that "it rids the city" of the Board.3 6
"Beyond the board's unconstitutionality, its emphasis on boroughwide
elections has been a historic deterrent to minority empowerment. "65 The
Voice then turned its rhetorical fire on the political forces in opposition:

359. Id.
360. Editorial, The Ballot Proposals,STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Oct. 30, 1989, at
B16.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See Editorial, Charter Endorsement, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Nov. 7, 1989.
While dated November 7, 1989, as a weekly newspaper, the issue would have been
published six or seven days earlier.
364. Id.
365. Id.
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Most of the major political forces aligned against this charter
proposal-led by the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Staten Island borough
presidents-fought the court challenge to the board's
constitutionality as well, never acknowledging the gross
malapportionment of this body. Their current opposition to the
charter proposal is merely their latest, rearguard action to protect
an indefensible status quo that has no duplicate anywhere in
American municipal life. 366
The Village Voice also warned against the consequences of defeat.367
New proposals for 1990 would leave voters with even less time to analyze
them. Furthermore, a new mayor who appointed a new Commission:
will be in his first year in office, horse-trading on crucial board
issues with the same borough presidents whose powers will be
decided by his commission. The charter will become the everyday
barter of board swaps. Beeps like Brooklyn's Howie Golden, the
symbolic artifact of the board's reactionary defenders, will press
for a weighted voting system that will preserve the board until the
next court challenge. Such a system will empower white Brooklyn
and Queens, whose votes will dominate a weighted board, and
extend the clubhouse grasp on city affairs into another decade.368
II. THE DEBATE HEATS UP
There was little public activity on the referendum for a few weeks after
the Commission's final vote in early August. We were busy preparing for
the Justice Department. The staff prepared and publicly issued a forty-nine
page Summary of Final Proposals.3 69 Both of the exercises did help to
focus on points to emphasize for the referendum. Mayoral primaries were
taking place, 370 and Charter debates would have been premature.

366. Id.
367. See id.
368. Id.
369.

See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, SUMMARY OF FINAL PROPOSALS

(Aug. 1989).
370. The primaries were held on September 12, 1989.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

A. A Potentially Divisive Issue
During this period, some Jewish groups began to express concern about
the provision requiring minority representation on the Districting
Commission. Before the referendum, this led to two or three quiet, nonpublicized discussions of the issues underlying the provision. At these
meetings, we explained the justifications and listened to the criticism. We
believed that the Jewish leaders would ultimately understand our position;
we also hoped to dissuade them from opposing the Charter because of it.
Fortunately, the provision did not prove to be a difficult and publicly
divisive issue.
The Jewish leaders who expressed to us their strong feelings regarding
the minority representation provision handled the issue responsibly. It
pleased us that no dramatic public attack was made. We do not know
whether this was based on our points on the merits, on the overkill of
opposing the whole Charter on this one issue, on the potential racial
divisiveness that might flow from making it a public issue, or from the
combination of all three. In retrospect, it would have been better had the
issue been raised more forcefully when the Commission was working. Had
that happened, we would have focused more on, and almost certainly
would have limited the provision to, the first redistricting. Schwarz made
this point during the discussions with the Jewish leaders. An additional
reason for their public restraint could have been that the leaders had not
spoken more clearly earlier.
B. Some Restraints on Campaigning
State law imposes certain restraints on the use of government
personnel, time, and resources in a referendum campaign. On the other
hand, state law anticipates the use of personnel and resources to educate
voters on referendum issues.37 ' The Commission, while independent, was
a governmental institution. The Commission members were unpaid; staff
members were paid.
The Commission's duty to educate the public provided a splendid
opportunity to advocate for the new Charter without advocating directly for
a favorable vote. Under Gretchen Dykstra's leadership, we did so with
relish. Through a series of publications, we attempted to put a favorable
cast on the proposed Charter. We also referred to opposing views and
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encouraged all constituents to vote on the Charter, whatever their
positions. 3"
Moreover, Schwarz and members of the Commission, through scores
of personal appearances before groups all over the City, in speaking to
reporters, and in writing, felt no inhibitions in giving reasons why the
Charter merited support. 373 The staff also made hundreds of appearances
at forums to educate people about the Charter. 374 Finally, the Commission
produced two major pieces which were widely circulated to the
Commission's large mailing list and in the City's Sunday papers
immediately prior to the referendum.375
C. Strange Bedfellows Urge a "No" Vote
On September 27, a newly created group called New Yorkers for a
Better Charter (the "Opposition Coalition") issued an eight-page press
release on behalf of a coalition of "more than 100 good government,
business, community and labor organizations ...."376 To us, and to the
New York Times reporter covering the story the next day, what was not said
in the press release and press conference was revealing. Thus, as reported,
"many of the plans' opponents have said for months that the new charter
should preserve the Board . . . . ,,3 The Opposition Coalition "did not
mention it."3 78 This reveals that this Opposition Coalition could not stay
together and call for preservation of the Board. For example, the Delay
Movement members in the Opposition Coalition, such as Esmeralda
Simmons, had contempt for the Board and were rivals of its apostles, such
as Howard Golden.
The Opposition Coalition did come together on one point. The one
common theme was delay, which was articulated by Chairman Lew Rudin:
"This is the most fundamental and complex change in our municipal

372. We were, in fact, sued over our efforts by a group claiming that our literature
was too adversarial. The suit was later dismissed.
373. See, e.g., FINAL IssuE, The CHARTER REVIEW (N.Y. City Charter Revision
Comm'n), Winter 1989-90.
374. See discussion infra Chapter XIII, Part II.
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376. See New Yorkers For a Better Charter, Broad-Based Coalition Urges "No" Vote
on Charter 1 (Sept. 27, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review)
[hereinafter Coalition Urges "No"].
377. Alan Finder, Coalition Opposing CharterRevision Starts Its Campaign, supra
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government in generations-and cannot be rushed through without regard
to the people who will be governed by it." 37 9
Former Borough President Percy Sutton, for example, added "the
citizenry" had not had adequate time to "make a knowledgeable and
reasoned decision about the most far-reaching governmental changes ever
to be proposed in New York City's history." 3 0 Sutton's credibility on this
point, however, was weakened by the fact that he had not contributed to the
Commission's hearings or debates. Moreover, Sutton seemed to seek delay
the Board and, in his words, his position as a "mayor
as a way to maintain
38
to the minorities." 1
In the release, real estate magnate Lew Rudin-another extraordinarily
strange bedfellow with the community activists in the Opposition
Coalition-opined that "[i]f it is confusing to the experts, it must be
confounding to the electorate." 382 One picture accompanying a Times
article about the coalition showed "Borough President Howard Golden" and
"the developer Lewis Rudin." 383 This combination was not likely to
suggest to readers that a reform agenda united the opponents.
A plea for delay and further explanation, issued six weeks before the
vote, was not a powerful, positive appeal to the electorate. Indeed, except
for the unarticulated appeal to stick with the Board, and thus the status quo,
the Opposition Coalition came forward with no positive alternative,
suggesting instead a series of complaints listed haphazardly.
Borough President Golden stressed that all Commission members had
been "appointed by Mayor Koch," ignoring the role he and other elected
officials had played in the original appointments.3 84 Golden's point had
been made before, and it did not rally New Yorkers against the
Commission itself. Perhaps this was because the record showed that the
Commission had done several things Mayor Koch did not want.
Additionally, many New Yorkers had respect either for Koch (who would
soon be concluding his twelve years as mayor), or for the Commission's
members.
Golden added that the new Charter "divides and demeans us, splitting
the city along racial and ethnic lines under the pretext of increasing
minority empowerment. "385 Borough President Ferrer viewed the minority

379. Coalition Urges "No," supra note 376, at 1.
380. Id. at 2.
381. See Finder, CoalitionOpposing CharterRevisionStartsIts Campaign,supra note
162.
382. Coalition Urges "No," supra note 376, at 1.
383. Finder, Coalition Opposing CharterRevision Starts Its Campaign, supra note
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384. See Coalition Urges "No," supra note 376, at 4.
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issue differently. He apparently liked our objectives on this subject, but
said expansion of the Council did not "guarantee" that minorities would be
3 86
Nor,387he
represented in proportion to their members in the population.
Council.
the
to
power
"meaningful
grant
Charter
opined, would the
The Coalition press release concluded by saying that the Commission
had done too much:
The Charter Commission had a mandate to correct the Board of
Estimate voting pattern because the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
it violated the one person, one vote principle.
The Commission went further, following Mayor Koch's agenda to
solidify power at City Hall.388
Neither of us found the press release to be very powerful. It made no
positive case; its negatives could be answered. We also knew that we
could match the opponents with supporters from particular groups, such as
the environmentalists and unions. Our jobs were first, to convince the
Justice Department to approve the new Charter,389 and second, to gather
support among city voters for the referendum on the Charter-solidifying
supporters, working for editorial and other endorsements, and sharpening
the positive case for the Charter.
D. Strange Bedfellows Also Say Vote "Yes"
Just as there were strange bedfellows in opposition, so were there in
support of the Charter changes. These strange bedfellows included, for
example: Mayor Koch and some of his bitterest and most persistent critics,
such as Stanley Hill, Calvin Butts, Victor Gotbaum, and Ruth Messinger;
Messinger and later mayoral rival Rudolph Giuliani; District Council 37
and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and Senator D'Amato and
Citizens Union and the NYPIRG.
The diversity among supporters of the Charter was a strength. For the
opponents it reflected a weakness-a failure to come forward with a
positive alternative plan. As Richard Wade, Professor of Urban History
at the Graduate Center of CUNY, stated after the referendum, the

386. See id. at 5.
387. Id. at 5.
388. Id. at 8.
389. We were finalizing key rebuttal documents on the day the press release was
issued. See discussion, supra Chapter XII.
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opponents "didn't have a coherent program," and their "fragmented
nature" limited their ability to sway voters. 3 ° In contrast, we could, and
did, use the theme that if strange bedfellows were on our side, our core
program must make sense.39' Similarly, we could, and did, use the theme
that with critics making diametrically opposed attacks, we should be seen
as having found the sensible middle ground. 3 2
E. A Potpourriof Groups and Individuals
In addition to the debates over broad issues such as the mix between
central and local power, fair representation, and the powers of the Council
and its speaker, the referendum debate also involved several smaller
questions of concern to particular interest groups. This echoed what had
happened at the Commission's public hearings and in the constant effort by
disparate groups-often pushing in opposite directions-to win points that
were important to them. At the end of the day, nobody knew how many
votes changed depending upon these narrower issues. We worked hard to
persuade on all issues, big and small.
1. Environmentalists
The Opposition Coalition's press release said that "environmentalists
also voiced their concerns."'3 93 Quoting Marcy Benstock, who had led the
opposition to Westway, the release said that the Charter would "undermine
the promotion of environmentally sound alternatives such as recycling
instead of burning garbage in incinerators. '' 1 Why? No reason was
given.
During the Charter process, Schwarz had had several meetings in his
law office with a coalition of environmental groups whose lobbying was
facilitated by Richard Kahan.395 Several ideas in the Charter had part of
their genesis in these meetings. This work paid off just days after the
Opposition Coalition's release. Steve Kass and Mike Gerard, two wellknown pro-environment lawyers, who in court issued a long article on The
Proposed CharterandEnvironmentalReview. 396 The article described the

390. Finder, Opposition to Charter Change Diverse, supra note 4.
391. See id.
392. See id.
393. Coalition Urges "No," supra note 376, at 4.
394. Id.
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396. See Steve Kass & Mike Gerard, The Proposed Charter and Environmental
Review, N.Y. L. J., Oct. 14, 1989, at 3.
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"extensive" public comment on the Commission's many preliminary
proposals, and added that subsequently Schwarz and senior staff "had met
informally with a broad range of individuals and organizations" interested
in the environment and the City's planning process.397

The proposed Charter, as finally issued, was characterized as "a
significant improvement," and as a "far better balance between the
competing demands of neighborhood and City-wide concerns. ,398 Kass and
Gerard also praised a number of "discreet provisions" that would "enhance
public and agency participation in the State Environmental Quality Review
Act ("SEQRA") process. 399 The Charter also was credited with beginning
to address the City's need for "long-term planning and meaningful
environmental actions" beyond the scope of SEQRA.
Kass and Gerard concluded by expressing their belief that "the public
would be well served" by the Charter's approval, though they expressed
"some reservations" about the separate landmarks question. 4 '
A few weeks later, the Times published a letter from Eric Goldstein,
40 2
a senior attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC").
Goldstein recommended a "yes" vote after referring to the "carefully
4
balanced" provisions of the Charter as a "plus for4good government." 03
"Fair share" was described as "ground-breaking." °4
Particularly satisfying, in light of Marcy Benstock's unsupported
conclusion about recycling in the Opposition Coalition's release, 4 5 was
Goldstein's reference to recycling in his praise of the City Council and its
"greater political clout" under the new Charter. 4 6 The Council's
Environmental Protection Committee "has been the City's major
environmental catalyst in recent years. Asbestos control, a phase out of
apartment house incinerators, and the landmark mandatory recycling
program, are just three advances it initiated. 40 7 The personal does, of
course, mix with the political. For Schwarz, then an NRDC Board
member, it would have been humiliating not to have substantial
environmental support. In the fall of 1989, however, what we wanted most
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were pro-Charter votes. It seemed as if the environmentalists on our side
were making by far the better case.
2. Unions
Both of us had worked with union leaders when in government and
knew how determined and skillful they could be on behalf of their
members. Yet, we had no particularly close personal ties.
The Opposition Coalition's release had headlined the opposition of
"labor organizations."' 408 The use of the plural seemed a bit of a stretch,
because the only union leader quoted in the release was Arthur Cheliotes
of the Communications Workers of America, and the list of supporters
added only ° the president of the New York State Court Clerks
Association."
During the Commission's work, Cheliotes had testified that the
Commission should propose a broad list of changes in the City's "merit
selection" system for employees because "the City systematically breaks
the Civil Service law. ", 4 11 In private meetings with Lane, Cheliotes had
vociferously pressed the same issues.
Many labor leaders took no public position on the Charter, including
Sandy Feldman of the Teachers Union. Eventual labor supporters of the
Charter included Stanley Hill of District Council 37, his predecessor Victor
Gotbaum, Sonny Hall of the Transit Workers Union, Phil Caruso of the
Patrolmens Benevolent Association, Nick Mancuso of the Uniformed
Firefighters Association, and Edward Ostrouski of the Uniformed
Sanitation Workers Association.4 1 Only Stanley Hill of District Council
37, however, had substantial involvement in the Charter process.
Hill was one of the co-chairs of the Citizens Committee for Charter
Change and, as such, he had pressed for a wide variety of Charter changes
that had nothing to do with more narrow union issues. Hill was also an
important minority figure. Hill and his colleagues, Bill Thomas and
District Council 37 economist Carol O'Cleareicain, were involved in a
wide spectrum of issues, including expansion of the Council, land-use
fairness, and various open government proposals.4 2 O'Cleareicain was one
of the more effective lobbyists. She pushed for particular points of view
but also understood the limits of her arguments.
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District Council 37, through O'Cleareicain, also pressed for some more
focused "union" issues. We adopted some of these proposals, which are
found in chapter 35 of the New York City Charter.
The Charter endorsement literature sent by District Council 37 to its
thousands of members urged a "yes" vote. In its four-page flier "Why DC
37 says Vote Yes," the union began by noting it had "diligently monitored
and worked with" the Charter revision process.4 14 It described the
Commission as "receptive to and understanding of' the union's positions. 1
District Council 37's "overriding concerns" were: to "increase citizen
participation," and "thus minority representation"; to "increase government
accountability"; and to "[l]imit potential for corruption. , 416 The Charter
proposals, District Council 37 said, include "70% of our requests plus two
years worth of discussions with resident New Yorkers., 417 Specific
changes that were highlighted were Council strengthening and expansion,
which "should result" in better minority representation; 418 a more
independent Civil Service Commission, thus "freeing" it from dependence
on the Department of Personnel;419 reports on the "number and length of
service of provisional employees" ;420 the new contract budget powers given
to the Council-"we will be able to fight contracting out in the
beginning;, 421 "[p]ay equity will be City policy" ;4' as well as "[gireater
public access to information. "3 On the issues narrowly relating to union
issues, the Charter contained less than the union had sought, but apparently
enough. At the end, the union asked what would happen if the Charter did
not pass, and expressed the fear that a federal judge, or "the Republican
Justice Department," or the state legislature would dictate "how this city
should run. , 424 Referring to the earlier fiscal crisis, District Council 37
said it had "made great sacrifices in the seventies specifically to prevent
this. ,425
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3. Business Groups
Although developer Lew Rudin was one of the leaders of the
opposition, more business leaders came out in favor of the Charter. Ronald
Shelp of the New York City Partnership, and Jim Gifford of the New York
City Chamber of Commerce and Industry, had been substantial participants
in the meetings of the Commission. Although supportive of changes that
would be helpful generally to the City's climate for business, such as
addressing lack of opportunity for minorities, they focused heavily on
governmental efficiency and on whether land-use decision making would
become too hard. Joined by the New York Building Congress, the General
Contractors Association, and numerous other business leaders, they
announced their support during the referendum campaign." 6
We worked hard for the endorsement of some of these groups. With
others we had no contacts. We do not know on what basis they supported
the new Charter. Were they students of constitutional government,
convinced we had come up with a better balance? Did they think through
the risks to the City of failure to approve the new Charter? Did they sign
on to please other supporters, particularly those thought likely to have
power under the new Charter? But as the City moved towards a vote, the
support, not what motivated it, was our main concern.
4. Cardinal O'Connor
For Schwarz personally, the most surprising Charter supporter was
John Cardinal O'Connor. During Schwarz's tenure as corporation counsel,
the Cardinal had repeatedly disagreed with his position on key issues. For
example, issues had arisen over the City's legal positions on gay rights and
on the application of civil rights laws to social service agencies affiliated
with the Catholic church that contracted with the City to provide, among
other things, group homes for foster care."2 7 The foster care case also
involved the delicate question of how to handle family planning information
for girls, particularly non-Catholic girls, in foster care agencies affiliated
with the church but financed by City contracts."' The Cardinal complained
to the mayor about Schwarz's positions.

426. See List of Supporting Organizations and Individuals as of October 19, 1989,
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427. See, e.g., Ari L. Goldman, CardinalEases Threatto CurbFosterServices, N.Y.
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N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1987, at B7.
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At a Gracie Mansion dinner in late 1986, just before Schwarz finished
his term as corporation counsel, the Cardinal seemed to express some
personal distaste. Someone had asked where Schwarz was going after
leaving the City. After hearing the answer, the Cardinal (without a smile)
interjected, "Do they know what they are getting?"
Mario Paredes worked to get the Cardinal's support for the Charter.
Paredes invited Schwarz to a breakfast with the Cardinal on October 13 at
the Cardinal's residence. The breakfast went very well. The Cardinal
spoke of his respect for what we had done, particularly on landmarks, but
on the main Charter as well. He expressed his wishes for success.
Subsequently, a supporting editorial appeared in the Archdiocese
newspaper.
5. Women's Groups
Gender issues were not at the core of the Charter changes. However,
we did vote to include women-owned companies along with minorityowned companies in the coverage of the Office of Economic and Financial
Opportunity,429 to add a pay equity requirement that wages not be set
according to sex, race, or other factors that may result in potential
discrimination, 430 and to change the Charter to make its language gender
neutral.43' Presumably, these changes were not an important part of the
calculus affecting women's votes. Nonetheless, the pay-equity provision
was the reason why the National Organization for Women-New York City
wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times urging NOW-N.Y.C.
members to vote for the Charter.432
6. Governor Cuomo
Except for Schwarz's
433 telephone call with the governor in response to
his probing about delay, we did not talk directly with Governor Cuomo.
During the Commission's deliberations, we met with Evan Davis, the
governor's counsel, to go over what the Commission was doing and why.
During the referendum, Lane spoke with various aides to the governor.
Here the effort was not so much to seek support as to make sure there was
no opposition. This was successful.

429. See N.Y.

CITY CHARTER

ch. 13-A § 340 (1989).

430. Id. ch. 35 § 810(a).
431. See Public Meeting, Aug. 1, 1989, at 394.
432. See Francoise Jacobsohn, President, NOW-N.Y.C., Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 6, 1989, at A22.
433. See discussion supra Chapter V.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

F. Costs and Corruption
The opponents claimed the Charter changes would be terribly
expensive. Their arguments floundered due to their gross exaggerations.
In a letter to the Times, our Commission colleague Bernie Richland wrote,
"The proposed Charter would cost the city's people more than $100 million
a year." 434 Most of Richland's argument was flawed.
Richland's $100 million figure had been used earlier by Borough
Presidents Golden and Ferrer. According to a late October newspaper
critique, they had been saying that the costs would be $100 million "or
more. "'435 When the two borough presidents were asked for details
supporting their estimates, however, "they were unable to identify new
costs that approached the large sums they have been citing. , 436 A good
example of exaggeration was the claim by Ferrer's spokesman defending
his boss' sweeping statements that the new IBO would cost "at least $30
million."43 7 However, because IBO's budget was set at ten percent of the
Office of Management and Budget's, the correct cost was $3.1 million.438
After many weeks, Borough President Golden backed down from a
total cost of $100 million and used the figure of $36.7 million. 439 Frank
Mauro said the new costs would be $16 million without counting likely
savings. 440
In the public discourse on this issue, Schwarz had the last word in a
November 2 letter to the Times, replying to Richland's earlier letter. 44' The

434. W. Bernard Richland, Letter to the Editor, Can New York Afford This New City
Charter?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1989, at A26.
435. See Alan Finder, Charter ProposalforNew York Generates Little PublicDebate,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, at Al.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. See id.
439. See id.
440. See id.
441. See Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Revised City Charter Will
Save Money, and It's Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1989, at A30.
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letter mixed critiques of Richland's accuracy" 2 with the positive fiscal case
for the Charter.
The letter began by referring to fiscal watchdogs who supported the
Charter:
The most respected watchdogs of New York City government
finances, including the Citizens Budget Commission, the New
York City Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and [State]
Comptroller Edward V. Regan endorse the proposed revisions
443

We were able both to deflect the opponents' complaints about costs and
come forward with the support of careful independent fiscal monitors. In
addition, the letter-which reflected the same points we were making in
debates and various forums-provided a platform to repeat one of our
themes about the Commission's proposed changes in contracting.' The
opponents' main attack on these changes were that they would help create
an "imperial mayor." Our response included saying that focusing
responsibility would add to accountability as well as efficiency. The letter
highlighted the efficiency point: "Costs would be more than offset by
savings, principally from reforms to the city's procurement system." 5
Schwarz's letter supported this by referencing comments by prestigious
sources. Frank Cary, former chairman and chief executive officer of IBM
(and as such a previous client of Schwarz's), had recently finished heading
a "private sector survey" of City government operations." 6 Cary had
written that he strongly supported the Commission's contract reforms." 7
The other endorsement-from the State Commission on Government

442. For example, in addition to overstating the IBO's costs tenfold, the opponents'
claimed cost of $12 million for borough commissioners was actually about $1.7 million,
"resulting in better city services"; the $10 million claim of additional bureaucracy was about

$600,000, resulting in "more competition for contracts by women-owned and minorityowned businesses, and greater public access to information about government programs."
Id.
The largest single component of increased costs would be about $4 million for an
expanded Council with greater responsibilities. "The commission believes this would make
New York government more representative and responsive." Id.

443. Id.
444. See id.
445. Id.

446. See id.
447. See id.
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Integrity ("State Integrity Commission")-both 44supported
our changes and
8
bludgeoned the City's current contract system.
According to John Feerick, the Commission's proposals provided a
"framework" within which the City would be "able" to make "wise
purchases of goods and services, using coherent, state-of-the-art procedures
449
that will themselves lessen the opportunities for fraud and corruption."
This was well put-or so we thought. Again, we have no way of
knowing the impact of any one of these endorsements upon "ordinary"
voters or on other opinion leaders. Ultimately, though, the aggregate effect
of our wide variety of supporters' endorsements presumably was helpful.
G. Making Our Case
As the referendum heated up, we were extremely busy: making our
case to citizen forums, community groups, professional associations, and
editorial boards; writing editorials; participating in interviews on radio and
television (which began, superficially at least, to wake from its slumber at
the end); and making and remaking our points to reporters and to
whomever else was available. In other words, we were campaigning.
What follows describes our main arguments. Our statements below
come from the New York Times' extensive coverage of the Charter
debate.450 As we remember it, this printed record is fully consistent with
what we were saying at community meetings, bar association forums,
editorial board meetings, and radio and television interviews.
Despite the occasional prolixity of the Charter changes, our main
themes in the referendum debate were pretty simple. The themes often

448. See id. The State Integrity Commission, appointed by Governor Cuomo, was
chaired by Fordham Law School Dean John Feerick. See Editorial, Fear and the Feerick
Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1987, at 16. A man with a well-deserved reputation
for fairness, integrity, and caution, Feerick was joined on the Commission by many notable
individuals. Among them were Cyrus Vance, former Court of Appeals Judge Bernard
Meyer, Patricia Hynes, and Richard Emery. See also Letter from John Feerick, Chairman,
Commission on Government Integrity, to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 1989
New York City Charter Revision Commission (Oct. 30, 1989) (on file with the New York
Law School Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from John Feerick to Schwarz]; Commission
on Government Integrity, The Commission on Government Integrity Endorses Proposed
City Charter Provisions on Contracting (Oct. 30, 1989) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review).
449. Letter from John Feerick to Schwarz, supra note 448.
450. The Times' coverage included a six-part series of articles by Alan Finder titled
City Charter:The Voters' Turn.
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reflect the six clear and simple goals the Commission had resolved to seek
on April 24. 4"'
Again and again, we reminded people that the Charter had to change.
The Supreme Court had held the current government unconstitutional.
Change was required, and we were "confident we [had] changed it for the
better. ,452
We presented the Commission's reforms as opening up a brighter
future, and the opponents as defending a flawed-and unconstitutionalstatus quo. In making these points, we sometimes indulged in rhetoric.
For example:
-"New York City should not be like Southern governors after the
Brown decision, who stood in the45 schoolhouse
door resisting changes in the
3
law to reflect the Constitution."
-"To say that [the Council] might not live up to their responsibility is,
first, to have no trust in democracy and, second, to be a prisoner of the
past.

,454

Unlike the Commission's own debate-where, for internal Commission
reasons,455 the recommendation to eliminate the Board was based solely on
its legal indefensibility-during the referendum, we also made the case that
the Board's performance had been deeply flawed and its overall impact in
some respects harmful. Thus:
The Board of Estimate simultaneously exercises too little and too
much power. It lacks the broad legislative authority needed to
promote and effectuate policies different from a mayor's. It
nevertheless throws a stunting shadow across the city's legislative
branch-the City Council. It therefore impedes the healthy
development of countervailing power to the mayoralty.456
The Board's work had been "truly in the dark of night, with only
deputies there. , 457 As for the borough presidents' power on the Board, it

451. See discussion supra Chapter IV, Part I.
452. Alan Finder, As the CharterVote Nears, New Yorkers Still Argue, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1989, at 24.
453. Id.
454. Alan Finder, Puzzled About New Charter? There Are 2 Basic Questions, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1989, at B1.
455. See discussion supra Chapter V, Part II.
456. Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Editorial, Government That's Fair,N.Y. TIMEs,

Nov. 4, 1989, at 25.
457.
252.

Alan Finder, Would New CharterCreate Throne Room at City Hall?, supranote
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had been "jawboning" which "was really a luxury"; they had been "passive
last-minute ad hoe reactors"; "they had a vote, and the almost invariable
result was that they were outvoted. , 458 Under the new Charter, however,
the borough presidents, "if they have energy and will, can really do a
better job for their constituents .. .
The new Charter should lead to better planning and give more attention
to the City's real needs. Thus:
We've tried to increase the attention given to planning and the
general effort to address the city's problems in a systematic sense
and at the outset . . . instead of the relatively overbalanced
emphasis now on ad hoc disputes, individual disputes, resolved at
the last minute. °
At the same time, the new Charter made mayors more accountable for
their actions on, for example, contracts.1 6' Responding to critics who said
we would produce "an imperial mayoralty," we dismissed the claim as
"pure rhetoric," and noted that "[t]he Mayor doesn't think that. Other
people are worried in the opposite direction. "462 We also repeatedly
returned to the importance of the Charter's added or strengthened checks
on the mayoralty. Moreover, we stressed that the "proper controls on
power" under the new Charter were in the
463 tradition of "separation of
powers in the traditional American sense.
Only on fiscal issues did we rely on the praise of outsiders, referring
to "fiscal watchdogs" such as the Citizens Budget Commission, State
Comptroller Regan, the State Integrity Commission, and Chairman of the
Private Sector Survey of Government Operations, Frank Cary.464
Concluding an editorial published three days before the referendum,
Schwarz simplified our case and critiqued the opponents' case:

458. Alan Finder, The Fight over Changing the Borough Presidents' Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1989, at B1.
459. Id.
460. Alan Finder, Redefining Comptroller, CouncilHead,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1989,
at 28.
461. See Finder, Would New CharterCreate Throne Room at City Hall?, supra note
252.
462. Id.
463. Alan Finder, As the CharterVote Nears, New Yorkers Still Argue, supra note
452.
464. See Schwarz, Government That's Fair,supra note 456.
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Because these proposed changes upset the status quo, they have
aroused some opposition.
The opponents, however, hold
contradictory and irreconcilable views.
Their common
denominator-"just say no" to the charter proposals-is not good
enough for New York. Not when we must change our government
to comply with the Constitution. Not when we have the chance to
improve our government. And certainly not when a failure to
change our government would present the next administration with
terrible unresolved legal problems and pressures from all the
inconsistent voices opposing change.4 65
H. Voices at the End
As the referendum campaign reached its close, we had already
described the decisions made by a number of editorial boards. In addition,
new opponents and supporters never heard from before began voicing their
views, and we and our opponents had enormously contrasting last-minute
appeals for support.
1. Last Minute Participants
As in any campaign, many supporters or opponents come forward at
the end. Mostjust lent their names. Examples of politicians who endorsed
the Charter at the end included former Governor Hugh Carey, former
Mayors John Lindsay and Robert Wagner, Senators Alfonse D'Amato and
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, former Assembly Speaker Stanley Fink, and
scores of others.466 Other notables included Cyrus Vance, Gordon Davis,
Victor Gotbaum, Joseph Papp, Martin Segal, and many others.467
Although we had talked to some of these people, this list of individuals
was put together by others, possibly by the group called Citizens for the
New Charter. 6 ' The executive director of that group, Bonnie Potter, had
several meetings or telephone conversations with us and was given access
to some of our materials, including the harder-hitting critiques of opponents

465. Id.
466. See, e.g., List of Supporting Organizations and Individuals as of October 19,
1989, supra note 225.
467.

See id.

468. Citizens for the New Charter was a coalition supporting the Charter proposal and
included many former officials and union and civic leaders, including then-Council member
Ruth W. Messinger. The opposition coalition, New Yorkers for a Better Charter, included
three borough presidents. See Alan Finder, 2 Camps Try to Sway Charter Voters, N.Y.

TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1989, at B2.
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in our Justice Department reply submissions. Potter produced a very
effective nine-page response to every argument of "those who oppose the
Charter. 469 The response was made available to supporters and gave them
suggestions on possible arguments to make.
Assembly Speaker Mel Miller and Brooklyn Congressman Charles
Schumer were examples of last-minute opponents of the Charter. During
our process, Miller had subjected us to a tirade about what he viewed as
our many failures and seemed to threaten to take things into his own hands,
if we did not make certain changes. We did not make those changes.
While pugnacious and loud, the tirade was neither persuasive nor
completely understandable. Despite the speaker's great power over his
colleagues in the assembly, many of them endorsed the Charter, as did his
predecessor Stanley Fink.47 On October 19, Miller issued a five-page
release urging rejection of the Charter so that New Yorkers could "devote
the coming year to an in-depth consideration of alternative
choices" 4 7 -consideration which Miller himself had failed to provide
earlier in 1989 or previously to the Ravitch Commission.
Congressman Schumer had not played a role during the Charter
deliberations. Then, three days before the referendum, he was co-author
with Miller of a Times editorial opposing the Charter.47 On the new landuse procedures, the Miller-Schumer editorial warned against "a recipe for
paralysis. 473 Furthermore, they wrote that the new budget procedures
were "a complicated labyrinth," and the new contract oversight system was
"an open invitation to nit-picking and obstructionism., 474 After these
aggressive conclusory remarks, the authors seemed a bit defensive when
they asked: "Are we complaining that the charter
revision is too much
475
democracy? No. It is too much government.
The article ended by asking for a "no" vote and "sending the Charter
Commission back to work." 476 However, no matter how the vote came

469. Bonnie Porter, The Charter and Its Critics (unpublished document on file with
the New York Law School Law Review).

470. See List of Supporting Organizations and Individuals as of October 19, 1989,
supra note 225.

471. Melvin Miller, New York State Assembly Speaker, State Legislature Leader
Urges Voters Defeat Proposed New York City Charter Provisions 5 (Oct. 19, 1989).
472. See Melvin Miller and Charles E. Schumer, It's Urban Paralysis,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1989 at 25.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
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out, we could not go "back to court" after it took place.
The Charter
477
Commission would be out of business under state law.
2. Vastly Different Final Appeals
As the referendum campaign closed, we tried to be clean and hardhitting on the merits, but constitutional in tone. Our opponents' tone was
very different.
The publications of the Commission itself were lengthy and focused on
the merits. The CharterReview Election Special's "sampling" of opinions
even included two negative arguments, one from Commissioner Richland,
the other from Leslie Lowe, who had participated extensively in the
Charter debate and then had represented the Delay Movement before the
Justice Department. 78 The Commission's Voters Handbook on Charter

Change was a favorable description of the Commission's goals and

decisions, but was more descriptive than adversarial. 7 9 Answering the
question "What Would Happen if the Charter Proposals Do Not Pass?," the
Voter's Handbook made points that could worry people, but began by
conceding the answer was not clear:

477. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 36(6)(e) (McKinney 1994).
478. See A Sampling of Opinions: The Final Proposalsfor CharterRevision, THE
CHARTERREVIEW (N.Y. City Charter Revision Comm'n), Fall 1989 Election Special, at 10.
479. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, THE VOTER'S HANDBOOK ON
CHARTER CHANGE (Fall 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review)
[hereinafter THE COMMISSION'S VOTER'S HANDBOOK]. Copies of the Handbook were
distributed to voters in October and November of 1989. The Handbook was also included
in the City's papers on the Sunday before the referendum. Opponents tried unsuccessfully
to enjoin this in New York State Supreme Court. See Finder, CharterProposalfor New
York GeneratesLittle Debate, supra note 435.
The Alliance for a Better Charter, a coalition of individuals and groups opposing the
Charter revision, distributed a six-page flier, the cover page of which exactly mirrored the
Commission's Handbook except for the insertion of the word "Thinking" in front of
Voter's. In answering the question "What Would Happen if the Charter Didn't Pass?," it
quoted the Commission's statement in full, adding, "Anyone who tells you that the city
would be brought to a halt if the 1989 charter proposals do not pass is either sadly
misinformed or lying to you." See ALLIANCE FOR A BETTER CHARTER, THE THINKING
VOTER'S HANDBOOK ON CHARTER CHANGE 5 (Fall 1989) (on file with the New York Law

School Law Review).
In a radio debate, Borough President Ferrer accused Schwarz of exaggerating the
likelihood of court intervention-a "bogyman

. .

. being brought

. . .

to frighten and

mislead the people of this city into an affirmative vote." Finder, CharterProposalforNew
York Generates Little Debate, supra note 435. Our point of the risks to the City was
broader than court intervention, which was a possibility. Additionally, the opposition
coalition's use of the Commission's own words is inconsistent with Ferrer's accusation.
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It's impossible to know. The federal court that found the voting
structure of the Board of Estimate unconstitutional could step in
and impose a solution on the city. This solution could only address
the narrow one-person, one-vote issue. The mayor and the
Council could ask the state legislature, including all the
representatives from outside of New York City, to change the
city's government. Or another charter revision commission might
be established.480
Schwarz's final comments also tried to avoid claims of perfection.
Thus, after making a case for the Charter that was hopefully persuasive and
a critique of the opponents that was hopefully fair, Schwarz's last words in
the last editorial were:
The proposed charter is not a perfect document; no charter can be.
It is the product of fallible men and women doing their best to
address hard issues.48'
Our one radio advertisement, run on the city's all-news stations, was
short, restrained, and did not run very often. We did not have money for
more:
The United States Supreme Court has ruled. The current Board of
Estimate is unconstitutional and things must change.
I'm Fritz Schwarz, Chair of the Charter Revision Commission.
My colleagues and I have heard from thousands of people
throughout the entire City and now have proposed major changes
to the way our City works. We believe that abolishing the Board
of Estimate and shifting most of its powers to an enlarged and
empowered City Council will make government fairer and more
efficient. Some people don't agree with us. You'll hear many
views, both for and against, but whatever you decide, please
remember to vote on questions two and three. You'll
find them on
48 2
the right hand side of the ballot on November 7th.

480.

THE COMMISSION'S VOTER's HANDBOOK, supra note 479,

481.

Schwarz, Government That's Fair,supra note 456.

at 15.

482. Radio Advertisement (broadcast, Oct. 1989) (text of the advertisement is on file
with the New York Law School Law Review).
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The opponents finished with an unsubstantive, emotional, television
advertisement campaign. Schwarz found it sleazy; Lane found it strong
and clever. However characterized, it presumably had an impact in
persuading a number of people to vote "no."
The advertisement displayed slimy worms slithering their way out of
a can labeled "A Can of Worms-Proposed Changes to the City
Charter. , 483 Paid for in part by the campaign funds of Borough Presidents
Golden and Ferrer-in a legal, but dubious, use of money previously
donated to help them get elected 4 a--the advertisements were the work of
the Opposition Coalition. 485 The coordinator of that coalition said earlier
the group hoped to raise "up to $1 million" for an advertising campaign.4 86
While we do not know the exact cost of this negative advertisement
campaign, it ran repeatedly in the days leading up to the election.
The negative advertisement campaign illustrates one of the dangers of
referendum campaigns. Big money and nonsubstantive emotional appeals
can have a particularly great impact in referenda when most voters are
faced with voting on the issues without spending much time to fully
understand them. 8 7
Additionally, this advertisement campaign lowered the tone of the
Charter debate and did not reflect well on its sponsors. Our concern as the
election approached, however, was not really focused on such lofty
questions as the appropriate tone. Our concern was whether the
advertisement would worm its way into voters' minds and increase the
"no" vote. Although we have seen no analysis of the advertisement, we
believe it affected the voters.
CHAPTER XIV. THE REFERENDUM VOTE
I. THE BALLOT QUESTION
At the Commission's final meeting on August 2, after we had decided
on a separate landmarks question, there was some discussion of the form
in which the Charter questions should be put to the voters.48 8 Even this
seemingly mechanical question had significance.

483. See Alan Finder, Foes and Backers Begin Ads on Charter Revision, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1989, at B4.

484. See id.
485.

See Finder, 2 Camps Try to Sway Charter Voters, supra note 468.

486. See id.
487. See generally Eric Lane, Men Are Not Angels: The Real Politik of Direct
Democracy and What We Can Do About It, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101 (1999).
488. See Public Meeting Aug. 2, 1989, at 152-72.
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While Lane said the law would have allowed a highly conclusory and
utterly uninformative question, such as "shall the amendment to the Charter
proposed by the Charter Revision Commission be put into law,, 48 9 he
opposed doing this, and no commissioner, except Commissioner Richland,
thought this type of question would be sensible or appropriate. 49° There
was a consensus that there should be a question that would succinctly be
followed in "bullet" form by some of the key changes. A model for this
was handed out at the meeting.
After some discussion, Harriet Michel suggested that the chair and staff
be delegated responsibility for the actual language.4 9 Mario Paredes urged
more discussion and then pushed for a bit more advocacy in the
bullets-for example, he suggested that the statement announcing the
expansion of the Council be followed by an explanation that this was done
"in order to establish a body more representative [of] the population of the
City. 492 Schwarz, as a litigator, believed that phrasing the question is a
major part of winning the battle. Therefore, he added that we could not
use suggestive language but instead would have to state the bullets "a little
more neutrally" or "clinically. 4 93 Paredes made a few more suggestions
on the bullets that were
appreciated as "helpful guidance" within the
"neutrality" limitation. 94 Additionally, there were "practical limitations"
495
as to what could be said because of space limitations on the ballot.
After the Commission adopted Michel's suggestion with only
Commissioner Richland dissenting (because he wanted no bullets),
Paredes asked for assurance that the separate landmarks question would be
put forward equally "forceful and positive. 497 Schwarz agreed that "it will
be put forward with the same spirit. ,498
As ultimately worked out, the ballot question was:
Should the changes to the City Charter, as proposed by the Charter
Revision Commission, be adopted? Among these changes are:
-abolishing the Board of Estimate;
489. Id. at 153-54.
490. See id. at 162-63.
491. See id. at 166-67.
492. Id. at 169.

493. Id. at 170. Schwarz's concern was that improperly phrased questions could be
challenged in court.
494. See id. at 170-71.

495.
496.
497.
498.

See id.
See id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
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-adding sixteen members to the Council by making Council
districts smaller, giving the Council sole legislative responsibility
for the adoption of the budget, and giving it new responsibilities in
the areas of land use and franchising;
-giving each borough president new responsibilities in the areas
of budget preparation, selection of sites for City facilities, land-use
review, and franchise approval;
-giving the council president new responsibilities to investigate
citizen complaints and to monitor agency performance and Charter
compliance;
-adding one appointee of each borough president and one
appointee of the council president to the City Planning
Commission; and
-establishing new procedures for awarding City contracts, for
facilitating equal opportunity in City contracting, for determining
the geographical distribution of City facilities, for monitoring the
equal employment practices of City agencies, for making City
records and information available to the public, and for
redistricting the Council. 499
Opponents presumably would not have written the bullets the same
way, but our aim was to make them fair. No one challenged our language
as unfair. Nonetheless, the repeated use of the word "new" might have
had some subliminal positive effect. Presumably, however, most voters do
not have, or take, much time to parse out referendum questions. This is
one of many reasons why referenda should be used sparingly.
II. THE VOTER'S GUIDE
Among the 1988 Charter reforms stemming from the Ravitch
Commission was a requirement for a Voters Guide," to be issued by the

499. The form of the landmarks ballot question was similar. On the ballot, there was
also a proposed (minor) amendment to the State Constitution protecting county sheriffs from
personal liability and making counties responsible for any official misconduct. This was
ballot proposal No. 1, making the main Charter proposal No. 2 and the landmarks question
No. 3. See THE COMMISSION'S VOTER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 479.
500. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 46 § 1053 (1976, as amended through 1988).
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newly created Campaign Finance Board."' The guide was to include,
among other things, "where there is a ballot proposal or referendum,
concise statements explaining such proposal or referendum, and an abstract
of each such proposal or referendum. 50 2 The guide was required to be
"prepared in plain language using words with common and everyday

meanings.

,503

Because the Voters Guide would be distributed to all voters and come
from a nonpartisan governmental body, we thought what it said would be
quite important. The Campaign Finance Board's executive director was
Nicole Gordon, who had earlier come from private practice to work with
Schwarz in the corporation counsel's office. While proponents and
opponents could, and did, make their positions known to her and her staff,
the Voters Guide was written by Gordon.
After the Voters Guide printed the ballot questions, it stressed the
importance of the Charter vote: "Every day, City government makes
decisions that make big differences in your life. Many New Yorkers think
they don't have much to say about how these decisions are made. On
Election Day, New Yorkers will have an opportunity to decide whether to
reshape their government as proposed., 504 This statement was followed by
brief, descriptive answers to the following questions: "What Is the
Charter?"; "What is the Charter Revision Commission?"; and "Charter
Revision-Why Vote Now?, 5 5 A brief description of the recommended
changes also followed." ° We found these descriptions rather helpful,
including the facts that the Supreme Court had set the process in motion
and that the mayor's appointments to the Commission had been made "with
suggestions from the other members of the Board of Estimate." 50 7
After these neutrally phrased, but helpful, descriptions came "pro" and
"con" statements.50 8 These were prepared by the Board "based on
statements received from many groups both for and against the Charter
revision proposals., 51 We thought the "pro" position fairly captured the
case we had been making on "Why Vote Now?," and on the reasons for
the changes to the structure and processes of City government. What was
particularly interesting about the "con" position was its revelation of the
internal split among opponents. For example, the borough presidents'

501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.

See CFB's VOTER GUIDE, supra note 375.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 46 § 1053(e) (1989).
Id.
CFB's VOTER GUIDE, supra note 375, at 14.
Id.at 14-15.
See id. at 15-17.
Id. at 14.
See id. at 17.
Id.
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power had been "virtually eliminated"-or they would be given too much
power over the budget. 1 On land use, small local groups will be able to
delay or block land-use approvals-or "the Mayor will dominate the
regulation of land use at the expense of community interests.""
To our knowledge, no research has been done on the impact of these
Voter Guides on voter participation and understanding since they went into
effect in 1989. Certainly, there was no research concerning the impact on
the Charter vote. Those who read the Voters Guide, however, would have
become aware of the importance of voting on the issues at stake. We
believed this was both good government and good for our side.
III. THE VOTE
On Tuesday, November 7, the polls opened at 6:00 a.m. and closed
fifteen hours later at 9:00 p.m. We both voted early. Members of both of
our families electioneered near our respective polls. Later, we had an
extended lunch with some staff members. The long, tense wait then began.
Waiting for final results, we spent the evening with staff members at
Lane's apartment. In the early evening, we began to hear sketchy, but
favorable, exit poll results. Then came the news that we had won. We felt
relief and joy. Schwarz and Bronx Borough President Ferrer were asked
to comment on television. After going to the Channel 7 station, however,
the interview was canceled, and the television stations went back into
slumber.
The overall vote on the main Charter question was fifty-five percent in
favor to forty-five percent opposed-514,773 to 425,598. I2 Although
typically only about one-third as many votes are cast on ballot questions as
are cast in the more highly publicized races for national, state, and citywide
office, on this Election Day there were about half as many votes cast on
Charter revision as in the mayoral election. 1 3

510. See id. at 19, 21.
511. Id. at 21.
512. See 1989 ElectionReturns: CharterRevisionWins, 55%-45%, CHARTERREVIEW

(N.Y. City Charter Revision Comm'n), Winter 1989-90, at 3. "These statistics were
compiled from the official canvass prepared by the City Board of Elections." Id. With a
smaller overall vote, the landmarks question carried by 57% to 43%. See id.
513. Overall, the vote on the Charter was 49.5% of the vote in the mayoral race
(47.6% on the landmarks question). Staten Island had the least fall-off in voting with
64.7% of the mayoral vote. This statistic reflected, no doubt, the special concern Staten
Islanders had about the aftermath of Morris. See The Ballot Proposals, supra note 360.

The other boroughs were: Manhattan (54.3); Queens (52.5); Brooklyn (43.5); Bronx
(41.8). See id. at 3.
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Breaking down the election into smaller pieces, we were told the
Charter won in every predominantly African-American district. On a
borough-by-borough basis, the Charter won overwhelmingly in Manhattan,
and lost overwhelmingly in Staten Island; 14 it lost in the Bronx and won in
Brooklyn and Queens, with the Queens vote percentages matching the
overall City vote closer than any other borough.5 15
Results on Question
Borough
Bronx

Yes

2516

%

No

%

55,939

46.4

64,757

53.6

Brooklyn

123,766

51.9

114,565

48.1

Manhattan

161,718

67.2

79,076

32.8

Queens

148,167

56.2

115,311

43.8

25,183

32.7

51,890

67.3

514,773

54.7

425,598

45.3

Staten Island

Total

Accompanying these statistics in the final issue of the CharterReview
was a letter from the chair which concluded by picking up themes used
throughout our long road to victory:
The new Charter is not a perfect document; no Charter can be.
Nor will it solve every problem we face; the Charter does not say
how potholes are to be filled or streets cleaned. But I believe that
it does lay a foundation for City government that will be
responsive to all our needs, represent us better, and give us greater
opportunities to influence the decisions that affect our lives. Now
it is up to our elected officials, the government watchdog

514. See 1989Election Returns: CharterRevision Wins, 55%-45%, supra note 512,
at 3.
515. See id.
516. Id.
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organizations and all of us as citizens of New York to work to
fulfill those goals."1 7
APPENDIX

Because this is our story and because of our leadership role, this
Article includes a lot about what we said and did, and why we did so.
However, each commissioner played an important role. Any successful
group is much more than the sum of its individual members. Ours was.
We learned from each other during our long process, and the end product
was much different and far better than it would have been had anyone tried
to devise a new Charter as a philosopher king sitting alone and musing.
Starting with the two other officers and then proceeding alphabetically
with the other commissioners, we provide here a thumbnail sketch of the
commissioners, their backgrounds, and their roles during our deliberations.
We understand that these descriptions cannot possibly do justice to the
breadth of the commissioners' interests.
Harriet Michel, as vice chairman, and Nat Leventhal, as secretary,
were the two other officers. They were also officers on the Ravitch
Commission.
Michel was president of the National Minority Supplier Development
Council and former president and chief executive officer of the New York
Urban League. She had also worked for the federal and City governments.
Michel was passionate and eloquent at several key points. Attentive to
issues of fairness to minorities, she pushed for balance against an overly
strong mayor. Michel was helpful in developing support for the
Commission among black leaders.
Leventhal was president of the Lincoln Center. He had been the City's
first deputy mayor in the Koch Administration. He had been commissioner
of two City housing agencies under Mayors Koch and Lindsay, and had
been Mayor Lindsay's City Hall chief of staff. He was the Commission
member most experienced in the workings of City government. Leventhal
played a significant role on every issue. Although strong-willed, Leventhal
understood how to move toward building consensus and electoral support.
Aida Alvarez was a vice president for municipal finance at First
Boston. She had been a journalist and involved in public affairs for the
City's Health and Hospitals Corporation. She was an advocate of replacing
the city council president (now public advocate) with an elected deputy
mayor. She was one of four dissenters on the Commission's final vote.

517. Id. at 2.
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Amalia Betanzos was president of Wildcat Services, a non-profit
employment program. She had been City Commissioner of Youth
Services, president of the National Association for Puerto Rican Civil
Rights, and a member of the City's Board of Education. Betanzos had a
quick wit and focused on fairness to minorities and on assuring an adequate
role for boroughs.
Fred Friendly was the Edward R. Murrow Professor Emeritus at the
Columbia School of Journalism. He had originated and produced a public
television services on the U.S. Constitution, and had been president of CBS
News. Because he knew less about the workings of city government in the
beginning of the Charter revision process, Friendly asked probing "why"
questions. He used his knowledge of constitutional principles and history
to make general points. He also had an ear for the quotable, pithy remark.
Simon Gourdine was director of labor relations for the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority. He had been commissioner of the Department
of Consumer Affairs, secretary of the Rockefeller Foundation, and deputy
commissioner of the National Basketball Association. Gourdine was very
attentive to increasing opportunities for minorities.
Judah Gribetz was a partner at Mudge Rose. He had been a deputy
mayor in the Beame Administration and counsel to Governor Hugh L.
Carey. Gribetz was one of the four dissenters and was angry about losing
on the question of whether to abolish the office of city council president.
At the end of our work, he was critical of how and when the City Council
would engage in land-use issues. Nonetheless, despite his anger, Gribetz
sharpened the debate and provided detailed drafting on issues.
Therese Molloy was going to law school. Her prior career had been
in banking, where she had risen to be a vice president at Chase Manhattan.
She had also been the chair of the Greater Jamaica Development
Corporation. Molloy was particularly concerned with the role of
communities and boroughs. She was one of the four dissenters on the final
vote.
Patrick Murphy was vice president for worldwide security at Merrill
Lynch. He had been chief of operations and first deputy commissioner of
the City's police department. Murphy paid particular attention to
protecting City government departments from undue burdens and to
assuring that Staten Island got fair treatment under a regime without a
Board of Estimate.
Archibald Murray was executive director and attorney-in-chief of the
Legal Aid Society. He had been commissioner of the state Department of
Criminal Justice Services and an assistant counsel to Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller. Murray was a gentle and modest man, whose words carried
weight.
Mario Paredes was executive director of the Northeast Catholic
Pastoral Center for Hispanics. He had been director of the Brooklyn
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Diocese Department of Religious Education for Hispanics. Paredes started
with the least knowledge about City government. He worked extremely
hard to learn. In addition to his role on a number of substantive issues,
Paredes was very helpful in urging outreach and openness.
Bernard Richland was an adjunct professor of local government law at
New York Law School. He had been corporation counsel under Mayor
Beame and general counsel to the 1973-1975 Charter Revision
Commission. For Richland, one issue was preeminent-finding a way to
save the Board of Estimate. He stood alone on this and dissented for this
reason. Although the Board of Estimate was Richland's key issue, he
weighed in on many issues and helped provide drafting clarity, even where
he thought our way was wrong.
Bishop Joseph Sullivan was executive vice president for Catholic
Charities for the Brooklyn Diocese. He had been a member of the City's
Commission on the Year 2000 and a director of the Fund for the City of
New York. Sullivan advanced the issue of fairness-pressing the
commissioners to set aside their personal objectives when these objectives
might harm the Commission's overall work.
David Trager was dean of Brooklyn Law School and chair of both the
Temporary State Commission of Investigation and the Mayor's Committee
on the Judiciary. He had been the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York. Trager was engaged on every issue. He was particularly
important in pushing for a borough role and in helping to craft appropriate
balances between central and more local power.
Additional biographical details about the members can be found in the
attachment to the Mayor's January 19, 1989, Certificate of Appointment
and vol. 1, nos. 1-3, and vol. 2, nos. 3-4 of the CharterReview.

